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US LAWS, STATUTES & CODES ON-LINE

Rule 43. Presence of the Defendant

(a) Presence Required. The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule.

(b) Continued Presence Not Required. The further progress of the trial to and including the return of the verdict, and the imposition of sentence, will not be prevented and the defendant will be considered to have waived the right to be present whenever a defendant, initially present at trial, or having pleaded guilty or nolo contendere,

(1) is voluntarily absent after the trial has commenced (whether or not the defendant has been informed by the court of the obligation to remain during the trial),

(2) in a noncapital case, is voluntarily absent at the imposition of sentence, or

(3) after being warned by the court that disruptive conduct will cause the removal of the defendant from the courtroom, persists in conduct which is such as to justify exclusion from the courtroom.

(c) Presence Not Required. A defendant need not be present:

(1) when represented by counsel and the defendant is an organization, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 18;

(2) when the offense is punishable by fine or by imprisonment for not more than one year or both, and the court, with the written consent of the defendant, permits arraignment, plea, trial, and imposition of sentence in the defendant's absence;

(3) when the proceeding involves only a conference or hearing upon a question of law; or

(4) when the proceeding involves a reduction or correction of sentence under Rule 35(b) or (c) or 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).

(As amended Apr. 22, 1974, eff. Dec. 1, 1975; Pub. L. 94-64, § 3(35), July 31, 1975, 89 Stat. 376; Mar. 9, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 27, 1995, eff. Dec. 1, 1995; Apr. 24, 1998, eff. Dec. 1, 1998.)

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1944

1. The first sentence of the rule setting forth the necessity of the defendant's presence at arraignment and trial is a restatement of existing law, Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370; Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455. This principle does not apply to hearings on motions made prior to or after trial, United States v. Lynch, 132 F.2d 111 (C.C.A. 3d).

2. The second sentence of the rule is a restatement of existing law that, except in capital cases, the defendant may not defeat the proceedings by voluntarily absenting himself after the trial has been commenced in his presence, Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455; United States v. Noble, 294 F. 689 (D.Mont.)--affirmed, 300 F. 689 (C.C.A. 9th); United States v. Barracota, 45 F.Supp. 38 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v. Vassalo, 52 F.2d 699 (E.D.Mich.).

3. The fourth sentence of the rule empowering the court in its discretion, with the defendant's written consent, to conduct proceedings in misdemeanor cases in defendant's absence adopts a practice prevailing in some districts comprising very large areas. In such districts appearance in court may require considerable travel, resulting in expense and hardship not commensurate with the gravity of the charge, if a minor infraction is involved and a small fine is eventually imposed. The rule, which is in the interest of defendants in such situations, leaves it discretionary with the court to permit defendants in misdemeanor cases to absent themselves and, if so, to determine in what types of misdemeanors and to what extent. Similar provisions are found in the statutes of a number of States. See A.L.I. Code of Criminal Procedure, pp. 881-882.

4. The purpose of the last sentence of the rule is to resolve a doubt that at times has arisen as to whether it is necessary to bring the defendant to court from an institution in which he is confined, possibly at a distant point, if the court determines to reduce the sentence previously imposed. It seems in the interest of both the Government and the defendant not to require such presence, because of the delay and expense that are involved.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1974 AMENDMENT

The revision of rule 43 is designed to reflect Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed. 2d 353 (1970). In Allen, the court held that "there are at least three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge to handle an obstreperous defendant like Allen: (1) bind and gag him, thereby keeping him present; (2) cite him for contempt; (3) take him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly." 397 U.S. at 343-344, 90 S.Ct. 1057.

Since rule 43 formerly limited trial in absentia to situations in which there is a "voluntary absence after the trial has been commenced," it could be read as precluding a federal judge from exercising the third option held to be constitutionally permissible in Allen. The amendment is designed to make clear that the judge does have the power to exclude the defendant from the courtroom when the circumstances warrant such action.

The decision in Allen, makes no attempt to spell out standards to guide a judge in selecting the appropriate method to ensure decorum in the courtroom and there is no attempt to do so in the revision of the rule.

The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan stresses that the trial judge should make a reasonable effort to enable an excluded defendant "to communicate with his attorney and, if possible, to keep apprised of the progress of the trial." 397 U.S. at 351, 90 S.Ct. 1057. The Federal Judicial Center is presently engaged in experimenting with closed circuit television in courtrooms. The experience gained from these experiments may make closed circuit television readily available in federal courtrooms through which an excluded defendant would be able to hear and observe the trial.

The defendant's right to be present during the trial on a capital offense has been said to be so fundamental that it may not be waived. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455, 32 S.Ct. 250, 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912) (dictum); Near v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 929, 931 (4th Cir. 1963); C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 723 at 199 (1969, Supp.1971).

However, in Illinois v. Allen, supra the court's opinion suggests that sanctions such as contempt may be least effective where the defendant is ultimately facing a far more serious sanction such as the death penalty. 397 U.S. at 345, 90 S.Ct. 1057. The ultimate determination of when a defendant can waive his right to be present in a capital case (assuming a death penalty provision is held constitutional, see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972)) is left for further clarification by the courts.

Subdivision (b)(1) makes clear that voluntary absence may constitute a waiver even if the defendant has not been informed by the court of his obligation to remain during the trial. Of course, proof of voluntary absence will require a showing that the defendant knew of the fact that the trial or other proceeding was going on. C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 723 n. 35 (1969). But it is unnecessary to show that he was specifically warned of his obligation to be present; a warning seldom is thought necessary in current practice. [See Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 94 S.Ct. 194, 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973).]

Subdivision (c)(3) makes clear that the defendant need not be present at a conference held by the court and counsel where the subject of the conference is an issue of law.

The other changes in the rule are editorial in nature. In the last phrase of the first sentence, "these rules" is changed to read "this rule," because there are no references in any of the other rules to situations where the defendant is not required to be present. The phrase "at the time of the plea," is added to subdivision (a) to make perfectly clear that defendant must be present at the time of the plea. See rule 11(c)(5) which provides that the judge may set a time, other than arraignment, for the holding of a plea agreement procedure.

NOTES OF COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, HOUSE REPORT NO. 94-247; 1975 AMENDMENT

A. Amendments Proposed by the Supreme Court. Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure deals with the presence of the defendant during the proceedings against him. It presently permits a defendant to be tried in absentia only in non-capital cases where the defendant has voluntarily absented himself after the trial has begun.

The Supreme Court amendments provide that a defendant has waived his right to be present at the trial of a capital or noncapital case in two circumstances: (1) when he voluntarily absents himself after the trial has begun; and (2) where he "engages in conduct which is such as to justify his being excluded from the courtroom."

B. Committee Action. The Committee added language to subdivision (b)(2), which deals with excluding a disruptive defendant from the courtroom. The Advisory Committee Note indicates that the rule proposed by the Supreme Court was drafted to reflect the decision in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). The Committee found that subdivision (b)(2) as proposed did not full track the Allen decision. Consequently, language was added to that subsection to require the court to warn a disruptive defendant before excluding him from the courtroom.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1987 AMENDMENT

The amendments are technical. No substantive change is intended.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1995 AMENDMENT

The revisions to Rule 43 focus on two areas. First, the amendments make clear that a defendant who, initially present at trial or who has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, but who voluntarily flees before sentencing, may nonetheless be sentenced in absentia. Second, the rule is amended to extend to organizational defendants. In addition, some stylistic changes have been made.

Subdivision (a). The changes to subdivision (a) are stylistic in nature and the Committee intends no substantive change in the operation of that provision.

Subdivision (b). The changes in subdivision (b) are intended to remedy the situation where a defendant voluntarily flees before sentence is imposed. Without the amendment, it is doubtful that a court could sentence a defendant who had been present during the entire trial but flees before sentencing. Delay in conducting the sentencing hearing under such circumstances may result in difficulty later in gathering and presenting the evidence necessary to formulate a guideline sentence.

The right to be present at court, although important, is not absolute. The caselaw, and practice in many jurisdictions, supports the proposition that the right to be present at trial may be waived through, inter alia, the act of fleeing. See generally Crosby v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 748, 506 U.S. 255 (1993). The amendment extends only to noncapital cases and applies only where the defendant is voluntarily absent after the trial has commenced or where the defendant has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. The Committee envisions that defense counsel will continue to represent the interests of the defendant at sentencing.

The words "at trial, or having pleaded guilty or nolo contendere" have been added at the end of the first sentence to make clear that the trial of an absent defendant is possible only if the defendant was previously present at the trial or has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. See Crosby v. United States, supra.

Subdivision (c). The change to subdivision (c) is technical in nature and replaces the word "corporation" with a reference to "organization," as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 18 to include entities other than corporations.

COMMITTEE NOTES--1998 AMENDMENT

The amendment to Rule 43(c)(4) is intended to address two issues. First, the rule is rewritten to clarify whether a defendant is entitled to be present at resentencing proceedings conducted under Rule 35. As a result of amendments over the last several years to Rule 35, implementation of the Sentencing Reform Act, and caselaw interpretations of Rules 35 and 43, questions had been raised whether the defendant had to be present at those proceedings. Under the present version of the rule, it could be possible to require the defendant's presence at a "reduction" of sentence hearing conducted under Rule 35(b), but not a "correction" of sentence hearing conducted under Rule 35(a). That potential result seemed at odds with sound practice. As amended, Rule 43(c)(4) would permit a court to reduce or correct a sentence under Rule 35(b) or (c), respectively, without the defendant being present. But a sentencing proceeding being conducted on remand by an appellate court under Rule 35(a) would continue to require the defendant's presence. See, e.g., United States v. Moree, 928 F.2d 654, 655-656 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting distinction between presence of defendant at modification of sentencing proceedings and those hearings that impose new sentence after original sentence has been set aside).

The second issue addressed by the amendment is the applicability of Rule 43 to resentencing hearings conducted under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Under that provision, a resentencing may be conducted as a result of retroactive changes to the Sentencing Guidelines by the United States Sentencing Commission or as a result of a motion by the Bureau of Prisons to reduce a sentence based on "extraordinary and compelling reasons." The amendment provides that a defendant's presence is not required at such proceedings. In the Committee's view, those proceedings are analogous to Rule 35(b) as it read before the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, where the defendant's presence was not required. Further, the court may only reduce the original sentence under these proceedings.

Changes Made to Rule 43 After Publication (``GAP Report''). The Committee made no changes to the draft amendment as published.

