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[G.R. No. 135038. February 23, 2005]

TAN vs. CA

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 23 2005 .

G.R. No. 135038 (Rolando Y. Tan v. The Court of Appeals, TheHeirs of Jose L. Atega, Francisco B. Aala, Hayden B. Luzon and Leoncio Paderes. )

For consideration is the January 15, 2005 letter of Hayden B. Luzon which seeks clarification on (a) why he was considered as a buyer in bad faith; (b) why this case was transferred from the Second Division to the First Division, and finally, to the Special First Division.

In the Decision dated November 16, 2001, we have explained why we considered respondents Luzon and Leoncio Paderes in bad faith, which we reiterate herein:

In the case at bar, there is evidence showing not only that respondents Hayden Luzon and Leoncio Paderes were not ignorant of the sale of the lot by Ismael Elloso to petitioner, but also that the latter was ahead in registering his acquisition of the lot with the Register of Deeds.

It should be recalled that Hayden Luzon bought his property from Lorenzo Atega on sale by installment, commencing in 1957 or 1958 and ending in 1987. Leoncio Paderes bought a portion of his property in 1977 and the remaining portion in 1990. At that time, no registration of their claims had been made in their favor, much less any title issued in their name. On the other hand, petitioner caused the registration of the Deed of Sale in his favor with the Register of Deeds in November 1979, soon after title was issued in the name of Lorenzo Atega, segregating his share in Lot No. 436-A. This is shown by the following testimony of petitioner, to wit:

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It is also on record that petitioner filed a notice of adverse claim, which was duly annotated on Atega's title as Entry No. 32638. In this connection, it has been held that a notice of adverse claim remains valid even after the lapse of the 30-day period provided by Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree...

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Both the prior registration of the deed of sale in his favor, as well as the adverse claim, effectively gave Luzon and Paderes notice of petitioner's right on the subject land. It bears stressing that the adverse claim of petitioner was annotated prior to the registration of title in the names of Luzon and Paderes.

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To reiterate, before second buyers like Luzon and Paderes can obtain priority over a first buyer like Ismael Elloso, petitioner's predecessor-in-interest, they must show that they acted in good faith throughout, having been ignorant of the first buyer's rights, from the time of their acquisition until the tile was transferred to them by registration. The requirement is such that the second buyer must show continuing good faith and innocence or lack of knowledge of the first sale until his contract ripens into full ownership through prior registration as provided by law. Evidently, both Luzon's and Paderes' claim on the subject land must yield in favor of petitioner's.

In his letter, respondent Luzon attached a certification from the Register of Deeds as proof that petitioner Tan did not register the Deed of Sale in his favor with the Register of Deeds sometime in 1979. Unfortunately, we cannot give probative value to said certification. Aside from being a mere photocopy, it is too late in the day to present the same because our judgment has already become final and executory on October 16, 2003 . Respondent Luzon should have presented the certification before the trial court. By his failure to raise the same at the first opportunity, he is deemed to have waived the same. We decide the merits of the case based only on the evidence duly presented.

As regards the allegation of misrepresentation on the part of petitioner Tan, suffice it to say that the assessment of the trial judge as to the issue of credibility binds the appellate court because he is in a better position to decide the issue, having heard the witnesses, and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. We believe that the perceived inconsistencies in petitioner Tan's testimony were sufficiently clarified. His apparent confusion regarding the date of registration of the deed of sale was due to the fact that it was not he, but his counsel, who registered it for him.

Finally, there is nothing irregular or improper in the transfer of this case, initially, from the Second Division to the First Division, then, to the Special First Division. The Justices of this Court do not become a member of a particular division on a permanent basis. Certain factors, such as the retirement of a Justice, may necessitate the transfer of one Justice to another division. Necessarily, once a Justice is transferred to another division, as in this case, he brings with him all the cases previously assigned to him. Hence, the corresponding transfer of a case to another division.

Further, this Court is under no obligation to notify a party that his case has been transferred to another division, more so divulge the identity of the ponente . It is enough that a party is properly informed and directed where to file his pleadings.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this case having become final and executory on October 16, 2003 and the issues raised in the January 15, 2005 letter of respondent Hayden B. Luzon having been clarified, the Division Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED not to include in the Division agenda this case or any of its incidents.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA ESGUERRA-VIDAL
Clerk of Court

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