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SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated SEP 28 2005.

G.R. No. 112526 ( Sta. Rosa Realty Dev.'t. Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. )

G.R. No. 118838 ( Juan B. Amante, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. )

For consideration is Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation's (SRRDC) Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Amended Decision dated March 16, 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Second Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Court's Decision dated October 12, 2001 in G.R. No. 112526 is SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 5, 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27234 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that the Land Bank of the Philippines is ordered to convert the trust account in the name of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation to a deposit account, subject to a 12% interest per annum from the time the LBP opened a trust account up to the time said account was actually converted into cash and LBP bonds deposit accounts. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on December 15, 1993, is LIFTED.

The petition filed by Amante, et al. in G.R. No. 118838 is GRANTED in that Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation is hereby ENJOINED from disturbing the peaceful possession of the farmer-beneficiaries with CLOAs. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 28, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 38182 is AFFIRMED insofar as the award of nominal damages is concerned.

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources and the Department of Agrarian Reform, in coordination with the farmer-beneficiaries identified by the DAR, are URGED to formulate a community-based watershed plan for the management and rehabilitation of Barangay Casile.

SO ORDERED.

Private respondents filed an Opposition to SRRDC's Motion for Reconsideration, while public respondents Secretary of Agrarian Reform and the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) filed their Comment. Both private and public respondents contend that the issues raised by SRRDC have already been passed upon by the Court in the assailed Amended Decision.

SRRDC argues that:

I

BY THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS MANDATE OF THE LAW, THE MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE CLASSIFYING THE SRRDC PROPERTIES AS "PARK" LONG PRIOR TO RA 6657, EXEMPTS THEM FROM THE COVERAGE OF THE CARP.

II

THE EXPRESS PROVISIONS OF SECTION 10, RA 6657, ARE ALSO SUFFICIENT TO EXEMPT THE SRRDC PROPERTIES FROM THE CARP.

III

AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITY IS ABSOLUTELY ANATHEMA TO A WATERSHED WHICH NEEDS TREE COVER FOR ITS LIFEBLOOD.

IV

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE JUDICIALLY DECLARED SQUATTERS AND THEREFORE ARE DISQUALIFIED BENEFICIARIES.

V

SECTION 22 OF RA 6657 INSOFAR AS IT EXPANDS THE COVERAGE OF THE CARP TO "LANDLESS RESIDENTS" IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

VI

THE DARAB HAS NO JURISDICTION TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE SRRDC PROPERTIES ARE SUBJECT TO CARP COVERAGE.

VII

THE CONVERSION OF THE TRUST ACCOUNT INTO DEPOSIT ACCOUNT WILL NOT CURE THE LACK OF COMPENSATION SINCE THERE IS STILL A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.

Indeed, all these arguments have already been raised and resolved by the Court in its Amended Decision, to wit:

(1) The classification of the property as a "park" via Municipal Ordinance No. 110-54 dated November 3,1979, did not change the nature of the property as agricultural land given that: [a] prior to the issuance of said ordinance, the property has been extensively utilized by the Canlubang Sugar Estate as an agricultural land; and [b] the ordinance did not convert the property into residential, commercial, industrial, or institutional, therefore, it remains agricultural in nature and within the coverage of the CARP;

(2) While Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 lists the kinds of lands exempted and excluded from the CARP coverage, the subject property does not fall within the enumeration because: [a] it was not actually, directly and exclusively used for watershed purposes; [b] the evidence on record shows that the property has a 5-10% flat to undulating scope; and [c] even assuming that it has an 18% slope and above, the property is already developed for agricultural purposes, and is in fact already planted with diversified crops; hence, it cannot be exempt from compulsory acquisition and distribution;

(3) It was SRRDC as well as its predecessors, that first utilized the property for agricultural purposes, for its own benefit, and now it seeks exemption from the coverage of CARP by claiming that it is a watershed. They had the opportunity to object to the classification and present contrary evidence before the DARAB but they failed to do so, putting the blame on others for its failure;

(4) SRRDC persistently relies upon the ruling of the Regional Trial Court of Laguna in Civil Case No. B-2333, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 13908. These cases pertain to the injunction case filed by respondents Amante, et al. It must be noted that in its resolution denying respondents' motion for reconsideration, the CA clarified that its decision should not preempt any judgment or prejudice the right of any party in the agrarian reform case (G.R. No. 112526) pending before the Supreme Court. Also, note must be made of the ejectment cases filed by SRRDC (Civil Cases Nos. 250, 258, 260, 262 and 266) before the Municipal Trial Court of Cabuyao, Laguna, which were subsequently dismissed by the Regional Trial Court of Bi�an, Laguna, and by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 33382 for SRRDC's failure to show any prior physical possession of the subject property that would have justified the filing of the ejectment cases.

More importantly, the identification of the farmer-beneficiaries is best left to the discretion of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, through its authorized offices, as this is a matter involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP, and unless the Court finds that there was grave abuse of discretion committed by the agency involved, which the Court finds absent in this case, it will not substitute its judgment to that of the agency's;

(5) The constitutionality of Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657 was raised for the first time only in the petitions with this Court, despite opportunity to do so before the DAR, not to mention that this case may be resolved, as it has been resolved, without delving into the constitutionality of the attacked provision;

(6) SRRDC cannot now assail the jurisdiction of the DARAB to determine whether the property is subject to CARP for the following reasons: [a] it was the Secretary of Agrarian Reform who actually and initially classified that the subject property is subject to CARP; [b] it was SRRDC who invoked the DARAB to resolve the issue whether the subject property is covered by the CARP; and [c] the issue was raised for the first time before the CA, and was never presented or discussed before the DARAB;

(7) The Court's order for the conversion of the trust account into a deposit account is in accordance with Landbank of the Philippines vs. Wycoco , ¹ wherein the Court ruled:

In light of the foregoing, the trust account opened by LBP in the name of Wycoco as the mode of payment of just compensation should be converted to a deposit account. Such conversion should be retroactive in application in order to rectify the error committed by the DAR in opening a trust account and to grant the landowners the benefits concomitant to payment in cash or LBP bonds prior to the ruling of the Court in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals. Otherwise, petitioner's right to payment of just and valid compensation for the expropriation of his property would be violated. The interest earnings accruing on the deposit account of landowners would suffice to compensate them pending payment of just compensation. ²

In Roxas & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals ³ cited by SRRDC, the invalidity of the opening of the trust account as a mode of just compensation was premised on the finding that the expropriation proceedings were tainted with lack of due process, and the replacement of the trust account with cash or LBP bonds did not cure such defect. There exists no such defect in the present case, as there was a valid expropriation of the subject property for CARP purposes.

Hence, there is no persuasive reason to grant SRRDC's Motion for Reconsideration.

WHEREFORE , the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED with finality.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA ESGUERRA-VIDAL

Clerk of Court