ChanRobles Virtual law Library

[G.R. 158540.� September 20, 2005]

SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT vs. PHIL. CEMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated SEP 20 2005 .

G.R. No. 158540 (Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Phil. Cement Manufacturers Corp., et al.)

For resolution is a Motion for Clarification dated 30 August 2005 filed by petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation wherein petitioner notes that the Resolution dated 3 August 2005, which denied the Motions for Reconsideration filed by respondents, makes four references to the Decision of the DTI Secretary dated 5 August 2003. Petitioner submits that the decision of the DTI Secretary is actually dated 25 June 2003.

The submission is well-taken.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby amends pages 87-89 of the Resolution dated 3 August 2005 to read as follows:

Philcemcor argues that the granting of Southern Cross's Petition should not necessarily lead to the voiding of the Decision of the DTI Secretary dated 25 June 2003 imposing the general safeguard measures. For Philcemcor, the availability of appeal to the CTA as an available and adequate remedy would have made the Court of Appeals' Decision merely erroneous or irregular, but not void. Moreover. the said Decision merely required the DTI Secretary to render a decision, which could have very well been a decision not to impose a safeguard measure; thus, it could not be said that the annulled decision resulted from the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals' Decision was annulled precisely because the appellate court did not have the power to rule on the petition in the first place. Jurisdiction is necessarily the power to decide a case, and a court which does not have the power to adjudicate a case is one that is bereft of jurisdiction. We find no reason to disturb our earlier finding that the Court of Appeals' Decision is null and void.

At the same time, the Court in its Decision paid particular heed to the peculiarities attaching to the 25 June 2003 Decision of the DTI Secretary. In the DTI Secretary's Decision, he expressly states that as a result of the Court of Appeals' Decision, "there is no legal impediment for the Secretary to decide on the application." Yet the truth remained that there was a legal impediment, namely, that the decision of the appellate court was not yet final and executory. Moreover, it was declared null and void, and since the DTI Secretary expressly denominated the Court of Appeals' Decision as his basis for deciding to impose the safeguard measures, the latter decision must be voided as well. Otherwise put without the Court of Appeals' Decision, the DTI Secretary's Decision of 25 June 2003 would not have been rendered as well.

Accordingly, the Court reaffirms as a nullity the DTI Secretary's Decision dated 25 June 2003. As a necessary consequence, no further action can be taken on Philcemcor's Petition for Extension of the Safeguard Measure. Obviously, if the imposition of the general safeguard measure is void as we declared it to be any extension thereof should likewise be fruitless. The proper remedy instead is to file a new application for the imposition of safeguard measures, subject to the conditions prescribed by the SMA. Should this step be eventually availed of, it is only hoped that the parties involved would content themselves in observing the proper procedure, instead of making a mockery of the rule of law.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court

Back to Home | Back to Main

CLICK HERE FOR THE LATEST SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE