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[A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-1685-MTJ.� July 27, 2005]
OCAMPO vs. MENDOZA
SECOND DIVISION
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 27 2005.
A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-1685-MTJ (DOLORES T. OCAMPO vs. JUDGE TERTULO A. MENDOZA, MTCC, BRANCH 2, CABANATUAN CITY.)
This resolves the Verified-Letter Complaint dated 12 June 2005 filed by Dolores T. Ocampo, charging Judge Tertulo A. Mendoza, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Cabanatuan City, with Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Order/Judgment, relative to Civil Case No. 15036 entitled, "Dolores T. Ocampo v. Sps. Godofredo and Luciana Melad," for Ejectment.
Complainant is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 15036. The parties thereto submitted a compromise agreement dated 18 June 2002 which was approved by respondent Judge in his decision dated 29 July 2002. The compromise agreement provides, among other stipulations, that defendants shall remove a portion of their house, including a pressure tank, septic tank and hog wire, and other improvements, which occupies complainant's road right-of-way. The pertinent portion of the compromise agreement reads:
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANTS SPOUSES GODOFREDO & LUCIANA MELAD, assisted by plaintiff's counsel, respectfully submit this Compromise Agreement under the following terms and conditions.
1.�������� That defendants Spouses Melad hereby recognize the plaintiff's right of way covered by TCT F-104261 with an area of 5,938 sq. m. registered in the name of Dolores T. Ocampo, et al. (Annex "D" of Complaint);
2.�������� That defendants spouses Melad are willing to remove a portion of their house occupying the plaintiff's road right of way, including the pressure tank, septic tank and hog wire and other improvements at their expense;
3.�������� That the defendants Spouses Melad will remove the above-mentioned improvements within 60 days from the time of the submission of this Compromise Agreement with the assistance of the deputy sheriff of this Honorable Court;
Complainant alleges that she had filed a petition for contempt dated 10 September 2003 against the defendants in the case because of the latter's resistance to the implementation of the terms and conditions of the compromise agreement. In their answer to the petition for contempt, the defendants claimed ownership over the land where the structures sought to be demolished by the complainant are located. They maintain that the writ of demolition was already moot and there is no legal basis for the court to implement its decision. On 19 April 2004, respondent Judge ordered the dismissal of the petition finding the same to be without basis in fact and in law.
The decision having attained finality, complainant filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution which was granted by respondent Judge in his order dated 9 June 2004. On 9 July 2004, the sheriff issued a notice for the defendants to vacate the premises. In his Sheriff's Return dated 21 July 2004, he informed the court that despite notice, defendants failed to vacate the premises and to demolish the structures therein.
Consequently, on 02 August 2004, complainant filed a motion to direct the sheriff to execute the order of demolition and to cite the defendants in contempt. In his order dated 10 November 2004, respondent Judge dismissed the motion for contempt.
Complainant now claims that respondent Judge unjustly rendered the above-mentioned orders dismissing the contempt charge contending that the defendants did not even present any document to prove their claim of ownership over the subject premises. Although complainant admits that she should have filed a motion for reconsideration of the 10 November 2004 order of respondent Judge, she reasoned out that she instead filed an administrative complaint due to the alleged threat to her life by the son of the defendants.
In his COMMENT dated 28 March 2005, respondent Judge denied the allegations of complainant.
Respondent Judge alleged that complainant was satisfied with the enforcement of the terms and condition of the compromise agreement per her notation at the back of the Sheriff's Return dated 4 July 2003. However, complainant filed a motion for contempt claiming that defendants resisted and refused to comply with the compromise agreement as there were still things left undone, i.e., two trees and a septic tank still remained encroaching in her "claimed" property.
Respondent Judge explained that he dismissed the contempt charge based on his evaluation of the facts and arguments of the parties. He insists that he did not knowingly render an unjust order because he rendered his order in accordance with the evidence and applicable law on the matter.
Complainant insists that respondent Judge based his order dismissing the contempt charges on defendants' claim that they now own the lot where the septic tanks are located without even asking for the original copy of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-23932 covering the subject lot. Neither did respondent Judge ask for the lot's subdivision or sketch plan.
In her LETTER-REPLY dated 07 April 2005, complainant alleged that after her petition for contempt was dismissed, the defendants claimed a part of the right-of-way and the portion of the lot where the septic tank is located.
After study and evaluation, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended the dismissal of the case for being judicial in nature. It stated that the issue of whether or not the order issued by respondent Judge in the contempt charge is unjustly rendered remain judicial in nature, which can be best resolved through judicial adjudication.
We agree in the recommendation of the OCA.
Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is a criminal offense defined and penalized under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code. For conviction to lie, it must be proved that the judgment is unjust and that the judge knows that it is unjust. Knowingly means consciously, intelligently, willfully or intentionally. It is firmly established in this jurisdiction that for a judge to be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and that the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.
The law requires that (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision; and (c) the judgment is unjust. This Court reiterates that in order to hold a judge liable it must be shown that the judgment is unjust and that it was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. That good faith is a defense to the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment remains the law. [1] cralaw
In the case at bar, there was neither proof presented nor allegation made by the complainant that bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose attended the rendition of the assailed orders of respondent Judge. There is, therefore, no basis for the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment/order.
Furthermore, the Court has consistently held that judges will not be held administratively liable for mere errors of judgment in their rulings or decisions absent a showing of malice or gross ignorance on their part. Bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment is adverse to a party. To hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position unbearable. [2] cralaw
Finally, it is settled that the filing of an administrative complaint against a judge is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available. In the absence of fraud, malice or dishonesty in rendering the assailed decision or order as in the case at bar, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to elevate the assailed decision or order to the higher court for review and corrections. [3] cralaw
Thus, the appropriate remedy of complainant, notwithstanding her lame and uncorroborated excuse that she instead filed the instant administrative complaint due to the alleged threat in her life by the son of the defendants, remains judicial in nature.
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint against Judge Tertulo A. Mendoza is hereby DISMISSED for being judicial in nature.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Eduardo P. Diego v. Judge Silverio Q. Castillo, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673, 11 August 2004, 436 SCRA 67.
[2] cralaw Francisco Galman-Cruz v. Justice Portia Ali�o-Hormachuelos, et al., A.M. No. CA-04-38, 31 March 2004, 426 SCRA 573.
[3] cralaw Atty. Rex J.M.A. Fernandez v. Justice Eubulo Verzola, et al., A.M. No. CA-04-40, 13 August
2004,436 SCRA 369.
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