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[G.R. No. 142509. June 28, 2006]

JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ATTY. JOSE J. PIERAZ

First Division

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUNE 28, 2006

G.R. No. 142509 (Jose Alemania Buatis, Jr. v. People of the Philippines and Atty. Jose J. Pieraz )

Before us is petitioner's motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated March 24, 2006 finding him guilty of libel, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that, in lieu of imprisonment, the penalty to be imposed upon the petitioner shall be a fine of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The award of compensatory damages is DELETED.

In his motion for reconsideration, petitioner wants us to decide whether People v. Velasco [1] cralaw which was cited in his petition and invoked as his defense to his libel case has been repealed, modified or superseded as to declare it invalid, inapplicable and/or unconstitutional. Petitioner contends that the doctrine laid down in the Velasco case which states:

"Lo quo hace el delito no es solamente la material, sino la actitud del agente" which was translated to English as "If the matter charged as libelous is only an incident in an act which has another objective, the crime is not libel."

does not require nor admit by any mode of qualifying circumstance in order that anyone may avail of it as a matter of defense in a libel case other than the act or matter charged to be libelous must be an act incidental which has another objective; that his letter reply to respondent's demand letter to vacate has another objective, i.e., to send a clear signal to respondent that petitioner is duty bound to protect the wife of a member of the GUARDIANS under his command even at the risk of imprisonment and threat and danger to his life and liberty, thus petitioner's action, although libelous as it would seem but without necessarily admitting, is still not a crime.

We find no merit in petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

In the first place, People v. Velasco was a 1937 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA). Article 8 of the Civil Code provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines and the decisions referred to are those enunciated by the Supreme Court which is the court of last resort. [2] cralaw Only the decisions of the Supreme Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction, thus, decisions of subordinate courts are only persuasive in nature and can have no mandatory effect. [3] cralaw However, this rule does not militate against the fact that a conclusion or pronouncement of the CA which covers a point of law still undecided in the Philippines may still serve as judicial guide to the inferior Courts. [4] cralaw Nonetheless, w e took Velasco case into consideration but find the principle enunciated therein inapplicable in the instant case considering the difference in their factual circumstances.

The facts in People v. Velasco are as follows:

Defendants-appellants Cornelio G. Velasco and Senon Simbulan were Pasay policemen who filed a sworn complaint for counterfeiting coins in the Justice of the Peace of Pasay against Tan Biao, Chan Kiat, and Kong Liong (the offended parties). However, when the case was forwarded to Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, the same was dismissed on petition of the Provincial Fiscal owing to lack of evidence and merit. After the dismissal, offended party Tan Biao filed a complaint against the defendants-appellants for the offense of incriminating innocent persons under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code, and for attempted robbery. They were acquitted in the first case and the second case was dismissed.

Subsequently, a case for libel was filed in the CFI of Rizal by the offended parties against the defendants-appellants based on the latters' complaint for counterfeiting coins filed against the former. During the trial, the prosecution, in addition to presenting the complaint as proof of libel, adduced evidence showing that defendants-appellants were the ones who took the counterfeiting moulds and the counterfeit coins to the house of the offended parties which was the object of the search; that it was not true that defendants-appellants found the articles in the flush tank as they were the ones who brought the same with them before the search; that defendants-appellants wanted to obtain money from the offended parties through intimidation and promising immunity to the latter if they agreed to pay the former; and that since they refused to do so, appellants decided to file the complaint for counterfeiting coins against the offended parties. Defendants-appellants were convicted of libel and sentenced to pay a fine with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Defendants-appellants filed their appeal with the CA which in a decision dated February 19, 1937 dismissed the case for libel and ordered the remand of the case to the trial court with an instruction for the fiscal to make another investigation of the facts for whatever action may be deemed proper in the premises. The CA ruled that under the definition of libel, the primordial intent to defame and discredit the reputation of a person whether juridical or natural is an essential element of the crime of libel; that what makes the crime is not only the defamatory matter but the attitude of the agent; that if the matter which is reputed to be libelous is but an incident in a scheme or ensemble of unlawful acts which have other underlying purpose or purposes, the appropriate action is not for libel but for the offense directly derived from said purposes. The appellate court said:

