US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

The First Amendment, while prohibiting legislation against free speech as such, was not intended to give immunity to every possible use of language. P. 249 U. S. 206.

A conspiracy to obstruct recruiting by words of persuasion merely, viz., by circulating newspaper publications, with overt acts, is within the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, and within the power of Congress to punish. Pp. 249 U. S. 206, 249 U. S. 208. Schenck v. United States, ante, 249 U. S. 47.

After conviction under an indictment charging such a conspiracy and, as overt acts, the circulation of newspapers containing articles which might well tend to effect its object if circulated in certain places, the court must assume, in the absence of a bill of exceptions, that the evidence as to the quarters reached by the newspapers and the scienter and expectation of the defendant was sufficient to sustain the conviction. P. 249 U. S. 208.

A conspiracy to obstruct recruiting in violation of the Espionage Act is criminal even when no means have been specifically agreed on to carry out the intent, and hence it is not an objection to an indictment that means are not alleged. P. 249 U. S. 209.

Neither, in such an indictment, is it necessary to allege that false reports were made or intended to be made. Id.

An allegation that defendants conspired to accomplish an object necessarily alleges their intent to do so. Id.

Under § 4 of the Espionage Act of 1917, the overt acts are sufficiently alleged as done to effect the object of the conspiracy. Id.

An indictment is not bad for duplicity in setting up in a single count a conspiracy to commit two offenses; the conspiracy is a unit, however diverse its objects. Id.

There is no merit in the suggestion that acts which are not treasonable cannot be punished under the Espionage Act of 1917 upon the theory that other acts included in the statute amount to treason, and can only be punished as such. P. 249 U. S. 210.

The amendment of 1918 did not affect indictments found under the Espionage Act of 1917. Id. chanrobles.com-red

Page 249 U. S. 205

Abuse of discretion is not established by the facts that, upon overruling a demurrer to an indictment, the district court on the next day ordered a plea of not guilty to be entered, refused a continuance, empaneled a jury out of those previously called to meet on that day for the term, and set the trial to begin on the day following. Id.

Affirmed.

The case is stated in the opinion.