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[A.M. OCA IPI No. 04-1585-MTJ.� August 10, 2005]
CABILING vs. MANTUA
SECOND DIVISION
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG 10 2005.
A.M. OCA IPI No. 04-1585-MTJ (Ma. Cristina Cabiling vs. Judge Celso L. Mantua, MTC, Albuera, Leyte.)
Acting on the Report of the Office of the Court Administrator dated June 20, 2005, to wit:
REASON FOR THE AGENDA : In a VERIFIED LETTER Ma. Cristina Cabiling charges Judge Celso Mantua with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Partiality, Abuse of Authority and Gross Misconduct relative to Criminal Case No. 4201 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Marian Cabiling and Ma. Cristina Cabiling".
Complainant, one of the accused in this case, alleges that based on an unsworn letter-complaint of the offended party charging her with grave oral defamation, respondent issued an order directing her to file a counter-affidavit pursuant to Section 10 of the rules on Summary Procedure. In the order, she was warned that a warrant for her arrest shall be issued if she failed to submit her counter-affidavit. She points out that grave oral defamation is an offense which is not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure. Likewise, the issuance of a warrant of arrest for failure to file a counter-affidavit is not authorized under Section 16 of the same Rule.
Complainant filed a motion to recall or vacate the said order. However, her counsel received an order dated 18 November 2003 in which respondent resolved to dismiss the criminal case based on the ex-parte motion to withdraw the criminal complaint filed by the offended party and further declared the motion to recall or vacate his assailed order as moot and academic.
Complainant claims that the withdrawal of the complaint was artfully made to cover up the error committed by the respondent in taking cognizance of the criminal complaint. Respondent and the offended party connived and made it appear that the motion to withdraw the criminal complaint was filed and received by the lower court ahead of the motion filed by the complainant. Aside from the fact that the withdrawal of the criminal complaint was without the intervention of the public prosecutor or peace officer concerned, complainant notes that the ex-parte motion to withdraw the criminal complaint was personally received by the respondent and not by the clerk of court.
In his COMMENT, respondent refutes the accusation against him, explaining that he considered the unsworn letter of the offended party, which was accompanied by the latter's affidavit-complaint as well as that of her witnesses, to have complied substantially with Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
According to respondent, while the offended party designated the offense as "grave oral deformation," he believed the acts complained of only constitute simple oral defamation or simple slander which falls under summary procedure. On the other hand, he admits to have inadvertently failed to correct the designation of the offence in his order.
Regarding the warning on the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of herein complainant in case she failed to comply with the orders of the court, respondent clarified that it is a standard content of the pre-printed order form which his court staff simply fills out. This is to ensure that the orders of the court are not disregarded.
Respondent also admits that he personally received the ex-parte motion because when it was filed he was the only one left in the courtroom as his court staff all went out for lunch. As regards his giving due course to the withdrawal of the criminal complaint, respondent explains that the offended party in a criminal action is authorized to prosecute the case.
EVALUATION: section 2 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure provides that "upon the filing of a civil or criminal action, the court shall issue an order declaring whether or not the case shall be governed by the Rule."
Prescinding from the foregoing, upon the filing of the complaint or information in a criminal case, judges are required to make a preliminary determination of the applicability of summary rule. However, prior to such determination, they are also duty bound to make a preliminary determination of whether they have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case or the nature of the action, or whether the complaint or information in the criminal case sufficiently charges an offense, and whether there are no valid causes to dismiss the complaint or information.
Clearly, the assailed acts of respondent in treating the unsworn letter complaint with attachment of the affidavit of the complainant as a criminal complaint for simple oral defamation and considering it to be governed by the summary rule were done in the exercise of his judicial function.
The Court in In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo, 241 SCRA 405 ruled that a judge may not be held administratively accountable for what he does in the exercise of his judicial powers and jurisdiction. It is also well-established rule that "in the absence of malice, fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even if such acts are erroneous." (Sanlakas ng Barangay Julo, San Antonio, Inc. vs. Empaynado, Jr., 31 SCRA 201).
There is nothing on record which shows that respondent acted with malice, bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. In fact, respondent sufficiently explained that he reviewed the allegations in the affidavit of the offended party and thereafter determined that the complaint though designated as grave oral defamation merely constitutes simple oral defamation which falls under the summary rule. He also admitted that he inadvertently failed to caption the case as simple oral defamation.
On the charge of abuse of authority, in cases governed by the summary rule, the judge may dismiss the complaint motu proprio if he finds that the case is patently without basis or merit (Section 12[a], 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure). Thus, the grant of the withdrawal of the criminal complaint may be considered as an exercise of respondent's judicial discretion, which in the absence of bad faith, malice or corruption cannot be sanctioned administratively.
As regards partiality, in Zamudio vs. Pe�as, Jr., 286 SCRA 367, mere suspicion that a judge is partial to a party is not enough, there must be adequate evidence to prove the charge. The fact that the respondent personally received the ex-parte motion to withdraw filed by the offended party is not sufficient to establish that he was partial to the offended party, as the eventual dismissal of the criminal complaint based on the said motion is even favorable to the accused (herein complainant).
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court is our recommendation that the instant complaint against respondent Judge Celso L. Mantua be DISMISSED. However, respondent should be REMINDED to be more circumspect in the performance of his judicial and administrative functions.
The Court finds the foregoing recommendation well taken.
Indeed, as a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. [1] cralaw The Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before a judge can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. [2] cralaw To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. [3] cralaw However, Judge Mantua is reminded to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties, considering that any act that may diminish or tend to diminish the image of the Judiciary cannot be countenanced.
Thus, the Court Resolves to DISMISS the instant administrative complaint. Judge Celso L. Mantua, however, is REMINDED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Casta�os v. Esca�o, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-93-955, 12 December 1995, 251 SCRA 174.
[2] cralaw Abdula v. Guiani, G.R. No. 118821, 18 February 2000, 326 SCRA 1.
[3] cralaw Sacmar v. Reyes-Carpio, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1766, 28 March 2003, 400 SCRA 32.
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