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A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 06-100-CA-J. May 3, 2006]
JOSE C. DIAZ v. FORMER SEVENTH DIVISION JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
En Banc
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated MAY 3, 2006
A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 06-100-CA-J (Jose C. Diaz v. Former Seventh Division Justices of the Court of Appeals, et al.)
Considering the Report of the Office of the Court Administrator, to wit:
1. AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT filed by Jose C. Diaz, charging Associate Justices PORTIA ALI�O-HORMACHUELOS, REBECCA DE GUIA-SALVADOR and AURORA SANTIAGO- LAGMAN, as members of the Former Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals, with "Bias and Evident Partiality for Defendants-Appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 79136" entitled Jose C. Diaz, plaintiff-appellant, versus Sps. Juan & Elizabeth Diaz, defendants-appellants".
In the aforesaid complaint filed on 11 November 2005, complainant accuses the respondents listed above with "rendering an unjust and unlawful decision against him" in the case mentioned in the preceding paragraph and for denying the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed by him in said case.
The complainant avers that the decision rendered by respondent Justices "was simply a rewrite of the brief of defendants-appellants in digested form". Complainant further avers that the said decision does not conform with the law and the evidence presented in said case. He then narrates the facts as he believes the Court should have found. He argues that because he was a co-owner of a certain property which was sold and with the proceeds being used to buy another property, he should have been held as a co-owner of the newly acquired property as provided by our civil laws.
The complainant further avers that he co-owned, together with his brother Juan (defendant-appellant in the case mentioned above) and his sister Marita, a parcel of real estate situated in Mandaluyong City. He owned 1/8 share and his sister Marita another 1/8, while Juan owned 6/8 share. Complainant avers that he had agreed to the sale of the same and his share in the selling price was P9,000.00. While his sister Marita was given P9,000.00 as her share, complainant states that he only received P2,000.00 from his brother. Complainant further alleges that with the proceeds of the sale, Juan purchased a parcel of land in the Greenhills Subdivision of the Ortigases in San Juan for P115,830.00. The title to this property was issued in the name of his brother Juan and that of his wife Elizabeth only, to his exclusion despite his still being a co-owner of the same.
Some thirty years later, Juan sold the Ortigas property together with the house he had built on it, for thirty one million pesos (P31,000,000.00). The complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City a case for the recovery of a sum of money to which he believed he was entitled as share in the selling price of the Greenhills property.
The Mandaluyong Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of complainant although it did not rule that he was a co-owner of the Greenhills property. The RTC held that Juan owed Jose the remainder of his share in the purchase price of the Mandaluyong property which Jose alleged Juan had withheld form him. The RTC ordered Juan to pay Jose the sum of P7,000.00 representing the portion of his share in the selling price of the Mandaluyong property which Juan had allegedly withheld, with interest. The RTC also granted moral and exemplary damages as well attorney's fees and costs.
Complainant decries the respondents' failure to adopt the findings of fact of the RTC. He argues that this action of the respondents constitute the bias and partiality that he claims characterized their judgment. For this reason, complainant prays that aside from the administrative sanctions which Supreme Court find appropriate, respondents should be made to reimburse him for actual damages in the amount of one million pesos (P1,000,000.00).
2. COMMENT filed by the three respondents. Respondents pray that the Complaint be dismissed outright for lack of merit.
Respondents claim that the complainant basically questions their appreciation of the evidence as well as their application of the law and jurisprudence. They argue that because complainant failed to elevate the questioned judgment to the Supreme Court by way of a Petition for Review, said findings have become final and have been accepted as such by the complainant.
Respondent Justices are correct in their averment that jurisprudence supports their present claim for in Tan Tiac Chiong vs. Cosico, 365 SCRA 589, the Supreme Court held that "(I)f a party is prejudiced by the orders of a judge, his remedy lies with the proper court for the proper judicial action and not with the Office of the Court Administrator by means of an administrative complaint".
It has been consistently held that an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every act of a Judge or Justice alleged to be aberrant or irregular where a judicial remedy exists and is available such as a motion for reconsideration, or an appeal. Obviously, if subsequently developments proved the Judge's challenged order to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against him at all (Flores vs. Adefuin dela Cruz, 440 SCRA 106). Disciplinary proceedings against Judges (and Justices) are not complementary or suppletory of nor a substitute for these judicial remedies. Resort and exhaustion of these judicial remedies are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the Judge concerned. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellant tribunals have spoken with finality that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be opened or closed." (Officers vs. Pamintuan, 443 SCRA 87, citing Flores vs. Abesamis, 275 SCRA 392).
