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[G.R. No. 141936. June 5, 2006]

BENJAMIN SY Y CHUA, ARTURO SY, AND ROSARIO SY, PETITIONERS, v. HON. BIENVENIDO L. REYES IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 74 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MALABON AND ADELA SY, RESPONDENTS

Third Division

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information is a resolution of the Third Division of this Court dated JUNE 5, 2006

G.R. No. 141936 (Benjamin Sy y Chua, Arturo Sy, and Rosario Sy, petitioners, v. Hon. Bienvenido L. Reyes in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch 74 of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon and ADELA SY, respondents.)

Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 27 October 1999 Decision [1] cralaw and 4 February 2000 Resolution [2] cralaw of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46898.

The facts are as follows:

On 4 September 1997, Adela Sy ("respondent") filed a petition for injunction with damages, with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, against her siblings Benjamin Sy y Chua, Arturo Sy, and Rosario Sy [3] cralaw ("petitioners"). Respondent alleged that she was the owner of Adeben Food Products. Petitioners allegedly took over the management and operations of Adeben Food Products and prevented respondent and her representatives from entering the factory premises.

The case was initially raffled to Branch 169 of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon ("Branch 169"). In his Order of 8 September 1997, Judge Emmanuel D. Laurea ("Judge Laurea") of Branch 169 issued a temporary restraining order ("TRO"), effective for 20 days, restraining petitioners from acting as owner, manager, representative, or proprietor of Adeben Food Products. Judge Laurea set the hearing on the application for preliminary injunction on 16 September 1997. The hearing was later moved to 11 September 1997 to consider petitioners' ex-parte motion to lift TRO. On 11 September 1997, Judge Laurea issued an Order considering the motion to lift TRO submitted for resolution upon petitioners' posting of a counter-bond in the amount of P500,000. On 22 September 1997, Judge Laurea approved the counter-bond and dissolved the TRO. However, he directed petitioners to account for the sales proceeds, stock inventory, and income from the business, and to allow respondent access to the premises and inspection of production and sales documents. On 23 October 1997, Judge Laurea amended the order to include respondent's husband Arturo Tan, their son Ronato Tan, and respondent's counsel as among those allowed to enter the premises and inspect the production and sales documents.

On 29 October 1997, a new counsel entered its appearance for respondent. On 3 November 1997, Judge Laurea inhibited himself from hearing the case as he was a former colleague of the new counsel. The case was re-raffled to Branch 74 of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon ("Branch 74"). On 5 February 1998, Judge Bienvenido L. Reyes ("Judge Reyes") of Branch 74 conducted a hearing on respondent's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction. Judge Reyes ruled that the application for preliminary injunction could be heard independently of the motion for hearing of the affirmative defenses. During the hearing, the parties agreed that petitioners' special and affirmative defenses would be considered submitted for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed. In his 11 February 1998 Order, Judge Reyes denied petitioners' motion to dismiss petition for lack of cause of action.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing Judge Reyes' 5 February 1998 Order granting the hearing on the application for preliminary injunction and the 11 February 1998 Order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the petition for injunction. In its 30 April 1998 Resolution, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Judge Reyes from further proceeding with the hearing of the petition for injunction during the pendency of the petition for certiorari. In its 27 October 1999 Decision, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. In its 4 February 2000 Order, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The issue is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in allowing the continuance of the hearing on the application for preliminary injunction.

The petition has no merit.

Petitioners seek to enjoin Judge Reyes from continuing with the trial on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners argue that a hearing on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction will effectively dispose of the main case for injunction without trial. Petitioners further argue that a writ of preliminary injunction is not available when its purpose is to take the possession and control of a property from one person to place it in the hands of another person. Hence, Judge Reyes should not have entertained the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the petition for certiorari filed before it was premature. The act of Judge Reyes in setting for hearing the application for a writ of preliminary injunction cannot be considered a disposition of the main case for injunction. Judge Reyes has yet to rule on whether to grant or deny the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. Since Judge Reyes may still deny the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, it is not proper for this Court to preempt Judge Reyes' action on the matter. It is also premature for this Court to rule on whether respondent availed of a wrong remedy in applying for a writ of preliminary injunction without awaiting Judge Reyes' ruling on the application.

Petitioners further allege that Judge Reyes committed grave abuse of discretion in hearing the application for a writ of preliminary injunction because the parties have agreed to hear the application for preliminary injunction together with the main case for injunction. Petitioners allege that Judge Laurea failed to put the terms of the agreement in his 11 September 1997 Order "for reasons known only to himself." [4] cralaw Petitioners further claim that Judge Laurea again failed to put the agreement in his 22 September 1997 Order. If there was really an agreement between the parties, petitioners should have called the attention of Judge Laurea when he failed, twice, to include it in his Orders. As there was nothing in Judge Laurea's Orders that shows the alleged agreement, Judge Reyes did not abuse his discretion in setting the hearing of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Finally, petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in sustaining Judge Reyes' denial of their motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action. Petitioners allege that there was no evidence that efforts toward a compromise between the parties have been made in accordance with Article 151 of the Family Code. [5] cralaw Petitioners argue that Arturo Tan and Ronato Tan's act of going to the factory premises, accompanied by security guards, could not be considered an effort towards a compromise. Further, Arturo Tan is not a member of the family since he is only respondent's common-law husband.

We do not agree. When Arturo Tan and Ronato Tan went to the factory premises to talk to petitioner Benjamin Sy, they were acting as respondent's representatives. They were accompanied by security guards because of the incident that happened a week before when Arturo Tan was allegedly attacked by Benjamin Sy and Arturo Sy. Benjamin Sy allegedly fired his handgun at Arturo Tan. The incident led to Arturo Tan's filing of charges against petitioners before the National Bureau of Investigation. Petitioners, on the other hand, charged Arturo Tan with Attempted Murder and Grave Threats before the Malabon Police. When Arturo Tan and Ronato Tan went to the factory premises, they were prevented from entering the premises and were threatened with bodily harm. Several policemen from the Malabon Police Station were allegedly inside the premises. Citing the incidents, respondent in her complaint stated that her efforts toward a compromise, through her representatives, have failed. Considering the animosity between petitioners and respondent, which resulted to physical violence and threats against respondent's representatives, it is too much to expect respondent to personally try to talk to petitioners again.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the 27 October 1999 Decision and 4 February 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46898.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court



Endnotes:

[1] cralaw Penned by Associate Justice Hector L. Hofile�a, with Associate Justices Demetrio G. Demetria and Omar U. Amin, concurring. Rollo , pp. 45-57.

[2] cralaw Penned by Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria, with Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., concurring. Id. at 59.

[3] cralaw Also referred to as Rosario Siy.

[4] cralaw Rollo , p. 29.

[5] cralaw Paragraph 1 of Article 151 states: No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.


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