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[A.C. No. 5830.
MARY D. MALECDAN v. ATTYS. PERCIVAL L. PEKAS AND MATTHEW P. KOLLIN
En Banc
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated SEPT. 12, 2006
A.C. No. 5830 (Mary D. Malecdan v. Attys. Percival L. Pekas and Matthew P. Kollin )
In the Decision of the Court dated January 26, 2004, respondents were found to have violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for appropriating for themselves P30,000.00 as attorney's fees, money belonging to complainant Mary D. Malecdan in the guise of a compromise agreement, and suspending them from the practice of law - Atty. Matthew P. Kollin for three years, and Atty. Percival L. Pekas for six months.
Atty. Pekas filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on
Respondent Atty. Kollin, for his part,
filed a Motion for Reconsideration on
In a Resolution dated
The Court resolves to deny the Motion for Reconsideration of
Atty. Kollin. The
allegations in his motion are but mere reiterations of the allegations made
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline. He had been given ample opportunity to
disprove the charges against him, and he failed to do so. As we had the occasion to state in our
Decision dated
A lawyer may legally apply a client's funds in his possession to satisfy professional fees which the client owes him, in the absence of any dispute as to the legality of the amount thereof [In Re: Rillaroza , 99 Phil. 1041 (1956)]. However, the fact that a lawyer has a lien for his fees on the client's money in his possession or the circumstance that the client owes him more than the client's funds in his hands may not excuse him from making an accounting nor entitle him to unilaterally apply the client's money to satisfy his disputed claims [Domingo v. Domingo, 42 SCRA 131 (1971)]. In this case, the amount of P30,000 which the respondents took for themselves as attorney's fees belonged to a third person, not their client, as admitted by them in their complaint; the owner was, in fact, an adverse party. It was the possession of the money, its entitlement, which was in fact put in issue in the complaint for rescission of contract, and, if respondent Atty. Kollin is to be believed, prompted the filing of the complaint itself. Thus, the respondents could not, without a claiming party's knowledge, apply the amount of P30,000 for themselves as attorney's fees. If there was someone liable for the respondents' attorney's fees, it was their client, Eliza Fanged. It cannot be said that there was a real "compromise" as to the manner in which the amount of P2,600,000 was to be applied, since the complainant was not present when the compromise agreement was made. [1] cralaw
Considering the foregoing, the Court resolves to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Atty. Matthew P. Kollin.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw 421 SCRA 7, 19-20 (2004).
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