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[A.M. No. RTJ-03-1817.� August 31, 2005]
MABUTAS vs. PERELLO
SECOND DIVISION
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG 31 2005.
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1817 (P/Sr. Supt. Orlando M. Mabutas, Regional Director, Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, Metro Manila Regional Office vs. Judge Norma C. Perello, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 276, Muntinlupa City.)
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1820 (City Prosecutor Edward M. Togonon vs. Judge Norma C. Perello.)
For resolution is respondent Judge's Supplication and Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Resolution dated June 8, 2005, finding respondent Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and suspending her for six (6) months. The dispositive portion of the assailed Resolution provides:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1)���� In Admin. Matter No. RTJ-03-1817, DISMISSING the complaint against respondent Judge; and,
(2)���� In Admin. Matter No. RTJ-04-1820, finding respondent Judge Norma C. Perello, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 276) of Muntinlupa City GUILTY of gross ignorance of law, and she is hereby SUSPENDED for Six (6) Months, with warning that a repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
AS TO OTHER MATTERS:
(a)���� The Court ORDERS the Office of the Court Administrator to initiate the appropriate complaint for grave misconduct and/or gross ignorance of the law against respondent Judge, insofar as Spl. Proc. Nos. 02-002, 02-008, 02-10, 98-023 and 98-048 are concerned; and to conduct preliminary investigation and submit report thereon within ninety (90) days from notice hereof.
(b)���� The Office of the Court Administrator is AUTHORIZED to conduct an audit and submit a report within ninety (90) days from notice hereof, on all the petitions for habeas corpus in all the courts of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City from 1998 to present.
SO ORDERED.
Respondent Judge first filed her "Supplication," asking the Court to reconsider its resolution suspending her for six months, as she is the sole breadwinner in her family, or that the Court reduce the period of suspension to a minimum so that she may return to work before Christmas.
Respondent Judge then filed her "Motion for Reconsideration" where she still insists in her erroneous reading and application of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. She maintains that methamphetamine hydrochloride is not in the list of Schedules annexed to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and in the Schedules annexed to the 1971 Single Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and that it is different from methamphetamine. According to respondent, if it was the intention of the legislature to classify methamphetamine hydrochloride as a dangerous drug, then it should have specified it in clear terms. Respondent Judge then proceeded to "relate" Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 9165, which defines controlled precursors and essential chemicals, with Section 3(x) thereof, defining methamphetamine hydrochloride, and concluded that it is a controlled precursor or essential element.
Precursor chemicals are used in the manufacture of synthetic drugs and become part of the final product. Essential chemicals, on the other hand, are used in the refining of coca and opium into cocaine and heroin. [1] cralaw Moreover, as used in the 1988 UN Drug Convention, controlled precursors and essential chemicals are chemicals used in the manufacture of drugs, whether narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. This is clear from Article 12, paragraph 1 of the 1988 UN Drug Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988 UN Drug Convention), which states: "The parties shall take measures they deem appropriate to prevent diversion of substances in Table I and Table II used for the purpose of illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances ..."
Dangerous drugs, meanwhile, can be either narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, as provided by Section 3(j) of R.A. No. 9165. In medical terms, narcotic drugs are substances that alter perception of pain, induce euphoria, mood changes, mental clouding and deep sleep, depress respiration and the cough reflex, constrict the pupils, and cause smooth muscle spasm, decreased peristalsis, emesis and nausea. [2] cralaw Psychotropic drugs or substances affect the psychic functions, behavior, or experience of a person using them. [3] cralaw
As stated in the assailed Resolution, metamfematine or methamphetamine is in the list of substances in Schedule II of the 1971 UN Single Convention of Psychotropic Substances. Congress need not couch in express terms that methamphetamine hydrochloride is a dangerous drug because R.A. No. 9165 already incorporates the provisions of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, the 1971 Single Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 UN Convention, as the Philippines is a party to these treaties.
The term "methamphetamine" or "meth" is commonly used in other countries, although in the Philippines, it is often referred to as methamphetamine hydrochloride or its street name, shabu. Hydrochloride simply means that it takes the form of "salt" or "crystal," and this occurs when hydrochloric acid is added to the substance. [4] cralaw Thus, the terms "ice" and "crystal" are usually associated with it. [5] cralaw Respondent Judge should know this because she has been sitting as a dangerous drugs court judge for 13 years.
Respondent Judge also contends that there is no conflict between Sections 5 and 11 of R.A. No. 9165 because Section 5 penalizes the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of dangerous drugs, while Section 11 penalizes the possession of dangerous drugs, and it must not have been the intention of the law to impose the capital penalty on those who sell or trade the drug in a quantity less than a gram, which according to respondent Judge, "is only as big as a grain of rice, with the value that cannot even hold together the body and soul of an accused, much more feed his family."
But respondent Judge should be reminded that that measly size of a grain of rice has caused unfathomable deaths, shattered lives, broken dreams and wasted beings, not to mention the hardships of therapy, counseling and rehabilitation. What is being penalized under Section 5 is not so much as the quantity of the dangerous drugs but the sale thereof, which undoubtedly triggers the menace. Thus, Section 2 of R.A. No. 9165 emphatically states that:
It is the policy of the State to safeguard the integrity of its territory and the well-being of its citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs on their physical and mental well-being, and to defend the same against acts or omissions detrimental to their development and preservation. In view of the foregoing, the State needs to enhance further the efficacy of the law against dangerous drugs, it being one of today's more serious social ills.
