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OCA-IPI No. 06-2464-RTJ. September 18, 2006]

SPO3 JOSE V. FABRIQUE v. JUDGE VEDASTO B. MARCO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 81, ROMBLON, ROMBLON

First Division

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated SEPT. 18, 2006 .

OCA-IPI No. 06-2464-RTJ (SPO3 Jose V. Fabrique v. Judge Vedasto B. Marco, Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, Romblon, Romblon )

Acting on the Report [1] cralaw of the Office of the Court Administrator dated August 9, 2006, to wit:

1.������ VERIFIED COMPLAINT dated March 8, 2006 [with enclosures] of SPO3 Jose V. Fabrique charging respondent with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Violation of Article 205 of the Revised Penal Code (Rendering Judgment Thru Inexcusable Negligence or Ignorance) relative to Criminal Case No. 2618 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. SPO4 Fernando Faigao and PO1 Joven Gaca."

Criminal Case No. 2618 stemmed from the criminal complaint for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 instituted by complainant before the Office of the Ombudsman against PNP police officers, SPO4 Faigao and PO1 Gaca. The Information subsequently filed with RTC-Romblon by the Office of the Ombudsman through the Romblon Provincial Prosecution Office alleged that the accused "(gave) unwarranted benefits, through manifest partiality in the discharge of their official function, to one Einstein Falculan, that is by refraining from filing a complaint of (sic) Violation of COMELEC Election Gun Ban against said Einstein Falculan who was arrested for possessing a firearm with the necessary COMELEC exemption sometime [on] July 16, 2002 to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Government."

After the arraignment of both accused on September 13, 2005, their counsel filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the Information does not charge an offense and that the act sought to be prosecuted "does not contemplate a resulting undue injury inasmuch as the damage is not capable of proof of actual damage, i.e., pecuniary measurement. The prosecution filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash contending that it was filed after the arraignment and that the issue of damage is an evidentiary matter that should be ventilated and proven during trial. In a Resolution dated January 12, 2006, respondent ruled for the defense and granted the Motion to Quash.

In the present I.P.I., complainant questions the quashal of the Information. He claims that respondent grossly misinterpreted the provisions of Section 3 (e), RA 3019 by limiting the interpretation of the word "undue injury" to pecuniary loss only. He contends that nowhere in the case of Pecho vs. Sandiganbayan which was cited by respondent in the assailed Resolution does the Supreme Court state that actual damage under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 is similar to "pecuniary loss" as contemplated in civil law. There was also a pre-judgment of the case since the existence or non-existence of undue injury or actual damage may only be proven and established after all the evidence have been presented and considered in a full blown trial.

Moreover, respondent also overlooked the fact that there are two ways of violating Section 3 (e) to wit: (a) by causing any undue injury to any party including the government, or (b) by giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference. Thus, assuming there is no undue injury to a private person or government, the non-filing of criminal case against Mr. Falculan is a violation of Anti-Grant and Corrupt Practices Act as it is a form of giving a private party unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.

Respondent's utter lack of familiarity and inexcusable failure to adhere to the clear provisions of Sec. 3 (e) when he dismissed the case for the reason of and only for the alleged lack of undue injury compromised the outcome of the case, defeated the ends of justice and weakened the government's stand against corruption. Also, his ruling emboldens even more the grafters in uniform to indulge in corrupt practices.

2.������ COMMENT dated April 24, 2006 of respondent Judge Vedasto B. Marco, RTC-Romblon, Branch 81.

Respondent avers that since he is charged merely of "inexcusable negligence or ignorance" and "gross ignorance of the law" and the complaint does not at all impute to him dishonest or improper motives, then it is prematurely filed in light of the settled jurisprudence that an administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal or a petition for review [on] certiorari. He contends that if any error of law was committed by him in issuing the assailed Resolution dated January 16, 2006 in Criminal Case 2618, the proper recourse of any interested party would be to file a Motion for Reconsideration or other applicable remedy. He explains that he may be proven mistaken in his view that "damage" refers to injury capable of pecuniary measurement, this is for the higher courts to rule on review and not for complainant to pontificate. Had the alleged offense which the accused failed to prosecute involved frauds and illegal exactions (Article 213, RPC), malversation of public funds (Article 217, RPC) or failure to make delivery of public funds or property (Article 221, RPC) he would readily agree that pecuniary loss to the government could be conceived. But the non-filing of a criminal case for alleged violation of the COMELEC "gun ban" which is more a function of prosecutors than police officers, simply cannot be thought of as involving pecuniary loss.