1975 Amendment

Pub. L. 94-62 amended subd. (b)(2) generally.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF AMENDMENTS PROPOSED APRIL 22, 1974; EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1975 AMENDMENTS

Amendments of this rule embraced in the order of the United States Supreme Court on Apr. 22, 1974 and the amendments of this rule made by section 3 of Pub. L. 94-64, effective Dec. 1, 1975, see section 2 of Pub. L. 94-64, set out as a note under rule 4 of these rules.

Rule 44. Right to and Assignment of Counsel

(a) Right to Assigned Counsel. Every defendant who is unable to obtain counsel shall be entitled to have counsel assigned to represent that defendant at every stage of the proceedings from initial appearance before the federal magistrate judge or the court through appeal, unless the defendant waives such appointment.

(b) Assignment Procedure. The procedures for implementing the right set out in subdivision (a) shall be those provided by law and by local rules of court established pursuant thereto.

(c) Joint Representation. Whenever two or more defendants have been jointly charged pursuant to Rule 8(b) or have been joined for trial pursuant to Rule 13, and are represented by the same retained or assigned counsel or by retained or assigned counsel who are associated in the practice of law, the court shall promptly inquire with respect to such joint representation and shall personally advise each defendant of the right to the effective assistance of counsel, including separate representation. Unless it appears that there is good cause to believe no conflict of interest is likely to arise, the court shall take such measures as may be appropriate to protect each defendant's right to counsel.

(As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966; Apr. 24, 1972, eff. Oct. 1, 1972; Apr. 30, 1979, eff. Dec. 1, 1980; Mar. 9, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 22, 1993, eff. Dec. 1, 1993.)

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1944

1. This rule is a restatement of existing law in regard to the defendant's constitutional right of counsel as defined in recent judicial decisions. The Sixth Amendment provides:

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."

28 U.S.C. former § 394 (now § 1654) provides:

"In all the courts of the United States the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally, or by the assistance of such counsel or attorneys at law as, by the rules of the said courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein."

18 U.S.C. former § 563 (now § 3005), which is derived from the act of April 30, 1790 (1 Stat. 118), provides:

"Every person who is indicted of treason or other capital crime, shall be allowed to make his full defense by counsel learned in the law; and the court before which he is tried or some judge thereof, shall immediately, upon his request, assign to him such counsel, not exceeding two, as he may desire, and they shall have free access to him at all seasonable hours."

The present extent of the right of counsel has been defined recently in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458; Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275; and Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60. The rule is a restatement of the principles enunciated in these decisions. See, also, Holtzoff, 20 N.Y.U.L.Q.R. 1.

2. The rule is intended to indicate that the right of the defendant to have counsel assigned by the court relates only to proceedings in court and, therefore, does not include preliminary proceedings before a committing magistrate. Although the defendant is not entitled to have counsel assigned to him in connection with preliminary proceedings, he is entitled to be represented by counsel retained by him, if he so chooses, Rule 5(b) (Proceedings before the Commissioner; Statement by the Commissioner) and Rule 40(b)(2) (Commitment to Another District; Removal--Arrest in Distant District--Statement by Commissioner or Judge). As to defendant's right of counsel in connection with the taking of depositions, see Rule 15(c) (Depositions--Defendant's Counsel and Payment of Expenses).

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1966 AMENDMENT

A new rule is provided as a substitute for the old to provide for the assignment of counsel to defendants unable to obtain counsel during all stages of the proceeding. The Supreme Court has recently made clear the importance of providing counsel both at the earliest possible time after arrest and on appeal. See Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958); Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). See also Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Special Committee to Study the Defender System, Equal Justice for the Accused (1959); Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Justice (1963); Beaney, Right to Counsel Before Arraignment, 45 Minn.L.Rev. 771 (1961); Boskey, The Right to Counsel in Appellate Proceedings, 45 Minn.L.Rev. 783 (1961); Douglas, The Right to Counsel--A Foreword, 45 Minn.L.Rev. 693 (1961); Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment; A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1 (1962); Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 Mich.L.Rev. 219 (1962); Symposium, The Right to Counsel, 22 Legal Aid Briefcase 4-48 (1963). Provision has been made by law for a Legal Aid Agency in the District of Columbia which is charged with the duty of providing counsel and courts are admonished to assign such counsel "as early in the proceeding as practicable." D.C. Code § 2-2202. Congress has now made provision for assignment of counsel and their compensation in all of the districts. Criminal Justice Act of 1964 (78 Stat. 552).

Like the original rule the amended rule provides a right to counsel which is broader in two respects than that for which compensation is provided in the Criminal Justice Act of 1964: (1) the right extends to petty offenses to be tried in the district courts, and (2) the right extends to defendants unable to obtain counsel for reasons other than financial. These rules do not cover procedures other than those in the courts of the United States and before United States commissioners. See Rule 1. Hence, the problems relating to the providing of counsel prior to the initial appearance before a court or commissioner are not dealt with in this rule. Cf. Escobedo v. United States, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Enker and Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 Minn.L.Rev. 47 (1964).

Subdivision (a).--This subdivision expresses the right of the defendant unable to obtain counsel to have such counsel assigned at any stage of the proceedings from his initial appearance before the commissioner or court through the appeal, unless he waives such right. The phrase "from his initial appearance before the commissioner or court" is intended to require the assignment of counsel as promptly as possible after it appears that the defendant is unable to obtain counsel. The right to assignment of counsel is not limited to those financially unable to obtain counsel. If a defendant is able to compensate counsel but still cannot obtain counsel, he is entitled to the assignment of counsel even though not to free counsel.

Subdivision (b).--This new subdivision reflects the adoption of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964. See Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States on the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 36 F.R.D. 277 (1964).

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1972 AMENDMENT

Subdivision (a) is amended to reflect the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968. The phrase "federal magistrate" is defined in rule 54.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1979 AMENDMENT

Note to Subdivision (c). Rule 44(c) establishes a procedure for avoiding the occurrence of events which might otherwise give rise to a plausible post-conviction claim that because of joint representation the defendants in a criminal case were deprived of their Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Although "courts have differed with respect to the scope and nature of the affirmative duty of the trial judge to assure that criminal defendants are not deprived of their right to the effective assistance of counsel by joint representation of conflicting interests," Holloway v. Arkansas, 98 S.Ct. 1173 (1978) (where the Court found it unnecessary to reach this issue), this amendment is generally consistent with the current state of the law in several circuits. As held in United States v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1976):

When a potential conflict of interest arises, either where a court has assigned the same counsel to represent several defendants or where the same counsel has been retained by co-defendants in a criminal case, the proper course of action for the trial judge is to conduct a hearing to determine whether a conflict exists to the degree that a defendant may be prevented from receiving advice and assistance sufficient to afford him the quality of representation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. The defendant should be fully advised by the trial court of the facts underlying the potential conflict and be given the opportunity to express his views.

See also United States v. Lawriw, 568 F.2d 98 (8th Cir. 1977) (duty on trial judge to make inquiry where joint representation by appointed or retained counsel, and "without such an inquiry a finding of knowing and intelligent waiver will seldom, if ever, be sustained by this Court"); Abraham v. United States, 549 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Mari, 526 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Truglio, 493 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1974) (joint representation should cause trial judge "to inquire whether the defenses to be presented in any way conflict"); United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1973) (noting there "is much to be said for the rule . . . which assumes prejudice and nonwaiver if there has been no on-the-record inquiry by the court as to the hazards to defendants from joint representation"; United States v. Alberti, 470 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1972) (lack of sufficient inquiry shifts the burden of proof on the question of prejudice to the government); Campbell v. United States, 352 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (where joint representation, court "has a duty to ascertain whether each defendant has an awareness of the potential risks of that course and nevertheless has knowingly chosen it"). Some states have taken a like position; see, e.g., State v. Olsen, __ Minn. ----, 258 N.W.2d 898 (1977).

This procedure is also consistent with that recommended in the ABA Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge (Approved Draft, 1972), which provide in § 3.4(b):

Whenever two or more defendants who have been jointly charged, or whose cases have been consolidated, are represented by the same attorney, the trial judge should inquire into potential conflicts which may jeopardize the right of each defendant to the fidelity of his counsel.

Avoiding a conflict-of-interest situation is in the first instance a responsibility of the attorney. If a lawyer represents "multiple clients having potentially differing interests, he must weigh carefully the possibility that his judgment may be impaired or his loyalty divided if he accepts or continues the employment," and he is to "resolve all doubts against the propriety of the representation." Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 5-15. See also ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function § 3.5(b) (Approved Draft, 1971), concluding that the "potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to act for more than one of several co-defendants except in unusual situations when, after careful investigation, it is clear that no conflict is likely to develop and when the several defendants give an informed consent to such multiple representation."

It by no means follows that the inquiry provided for by rule 44(c) is unnecessary. For one thing, even the most diligent attorney may be unaware of facts giving rise to a potential conflict. Often "counsel must operate somewhat in the dark and feel their way uncertainly to an understanding of what their clients may be called upon to meet upon a trial" and consequently "are frequently unable to foresee developments which may require changes in strategy." United States v. Carrigan, supra (concurring opinion). "Because the conflicts are often subtle it is not enough to rely upon counsel, who may not be totally disinterested, to make sure that each of his joint clients has made an effective waiver." United States v. Lawriw, supra.

Moreover, it is important that the trial judge ascertain whether the effective and fair administration of justice would be adversely affected by continued joint representation, even when an actual conflict is not then apparent. As noted in United States v. Mari, supra (concurring opinion):

Trial court insistence that, except in extraordinary circumstances, codefendants retain separate counsel will in the long run . . . prove salutary not only to the administration of justice and the appearance of justice but the cost of justice; habeas corpus petitions, petitions for new trials, appeals and occasionally retrials . . . can be avoided. Issues as to whether there is an actual conflict of interest, whether the conflict has resulted in prejudice, whether there has been a waiver, whether the waiver is intelligent and knowledgeable, for example, can all be avoided. Where a conflict that first did not appear subsequently arises in or before trial, . . . continuances or mistrials can be saved. Essentially by the time a case . . . gets to the appellate level the harm to the appearance of justice has already been done, whether or not reversal occurs; at the trial level it is a matter which is so easy to avoid.

A rule 44(c) inquiry is required whether counsel is assigned or retained. It "makes no difference whether counsel is appointed by the court or selected by the defendants; even where selected by the defendants the same dangers of potential conflict exist, and it is also possible that the rights of the public to the proper administration of justice may be affected adversely." United States v. Mari, supra (concurring opinion). See also United States v. Lawriw, supra. When there has been "no discussion as to possible conflict initiated by the court," it cannot be assumed that the choice of counsel by the defendants "was intelligently made with knowledge of any possible conflict." United States v. Carrigan, supra. As for assigned counsel, it is provided by statute that " the court shall appoint separate counsel for defendants having interests that cannot properly be represented by the same counsel, or when other good cause is shown." 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A)(b). Rule 44(c) is not intended to prohibit the automatic appointment of separate counsel in the first instance, see Ford v. United States, 379 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1967), which would obviate the necessity for an inquiry.

