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[A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 04-2100-RTJ.� August 22, 2005]
MACASAET vs. LANTION
SECOND DIVISION
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG 22 2005.
A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 04-2100-RTJ (Teresita Arellano-Macasaet vs. Judge Jane Aurora C. Lantion, Atty. Maria Socorro A. Godoy, Remedios B. Africa and Marcela O. Jalos, all of RTC-Branch 13, Fourth Judicial Region, Lipa City.)
For consideration is the administrative complaint dated 30 September 2004, filed by Teresita Arellano-Macasaet charging Judge Jane Aurora C. Lantion; Atty. Ma. Socorro A. Godoy, Clerk of Court; Remedios B. Africa, Court Stenographer III; and Marcela O. Jalos, Court Stenographer III, with Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Grave Misconduct, Gross Incompetence and Gross Ignorance of the Law relative to Civil Case No. 97-0069 entitled, "Spouses Ismael Macasaet and Teresita Arellano-Macasaet v. Spouses Florencio Macasaet and Teresita Cetron Macasaet" for Damages, and Criminal Case No. 0637-97 entitled, "People v. Marivic M. Pamplona" for Qualified Theft," all pending with Branch 13, Regional Trial Court, Lipa City.
In her administrative complaint, Teresita Arellano-Macasaet assailed the decision rendered in the abovementioned civil case by respondent Judge Lantion. Specifically, she questioned the retyping of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) by respondents Africa and Jalos, both Court Stenographer III, without her (complainant) knowledge and consent, as well as those of the other co-plaintiffs in the said civil case. She claimed that "this retyping of the TSN and the act of Judge Lantion to cover-up the same constitutes [sic] serious misconduct on her part" [1] cralaw since the retyping of TSNs is not what is required in Section 11, Rule 41 and Section 17, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court. It is her position that any order for the retyping of the TSN under the circumstances of the case is unlawful and irregular.
The complainant further contended that respondent Godoy, the Clerk of Court, should also be held equally liable for having consented to the retyping of said TSN.
Relative to Criminal Case No. 0637-97 for Qualified Theft where the complainant was the private complainant therein, she alleged that the respondent Judge rendered a decision that was grossly violative of the Rules of Evidence.
Firstly, respondent Judge supposedly disregarded the Hearsay Rule. According to the complainant, respondent Judge allowed hearsay evidence to be admitted in evidence when she gave credence to an affidavit of a certain Mr. Ruel Bandoja who attested to the fact that the subject robbery took place on 27 September 1993 and not in November 1993 as he earlier certified, notwithstanding the fact that the affiant was not presented in court.
Complainant also averred that it was illogical and whimsical for respondent Judge to hold that "[e]ven if there were inconsistencies between the Counter-Affidavit of Accused Virgilio Macasaet and the Certification of Ruel Bandoja as to the dates of the alleged robbery which took place at ULTRACOM, the same were candidly corrected in open court by accused Virgilio Macasaet, thru an Affidavit executed by Ruel Bandoja . . .," accused Virgilio Macasaet being incompetent to clarify the inconsistency because he had no personal knowledge thereof.
Secondly, respondent Judge purportedly intentionally disregarded the material, relevant and competent evidence of the prosecution when she found the written admissions of accused Marivic M. Pamplona that she gave co-accused Virgilio the item subject of the crime as self-serving testimony. According to the complainant, such pronouncement of the respondent Judge violated Sections 26 and 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the complainant claimed that the foregoing acts also constituted a violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 thereof. Complainant maintained that under the doctrine of "Res Ipsa Loquitor" respondent Judge should be disqualified as a lawyer and disbarred.
In her Comment dated 10 November 2004, respondent Judge Jane Aurora C. Lantion denied the allegation that the TSN of the proceedings of Civil Case No. 97-0069 were retyped at her instance. She explained that the reproduction [2] cralaw of additional copies of the TSN was based on existing original TSN that were typewritten using ordinary/manual typewriters; that they were copied verbatim; and that they were done in the presence of complainant's husband. Hence, there was no cover-up to speak of.
Similarly, in their Comment dated 10 November 2004, respondents Court Stenographers Africa and Jalos avowed that they did not violate any of complainant's rights as they faithfully reproduced the subject TSNs. They explained that it is the Court's standard operating procedure to prepare additional copies of transcripts just in case there will be a need for additional copies in the future and they do not have to wait for any order or directive from the Judge to do so. Furthermore, they recounted that the complainant's husband watched respondent Jalos retype her notes without any opposition on his part. He also purportedly attempted to coerce said stenographer to change some entries therein.
