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[A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1330-MTJ.� August 3, 2005]
ABARQUEZ vs. LLOSA
SECOND DIVISION
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG 3 2005.
Resolution. A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1330-MTJ (Pepito C. Abarquez vs. Judge Ophelia S. Llosa, Acting Presiding Judge, MCTC, Calbiga-Hinabangan, Samar.)
On November 12, 2002, a Complaint-Affidavit was filed by Pepito C. Abarquez with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging Judge Ophelia S. Llosa, Acting Presiding Judge, MCTC, Calbiga-Hinabangan, Samar with ignorance of the law and delay in the disposition of cases relative to Criminal Case No. 2989 entitled "People v. Luz U. Gaspan".
Complainant claimed that on December 2, 1996, he filed before the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) a complaint against Hinabangan Vice Mayor Luz U. Gaspan. A year later, the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding a prima facie case against Vice Mayor Gaspan and recommended the filing of Information before the proper court. On April 5, 1999, Gaspan was charged with Perjury before MCTC, Calbiga-Hinabangan, Samar and arraignment was set on May 4, 1999 but counsel for the accused moved to reset it to May 12, 1999. On the scheduled date, accused asked for another postponement which respondent judge again granted.
A Motion to Quash was filed on June 7, 1999 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority of the Graft Investigation Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman to sign and file the Information. On March 27, 2001 or after almost two (2) years, respondent judge granted the Motion to Quash. The public prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 23, 2001, however, it was only on February 27, 2002 when respondent judge required the defense to file its comment and finally resolved the Motion for Reconsideration on March 19, 2002.
According to the complainant, the proceeding of the case was further delayed when respondent judge absented herself in the April 10, 2002 and July 31, 2002 hearings. Moreover, despite his repeated manifestations for the resolution of the case, respondent judge failed to set the case for hearing from July 31, 2002 until the filing of the administrative complaint in October 2002.
In her Comment, respondent judge alleged that she was designated Acting Presiding Judge of MCTC, Calbiga-Hinabangan, Samar on April 6, 2000. When she assumed office therein on April 16, 2000, the Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 2989 was already pending before that court.� She immediately set the motion for hearing.� Considering that she also has to attend to the cases pending before her regular court at MTC, Marabut, Samar, she holds court sessions in MCTC, Calbiga-Hinabangan, Samar only three (3) days a week. Moreover, there is only one (1) Assistant Provincial Prosecutor assigned to the province, Prosecutor Agerico A. Avila who has to divide his time among various courts. Since the Regional Trial Court is given preference by the Provincial Prosecutor, she requested the RTC judge of Calbiga not to set criminal cases for hearing on Wednesdays so that lower courts can avail of the services of Prosecutor Avila.
Respondent judge maintained that she granted the defense's Motion to Quash based on the ruling of the Supreme Court dated August 9, 1999 and its Resolution of February 22, 2002 stating that the Ombudsman exercised prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, that is, government employees occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher. She further explained that since Gaspan was being prosecuted for an act committed when she was the Municipal Engineer with Salary Grade 24, the Office of the Ombudsman has no prosecutorial power over her case and thus, the Graft Investigation Officer has no authority to sign and file the information.
Moreover, respondent judge claimed that because of the emotional and political undertones attendant to the case, she had to proceed with caution in hearing the case, thus, she first allowed the parties to be heard, to argue and rebut in open court on the issues raised in the Motion to Quash. It was only after the public prosecutor and the defense had the opportunity to face each other that she resolved the Motion to Quash.
As to her failure to attend the scheduled hearing on April 10, 2002, she explained that on her way to the court, her vehicle broke down in Jiabong, Samar and her driver was able to fix it at almost 12:00 noon. Knowing that the parties and their counsels had already left the court, she opted to return to Catbalogan, Samar. The July 31, 2002 hearing was reset because she was on a birthday leave.
In its Report dated June 14, 2005, the OCA recommended that the charge of ignorance of the law against Judge Ophelia S. Llosa be dismissed for lack of merit.
Complainant claimed that respondent judge is guilty of ignorance of the law when she ordered the quashal of the information in Criminal Case No. 2989 (People v. Luz U. Gaspan) for lack of authority of the Graft Investigation Officer of the Ombudsman to sign the information.
Respondent judge cannot be faulted in granting the accused's Motion to Quash since her decision was in line with the ruling of the Court dated 09 August 1999 in G.R. No. 105965-105970 (George Uy v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 312 SCRA 77) which states that "in cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, xxx exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be. In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s against petitioner in the RTC. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan."
However, on 20 March 2001, in the same case, the Court set aside its ruling in the 09 August 1999 decision and declared that "[t]he law recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman and other investigative agencies of the government in the prosecution of cases cognizable by regular courts." Accordingly, respondent judge rectified her previous decision by granting complainant's Motion for Reconsideration and ordering the reinstatement of the case.
The delay in the prosecution of the case cannot entirely be attributed to respondent judge. As can be gleaned from the recital of events that took place from the time respondent judge presided over the case, the delays are due to the absence of the counsels of both parties, most often, because of the unavailability of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor who has to divide his time between Regional Trial Court and the first level courts.
In fact, when respondent judge assumed office on 16 April 2000, she immediately set for hearing the Motion to Quash which had been pending since 16 June 1999. However, due to postponements, mostly requested by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, the Motion was submitted for resolution only on 09 January 2001 and resolved on 27 March 2001. Likewise, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by complainant on 23 April 2001 was submitted for resolution only on 27 February 2002 and resolved on 19 March 2002 not only because of the absence of the public prosecutor but also due to "People Power" led by supporters of Luz Gaspan.
In the case of Eleazar B. Gaspar v. Judge William H. Bayhon, 278 SCRA 492 (1997), the Court held that "[a] judge should not be blamed for the delay in the disposition of a case when the delay is beyond his control, especially in the absence of any showing that it was done in bad faith and intended to prejudice a party to the case or that it was motivated by some ulterior ends." No such ill motive was even alleged, much less proved, against respondent judge. Neither is there any allegation of dishonesty or partiality against her. Verification with the Docket and Clearance Division, Legal Office, Office of the Court Administrator shows that respondent judge has never been administratively sanctioned in her twenty-four (24) years stint in the judiciary.
We agree with the evaluation and recommendation of the OCA. Undeniably, the issue is impressed with judicial character. Relief can not be had through an administrative proceeding but in a proper judicial remedy provided by the Rules of Court. [1] cralaw If the complainant believes that the respondent judge committed error in her judgment, it was incumbent upon the aggrieved party to elevate the assailed decision or order to the higher court for review and correction instead of filing the instant administrative complaint. It must be stressed that the filing of an administrative complaint against a judge is not the appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available. Even if it is later proved that respondent judge indeed erred, this fact will not necessarily make her administratively liable absent any proof that she acted with malice. [2] cralaw Likewise, we find the reason for the alleged delay in the resolution of the motion for reconsideration well-taken. There was no showing that the delay was intentional or ill-motivated. The administrative complaint must fail.
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DISMISS the instant administrative complaint for lack of merit.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Galan Realty Co., Inc. v. Arranz, A.M. No. MTJ-93-878, October 27, 1994, 237 SCRA 770.
[2] cralaw Atty. Alberto M. Velasco v. Judge Aida Rangel Roque, MeTC, Manila, Branch 24, A.M. No. OCA-IPI-98-514-MTJ, March 1, 2000.
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