Under rule 44(c), an inquiry is called for when the joined defendants are represented by the same attorney and also when they are represented by attorneys "associated in the practice of law." This is consistent with Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D) (providing that if "a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employment" because of a potential conflict, "no partner or associate of his or his firm may accept or continue such employment"); and ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function § 3.5(b) (Approved Draft, 1971) (applicable to "a lawyer or lawyers who are associated in practice"). Attorneys representing joined defendants should so advise the court if they are associated in the practice of law.

The rule 44(c) procedure is not limited to cases expected to go to trial. Although the more dramatic conflict situations, such as when the question arises as to whether the several defendants should take the stand, Morgan v. United States, 396 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1968), tend to occur in a trial context, serious conflicts may also arise when one or more of the jointly represented defendants pleads guilty.

The problem is that even where as here both codefendants pleaded guilty there are frequently potential conflicts of interest . . . [T]he prosecutor may be inclined to accept a guilty plea from one codefendant which may harm the interests of the other. The contrast in the dispositions of the cases may have a harmful impact on the codefendant who does not initially plead guilty; he may be pressured into pleading guilty himself rather than face his codefendant's bargained-for testimony at a trial. And it will be his own counsel's recommendation to the initially pleading codefendant which will have contributed to this harmful impact upon him . . . [I]n a given instance it would be at least conceivable that the prosecutor would be willing to accept pleas to lesser offenses from two defendants in preference to a plea of guilty by one defendant to a greater offense.

United States v. Mari, supra (concurring opinion). To the same effect is ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function at 213-14.

It is contemplated that under rule 44(c) the court will make appropriate inquiry of the defendants and of counsel regarding the possibility of a conflict of interest developing. Whenever it is necessary to make a more particularized inquiry into the nature of the contemplated defense, the court should "pursue the inquiry with defendants and their counsel on the record but in chambers" so as "to avoid the possibility of prejudicial disclosures to the prosecution." United States v. Foster, supra. It is important that each defendant be "fully advised of the facts underlying the potential conflict and is given an opportunity to express his or her views." United States v. Alberti, supra. The rule specifically requires that the court personally advise each defendant of his right to effective assistance of counsel, including separate representation. See United States v. Foster, supra, requiring that the court make a determination that jointly represented defendants "understand that they may retain separate counsel, or if qualified, may have such counsel appointed by the court and paid for by the government."

Under rule 44(c), the court is to take appropriate measures to protect each defendant's right to counsel unless it appears "there is good cause to believe no conflict of interest is likely to arise" as a consequence of the continuation of such joint representation. A less demanding standard would not adequately protect the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel or the effective administration of criminal justice. Although joint representation "is not per se violative of constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel, Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, it would not suffice to require the court to act only when a conflict of interest is then apparent, for it is not possible "to anticipate with complete accuracy the course that a criminal trial may take." Fryar v. United States, 404 F.2d 1071 (10th Cir. 1968). This is particularly so in light of the fact that if a conflict later arises and a defendant thereafter raises a Sixth Amendment objection, a court must grant relief without indulging "in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial." Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). This is because, as the Supreme Court more recently noted in Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, "in a case of joint representation of conflicting interests the evil . . . is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing," and this makes it "virtually impossible" to assess the impact of the conflict.

Rule 44(c) does not specify what particular measures must be taken. It is appropriate to leave this within the court's discretion, for the measures which will best protect each defendant's right to counsel may well vary from case to case. One possible course of action is for the court to obtain a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of the right to separate representation, for, as noted in Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, "a defendant may waive his right to the assistance of an attorney unhindered by a conflict of interests." See United States v. DeBerry, supra, holding that defendants should be jointly represented only if "the court has ascertained that . . . each understands clearly the possibilities of a conflict of interest and waives any rights in connection with it." It must be emphasized that a "waiver of the right to separate representation should not be accepted by the court unless the defendants have each been informed of the probable hazards; and the voluntary character of their waiver is apparent." ABA Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge at 45. United States v. Garcia, supra, spells out in significant detail what should be done to assure an adequate waiver:

As in Rule 11 procedures, the district court should address each defendant personally and forthrightly advise him of the potential dangers of representation by counsel with a conflict of interest. The defendant must be at liberty to question the district court as to the nature and consequences of his legal representation. Most significantly, the court should seek to elicit a narrative response from each defendant that he has been advised of his right to effective representation, that he understands the details of his attorney's possible conflict of interest and the potential perils of such a conflict, that he has discussed the matter with his attorney or if he wishes with outside counsel, and that he voluntarily waives his Sixth Amendment protections. It is, of course, vital that the waiver be established by "clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous language." . . . Mere assent in response to a series of questions from the bench may in some circumstances constitute an adequate waiver, but the court should nonetheless endeavor to have each defendant personally articulate in detail his intent to forego this significant constitutional protection. Recordation of the waiver colloque between defendant and judge, will also serve the government's interest by assisting in shielding any potential conviction from collateral attack, either on Sixth Amendment grounds or on a Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment "fundamental fairness" basis.

See also Hyman, Joint Representation of Multiple Defendants in a Criminal Trial: The Court's Headache, 5 Hofstra L.Rev. 315, 334 (1977).

Another possibility is that the court will order that the defendants be separately represented in subsequent proceedings in the case. Though the court must remain alert to and take account of the fact that "certain advantages might accrue from joint representation," Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, it need not permit the joint representation to continue merely because the defendants express a willingness to so proceed. That is,

there will be cases where the court should require separate counsel to represent certain defendants despite the expressed wishes of such defendants. Indeed, failure of the trial court to require separate representation may . . . require a new trial, even though the defendants have expressed a desire to continue with the same counsel. The right to effective representation by counsel whose loyalty is undivided is so paramount in the proper administration of criminal justice that it must in some cases take precedence over all other considerations, including the expressed preference of the defendants concerned and their attorney.
not satisfied that the waiver is proper. For example, a defendant may be competent enough to stand trial, but not competent enough to understand the complex, subtle, and sometimes unforeseeable dangers inherent in multiple representation. More importantly, the judge may find that the waiver cannot be intelligently made simply because he is not in a position to inform the defendant of the foreseeable prejudices multiple representation might entail for him.

As concluded in Dolan, "exercise of the court's supervisory powers by disqualifying an attorney representing multiple criminal defendants in spite of the defendants' express desire to retain that attorney does not necessarily abrogate defendant's sixth amendment rights". It does not follow from the absolute right of self-representation recognized in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), that there is an absolute right to counsel of one's own choice. Thus,

when a trial court finds an actual conflict of interest which impairs the ability of a criminal defendant's chosen counsel to conform with the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, the court should not be required to tolerate an inadequate representation of a defendant. Such representation not only constitutes a breach of professional ethics and invites disrespect for the integrity of the court, but it is also detrimental to the independent interest of the trial judge to be free from future attacks over the adequacy of the waiver or the fairness of the proceedings in his own court and the subtle problems implicating the defendant's comprehension of the waiver. Under such circumstances, the court can elect to exercise its supervisory authority over members of the bar to enforce the ethical standard requiring an attorney to decline multiple representation.

The failure in a particular case to conduct a rule 44(c) inquiry would not, standing alone, necessitate the reversal of a conviction of a jointly represented defendant. However, as is currently the case, a reviewing court is more likely to assume a conflict resulted from the joint representation when no inquiry or an inadequate inquiry was conducted. United States v. Carrigan, supra; United States v. DeBerry, supra. On the other hand, the mere fact that a rule 44(c) inquiry was conducted in the early stages of the case does not relieve the court of all responsibility in this regard thereafter. The obligation placed upon the court by rule 44(c) is a continuing one, and thus in a particular case further inquiry may be necessary on a later occasion because of new developments suggesting a potential conflict of interest.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1987 AMENDMENT

The amendments are technical. No substantive change is intended.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1993 AMENDMENT

The Rule is amended to conform to the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 [P.L. 101-650, Title III, Section 321] which provides that each United States magistrate appointed under section 631 of title 28, United States Code, shall be known as a United States magistrate judge.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1979 AMENDMENT

Amendment of this rule by addition of subd. (c) by order of the United States Supreme Court of Apr. 30, 1979, effective Dec. 1, 1980, see section 1(1) of Pub. L. 96-42, July 31, 1979, 93 Stat. 326, set out as a note under section 3771 of this title.

Rule 45. Time

(a) Computation. In computing any period of time the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, or, when the act to be done is the filing of some paper in court, a day on which weather or other conditions have made the office of the clerk of the district court inaccessible, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is not one of the aforementioned days. When a period of time prescribed or allowed is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation. As used in these rules, "legal holiday" includes New Year's Day, Birthday of Martin Luther King, Jr., Washington's Birthday, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Columbus Day, Veterans Day, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and any other day appointed as a holiday by the President or the Congress of the United States, or by the state in which the district court is held.

(b) Enlargement. When an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice, order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done if the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect; but the court may not extend the time for taking any action under Rules 29, 33, 34 and 35, except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them.

[(c) Unaffected by Expiration of Term.] (Rescinded Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966)

(d) For Motions; Affidavits. A written motion, other than one which may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not later than 5 days before the time specified for the hearing unless a different period is fixed by rule or order of the court. For cause shown such an order may be made on ex parte application. When a motion is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and opposing affidavits may be served not less than 1 day before the hearing unless the court permits them to be served at a later time.

(e) Additional Time After Service by Mail. Whenever a party has the right or is required to do an act within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon that party and the notice or other paper is served by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period.

(As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966; Dec. 4, 1967, eff. July 1, 1968; Mar. 1, 1971, eff. July 1, 1971; Apr. 28, 1982, eff. Aug. 1, 1982; Apr. 29, 1985, eff. Aug. 1, 1985; Mar. 9, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987.)

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1944

The rule is in substance the same as Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [28 U.S.C., Appendix]. It seems desirable that matters covered by this rule should be regulated in the same manner for civil and criminal cases, in order to preclude possibility of confusion.

Note to Subdivision (a). This rule supersedes the method of computing time prescribed by Rule 13 of the Criminal Appeals Rules, promulgated on May 7, 1934, 292 U.S. 661.