For her part, respondent Clerk of Court, Atty. Godoy, in her Comment dated 11 November 2004, clarified that she consented, in good faith, to the reprinting of the TSN so as not to send mere photocopies of the TSN to the Court of Appeals. Also, she too witnessed complainant's husband review and compare notes in his possession with that of the reprinted copies without any objection.
The complainant filed a Reply dated 04 December 2004, in response to respondent Judge's Comment. In the Reply, she merely reiterated her earlier charges and took exception to the respondent Judge's assertion that the subject Decisions were rendered based on the cases' merits.
The supposed errors are quoted hereunder for reference, to wit:
As to Civil Case No. 97-0069:
a)���� Misapprehension of Evidence. Respondent Judge stated in her Decision that Exhibit "E" thereof has a notation "Paid by Mr. Vicente Macasaet" when in fact the document, upon examination, will show no such notation;
b)���� Wrong Application of Law. Respondent Judge applied Article 1920 of the New Civil Code in declaring that the Special Power of Attorney used in obtaining the subject loan with the Bank as impliedly revoked. According to complainant, said law is inapplicable for it is a bilateral contract. What is controlling is Article 1927 of the New Civil Code.
c)���� Retyping happened. Complainant avers that as admitted in the Comment, there is already an existing TSN which were originally typewritten in ordinary/manual typewriters. Necessarily, reproducing the same in a computer requires retyping. Upon Motion for Allowance to Inspect records and TSN with the Court of Appeals, the complainant found out that the original TSN was not retyped verbatim. There are distorted portions and discrepancies.
d)���� No truth to the statement that complainant's husband was watching when the alleged retyping of the TSN happened. Complainant claims that the records of the case were already forwarded to the Court of Appeals when her husband came to know about the retyping of the TSN by the court stenographers concerned.
As to Criminal Case No. 0637-97 , complainant merely expounded her earlier averments.
Complainant's Reply to the comments of respondents Godoy, Africa and Jalos dated 30 December 2004, noted the discrepancies in the statements of the respondents pertaining to the production of additional copies of TSN. She stated that while respondent Godoy mentioned reprinting additional copies from the stenographer's computer, respondent Judge, on the other hand, denied that the TSN reproduced were originally typewritten, and additional copies of the same as required were copied in the stenographer's computers. The two stenographers admitted that they retyped the TSN to produce additional copies.
It is the complainant's view that the retyping of the TSN is not among the methods of reproduction authorized by the Rules of Court. What is allowed is the re-entering of new command for letters and words in the computers. She also pointed out specific discrepancies and distortions made on the original TSN.
With respect to her decision in the abovementioned criminal case, respondent judge asserted that the decision "should speak for itself as to why both the accused were acquitted." More to the point, she opined that not because the rendered decision was contrary to herein complainant's position means that the court was "coddling the criminals."
A Rejoinder received by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on 13 January 2005, filed by respondent Judge, branded as baseless the allegations and insinuations of the complainant. She countered that the allegations contained in the Reply were only a rehash of the complaint, not supported by facts except by her twisted interpretation of events. With respect to the so-called discrepancies contained in the TSN's lay-out, she stressed that there are proper remedies for the correction thereof.
A sur-rejoinder, dated 30 January 2005, was filed by the complainant. In it, she cited the inability of respondent Judge to refute point by point the charges levelled against her. All respondent Judge offered were general denials. She further stated that the Decision in the criminal case was an unjust judgment, which is punishable under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 3, Paragraph (e) of Republic Act. No. 3019 of the Anti-Graft Law.
In a memorandum dated 28 June 2005, the OCA recommended the dismissal of the complaint, the reasons for which we find befitting to be quoted:
The decision in Civil Case No. 97-0069 is pending review before the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. No. 53513-CV. This Office cannot discuss the merits of the instant matter, the same being intricately connected with the issues raised on appeal. As aptly held in Flores vs. Abesamis (275 S 302, 316), [i]t is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened or closed. No finding of administrative liability can be made against respondents Judge Lantion, Clerk of Court Godoy and stenographers Africa and Jalos pending a final judicial decision in the civil case.
