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MASON vs. CA
SECOND DIVISION
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG 31 2005 .
G.R. No. 168423 (Jesus T. Mason vs. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines .)
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26822, dated 22 December 2004,
[1]
cralaw
and the Resolution of the same court, dated 06 May 2005,
[2]
cralaw
denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the said Decision. The assailed
Decision affirms the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City,
Branch 59, dated 15 December 2000,
[3]
cralaw
which in turn, affirms in toto the Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Baguio City, Branch 4, dated 31 March 2000,
[4]
cralaw
finding petitioner herein, Jesus T. Mason, guilty, beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of reckless imprudence causing damage to property; and ordering him
to pay a fine of P17,250.00; to indemnify the offended party, Narciso
Itturiaga, in the sum of P17,250; and to pay the costs.
The Information filed against petitioner Mason before the MTC reads
That on or about the 21st day of October 1998 in the
City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused being then the driver and person in charge of a
Toyota Tamaraw FX Taxicab bearing Plate No. ADG 997, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive and operate the same while passing
along Naguilian Road, Baguio City, in a negligent, careless and imprudent
manner, without due regard to the traffic laws, regulations and ordinances of
the City of Baguio, and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent
accident to persons and damage to property causing by such negligence,
carelessness and imprudence, said vehicle driven and operated by him to hit and
bump a Toyota Corolla Lift back bearing Plate No." DAY 584 driven by
NARCISO ITURRIAGA and belonging to him thereby causing upon the said Toyota
Corolla Lift back damage in the amount of P17,250.00 to the damage and
prejudice of the owner thereof in the aforementioned amount of
SEVENTEEN THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED FIFTY (P17,250.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [5] cralaw
The MTC, RTC, and the Court of Appeals all gave credence to the prosecution's version of the events that on 21 October 1998, the vehicles driven by petitioner Mason and private complainant Itturiaga, a Tamaraw FX and a Toyota Corolla Lift Back, respectively, figured in a collision in front of petitioner Mason's house along Naguilian Road, Baguio City, causing damage to the car of private complainant Itturiaga. Petitioner Mason was backing out the Tamaraw FX from his garage, while the vehicle of private complainant Itturiaga was traversing the Naguilian Road towards the direction of the Baguio City proper. Private complainant Itturiaga honked his horn to warn petitioner Mason of his approach, but the latter ignored the said warning and continued moving his vehicle out of his garage.
Although having been consistently adjudged as guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the above-quoted Information by the MTC, the RTC, and the Court of Appeals, petitioner Mason still insists in his Petition for Review that the said courts have committed grave error of law and jurisprudence in their finding of guilt. A closer scrutiny of his Petition would reveal, however, that the issues raised therein do not involve any question of law and/or jurisprudence, but essentially, questions of fact that would require a re-evaluation by this Court of the weight and credibility accorded by the lower and appellate courts to the evidences presented by both parties.
The jurisdiction of this Court in Petitions for Review on Certiorari of the Decisions of the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing questions of law. A question of law must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants. Consequently, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, as a general rule, are conclusive on this Court, which is not a trier of facts; [6] cralaw and such rule carries even more weight when the Court of Appeals is merely affirming the factual findings of the lower courts. [7] cralaw
There being no ground to deviate therefrom, this Court follows the above-mentioned general rule and declines to disturb the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt rendered by the lower and appellate courts against petitioner Mason, when such is supported by the evidence presented during trial. As amply explained by the Court of Appeals in its assailed Decision, to wit -
The issue of whether a party is negligent or not is a question of fact. It should be noted that both lower courts found private respondent's testimony on this point to be credible and convincing. The RTC upheld the prosecution's version of the incident, saying that it was more credible and consistent. This court will not interfere with the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, except where it is shown that the trial court overlooked some material fact or circumstance that could lead to a different result. We find no palpable factual error that would warrant the reversal of the lower courts' factual determination.