Note to Subdivision (c). This rule abolishes the expiration of a term of court as a time limitation for the taking of any step in a criminal proceeding, as is done for civil cases by Rule 6(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [28 U.S.C., Appendix]. In view of the fact that the duration of terms of court varies among the several districts and the further fact that the length of time for the taking of any step limited by a term of court depends on the stage within the term when the time begins to run, specific time limitations have been substituted for the taking of any step which previously had to be taken within the term of court.

Note to Subdivision (d). Cf. Rule 47 (Motions) and Rule 49 (Service and filing of papers).

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1966 AMENDMENT

Subdivision (a).--This amendment conforms the subdivision with the amendments made effective on July 1, 1963, to the comparable provision in Civil Rule 6(a). The only major change is to treat Saturdays as legal holidays for the purpose of computing time.

Subdivision (b).--The amendment conforms the subdivision to the amendments made effective in 1948 to the comparable provision in Civil Rule 6(b). One of these conforming changes, substituting the words "extend the time" for the words "enlarge the period" clarifies the ambiguity which gave rise to the decision in United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220 (1960). The amendment also, in connection with the amendments to Rules 29 and 37, makes it clear that the only circumstances under which extensions can be granted under Rules 29, 33, 34, 35, 37(a)(2) and 39(c) are those stated in them.

Subdivision (c).--Subdivision (c) of Rule 45 is rescinded as unnecessary in view of the 1963 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 138 eliminating terms of court.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1968 AMENDMENT

The amendment eliminates inappropriate references to Rules 37 and 39 which are to be abrogated.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1971 AMENDMENT

The amendment adds Columbus Day to the list of legal holidays to conform the subdivision to the Act of June 28, 1968, 82 Stat. 250, which constituted Columbus Day a legal holiday effective after January 1, 1971.

The Act, which amended Title 5, U.S.C., § 6103(a), changes the day on which certain holidays are to be observed. Washington's Birthday, Memorial Day and Veterans Day are to be observed on the third Monday in February, the last Monday in May and the fourth Monday in October, respectively, rather than, as heretofore, on February 22, May 30, and November 11, respectively. Columbus Day is to be observed on the second Monday in October. New Year's Day, Independence Day, Thanksgiving Day and Christmas continue to be observed on the traditional days.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1982 AMENDMENT

The amendment to subdivision (a) takes account of the fact that on rare occasion severe weather conditions or other circumstances beyond control will make it impossible to meet a filing deadline under Rule 45(a). Illustrative is an incident which occurred in Columbus, Ohio during the "great blizzard of 1978," in which weather conditions deteriorated to the point where personnel in the clerk's office found it virtually impossible to reach the courthouse, and where the GSA Building Manager found it necessary to close and secure the entire building. The amendment covers that situation and also similar situations in which weather or other conditions made the clerk's office, though open, not readily accessible to the lawyer. Whether the clerk's office was in fact "inaccessible" on a given date is to be determined by the district court. Some state time computation statutes contain language somewhat similar to that in the amendment; see, e.g., Md.Code Ann. art. 94, § 2.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1985 AMENDMENT

The rule is amended to extend the exclusion of intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays to the computation of time periods less than 11 days. Under the current version of the Rule, parties bringing motions under rules with 10-day periods could have as few as 5 working days to prepare their motions. This change corresponds to the change being made in the comparable provision in Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a).

The Birthday of Martin Luther King, Jr., which becomes a legal holiday effective January 1986, has been added to the list of legal holidays enumerated in the Rule.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1987 AMENDMENT

The amendments are technical. No substantive change is intended.

Rule 46. Release From Custody

(a) Release Prior to Trial. Eligibility for release prior to trial shall be in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3142 and 3144.

(b) Release During Trial. A person released before trial shall continue on release during trial under the same terms and conditions as were previously imposed unless the court determines that other terms and conditions or termination of release are necessary to assure such person's presence during the trial or to assure that such person's conduct will not obstruct the orderly and expeditious progress of the trial.

(c) Pending Sentence and Notice of Appeal. Eligibility for release pending sentence or pending notice of appeal or expiration of the time allowed for filing notice of appeal, shall be in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3143. The burden of establishing that the defendant will not flee or pose a danger to any other person or to the community rests with the defendant.

(d) Justification of Sureties. Every surety, except a corporate surety which is approved as provided by law, shall justify by affidavit and may be required to describe in the affidavit the property by which the surety proposes to justify and the encumbrances thereon, the number and amount of other bonds and undertakings for bail entered into by the surety and remaining undischarged and all the other liabilities of the surety. No bond shall be approved unless the surety thereon appears to be qualified.

(e) Forfeiture.

(1) Declaration. If there is a breach of condition of a bond, the district court shall declare a forfeiture of the bail.

(2) Setting aside. The court may direct that a forfeiture be set aside in whole or in part, upon such conditions as the court may impose, if a person released upon execution of an appearance bond with a surety is subsequently surrendered by the surety into custody or if it otherwise appears that justice does not require the forfeiture.

(3) Enforcement. When a forfeiture has not been set aside, the court shall on motion enter a judgment of default and execution may issue thereon. By entering into a bond the obligors submit to the jurisdiction of the district court and irrevocably appoint the clerk of the court as their agent upon whom any papers affecting their liability may be served. Their liability may be enforced on motion without the necessity of an independent action. The motion and such notice of the motion as the court prescribes may be served on the clerk of the court, who shall forthwith mail copies to the obligors to their last known addresses.

(4) Remission. After entry of such judgment, the court may remit it in whole or in part under the conditions applying to the setting aside of forfeiture in paragraph (2) of this subdivision.

(f) Exoneration. When the condition of the bond has been satisfied or the forfeiture thereof has been set aside or remitted, the court shall exonerate the obligors and release any bail. A surety may be exonerated by a deposit of cash in the amount of the bond or by a timely surrender of the defendant into custody.

(g) Supervision of Detention Pending Trial. The court shall exercise supervision over the detention of defendants and witnesses within the district pending trial for the purpose of eliminating all unnecessary detention. The attorney for the government shall make a biweekly report to the court listing each defendant and witness who has been held in custody pending indictment, arraignment or trial for a period in excess of ten days. As to each witness so listed the attorney for the government shall make a statement of the reasons why such witness should not be released with or without the taking of a deposition pursuant to Rule 15(a). As to each defendant so listed the attorney for the government shall make a statement of the reasons why the defendant is still held in custody.

(h) Forfeiture of Property. Nothing in this rule or in chapter 207 of title 18, United States Code, shall prevent the court from disposing of any charge by entering an order directing forfeiture of property pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3142(c)(1)(B)(xi) if the value of the property is an amount that would be an appropriate sentence after conviction of the offense charged and if such forfeiture is authorized by statute or regulation.

(i) Production of Statements.

(1) In General. Rule 26.2(a)-(d) and (f) applies at a detention hearing held under 18 U.S.C. § 3142, unless the court, for good cause shown, rules otherwise in a particular case.

(2) Sanctions for Failure to Produce Statement. If a party elects not to comply with an order under Rule 26.2(a) to deliver a statement to the moving party, at the detention hearing the court may not consider the testimony of a witness whose statement is withheld.

(As amended Apr. 9, 1956, eff. July 8, 1956; Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966; Apr. 24, 1972, eff. Oct. 1, 1972; Pub. L. 98-473, title II, § 209(d), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 1987; Mar. 9, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 30, 1991, eff. Dec. 1, 1991; Apr. 22, 1993, eff. Dec. 1, 1993; Pub. L. 103-322, title XXXIII, § 330003(h), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2141.)

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1944

Note to Subdivision (a)(1). This rule is substantially a restatement of existing law, 18 U.S.C. 596, 597 [now 3141].

Note to Subdivision (a)(2). This rule is substantially a restatement of Rule 6 of Criminal Appeals Rules, with the addition of a reference to bail pending certiorari. This rule does not supersede 18 U.S.C. 682 [now 3731] (Appeals; on behalf of the United States; rules of practice and procedure), which provides for the admission of the defendant to bail on his own recognizance pending an appeal taken by the Government.

Note to Subdivision (b). This rule is substantially a restatement of existing law, 28 U.S.C. [former] 657.

Note to Subdivision (d). This rule is a restatement of existing practice, and is based in part on 6 U.S.C. 15 [now 31 U.S.C. 9103] (Bonds or notes of United States in lieu of recognizance, stipulation, bond, guaranty, or undertaking; place of deposit; return to depositor; contractors' bonds).

Note to Subdivision (e). This rule is similar to Sec. 79 of A.L.I. Code of Criminal Procedure introducing, however, an element of flexibility. Corporate sureties are regulated by 6 U.S.C. 6-14 [now 31 U.S.C. 9304-9308].

Note to Subdivision (f). 1. With the exception hereafter noted, this rule is substantially a restatement of existing law in somewhat greater detail than contained in 18 U.S.C. [former] 601 (Remission of penalty of recognizance).

2. Subdivision (f)(2) changes existing law in that it increases the discretion of the court to set aside a forfeiture. The present power of the court is limited to cases in which the defendant's default had not been willful.

3. The second sentence of paragraph (3) is similar to Rule 73(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [28 U.S.C., Appendix]. This paragraph also substitutes simple motion procedure for enforcing forfeited bail bonds for the procedure by scire facias, which was abolished by Rule 81(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Note to Subdivision (g). This rule is a restatement of existing law and practice. It is based in part on 18 U.S.C. 599 [now 3142] (Surrender by bail).

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1966 AMENDMENT

Subdivision (c).--The more inclusive word "terms" is substituted for "amount" in view of the amendment to subdivision (d) authorizing releases without security on such conditions as are necessary to insure the appearance of the defendant. The phrase added at the end of this subdivision is designed to encourage commissioners and judges to set the terms of bail so as to eliminate unnecessary detention. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); Bandy v. United States, 81 S.Ct. 197 (1960); Bandy v. United States, 82 S.Ct. 11 (1961); Carbo v. United States, 82 S.Ct. 662 (1962); review den. 369 U.S. 868 (1962).

Subdivision (d).--The amendments are designed to make possible (and to encourage) the release on bail of a greater percentage of indigent defendants than now are released. To the extent that other considerations make it reasonably likely that the defendant will appear it is both good practice and good economics to release him on bail even though he cannot arrange for cash or bonds in even small amounts. In fact it has been suggested that it may be a denial of constitutional rights to hold indigent prisoners in custody for no other reason than their inability to raise the money for a bond. Bandy v. United States, 81 S.Ct. 197 (1960).