Supposing that the evidence in the record is true, that is, that the defendants simulated the finding in the complainant's house of counterfeit coins together with the instruments and paraphernalia for making them; that this trick was engineered by the defendants in order to obtain money from the offended parties through intimidation; and that their criminal plan having failed, they then presented the complaint which is now considered libelous. Now we ask: has the crime of libel been committed? In our opinion, no. The libel in this case, if there is any, is only accidental, a mere detail in a greater and more serious criminal scheme; that of obtaining money through intimidation, or, in more precise terms, a plan to rob. If under such facts and circumstances it should be held that the crime committed was that of libel, aside from the juridical impropriety which perhaps would have nothing more than an academic value, repercussions may even be feared which are dangerous to the public interest, for it would not be improbable that unlawful collusions may give way to the prosecution of the less serious offense, as that of libel, leaving unpunished, on the other hand, the more serious transgression. If we allow a complex set of facts principally intended to advance a definite criminal purpose, to be dissociated and divided into as many complaints as are justified by said facts taken separately, instead of trying them all under the common designation of the main offense which the agent sought to commit, a defendant could be harassed with a heap of complaints by dividing the criminal act into several acts, independent from one another. Taking as an example the case under consideration, four complaints could be filed: one for incriminating innocent persons under article 363 of our Penal Code; another for attempted robbery; another for libel; and still another for false testimony, inasmuch as these four offenses fit in perfectly with the facts of the case if these were separated and divided, giving to each part a distinct individuality. We do not believe that an interpretation could be allowed leading to such an outcome which would evidently deviate from the law and from that which is normal and human.

It might perhaps be stated that the complaint for counterfeiting which has originated this case is libelous per se, and that the same having been filed independently from that for attempted robbery imputed by the offended parties to the defendants herein, the case for libel becomes perfectly justified and ought to be sustained. To this we shall answer, reiterating our contention, that what determines the crime is not only the act itself, but the intention of the agent as deduced from all the circumstances and facts of the case. When, upon failure of the intent to obtain money from the offended parties through intimidation, the defendants filed the next day in the justice of peace court the complaint for counterfeiting of coins, what was their underlying purpose? Was it to defame and discredit the reputation of the herein offended parties? Certainly not. Aside from justifying their machinations, their purpose could be no other than to cause the arrest of the defendants, as in fact they were arrested, and to secure their conviction under the said complaint. The defendants Velasco and Simbulan, having been sworn to upon filing it, supposing that the same was false and was filed with knowledge of its falsity, the proper charge that may, by all means, be preferred against them, would be for false testimony, but not for libel. [5] cralaw

The persons accused of libel in the Velasco case are policemen tasked with the official duty to file a criminal complaint against one charged with committing an offense and as found by the C A, their purpose was not to defame and discredit the reputation of the offended parties but to cause their arrest and to secure their convictions under the said complaint. In the instant case, petitioner's alleged objective in sending the letter-reply to respondent's demand letter, i.e., to make known to respondent that he is duty bound to protect a wife of a member of his organization, is not a duty provided for by law and the letter as written by petitioner showed no other purpose but to malign respondent's integrity as a lawyer. Our decision had extensively discussed that petitioner's alleged moral and social duty towards a member's wife cannot be categorized as a privileged communication.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA ESGUERRA-VIDAL
Clerk of Court

First Division


Endnotes:

[1] cralaw Court of Appeals Decision, G.R. No. 43186, February 19, 1937.

[2] cralaw Paras, E., CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED, Vol. 1, Fourteenth edition, 1998, p. 65.

[3] cralaw Id. citing V da. de Miranda, et al. vs. Imperial et al., 77 Phil 1066 (1947).

[4] cralaw Id.

[5] cralaw 2 Appellate Court Reports, pp. 128-129.


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