RAILWAY EXPRESS AGENCY, INC. V. NEW YORK, 336 U. S. 106 (1949)Subscribe to Cases that cite 336 U. S. 106
U.S. Supreme Court
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949)
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York
Argued December 6, 1948
Decided January 31, 1949
336 U.S. 106
A New York City traffic regulation forbids the operation of any advertising vehicle on the streets, but excepts vehicles which have upon them business notices or advertisements of the products of the owner and which are not used merely or mainly for advertising. An express company, which sold space on the exterior sides of its trucks for advertising and which operated such trucks on the streets, was convicted and fined for violating the ordinance. Upon review here of the state court judgment, held:
1. The regulation does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 336 U. S. 108-109.
(a) The function of this Court upon such review is not to weigh evidence on the due process issue in order to determine whether the regulation is sound or appropriate, nor to pass judgment on the wisdom of the regulation. P. 336 U. S. 109.
(b) This Court can not say that the regulation has no relation to the trnffic problem of the City. P. 109.
2. The exemption of vehicles having upon them advertisements of products sold by the owner does not render the regulation a denial of the equal protection of the laws. Pp. 336 U. S. 109-110. chanrobles.com-red
(a) This Court can not say that the advertising which is forbidden has less incidence on traffic than that which is exempted. P. 336 U. S. 110.
(b) The regulation is not rendered invalid by the fact that it does not extend to what may be even greater distractions affecting traffic safety, such as the spectacular displays at Times Square. P. 336 U. S. 110.
3. The regulation does not burden interstate commerce in violation of Art. I, § 8 of the Federal Constitution. P. 336 U. S. 111.
(a) Where traffic control and the use of highways are involved, and where there is no conflicting federal regulation, great leeway is allowed local authorities, even though the local regulation materially interferes with interstate commerce. P. 336 U. S. 111.
297 N.Y. 703, 77 N.E.2d 13, affirmed.
Appellant was convicted and fined for violation of a traffic regulation of the City of New York. The conviction was sustained by the Court of Special Sessions. 188 Misc. 342, 67 N.Y.S.2d 732. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 297 N Y. 703, 77 N.E.2d 13. On appeal to this Court, affirmed, p. 336 U. S. 111.