The first change authorizes the acceptance as security of a deposit of cash or government securities in an amount less than the face amount of the bond. Since a defendant typically purchases a bail bond for a cash payment of a certain percentage of the face of the bond, a direct deposit with the court of that amount (returnable to the defendant upon his appearance) will often be equally adequate as a deterrent to flight. Cf. Ill.CodeCrim.Proc. § 110-7 (1963).

The second change authorizes the release of the defendant without financial security on his written agreement to appear when other deterrents appear reasonably adequate. See the discussion of such deterrents in Bandy v. United States, 81 S.Ct. 197 (1960). It also permits the imposition of nonfinancial conditions as the price of dispensing with security for the bond. Such conditions are commonly used in England. Devin, The Criminal Prosecution in England, 89 (1958). See the suggestion in Note, Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70 Yale L.J. 966, 975 (1961) that such conditions "* * * might include release in custody of a third party, such as the accused's employer, minister, attorney, or a private organization; release subject to a duty to report periodically to the court or other public official; or even release subject to a duty to return to jail each night." Willful failure to appear after forfeiture of bail is a separate criminal offense and hence an added deterrent to flight. 18 U.S.C. § 3146.

For full discussion and general approval of the changes made here see Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Criminal Justice 58-89 (1963).

Subdivision (h).--The purpose of this new subdivision is to place upon the court in each district the responsibility for supervising the detention of defendants and witnesses and for eliminating all unnecessary detention. The device of the report by the attorney for the government is used because in many districts defendants will be held in custody in places where the court sits only at infrequent intervals and hence they cannot be brought personally before the court without substantial delay. The magnitude of the problem is suggested by the facts that during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1960, there were 23,811 instances in which persons were held in custody pending trial and that the average length of detention prior to disposition (i.e., dismissal, acquittal, probation, sentence to imprisonment, or any other method of removing the case from the court docket) was 25.3 days. Federal Prisons 1960, table 22, p. 60. Since 27,645 of the 38,855 defendants whose cases were terminated during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1960, pleaded guilty (United States Attorneys Statistical Report, October 1960, p. 1 and table 2), it would appear that the greater part of the detention reported occurs prior to the initial appearance of the defendant before the court.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1972 AMENDMENT

The amendments are intended primarily to bring rule 46 into general conformity with the Bail Reform Act of 1966 and to deal in the rule with some issues not now included within the rule.

Subdivision (a) makes explicit that the Bail Reform Act of 1966 controls release on bail prior to trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 refers to release of a defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3149 refers to release of a material witness.

Subdivision (b) deals with an issue not dealt with by the Bail Reform Act of 1966 or explicitly in former rule 46, that is, the issue of bail during trial. The rule gives the trial judge discretion to continue the prior conditions of release or to impose such additional conditions as are adequate to insure presence at trial or to insure that his conduct will not obstruct the orderly and expeditious progress of the trial.

Subdivision (c) provides for release during the period between a conviction and sentencing and for the giving of a notice of appeal or of the expiration of the time allowed for filing notice of appeal. There are situations in which defense counsel may informally indicate an intention to appeal but not actually give notice of appeal for several days. To deal with this situation the rule makes clear that the district court has authority to release under the terms of 18 U.S.C. § 3148 pending notice of appeal (e.g., during the ten days after entry of judgment; see rule 4(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure). After the filing of notice of appeal, release by the district court shall be in accordance with the provisions of rule 9(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. The burden of establishing that grounds for release exist is placed upon the defendant in the view that the fact of conviction justifies retention in custody in situations where doubt exists as to whether a defendant can be safely released pending either sentence or the giving of notice of appeal.

Subdivisions (d), (e), (f), and (g) remain unchanged. They were formerly lettered (e), (f), (g), and (h).

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1987 AMENDMENT

The amendments are technical. No substantive change is intended.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1991 AMENDMENT

The amendment is technical. No substantive change is intended.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1993 AMENDMENT

The addition of subdivision (i) is one of a series of similar amendments to Rules 26.2, 32, 32.1, and Rule 8 of the Rules Governing Proceedings Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 which extend Rule 26.2 to other proceedings and hearings. As pointed out in the Committee Note to the amendment to Rule 26.2, there is continuing and compelling need to assess the credibility and reliability of information relied upon by the court, whether the witness's testimony is being considered at a pretrial proceeding, at trial, or a post-trial proceeding. Production of a witness's prior statements directly furthers that goal.

The need for reliable information is no less crucial in a proceeding to determine whether a defendant should be released from custody. The issues decided at pretrial detention hearings are important to both a defendant and the community. For example, a defendant charged with criminal acts may be incarcerated prior to an adjudication of guilt without bail on grounds of future dangerousness which is not subject to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the defendant clearly has an interest in remaining free prior to trial, the community has an equally compelling interest in being protected from potential criminal activity committed by persons awaiting trial.

In upholding the constitutionality of pretrial detention based upon dangerousness, the Supreme Court in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1986), stressed the existence of procedural safeguards in the Bail Reform Act. The Act provides for the right to counsel and the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (right of defendant to cross-examine adverse witness). Those safeguards, said the Court, are "specifically designed to further the accuracy of that determination." 481 U.S. at 751. The Committee believes that requiring the production of a witness's statement will further enhance the fact-finding process.

The Committee recognized that pretrial detention hearings are often held very early in a prosecution, and that a particular witness's statement may not yet be on file, or even known about. Thus, the amendment recognizes that in a particular case, the court may decide that good cause exists for not applying the rule.

1994 Amendment

Subd. (i)(1). Pub. L. 103-322 substituted "3142" for "3144".

1984 Amendment

Subd. (a). Pub. L. 98-473, § 209(d)(1), substituted "§ 3142 and 3144" for "§ 3146, § 3148, or § 3149".

Subd. (c). Pub. L. 98-473, § 209(d)(2), substituted "3143" for "3148".

Subd. (e)(2). Pub. L. 98-473, § 209(d)(3), substituted "be set aside in whole or in part upon such conditions as the court may impose, if a person released upon execution of an appearance bond with a surety is subsequently surrendered by the surety into custody or if it otherwise appears that justice does not require the forfeiture" for "set aside, upon such conditions as the court may impose, if it appears that justice does not require the enforcement of the forfeiture".

Subd. (h). Pub. L. 98-473, § 209(d)(4), added subd. (h).

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1956 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Order of April 9, 1956, became effective 90 days thereafter.

Rule 47. Motions

An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. A motion other than one made during a trial or hearing shall be in writing unless the court permits it to be made orally. It shall state the grounds upon which it is made and shall set forth the relief or order sought. It may be supported by affidavit.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1944

1. This rule is substantially the same as the corresponding civil rule (first sentence of Rule 7(b)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) [28 U.S.C., Appendix], except that it authorizes the court to permit motions to be made orally and does not require that the grounds upon which a motion is made shall be stated "with particularity," as is the case with the civil rule.

2. This rule is intended to state general requirements for all motions. For particular provisions applying to specific motions, see Rules 6(b)(2), 12, 14, 15, 16, 17(b) and (c), 21, 22, 29 and Rule 41(e). See also Rule 49.

3. The last sentence providing that a motion may be supported by affidavit is not intended to permit "speaking motions" (e.g. motion to dismiss an indictment for insufficiency supported by affidavits), but to authorize the use of affidavits when affidavits are appropriate to establish a fact (e.g. authority to take a deposition or former jeopardy).

Rule 48. Dismissal

(a) By Attorney for Government. The Attorney General or the United States attorney may by leave of court file a dismissal of an indictment, information or complaint and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate. Such a dismissal may not be filed during the trial without the consent of the defendant.

(b) By Court. If there is unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to a grand jury or in filing an information against a defendant who has been held to answer to the district court, or if there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the court may dismiss the indictment, information or complaint.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1944

Note to Subdivision (a). 1. The first sentence of this rule will change existing law. The common-law rule that the public prosecutor may enter a nolle prosequi in his discretion, without any action by the court, prevails in the Federal courts, Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454, 457; United States v. Woody, 2 F.2d 262 (D.Mont.). This provision will permit the filing of a nolle prosequi only by leave of court. This is similar to the rule now prevailing in many States. A.L.I. Code of Criminal Procedure, Commentaries, pp. 895-897.

2. The rule confers the power to file a dismissal by leave of court on the Attorney General, as well as on the United States attorney, since under existing law the Attorney General exercises "general superintendence and direction" over the United States attorneys "as to the manner of discharging their respective duties," 5 U.S.C. 317 [now 28 U.S.C. 509, 547]. Moreover it is the administrative practice for the Attorney General to supervise the filing of a nolle prosequi by United States attorneys. Consequently it seemed appropriate that the Attorney General should have such power directly.

3. The rule permits the filing of a dismissal of an indictment, information or complaint. The word "complaint" was included in order to resolve a doubt prevailing in some districts as to whether the United States attorney may file a nolle prosequi between the time when the defendant is bound over by the United States commissioner and the finding of an indictment. It has been assumed in a few districts that the power does not exist and that the United States attorney must await action of the grand jury, even if he deems it proper to dismiss the prosecution. This situation is an unnecessary hardship to some defendants.

4. The second sentence is a restatement of existing law, Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454-457; United States v. Shoemaker, 27 Fed. Cases No. 16, 279 (C.C.Ill.). If the trial has commenced, the defendant has a right to insist on a disposition on the merits and may properly object to the entry of a nolle prosequi.

Note to Subdivision (b). This rule is a restatement of the inherent power of the court to dismiss a case for want of prosecution. Ex parte Altman, 34 F.Supp. 106 (S.D.Cal.).

Rule 49. Service and Filing of Papers

(a) Service: When Required. Written motions other than those which are heard ex parte, written notices, designations of record on appeal and similar papers shall be served upon each of the parties.

(b) Service: How Made. Whenever under these rules or by an order of the court service is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party personally is ordered by the court. Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made in the manner provided in civil actions.

(c) Notice of Orders. Immediately upon the entry of an order made on a written motion subsequent to arraignment the clerk shall mail to each party a notice thereof and shall make a note in the docket of the mailing. Lack of notice of the entry by the clerk does not affect the time to appeal or relieve or authorize the court to relieve a party for failure to appeal within the time allowed, except as permitted by Rule 4(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

(d) Filing. Papers required to be served shall be filed with the court. Papers shall be filed in the manner provided in civil actions.

[(e) Filing of Dangerous Offender Notice.] (Abrogated Apr. 27, 1995, eff. Dec. 1, 1995.)

(As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966; Dec. 4, 1967, eff. July 1, 1968; Apr. 29, 1985, eff. Aug. 1, 1985; Mar. 9, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 22, 1993, eff. Dec. 1, 1993; Apr. 27, 1995, eff. Dec. 1, 1995.)