Finally, respondent Judge claims that the "lack of settled jurisprudence and interpretation of section 5 article II of RA 9165" has led her to "honestly interpret said section" in the way she did, and the same is merely an error of judgment.
Respondent Judge takes pride in her career as a drugs court judge for 13 years. Precisely, because of the length of her tenure as a drugs court judge that respondent Judge should very well know that methamphetamine hydrochloride is a dangerous drug. That was the nature of the drug before R.A. No. 9165, as it is still the nature now. The passage of R.A. No. 9165 did not, in any way, reclassify methamphetamine hydrochloride as other than a dangerous drug. The Court can only shudder in anxiety over the thought that such "honest interpretation" could have led numerous illegal drug pushers and traffickers to roam the streets freely and ply their trade fearlessly.
Respondent Judge avers that absent bad faith, malice or other similar motives on her part, her error is merely one of judgment for which she cannot be held administratively liable for.
Indeed, the administrative liability for ignorance of the law does not necessarily arise from the mere fact that a judge issued an order that is adjudged to be erroneous. But judges may be held administratively accountable when they act fraudulently or with gross ignorance that administrative sanctions are called for. [6] cralaw
To be liable for gross ignorance of the law, the judge must be shown to have committed an error that was "gross or patent, deliberate or malicious." [7] cralaw
In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Hontanosas, Jr., [8] cralaw the Court rejected the respondent judge's defense of good faith, as the case subject of the administrative complaint involved an unambiguous and unequivocal law, such that application, not interpretation thereof, is imperative, thus:
Admittedly, judges cannot be held to account for erroneous judgments rendered in good faith. However, this defense has been all too frequently cited to the point of staleness. In truth, good faith in situations of infallible discretion inheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal principle evident and basic as to be beyond permissible margins of error. Indeed, while a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision he renders, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives.
.
As a judge, the respondent must have the basic rules at the palm of his hands as he is expected to maintain professional competence at all times. Judges should be diligent in keeping abreast with developments in law and jurisprudence, and regard the study of law as a never-ending and ceaseless process. Elementary is the rule that when laws or rules are clear, it is incumbent upon the respondent to apply them regardless of personal belief and predilections. To put it differently, when the law is unambiguous and unequivocal, application not interpretation thereof is imperative. Indeed, a judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. He must be conversant with basic legal principles and well-settled doctrines. He should strive for excellence and seek the truth with passion.[43] The failure to observe the basic laws and rules is not only inexcusable, but renders him susceptible to administrative sanction for gross ignorance of the law from which no one is excused, and surely not a judge. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of respondent, it is not simple error of judgment. Respondent Judge's error amounts to gross ignorance of the law, which could easily undermine the public's perception of the court's competence. [9] cralaw
A judge owes it to the public and the administration of justice to know the law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. There will be faith in the administration of justice only if there be a belief on the part of litigants that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. [10] cralaw
Respondent Judge may not have been ill-motivated in granting the petitions for bail, nevertheless, her error is so gross or patent which is tantamount to bad faith such that she should be held liable therefor.
Unlike in Realubin vs. Pizarro, 388 SCRA 636, cited by respondent Judge, there is no "unsettled legal issue" in this case. As stated in the Court's Resolution:
Had respondent Judge been more circumspect in going over the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9165, she would certainly arrive at the same conclusion. It does not even take an interpretation of the law but a plain and simple reading thereof. Furthermore, had respondent judge kept herself abreast of jurisprudence and decisions of the Court, she would have been apprised that in all the hundreds and hundreds of cases decided by the Court, methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu had always been considered as a dangerous drug. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Judge beseeches the Court to impose on her a fine in
lieu of suspension, citing several cases, e.g.,
Tucay vs. Domagas,
242 SCRA 110; Almeron vs. Sardido, 281 SCRA 415; Taborite vs.
Sollesta, 408 SCRA 602; Tolentino vs. Camano, Jr., 322 SCRA 559; Cortes
vs. Catral, 279 SCRA 1, et seq.
[11]
cralaw
These, however, are not applicable to respondent Judge's case because these
involved cases where judges were found administratively liable for the first
time, except for Almeron vs. Sardido, which involved a judge's second
offense. In respondent Judge's case, she has already been administratively
fined by the Court twice. First, in A.M. No. RTJ-02-1686, where a fine
of P5,000.00 and a reprimand was imposed on respondent Judge for
dereliction of duty, and second, in A.M. No. RTJ-04-1846, where
respondent Judge was held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the
law, grave misconduct and oppression, and was fined P20,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration together with the Supplication is DENIED with finality.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Asst. Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2003 released by the U.S. Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.
[2] cralaw Mosby's Pocket Dictionary of Medicine, Nursing and Allied Health, Fourth Edition.
[3] cralaw Id.
[4] cralaw Chemical Required for the Illicit Manufacture of Drugs, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/india/ccch2.pdf, page 16.
[5] cralaw The Methamphetamine Problem: A Question and Answer Guide by the Institute for Intergovernmental Research; see also the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2001 on the Philippines, http://manila.usembassy.gov/wwwhtxt1.html.
[6] cralaw Cabatingan, Sr. vs. Arcueno, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1323, August 22, 2002, 387 SCRA 532, 540-541.
[7] cralaw Ibid.
[8] cralaw A.M. No. RTJ-03-1815, October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA 229.
[9] cralaw People vs. Gacott, Jr., G.R. No. 116049, March 20, 1995, 242 SCRA 515.
[10] cralaw Mu�ez vs. Ari�o, A M. No. MTJ-94-985, February 21, 1995, 241 SCRA 478.
[11] cralaw Motion for Reconsideration, p. 16.
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