In this case, the petitioner posits the view that the criminal negligence of the private complainant was the proximate cause of the accident. He argues that since the private complainant was still 200 to 250 meters away from the Tamaraw FX he was driving, it was still safe for him to get out of their garage and he posed no immediate danger to the private complainant. He submits that the burden of proving that care and diligence were observed is shifted to the private complainant, for, as previously claimed, he took all the precautions at the time to avoid any accident. Likewise, he proffers that since the rear portion of his vehicle was already visible to the private complainant, he cannot be the disfavored motorist because he was already on the road at the time of the collision.
The evidence, however, discloses that prior to the collision, the private complainant driving a Toyota Corolla Lift back at 60 kilometers per hour was only 15 to 20 meters away from the Tamaraw FX. When he saw the petitioner backing out from his garage, he blew his horn but the petitioner continued to move his vehicle. By the time he applied on the brakes, the two vehicles collided and as a consequence thereof, the vehicle driven by the private complainant suffered damage. And from defense witness Rodolfo Amistoso's admission, it was also established that despite the warning he gave the petitioner to stop, the latter continued moving out of the garage.
As the private complainant was running a (sic) relatively fast speed, the distance of about 15 to 20 meters away was quite too short a distance and leaves little time to anticipate, not withstanding the fact that according to the petitioner, he already warned the private complainant to stop.
As held by the Regional Trial Court:
"Evaluating the evidence submitted and considering the attendant circumstances that brought about the collision, this Court believes and so holds that the accused was imprudent and negligent. The accused was backing out from his garage proceeding to the main road, which he is aware of as a highway. X x x Considering that the road is a highway, which normally the speed of a vehicle is fast, and more so, that according to him the road was clear, his act of moving out slowly despite the approaching vehicle cruising the highway manifests inexcusable lack of precaution on his part. The accused is grossly negligent as shown by the fact that having seen the fast approaching vehicle he did not stop completely to give way. He is the disfavored motorist. A motorist from a parked position entering the main road has the duty of exercising greater precaution and more vigilance than when he is driving upon the open road; to slow down, and even stop, or to reverse and withdraw his car to give way to the car having the right of way (Lopez vs. Tinio, et al, CA-G.R. No. 19061-R, July 7, 1958).
"Further, his own witness testified that he tapped the rear portion of accused's car when he saw the fast approaching vehicle to warn him but accused did not stop moving out, instead he moved out slowly. Accused seems to believe that because he was moving out slowly, he cannot be found negligent. That is emphatically not the law. His moving out slowly under the circumstances is no longer an adequate test of diligence." [8] cralaw
The amount of actual damages which petitioner Mason was ordered to pay to private complainant Iturriaga is likewise a question of fact, which was already addressed by the Court of Appeals in its assailed Decision, in the following manner-
Petitioner argues that there is no basis for the award of actual
damages in favor of the private complainant in the amount of P17,250.00
since no receipt or other competent evidence was ever presented to support his
claim. Petitioner's argument is flawed.
The award of actual damages by the lower court was justified
because the expenses for the repair were incurred as a direct result of the
collision. The fact that only the photocopy of the job estimate, which is not
even sufficient proof of the alleged actual damage suffered by the private
complainant, was presented in court is of no moment. Petitioner's counsel
waived his right to cross-examine Marcelo Dumsing who made the repairs. Morever,
the prosecution and the defense already stipulated during the trial that the
total amount of the damage is P17,250.00.
Article 365, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code states that "when the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos. (sic) [9] cralaw
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Asst. Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos with Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Monina Arevalo Zenarosa, concurring; Rollo, pp. 89-95.
[2] cralaw Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos with Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Monina Arevalo Zenarosa. concurring; Id., p. 104.
[3] cralaw Penned by Judge Abraham B. Borreta, Id., pp. 67-70.
[4] cralaw Penned by Judge lluminada Cabato-Cortes, Id , pp. 37-46.
[5] cralaw Supra, note 1, pp. 89-90.
[6] cralaw Custodio v. Corrado, G.R. No. 146082, 30 July 2004, 435 SCRA 500; Gener v. De Leon, G.R. No. 130730, 19 October 2001, 367 SCRA 631.
[7] cralaw Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109197, 21 June 2001, 359 SCRA 262.
[8] cralaw Supra, note 5, pp. 92-94.
[9] cralaw Id., p. 94.
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