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1944

Note to Subdivision (a). This rule is substantially the same as Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [28 U.S.C., Appendix] with such adaptations as are necessary for criminal cases.

Note to Subdivision (b). The first sentence of this rule is in substance the same as the first sentence of Rule 5(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [28 U.S.C., Appendix]. The second sentence incorporates by reference the second and third sentences of Rule 5(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Note to Subdivision (c). This rule is an adaptation for criminal proceedings of Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [28 U.S.C., Appendix]. No consequence attaches to the failure of the clerk to give the prescribed notice, but in a case in which the losing party in reliance on the clerk's obligation to send a notice failed to file a timely notice of appeal, it was held competent for the trial judge, in the exercise of sound discretion, to vacate the judgment because of clerk's failure to give notice and to enter a new judgment, the term of court not having expired. Hill v. Hawes, 320 U.S. 520.

Note to Subdivision (d). This rule incorporates by reference Rule 5(d) and (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [28 U.S.C., Appendix].

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1966 AMENDMENT

Subdivision (a).--The words "adverse parties" in the original rule introduced a question of interpretation. When, for example, is a co-defendant an adverse party? The amendment requires service on each of the parties thus avoiding the problem of interpretation and promoting full exchange of information among the parties. No restriction is intended, however, upon agreements among co-defendants or between the defendants and the government restricting exchange of papers in the interest of eliminating unnecessary expense. Cf. the amendment made effective July 1, 1963, to Civil Rule 5(a).

Subdivision (c).--The words "affected thereby" are deleted in order to require notice to all parties. Cf. the similar change made effective July 1, 1963, to Civil Rule 77(d).

The sentence added at the end of the subdivision eliminates the possibility of extension of the time to appeal beyond the provision for a 30 day extension on a showing or "excusable neglect" provided in Rule 37(a)(2). Cf. the similar change made in Civil Rule 77(d) effective in 1948. The question has arisen in a number of cases whether failure or delay in giving notice on the part of the clerk results in an extension of the time for appeal. The "general rule" has been said to be that in the event of such failure or delay "the time for taking an appeal runs from the date of later actual notice or receipt of the clerk's notice rather than from the date of entry of the order." Lohman v. United States, 237 F.2d 645, 646 (6th Cir. 1956). See also Rosenbloom v. United States, 355 U.S. 80 (1957) (permitting an extension). In two cases it has been held that no extension results from the failure to give notice of entry of judgments (as opposed to orders) since such notice is not required by Rule 49(d). Wilkinson v. United States, 278 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. den. 363 U.S. 829; Hyche v. United States, 278 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. den. 364 U.S. 881. The excusable neglect extension provision in Rule 37(a)(2) will cover most cases where failure of the clerk to give notice of judgments or orders has misled the defendant. No need appears for an indefinite extension without time limit beyond the 30 day period.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1968 AMENDMENT

The amendment corrects the reference to Rule 37(a)(2), the pertinent provisions of which are contained in Rule 4(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1985 AMENDMENT

18 U.S.C. § 3575(a) and 21 U.S.C. § 849(a), dealing respectively with dangerous special offender sentencing and dangerous special drug offender sentencing, provide for the prosecutor to file notice of such status "with the court" and for the court to "order the notice sealed" under specified circumstances, but also declare that disclosure of this notice shall not be made "to the presiding judge without the consent of the parties" before verdict or plea of guilty or nolo contendere. It has been noted that these provisions are "regrettably unclear as to where, in fact, such notice is to be filed" and that possibly filing with the chief judge is contemplated. United States v. Tramunti, 377 F.Supp. 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). But such practice has been a matter of dispute when the chief judge would otherwise have been the presiding judge in the case, United States v. Gaylor, No. 80-5016 (4th Cir. 1981), and "it does not solve the problem in those districts where there is only one federal district judge appointed," United States v. Tramunti, supra.

The first sentence of subdivision (e) clarifies that the filing of such notice with the court is to be accomplished by filing with the clerk of the court, which is generally the procedure for filing with the court; see subdivision (d) of this rule. Except in a district having a single judge and no United States magistrate, the clerk will then, as provided in the second sentence, transmit the notice to the chief judge or to some other judge or a United States magistrate if the chief judge is scheduled to be the presiding judge in the case, so that the determination regarding sealing of the notice may be made without the disclosure prohibited by the aforementioned statutes. But in a district having a single judge and no United States magistrate this prohibition means the clerk may not disclose the notice to the court at all until the time specified by statute. The last sentence of subdivision (e) contemplates that in such instances the clerk will seal the notice if the case falls within the local rule describing when "a public record may prejudice fair consideration of a pending criminal matter," the determination called for by the aforementioned statutes. The local rule might provide, for example, that the notice is to be sealed upon motion by any party.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1987 AMENDMENT

The amendments are technical. No substantive change is intended.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1993 AMENDMENT

The Rule is amended to conform to the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 [P.L. 101-650, Title III, Section 321] which provides that each United States magistrate appointed under section 631 of title 28, United States Code, shall be known as a United States magistrate judge.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1995 AMENDMENT

Subdivision (e) has been deleted because both of the statutory provisions cited in the rule have been abrogated.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, referred to in subd. (c), are set out in the Appendix to Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.

Rule 50. Calendars; Plans for Prompt Disposition

(a) Calendars. The district courts may provide for placing criminal proceedings upon appropriate calendars. Preference shall be given to criminal proceedings as far as practicable.

(b) Plans for Achieving Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases. To minimize undue delay and to further the prompt disposition of criminal cases, each district court shall conduct a continuing study of the administration of criminal justice in the district court and before United States magistrate judges of the district and shall prepare plans for the prompt disposition of criminal cases in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 208 of Title 18, United States Code.

(As amended Apr. 24, 1972, eff. Oct. 1, 1972; Mar. 18, 1974, eff. July 1, 1974; Apr. 26 and July 8, 1976, eff. Aug. 1, 1976; Apr. 22, 1993, eff. Dec. 1, 1993.)

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1944

This rule is a restatement of the inherent residual power of the court over its own calendars, although as a matter of practice in most districts the assignment of criminal cases for trial is handled by the United States attorney. Cf. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 40 and 78 [28 U.S.C., Appendix]. The direction that preference shall be given to criminal proceedings as far as practicable is generally recognized as desirable in the orderly administration of justice.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1972 AMENDMENT

The addition to the rule proposed by subdivision (b) is designed to achieve the more prompt disposition of criminal cases.

Preventing undue delay in the administration of criminal justice has become an object of increasing interest and concern. This is reflected in the Congress. See, e.g., 116 Cong.Rec. S7291-97 (daily ed. May 18, 1970) (remarks of Senator Ervin). Bills have been introduced fixing specific time limits. See S. 3936, H.R. 14822, H.R. 15888, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).

Proposals for dealing with the problem of delay have also been made by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Courts (1967) especially pp. 84-90, and by the American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Speedy Trial (Approved Draft, 1968). Both recommend specific time limits for each stage in the criminal process as the most effective way of achieving prompt disposition of criminal cases. See also Note, Nevada's 1967 Criminal Procedure Law from Arrest to Trial: One State's Response to a Widely Recognized Need, 1969 Utah L.Rev. 520, 542 no. 114.

Historically, the right to a speedy trial has been thought of as a protection for the defendant. Delay can cause a hardship to a defendant who is in custody awaiting trial. Even if afforded the opportunity for pretrial release, a defendant nonetheless is likely to suffer anxiety during a period of unwanted delay, and he runs the risk that his memory and those of his witnesses may suffer as time goes on.

Delay can also adversely affect the prosecution. Witnesses may lose interest or disappear or their memories may fade thus making them more vulnerable to cross-examination. See Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 Colum.L.Rev. 846 (1957).

There is also a larger public interest in the prompt disposition of criminal cases which may transcend the interest of the particular prosecutor, defense counsel, and defendant. Thus there is need to try to expedite criminal cases even when both prosecution and defense may be willing to agree to a continuance or continuances. It has long been said that it is the certain and prompt imposition of a criminal sanction rather than its severity that has a significant deterring effect upon potential criminal conduct. See Banfield and Anderson, Continuances in the Cook County Criminal Courts, 35 U.Chi.L.Rev. 259, 259-63 (1968).

Providing specific time limits for each stage of the criminal justice system is made difficult, particularly in federal courts, by the widely varying conditions which exist between the very busy urban districts on the one hand and the far less busy rural districts on the other hand. In the former, account must be taken of the extremely heavy caseload, and the prescription of relatively short time limits is realistic only if there is provided additional prosecutorial and judicial manpower. In some rural districts, the availability of a grand jury only twice a year makes unrealistic the provision of short time limits within which an indictment must be returned. This is not to say that prompt disposition of criminal cases cannot be achieved. It means only that the achieving of prompt disposition may require solutions which vary from district to district. Finding the best methods will require innovation and experimentation. To encourage this, the proposed draft mandates each district court to prepare a plan to achieve the prompt disposition of criminal cases in the district. The method prescribed for the development and approval of the district plans is comparable to that prescribed in the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1863(a).

Each plan shall include rules which specify time limits and a means for reporting the status of criminal cases. The appropriate length of the time limits is left to the discretion of the individual district courts. This permits each district court to establish time limits that are appropriate in light of its criminal caseload, frequency of grand jury meetings, and any other factors which affect the progress of criminal actions. Where local conditions exist which contribute to delay, it is contemplated that appropriate efforts will be made to eliminate those conditions. For example, experience in some rural districts demonstrates that grand juries can be kept on call thus eliminating the grand jury as a cause for prolonged delay. Where manpower shortage is a major cause for delay, adequate solutions will require congressional action. But the development and analysis of the district plans should disclose where manpower shortages exist; how large the shortages are; and what is needed, in the way of additional manpower, to achieve the prompt disposition of criminal cases.

The district court plans must contain special provision for prompt disposition of cases in which there is reason to believe that the pretrial liberty of a defendant poses danger to himself, to any other person, or to the community. Prompt disposition of criminal cases may provide an alternative to the pretrial detention of potentially dangerous defendants. See 116 Cong.Rec. S7291-97 (daily ed. May 18, 1970) (remarks of Senator Ervin). Prompt disposition of criminal cases in which the defendant is held in pretrial detention would ensure that the deprivation of liberty prior to conviction would be minimized.

Approval of the original plan and any subsequent modification must be obtained from a reviewing panel made up of one judge from the district submitting the plan (either the chief judge or another active judge appointed by him) and the members of the judicial council of the circuit. The makeup of this reviewing panel is the same as that provided by the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1863(a). This reviewing panel is also empowered to direct the modification of a district court plan.