Respondent also brands the complaint as baseless as he is tagged to be ignorant of a clearly inexistent legal doctrine. He avers that while complainant questions his interpretation of the word "damage" in Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 with "pecuniary loss", complainant did not cite any Supreme Court decision which holds the contrary view. He denies being grossly ignorant of the law just because he takes a different view from the interpretation that respondent adopted. Moreover, in the words of complainant himself, he simply "misinterpreted" the word damage in Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 and misinterpretation is miles way from gross ignorance.

As to the allegation of his having overlooked the two ways by which Section 3 (e) may be violated, respondent claims it to be specious. He avers that the same was never an issue when the motion to quash was filed and the Provincial Prosecution Office never raised this as an argument. It was therefore not incumbent upon him to rule on a non-issue. Respondent stands by his opinion that "giving any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference" cannot be allowed as an alternative charge If "causing any undue injury to any party" specifically been relied upon. Otherwise, it would result to duplicity of offenses which is prohibited by the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Citing the case of Zuno vs. Cabnee, 444 SCRA 382 (2004), he alleges that for "liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order of a judge must not only be erroneous; more important, it must be motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other similar motive.

3.������ REPLY dated May 26, 2006 of complainant SPO3 Jose V. Fabrique.

Complainant avers that while it may be difficult to establish malice on the part of the respondent in rendering the questioned resolution, it would not be hard, should the case be tried and heard, to prove the existence of friendly relation between respondent and SPO4 Faigao who was one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 2618 and Criminal Case No. 2637 which were all outrightly dismissed by respondent without giving opportunity to the prosecution to amend the informations filed to correct its defects.

Complainant adds that he had the impression from the beginning that respondent had been manifesting partiality in the treatment of the aforesaid cases just to favor Faigao. Allegedly, this was shown by the inaction of respondent judge on the Joint Motions filed by the concerned prosecutor praying for the suspension of Faigao and his co-accused from office pursuant to Section 47 of RA 6970.

EVALUATION. The instant complaint for Gross Ignorance of the Law and Rendering Judgment through Inexcusable Negligence or Ignorance is primarily anchored on the act of respondent of granting the Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 2618. This however is purely a judicial act which as a matter of public policy is not subject to disciplinary actions even if erroneous provided the act was in good faith and without malice.

In his attempt to impute malice to respondent in granting said motion to quash, complainant alleged in his Reply to the Comment of respondent that the latter maintains a friendly relation with SP04 Faigao. This fact alone even if proven is not convincing enough to lead us to conclude that respondent was in fact biased and partial in favor of Faigao and such bias motivated him to dismiss Criminal Case No. 2618 by granting the Motion to Quash. Mere suspicion is not enough. The burden is on the complainant to prove that the respondent was motivated by bad faith and other corrupt motives in dismissing the case. Regularity in the performance of official duties is presumed.

As the instant complaint is solely anchored now on the alleged errors committed by respondent in the exercise of his adjudicative functions, we are constrained to recommend its dismissal. Time and again this Court has ruled that "disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the person of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened or closed." (Flores vs. Abesamis, 275 SCRA 302 [1997])

RECOMMENDATION. Respectfully submitted for the consideration of this Honorable Court is our recommendation that the instant complaint against respondent Judge Vedasto B. Marco be DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Well settled is the rule unless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith or deliberate intent to do an injustice, the respondent judge may not be held administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts or acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, particularly in the adjudication of cases. Further to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous rule or decision he renders would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of the administration of justice can be infallible in his judgment. [2] cralaw

Indeed, complainant failed to adduce evidence to prove bias on the part of respondent in dismissing Criminal Case No. 2618 by granting the Motion to Quash. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence. [3] cralaw Neither could complainant attribute bad faith, ill-will or malice to respondent in his exercise of judicial discretion.

ACCORDINGLY, the complaint against respondent Judge Vedasto B. Marco is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA ESGUERRA-VIDAL
Clerk of Court

First Division


Endnotes:

[1] cralaw Rollo , pp. 35-38.

[2] cralaw Cordero v. Enriquez, A.M. No. CA-04-36, February 18, 2004, 423 SCRA 181, 187.

[3] cralaw Fernandez v. Verzola , A.M. No. CA-04-40, August 13, 2004, 436 SCRA 369, 373.


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