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[G.R. No. 168510.� September 5, 2005]
DELA CRUZ vs. CA
SECOND DIVISION
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated SEP 5 2005.
G.R. No. 168510 (Heirs of the late Guillermo dela Cruz, as represented by Rogelio dela Cruz vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Heirs of the late Antero Ilasco, as represented by Roman and Mariano Ilasco.)
A Complaint for Security of Tenure and/or maintenance of peaceful possession with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order was filed by plaintiff Guillermo dela Cruz against the heirs of the late Antero Ilasco represented by Roman and Mariano Ilasco, docketed as DARAB Case No. 000-BUL-94 before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Malolos, Bulacan.
In his Complaint, then plaintiff Guillermo dela Cruz alleged that he is the agricultural leasehold lessee/actual tiller of a parcel of private agricultural land, with an area more or less of one (1) hectare situated at Barangay Perez, Meycauayan, Bulacan, owned by the late Antero Ilasco, father of then defendants (Ilascos) as evidenced by DAR OLT: PS Form No. 1 otherwise known as The Rice and Corn Land Tenure Survey. Immediately before the death of Antero Ilasco, Guillermo was persuaded by him to surrender the farmholding in consideration of the payment of disturbance compensation. The documents for the voluntary surrender, however, had not been prepared and signed by the parties due to the untimely death of Antero Ilasco. Guillermo further alleged that the Ilascos and their hired men threatened to unlawfully eject him from his farmholding and to prevent him from entering the premises which constrained him to file the Complaint.1
Answering the Complaint, the Ilascos countered that when Antero
Ilasco was still alive, he had an agreement with his brother-in-law, Marcial de
la Cruz (the father of Guillermo and the brother of Antero's wife, Adela
Ilasco), to act as caretaker of the land in consideration of which Antero
allowed Marcial to till the land and share in the fruits of their cultivation.
In 1978, Marcial voluntarily surrendered his right to till the land, due to his
inability to cultivate the same and the absence of another person to take his
place as evidenced by the "Kasulatan sa Pagwawaksi sa Karapatan sa
Pagsasaka sa Lupa" he executed on September 11, 1978. In turn, Antero
donated to Marcial a portion of the land with an area of about one thousand
(1,000) square meters, duly annotated as Entry No. 20201 on Antero's Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-120. The remaining portion of Antero's land had
since been untenanted. This fact was indicated in 1978 on Antero's title as
Entry No. 20200. Antero likewise gave Marcial the amount of Twelve Thousand
Pesos (P12,000.00) so that Guillermo and his children could relocate
their houses on said land. After Antero's death, his heirs noticed that
Guillermo was constructing improvements, encroaching on their property which
was already outside of the donated property and that he was claiming a right to
cultivate the land as a subsisting agricultural lessee. Being first cousins,
the Ilascos gently reminded Guillermo to limit his improvements within the
donated property; to no avail. Left with no alternative, the Ilascos built a
perimeter fence to identify the borders of the land. In fact, during the
preliminary conference at the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council, Guillermo's
father, Marcial, disputed plaintiff's allegations that he was the only former
agricultural lessee of the land. This fact was corroborated by Guillermo's own
brother, Ben dela Cruz.
After hearing, the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator rendered his decision dated 06 January 1997, favoring the Ilascos and dismissing the Complaint for lack of merit.2 A motion for reconsideration filed by Guillermo was denied in the Order of the Provincial Adjudicator dated 11 April 1997. Guillermo appealed this dismissal to the DARAB.3 In a decision promulgated on 21 June 2004, the DARAB affirmed the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator and dismissed Guillermo's appeal.4 The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the DARAB. Still undaunted, Guillermo, who has since died and was substituted by his heirs (herein petitioners), sought recourse to the Court of Appeals by way of Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.5 In a decision6 dated 14 March 2005, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit7 and the motion for reconsideration was also denied in its resolution dated 10 June 2005.8
Hence, this petition for review on Certiorari before this Court anchored on the following grounds:
I
THERE EXIST (SIC) A TENANCY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PETITIONERS AND THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE CERTIFICATION OF THE MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER (MARO) OF MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, THAT THE LATE GUILLERMO DELA CRUZ IS A REGISTERED FARMER.
Ill
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE DAR PS FORM NO. 1 AND THE MASTERLIST OF FARMER BENEFICIARIES SHOWING THE LATE GUILLERMO DELA CRUZ, AS THE BONAFIDE TENANT IN THE SUBJECT LANDHOLDING.
The Petition is not meritorious.
In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it is essential to establish all its indispensable elements,9 to wit:
(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. Arzaga v. Copias, 400 SCRA 148.