The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently adopted a set of rules for the prompt disposition of criminal cases. See 8 Cr.L. 2251 (Jan. 13, 1971). These rules, effective July 5, 1971, provide time limits for the early trial of high risk defendants, for court control over the granting of continuances, for criteria to control continuance practice, and for sanction against the prosecution or defense in the event of noncompliance with prescribed time limits.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1974 AMENDMENT

The amendment designates the first paragraph of Rule 50 as subdivision (a) entitled "Calendars," in view of the recent addition of subdivision (b) to the rule.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1976 AMENDMENT

This amendment to rule 50(b) takes account of the enactment of The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3152-3156, 3161-3174. As the various provisions of the Act take effect, see 18 U.S.C. § 3163, they and the district plans adopted pursuant thereto will supplant the plans heretofore adopted under rule 50(b). The first such plan must be prepared and submitted by each district court before July 1, 1976. 18 U.S.C. § 3165(e)(1).

That part of rule 50(b) which sets out the necessary contents of district plans has been deleted, as the somewhat different contents of the plans required by the Act are enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3166. That part of rule 50(b) which describes the manner in which district plans are to be submitted, reviewed, modified and reported upon has also been deleted, for these provisions now appear in 18 U.S.C. § 3165(c) and (d).

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1993 AMENDMENT

The Rule is amended to conform to the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 [P.L. 101-650, Title III, Section 321] which provides that each United States magistrate appointed under section 631 of title 28, United States Code, shall be known as a United States magistrate judge.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1976 AMENDMENT

Amendment of subd. (b) by the order of the United States Supreme Court of Apr. 26, 1976, effective Aug. 1, 1976, see section 1 of Pub. L. 94-349, July 8, 1976, 90 Stat. 822, set out as a note under section 3771 of this title.

Rule 51. Exceptions Unnecessary

Exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary and for all purposes for which an exception has heretofore been necessary it is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the court the action which that party desires the court to take or that party's objection to the action of the court and the grounds therefor; but if a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order, the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice that party.

(As amended Mar. 9, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987.)

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1944

1. This rule is practically identical with Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [28 U.S.C., Appendix]. It relates to a matter of trial practice which should be the same in civil and criminal cases in the interest of avoiding confusion. The corresponding civil rule has been construed in Ulm v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 115 F.2d 492 (C.C.A. 2d), and Bucy v. Nevada Construction Company, 125 F.2d 213, 218 (C.C.A. 9th). See, also, Orfield, 22 Texas L.R. 194, 221. As to the method of taking objections to instructions to the jury, see Rule 30.

2. Many States have abolished the use of exceptions in criminal and civil cases. See, e.g., Cal.Pen. Code (Deering, 1941), sec. 1259; Mich.Stat.Ann. (Henderson, 1938), secs. 28.1046, 28.1053; Ohio Gen Code Ann. (Page, 1938), secs. 11560, 13442-7; Oreg.Comp. Laws Ann. (1940), secs. 5-704, 26-1001.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1987 AMENDMENT

The amendments are technical. No substantive change is intended.

Rule 52. Harmless Error and Plain Error

(a) Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.

(b) Plain Error. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1944

Note to Subdivision (a). This rule is a restatement of existing law, 28 U.S.C. [former] 391 (second sentence): "On the hearing of any appeal, certiorari, writ of error, or motion for a new trial, in any case, civil or criminal, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the entire record before the court, without regard to technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties"; 18 U.S.C. [former] 556; "No indictment found and presented by a grand jury in any district or other court of the United States shall be deemed insufficient, nor shall the trial, judgment, or other proceeding thereon be affected by reason of any defect or imperfection in matter of form only, which shall not tend to the prejudice of the defendant, * * *." A similar provision is found in Rule 61 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [28 U.S.C., Appendix].

Note to Subdivision (b). This rule is a restatement of existing law, Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 658; Hemphill v. United States, 112 F.2d 505 (C.C.A. 9th), reversed 312 U.S. 657. Rule 27 of the Rules of the Supreme Court [28 U.S.C., Appendix] provides that errors not specified will be disregarded, "save as the court, at its option, may notice a plain error not assigned or specified." Similar provisions are found in the rules of several circuit courts of appeals.

Rule 53. Regulation of Conduct in the Court Room

The taking of photographs in the court room during the progress of judicial proceedings or radio broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the court room shall not be permitted by the court.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1944

While the matter to which the rule refers has not been a problem in the Federal courts as it has been in some State tribunals, the rule was nevertheless included with a view to giving expression to a standard which should govern the conduct of judicial proceedings, Orfield, 22 Texas L.R. 194, 222-3; Robbins, 21 A.B.A.Jour. 301, 304. See, also, Report of the Special Committee on Cooperation between Press, Radio and Bar, as to Publicity Interfering with Fair Trial of Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Proceedings (1937), 62 A.B.A.Rep. 851, 862-865; (1932) 18 A.B.A.Jour. 762; (1926) 12 Id. 488; (1925) 11 Id. 64.

Rule 54. Application and Exception

(a) Courts. These rules apply to all criminal proceedings in the United States District Courts; in the District Court of Guam; in the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, except as otherwise provided in articles IV and V of the covenant provided by the Act of March 24, 1976 (90 Stat. 263); and in the District Court of the Virgin Islands; in the United States Courts of Appeals; and in the Supreme Court of the United States; except that the prosecution of offenses in the District Court of the Virgin Islands shall be by indictment or information as otherwise provided by law.

(b) Proceedings.

(1) Removed Proceedings. These rules apply to criminal prosecutions removed to the United States district courts from state courts and govern all procedure after removal, except that dismissal by the attorney for the prosecution shall be governed by state law.

(2) Offenses Outside a District or State. These rules apply to proceedings for offenses committed upon the high seas or elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any particular state or district, except that such proceedings may be had in any district authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3238.

(3) Peace Bonds. These rules do not alter the power of judges of the United States or of United States magistrate judges to hold to security of the peace and for good behavior under Revised Statutes, § 4069, 50 U.S.C. § 23, but in such cases the procedure shall conform to these rules so far as they are applicable.

(4) Proceedings Before United States Magistrate Judges. Proceedings involving misdemeanors and other petty offenses are governed by Rule 58.

(5) Other Proceedings. These rules are not applicable to extradition and rendition of fugitives; civil forfeiture of property for violation of a statute of the United States; or the collection of fines and penalties. Except as provided in Rule 20(d) they do not apply to proceedings under 18 U.S.C., Chapter 403--Juvenile Delinquency--so far as they are inconsistent with that chapter. They do not apply to summary trials for offenses against the navigation laws under Revised Statutes § 4300-4305, 33 U.S.C. § 391-396, or to proceedings involving disputes between seamen under Revised Statutes, § 4079-4081, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 256-258, or to proceedings for fishery offenses under the Act of June 28, 1937, c. 392, 50 Stat. 325-327, 16 U.S.C. § 772-772i, or to proceedings against a witness in a foreign country under 28 U.S.C. § 1784.

(c) Application of Terms. As used in these rules the following terms have the designated meanings.

"Act of Congress" includes any act of Congress locally applicable to and in force in the District of Columbia, in Puerto Rico, in a territory or in an insular possession.

"Attorney for the government" means the Attorney General, an authorized assistant of the Attorney General, a United States Attorney, an authorized assistant of a United States Attorney, when applicable to cases arising under the laws of Guam the Attorney General of Guam or such other person or persons as may be authorized by the laws of Guam to act therein, and when applicable to cases arising under the laws of the Northern Mariana Islands the Attorney General of the Northern Mariana Islands or any other person or persons as may be authorized by the laws of the Northern Marianas to act therein.

"Civil action" refers to a civil action in a district court.

The words "demurrer," "motion to quash," "plea in abatement," "plea in bar" and "special plea in bar," or words to the same effect, in any act of Congress shall be construed to mean the motion raising a defense or objection provided in Rule 12.

"District court" includes all district courts named in subdivision (a) of this rule.

"Federal magistrate judge" means a United States magistrate judge as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 631-639, a judge of the United States or another judge or judicial officer specifically empowered by statute in force in any territory or possession, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia, to perform a function to which a particular rule relates.

"Judge of the United States" includes a judge of a district court, court of appeals, or the Supreme Court.

"Law" includes statutes and judicial decisions.

"Magistrate judge" includes a United States magistrate judge as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 631-639, a judge of the United States, another judge or judicial officer specifically empowered by statute in force in any territory or possession, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia, to perform a function to which a particular rule relates, and a state or local judicial officer, authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3041 to perform the functions prescribed in Rules 3, 4, and 5.

"Oath" includes affirmations.

"Petty offense" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 19.

"State" includes District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, territory and insular possession.

"United States magistrate judge" means the officer authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 631-639.

(As amended Dec. 27, 1948, eff. Oct. 20, 1949; Apr. 9, 1956, eff. July 8, 1956; Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966; Apr. 24, 1972, eff. Oct. 1, 1972; Apr. 28, 1982, eff. Aug. 1, 1982; Pub. L. 98-473, title II, § 209(e), 215(e), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 1987, 2016; Pub. L. 100-690, title VII, § 7089(c), Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4409; May 1, 1990, eff. Dec. 1, 1990; Apr. 30, 1991, eff. Dec. 1, 1991; Apr. 22, 1993, eff. Dec. 1, 1993; Apr. 26, 1999, eff. Dec. 1, 1999.)

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1944

Note to Subdivision (a)(1). 1. The Act of June 28, 1940 (54 Stat. 688; 18 U.S.C. 687 [see 3771]), authorizing the Supreme Court to prescribe rules of criminal procedure for the district courts of the United States in respect to proceedings prior to and including verdict or finding of guilty or not guilty or plea of guilty, is expressly applicable to the district courts of Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Canal Zone, Virgin Islands, the Supreme Courts of Hawaii and Puerto Rico, and the United States Court for China. This is likewise true of the Act of February 24, 1933 (47 Stat. 904; 18 U.S.C. 688 [see 3772]), authorizing the Supreme Court to prescribe rules in respect to proceedings after verdict or finding or after plea of guilty. In this respect these two statutes differ from the Act of June 19, 1934 (48 Stat. 1064; 28 U.S.C. 723b, 723c [now 2072]), authorizing the Supreme Court to prescribe rules of civil procedure. The last-mentioned Act comprises only district courts of the United States and the courts of the District of Columbia. The phrase "district courts of the United States" was held not to include district courts in the territories and insular possessions, Mookini v. United States, 303 U.S. 201. By subsequent legislation the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were extended to the District Court of the United States for Hawaii and to appeals therefrom (Act of June 19, 1939; 53 Stat. 841; 48 U.S.C. 646) and to the District Court of the United States for Puerto Rico and to appeals therefrom (Act of February 12, 1940; 54 Stat. 22; 48 U.S.C. 873a).

