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[G.R. No. 168795.� August 2, 2005]
TIU vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
EN BANC
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG 2 2005.
G.R. No. 168795 (Antonio H. Tiu vs. Commission on Elections, et al.)
Petitioner Antonio H. Tiu (Tiu) and private respondent Petronilo G. Java (Java) contested the position of Punong Barangay during the 2002 Barangay Elections for Barangay 31, Cagayan de Oro City. Java was proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers by a margin of fifteen (15) votes (279-264) over Tiu, who then filed an election protest before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cagayan de Oro City involving the results in six (6) precincts. After the revision of ballots in the contested precincts, the MTC rendered a decision upholding the election of Java. Tiu appealed the decision to the COMELEC First Division, which conducted its own appreciation of the contested ballots. Finding that Tiu actually won by six (6) votes over Java, in its Resolution dated 17 November 2004, the COMELEC First Division set aside the decision of the MTC and proclaimed Tiu as the duly elected Barangay Chairman.
Java filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc assailing the First Division's Resolution. Apparently, this motion for reconsideration was not verified by Java. Tiu likewise filed a motion for execution praying for the issuance of a writ of execution in respect to the First Division's Resolution. It appears that without awaiting the writ of execution, Tiu took his oath of office before Court of Appeals Associate Justice Jose Sabio, and started to preside over sessions of the Sangguniang Barangay. However, the COMELEC en banc, in a Resolution dated 13 December 2004, denied Tiu's motion for execution in light of the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration. The motion suspended the execution or implementation of the First Division's Resolution, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Then, on 26 April 2005, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution reversing the First Division's Resolution and declaring that Java won the election by a margin of (3) votes. The COMELEC therein noted that Java's motion for reconsideration was not verified, yet characterized the verification requirement as a mere technical rule of procedure which may be suspended in the interest of justice.
Hence, the present petition.
Before this Court, Tiu contends that pursuant to Section 2 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution, "decisions, final orders or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final executory and not appealable." Accordingly, the ruling of the First Division could no longer be the subject of a motion for reconsideration, since such ruling would already constitute a final and executory judgment. Tiu also argues that the unverified motion for reconsideration should have been denied, considering that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure itself makes verification of such motion mandatory.
Significantly, Tiu does not impute any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC en banc in its appreciation of the contested ballots and its ultimate conclusion that Java won the election by three (3) votes. Even if such factual conclusions were put into issue by Tiu in his petition, Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Civil Procedure would militate against such review as its provides that findings of fact of the COMELEC supported by substantial evidence shall be final and non-reviewable.
The Court can summarily dispense with the argument that the lack of verification of the motion for reconsideration precludes cognizance of the motion.� Election protests are guided by an extraordinary rule of interpretation that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections. [1] cralaw The COMELEC Rules of Procedure itself provides the rules are to be construed liberally "in order to promote the effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding". [2] cralaw
Ultimately, the discretion of whether or not to strictly or liberally construe electoral rules of procedure is for the COMELEC to exercise, and the Court shall respect such exercise of discretion, unless otherwise demonstrated to have been attended with grave abuse. We can find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in countenancing the lack of verification of the motion for reconsideration in view of what the poll body deemed as the higher interest of justice.
Before leaving this issue, let it be stressed that with the seasonable filing of Java's motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC First Division had no recourse but to transmit the motion and certify the case, through its Presiding Commissioner, to the Commission en banc in accordance with Section 5, Rule 3 [3] cralaw of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. That is why the COMELEC First Division opted not to act on Tiu's motion for reconsideration.
On the central question, the Court has considered the relevant constitutional provisions that come to fore. Tiu relies on Section 2 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution, particularly the second paragraph thereof. The first paragraph of the provision is no less important, establishing as it does the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC over contests involving elective barangay officials. The provision reads:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
.�������� .���������� .
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election returns, and qualification of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
It should be noted that this Court, in the 1991 cases of Galido v. COMELEC [4] cralaw and Rivera v. COMELEC [5] cralaw , ruled that Section 2 (2), Article IX-C does not forestall recourse to this Court by way of special civil action of certiorari to assail decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices. We have eschewed a literal reading of that provision that would contradict the Court's authority to resolve questions of law as inherent in the judicial power conferred upon it by the Constitution. [6] cralaw
But does the provision otherwise debar the review by the COMELEC en banc of a ruling of its division involving a barangay election contest? In order to sustain Tiu's theory, the Court will have to rule that the "Commission" mentioned in second paragraph of Section 2 (2), Article IX-C refers solely to a division of the COMELEC, to the exclusion of that poll body en banc. That of course would be an outlandish proposition. The constitution itself provides that the COMELEC may sit either in divisions or en banc.� Section 3, Article IX-C provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
Not only does the Constitution authorize the COMELEC to sit en banc or in divisions, it also explicitly provides that all election cases shall be heard in division, and motions for reconsideration thereof decided by the Commission en banc. This further militates against Tiu's implied construction that the decision, final orders or rulings mentioned in Section 2 (2), Article IX-C refers to those rendered by the COMELEC division. Section 3, Article IX-C, in authorizing motions for reconsideration to be heard by the COMELEC en banc, necessitates the conclusion that a decision by a COMELEC division, such as that of the First Division in this case, is not yet final and executory unless no motion for reconsideration thereto has been filed before the COMELEC en banc.
Therefore, we cannot conclude as Tiu does, that the Resolution of the First Division was a final, executory and unappealable judgment beyond the ambit of any further review, since the Constitution itself authorizes the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the same judgment with the Commission en banc.
WHEREFORE, the PETITION is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Acting Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Idulza v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 160130, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 701; citing Punzallan v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 702, 716 (1998); Bince, Jr. v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 273 (1995); Benito v. COMELEC, 235 SCRA 436 (1994); Pahilan v. Tabalba, 230 SCRA 205 (1994); Aruelo, Jr. Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 311 (1993); Tatlonghari v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 849 (1991); Unda v. COMELEC, 190 SCRA 827 (1990); De Leon v. Guadiz, Jr., 104 SCRA 591 (1981).
[2] cralaw Section 3, Rule 1, COMELEC Rules of Procedure.� See also Idulza, id.
[3] cralaw Section 5, How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed Of.- Upon the filing of a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding Commissioner.� The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc.� (Rule 3, COMELEC Rules of Procedure) (Emphasis supplied.)
[4] cralaw G.R. No. 95346, 18 January 1991, 193 SCRA 78.
[5] cralaw G.R. No. 95336, 12 July 1991, 199 SCRA 178.
[6] cralaw Flores v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 89604, 20 April 1990, 184 SCRA 484.
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