A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed.10
Mere allegation of tilling the land without sufficient proof does not suffice to establish a relationship of agricultural tenancy.11 We agree in the findings of the Provincial Adjudicator, affirmed by both the DARAB and the Court of Appeals, that the element of consent and sharing is not present, negating the presence of a tenancy relationship between the Ilascos and Guillermo. Thus:
With regard the element of consent, nowhere in the records would prove or show that, indeed, plaintiff-appellant was installed as tenant by the landowner himself, Antero Ilasco or any of his successor-in-interest. Consent must be given by the true and lawful landholder (Hilario v. IAC, 148 SCRA 573), who is the owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the land.
Anent the element of sharing, plaintiff-appellant failed to present evidence, such as receipts, that he had paid his lease rentals to the landowner. If plaintiff-appellant were really a tenant thereon, he would have alleged in his pleadings that he had shared the produce of the land to the landowner or to his successors-in-interest considering that payment of lease rentals is one of the obligations of a tenant. But, he did not allege nor prove this element.
It is also the contention of plaintiff-appellant that he is the tenant on the subject land as evidenced by the following, to wit: (1) a photocopy of a PS Form 1 (Revised 1976) known as "Rice and Corn Land Tenure Survey," (2) Materlist of Farmer-Beneficiaries as of 31 December 1981 of Barangay Perez, Meycauayan, Bulacan, and (3) Certification of the MARO concerned.
Granting for the sake of argument that plaintiff-appellant is a tenant on the subject land, yet, his act of leaving the country and by working in Saudi Arabia, as evidenced by the Affidavit of his father Marcial dela Cruz, constitutes abandonment, and abandonment is one of the grounds enumerated by the law for the extinguishment of agricultural leasehold relation (Sec. 8, republic Act No. 3844, as amended). Abandonment consists of two factors or elements, namely: 1) an intention to abandon; and 2) an external act or omission to act, by which such intention is carried into effect. These elements must concur in order that there may be abandonment (Dano, et al. v. Pino, CA-G.R. No. 04508-R, February 15, 1977). When one is employed elsewhere and does not work the land himself, he ceases to be a tenant and is considered as having abandoned the said land. Also, if indeed, he were the tenant on the subject land, his failure to pay his lease rentals to the landowner or to his successors-in-interest would have negated his claim for maintenance of the peaceful possession of the said land. As earlier discussed, plaintiff-appellant did not present a single iota of evidence to prove that he is paying his lease rentals.
The law is explicit that with respect to a parcel of land, the absence of one element does not make an occupant or a cultivator or a planter a de jure tenant.12
As to the second and third issues, be it noted that certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain person is a tenant are merely provisional and not conclusive on courts. This Court is not bound by these findings especially if they are mere conclusions not supported by substantial evidence,13 as in the case at bar. Thus, we are in agreement in the findings of the Court of Appeals when it held:
PS Form No. 1 is self-serving. It is discernible from this document that Guillermo was the one who supplied the information contained therein, as shown by his signature beside his name at the back portion thereof.
Equally unreliable are the MARO Certification and the master List of Farmer-Beneficiaries. These documents do not at all establish that Antero made Guillermo his tenant.
Besides, certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain person is a tenant are merely "preliminary" or "provisional" and are not binding on the courts.
Finally, it is an opportune time to reiterate that factual findings of administrative agencies tasked to decide on matters within their expertise deserve respect and are, as general rule, conclusive and binding on this Court and shall not be disturbed as long as they are supported by substantial evidence.14
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Asst. Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
1 Annex E; Rollo, p. 47.
2 Annex K; Rollo, p. 66.
3 Docketed as DARAB Case No. 6203.
4 Annex L; Rollo, p. 7.
5 Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87195.
6 Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao with Associate Justices Edgardo F. Sundiam and Japar B. Dimaampao, concurring.
7 Rollo, p. 28.
8 Rollo, p. 38.
9 Arzaga v. Copias, G.R. No. 152404, 28 March 2003, 400 SCRA 148; Atuel v. Valdez, G.R. No. 139561, 10 June 2003, 403 SCRA 517.
10 Valencia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122363, 29 April 2003, 401 SCRA 666.
11 Rivera v. Santiago, G.R. No. 146501, 28 August 2003, 410 SCRA 113.
12 Esquivel v. Reyes, G.R. No. 152957, 08 September 2003, 410 SCRA 404.
13 Bautista v. Araneta, G.R. No. 135829, 22 February 2000, 326 SCRA 234, citing Oarde v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 104774-75, 08 October 1997, 280 SCRA 235.
14 Dulos Realty and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128516, 28 November 2001, 370 SCRA 709; Calvo v. Vergara, G.R. No. 134741, 19 December 2001, 372 SCRA 650.
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