Respondent Justices argue that clearly complainant's remedy was to elevate the questioned judgment to the Supreme Court for review. That he did not prove that he had not [sic] exhausted the judicial remedies of which he could have availed.
Respondent Justices pray that the complaint be dismissed outright for
sheer lack of merit and that pursuant to A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC dated
EVALUATION: Evidently, the complainant has failed to show sufficient reason for the Court to give due course to this case. As stated above, he questions the findings of fact found in the questioned judgment rendered by the three Associate Justices. His action, after the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration should have been to elevate the case to the Supreme Court for review. However, for reasons only known to him, he failed to elevate the case. The decision having attained finality, the findings of fact as well as the application of the law therein are no longer open to question. The filing of the present administrative complaint has, therefore, no legal or factual underpinnings and deserves to be dismissed outright.
It does not mean that in every case where the trial court views the evidence in one way and the appellate court in another, one of them has erred. It is precisely the reason that in the hierarchy of courts the court superior to another is the venue for the review of the lower court's decisions.
In the present case, the trial court found from the evidence before
it that Juan did not deliver to Jose the totality of his share in the sale of Mandaluyong property which they admittedly jointly owned. The court found that Juan gave Jose only
P2,000.00 which he admitted when his total share should have been P9,000.00. This was the amount which Juan gave to their
sister Marita, whose share in the property was the
same as that of the complainant. For
this reason, the trial court held that the defendants (spouses Juan and
Elizabeth) had failed to prove that he had delivered the share of Jose in full.
He failed to substantiate his claim that
aside from the P2,000.00 check he had given to Jose, he had given another P1,000.00
as "balato" to their mother nor the alleged
monthly payment of P100.00 upon the instructions of their mother during the
entire period of their stay with Juan in the house he had constructed on the Greenhills property. In the decretal
portion of his decision, the trial judge merely directed Juan to pay Jose the
sum of P7,000.00 which was withheld from him when the Mandaluyong
property was sold, with interest from
The appealed judgment reversed the lower court and dismissed the complaint. The respondent Justices held that the co-ownership of the Mandaluyong property was terminated when it was sold in 1958, the fact that Juan subsequently purchased the Greenhills property did not create another co-ownership over the latter. The questioned decision points to the fact that there is no evidence, whether documentary or testimonial to show that the Mandaluyong property was purposely sold in order to buy the Greenhills property. The title issued for the Greenhills property does not show that the complainant is one of the co-owners. While in the title to the Mandaluyong property the proportionate share of the co-owners was stated clearly, the respondents found it improbable that the complainant would agree to the title being issued without his name as co-owner if he really was one.
It is rather surprising that the complainant only filed this case against the present respondents. Why did he not file the same case against the trial judge who decided the case not in accordance with his expectations.
The decision of the three respondent Justices mentions the fact that during the nearly thirty years the spouses Juan and Elizabeth Diaz held the property, built their house, occupied the same under the claim of ownership that recognized no other co-owner, complainant Jose was conspicuously silent. It was only when the property was sold for P31 Million (P54Million according to complainant) that complainant awoke from his slumber to claim a portion of the consideration.
RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended that the present administrative complaint be DISMISSED for lack of merit. It is further recommended that the complainant Jose C. Diaz be directed to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be cited in contempt of court for filing such a frivolous and unmeritorious complaint which has deprived the respondent Justices of valuable time which they could have used for more important and pressing duties in the court.
and finding the evaluation and recommendation therein to be in accord with law and the facts of the case, the Court approves and adopts the same.
If a party is prejudiced by the orders of a judge, his remedy lies with the proper court for the proper judicial action and not with the Office of the Court Administrator by means of an administrative complaint. [1] cralaw Complainant should have filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Court. Furthermore, a judge's failure to correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily render him administratively liable. The acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. [2] cralaw
ACCORDINGLY, the administrative complaint against Justices Portia Ali�o-Hormachuelos, Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Aurora Santiago-Lagman is DISMISSED.
Complainant Jose C. Diaz is DIRECTED to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be cited in contempt of court for filing such a frivolous and unmeritorious complaint, within ten (10) days from notice.
Puno, J., on leave.
Very truly yours,
MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court
By:
(Sgd.) FELIPA B. ANAMA
Assistant Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Mamerto Maniquiz Foundation, Inc. v. Pizarro, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1750, January 14, 2005, 448 SCRA 140, 156.
[2] cralaw Claro v. Efondo , A.M. No. MTJ-05-1585, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 218, 219.
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