Similarly, anent (the acquittal of the accused) Criminal Case No. 0637-97, no administrative liability may be meted on respondent Judge Lantion. The issues raised against her are matters of judicial import. They involve questions of fact and appreciation of evidence which are matters beyond the sphere of administrative scrutiny. To answer the questions raised by complainant will necessitate a review of the respondent Judge's Decision. That this office cannot do without running afoul of the long standing principle enunciated in Dela Cruz vs. Concepcion (235 SCRA 597, 607 [1994]) which states that the judge must be allowed a reasonable latitude for the operation of his own individual view of the case, his appreciation of facts and his understanding of the applicable law on the matter. x x x. If any error was committed, it was error of judgment and it is important to recall the firmly established principle that a judge may not be administratively charged for mere error of judgment, in the absence of showing of any bad faith, malice or corrupt practices. This Office cannot therefore speculate why respondent Judge relied on Virgilio's testimony correcting in open court the alleged discrepancy between Mr. Bandoja's affidavit and certification, or why the document signed by accused Marivic stating that the property subject of the suit was earlier given to accused Virgilio was not considered enough proof to hold accused guilty of the crime as charged. We cannot disturb the findings of respondent Judge that there was (sic) insufficient evidence to hold the accused liable for the crime charged. As held the trial court has the peculiar advantage to determine the credibility of a witness because of its superior advantage in observing the conduct and demeanor of the witness while testifying. The trial court judge is the best person to discern and evaluate the credibility of witnesses whose manner of testifying he has closely observed (Heirs of Amado Celestial vs. Heirs of Editha Celestial, G.R. No. 142691, 05 August 2003, Bartocillo vs. CA, G.R. No. 125193, 23 October 2001).
Moreover, complainant has not amply demonstrated instances of impropriety and arbitrariness in respondent Judge's conduct. She has failed to show that respondent Judge was motivated by a premeditated and obstinate intention to cause an injustice. Aside from her laments over the supposed errors in the Decision, complainant has shown no actions by respondent evincing a malevolent transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence which threatens the very existence of the system of administration of justice (Grave misconduct, definition. Imperial vs. Santiago, Jr., A.M. No. P-01-1449). What complainant has established at best may be errors in judgment which we have already stated this Office cannot undo. "Indeed, some judges must be free to judge without pressure or influence from external forces or factors, they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative for acts that they may do and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and functions, and it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith, and that exceptionally, prosecution of a judge can be had only if there be final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceedings of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order and also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable or order x x x. (In re: Joaquin T. Borromeo, 241 SCRA 405 [1995] and In re: Wenceslao Laurete, 148 SCRA 382 [1987]).
We agree in the recommendation of the OCA and hereby adopt its exhaustive and meticulous discussion.
In the case of De Guzman v. Pamintuan, [3] cralaw we had the occasion to state our oft-enunciated tenet that an administrative action is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari. Disciplinary proceedings against a judge are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for these judicial remedies whether ordinary or extraordinary. For, obviously, if subsequent developments prove the judge's challenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against him at all.
In the case at bar, it cannot be gainsaid that complainant has availed herself of one of the judicial remedies provided for by the Rules of Court. With the assailed decision of the respondent Judge pending review before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 53513-CV, the complainant is now precluded from benefiting from this administrative action, the subject of which being intricately allied with that of the appealed case, in order to be relieved of the effects of said alleged irregular or erroneous order as the propriety of the decisions of respondent Judge calls for the exercise of judicial discretion. Moreover, the complainant failed to adduce sufficient evidence that fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith or deliberate intent to do an injustice attended the rendition of the assailed decisions and the reproduction of the TSN.
In view of the foregoing, there is, therefore, no basis for the charge of Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Grave Misconduct, Gross Incompetence and Gross Ignorance of the Law.
A word of caution to unsuccessful litigants - to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous rule or decision he renders would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of the administration of justice can be infallible in his judgment. [4] cralaw
WHEREFORE, finding the recommendation to be in accord with the law and the facts of the case on record, the same is hereby APPROVED. The administrative complaints against Judge Jane Aurora C. Lantion, Atty. Maria Socorro A. Godoy, Remedios B. Africa and Marcela O. Jalos are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Asst. Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Rollo, pp. 1-10.
[2] cralaw Encoding in computers.
[3] cralaw A.M. No. RTJ-02-1736, 26 June 2003, 405 SCRA 22.
[4] cralaw Severo A. Cordero v. Justice Q. Enriquez, etc., A.M. No. CA-01-36, 18 February 2004, 423 SCRA 181.
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