2. While the specific reference in the rule to the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia is probably superfluous, since that court has the same powers and exercises the same jurisdiction as other district courts of the United States in addition to such local powers and jurisdiction as have been conferred upon it by statute (D.C. Code, 1940, Title 11, § 305), nevertheless it was listed in the rule in view of the fact that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [28 U.S.C., Appendix] contain a somewhat similar provision (Rule 81(d)).

3. The United States Court for China has been omitted from the rule in view of the fact that the court has recently been abolished with the abandonment by the United States of its extraterritorial jurisdiction in China.

4. Although, as indicated above, the rule-making power of the Supreme Court in respect to criminal cases extends to the Supreme Courts of Hawaii and Puerto Rico, the rules are not made applicable to those two courts, in view of the fact that they are purely local appellate courts having no appellate jurisdiction over the district courts of the United States in those territories. Alaska and Hawaii have dual systems of courts: local courts exercising purely local jurisdiction and United States district courts exercising Federal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of each of the two territories hears appeals only from the local courts.

5. Alaska.--There is a district court for the Territory of Alaska consisting of four divisions, established on a territorial basis, 48 U.S.C. 101, 101a. As the only court in the Territory, it acts in a dual capacity: it has jurisdiction over cases arising under the laws of the United States as well as those arising under local laws. Although a legislative rather than a constitutional court, it is, nevertheless, deemed a court of the United States and has the jurisdiction of district courts of the United States, 48 U.S.C. 101, 101a; Steamer Coquitlam v. United States, 163 U.S. 346; McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174, 179; Ex parte Krause, 228 F. 547, 549 (W.D.Wash.). Criminal procedure is now regulated by Acts of Congress, by the Alaska Code of Criminal Procedure (Alaska Comp. Laws, 1933, pp. 959-1018), and by rules promulgated by the district court.

6. Hawaii.--Hawaii has a dual system of courts. The United States District Court for the Territory of Hawaii, a legislative court, has the jurisdiction of district courts of the United States and proceeds therein "in the same manner as a district court," 48 U.S.C. 641, 642. In addition, there are circuit courts having jurisdiction over cases arising under local laws. Appeals from the circuit courts run to the Supreme Court of the Territory, 48 U.S.C. 631. These rules are made applicable to the district court, but not to the local courts. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been made applicable to the district court and to appeals therefrom, 48 U.S.C. 646.

7. Puerto Rico.--Puerto Rico has a dual system of courts. The District Court of the United States for Puerto Rico, a legislative court, has jurisdiction of all cases cognizable in the district courts of the United States and proceeds "In the same manner," 48 U.S.C. 863.

In addition, there are local courts for the trial of cases arising under local law, appeals therefrom running to the Supreme Court of the Territory. These rules are made applicable to the district court, but not to the local courts. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [28 U.S.C., Appendix] have been extended to the district court, 48 U.S.C. 873a.

8. Virgin Islands.--In the Virgin Islands there is a District Court of the Virgin Islands, a legislative court, consisting of two divisions and exercising both Federal and local jurisdiction, 48 U.S.C. 1405z, 1406. Heretofore the rules of practice and procedure have been prescribed "by law or ordinance or by rules and regulations of the district judge not inconsistent with law or ordinance," 48 U.S.C. 1405z.

9. Canal Zone.--In the Canal Zone there is a United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, a legislative court, exercising both Federal and local jurisdiction, 48 U.S.C. 1344, 1345. Criminal procedure is regulated by the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Canal Zone (Canal Zone Code, Title 6; 48 Stat. 1122), and by rules of practice and procedure prescribed by the district judge, 48 U.S.C. 1344. There are no grand juries in the district, all prosecutions being instituted by information. In the light of these circumstances and because of the peculiar status of the Canal Zone and its quasi-military nature, these rules have been made applicable to its district court, only with respect to proceedings after verdict or finding of guilty or plea of guilty.

10. By order dated March 31, 1941, effective July 1, 1941, the Supreme Court extended the rules of practice and procedure after plea of guilty, verdict or finding of guilty, in criminal cases, to the district courts of Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Canal Zone, and Virgin Islands, and all subsequent proceedings in such cases in the United States circuit courts of appeals and in the Supreme Court of the United States, 312 U.S. 721.

Note to Subdivision (a)(2). 1. Rules 3, 4, and 5, supra, relate to proceedings before United States commissioners.

2. Justices and judges of the United States, as well as United States commissioners, may issue warrants and conduct proceedings as committing magistrates, 18 U.S.C. 591 [now 3041] (Arrest and removal for trial); 9 Edmunds, Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure, 2d Ed., secs. 3800, 3819.

3. In the District of Columbia judges of the Municipal Court have authority to issue warrants and conduct proceedings as committing magistrates, D.C. Code, 1940, Title 11, secs. 602, 755. These proceedings are governed by these rules. The Municipal Court of the District of Columbia is also a local court for the trial of misdemeanors, but when so acting it is not a court of the United States. These rules, therefore, do not apply to such proceedings.

4. State and local judges and magistrates may issue warrants and act as committing magistrates in Federal cases, 18 U.S.C. 591 [now 3041]. Only a very small proportion of cases are brought before them, however, and then ordinarily only in an emergency. Since these judicial officers may not be familiar with Federal procedure, these rules have not been made applicable to such proceedings.

Note to Subdivision (b)(1). 1. Certain types of State criminal prosecutions, principally those in which defendant is an officer appointed under or acting by authority of a revenue law of the United States and is prosecuted on account of an act done under color of his office, are removable to a Federal court on defendant's motion, 28 U.S.C. 74 [now 1443, 1446, 1447] (Removal of suits from State courts; causes against persons denied civil rights); sec. 76 [now 1442, 1446, 1447] (Removal of suits from State courts; suits and prosecutions against revenue officers). In such cases the Federal court applies the substantive law of the State, but follows Federal procedure; State of Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257; Carter v. Tennessee, 18 F.2d 850 (C.C.A. 6th); Miller v. Kentucky, 40 F.2d 820 (C.C.A. 6th). See also, State of Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9. The rule is, therefore, a restatement of existing law, except that it does not affect whatever power the State prosecutor may have as to dismissal.

2. The rule does not affect the mode of removing a case from a State to a Federal court and leaves undisturbed the statutes governing this matter, 28 U.S.C. 74-76 [now 1442, 1443, 1446, 1447].

Note to Subdivision (b)(2). This rule should be read in conjunction with Rule 18, which provides that "Except as otherwise permitted by statute or by these rules, the prosecution shall be held in a district in which the offense was committed * * *".

Note to Subdivision (b)(4). United States commissioners specially designated for that purpose by the court by which they are appointed have trial jurisdiction over petty offenses committed on Federal reservations if the defendant waives his right to be tried in the district court and consents to be tried before the commissioner. Act of October 9, 1940, 54 Stat. 1058, 18 U.S.C. 576 [now 3401]. A petty offense is an offense the penalty for which does not exceed confinement in a common jail without hard labor for a period of six months or a fine of $500, or both, 18 U.S.C. 541 [see 1]. Appeals from convictions by commissioners lie to the district court, 18 U.S.C. 576a [now 3402]. These rules do not apply to trials before United States commissioners in such cases, since rules of procedure and practice in such matters were specially prescribed by the Supreme Court on January 6, 1941, 311 U.S. 733 et seq. The substantive law applicable in such cases with respect to offenses other than so-called Federal offenses is governed by 18 U.S.C. 468 [now 13] (Laws of States adopted for punishing wrongful acts; effect of repeal). In addition, National Park commissioners have limited trial jurisdiction with respect to offenses committed in National Parks. Trials before commissioners in such cases are not governed by these rules, although when a National Park commissioner conducts a proceeding as a committing magistrate, these rules are applicable.

Among the statutes relating to jurisdiction of and proceedings before National Park commissioners are the following:
U.S.C., Title 16:

 Section 10 (Arrests by employees of park service for violation of laws and regulations)

 Section 10a (Arrests by employees for violation of regulations made under § 9a)

 Section 27 (Yellowstone National Park; commissioner; jurisdiction and powers)

 Section 66 (Yosemite and Sequoia National Parks; commissioners; appointment; jurisdiction)

 Section 70 (Same; arrests by commissioners for certain offenses; holding persons arrested for trial; bail)

 Section 101 (Mount Rainier National Park; commissioner; arrest; bail)

 Section 102 (Same; commissioner; direction of process of; arrests by other officers)

 Section 117b (Mesa Verde National Park; application of Colorado laws to offenses)

 Section 117f (Same; criminal offenses not covered by section 117c; jurisdiction of commissioner)

 Section 117g (Same; process to whom issued; arrests without process)

 Section 129 (Crater Lake National Park; commissioner; appointment; powers and duties)

 Section 130 (Same; commissioner; arrests by; bail)

 Section 131 (Same; commissioner; direction of process; arrest without process)

 Section 172 (Glacier National Park; commissioner; jurisdiction; powers and duties)

 Section 173 (Same; commissioner; arrest of offenders, confinement, and bail)

 Section 174 (Same; commissioner; process directed to marshal; arrest without process)

 Section 198b (Rocky Mountain National Park; punishment of offenses; Colorado laws when followed)

 Section 198e (Same; United States Commissioner; appointment; jurisdiction; issuing process; appeals; rules of procedure)

 Section 198f (Same; United States Commissioner; arrest of persons for offenses not covered by section 198c; bail)

 Section 198g (Same; United States Commissioner; process to whom directed; arrest without process)

 Section 204b (Lassen Volcanic National Park; application of California laws to offenses)

 Section 204e (Same; United States Commissioner; appointment; jurisdiction of offenses; appeals; rules of procedure)

 Section 204f (Same; criminal offenses not covered by section 204c; jurisdiction of commissioner)

 Section 204g (Same; process to whom issued; arrests without process)

 Section 376 (Hot Springs National Park; prosecutions for violations of law or rules and regulations)

 Section 377 (Same; prosecutions for other offenses)

 Section 378 (Same; process directed to marshal; arrests by others)

 Section 381 (Same; execution of sentence on conviction)

 Section 382 (Same; imprisonment for nonpayment of fines or costs)

 Section 395b (Hawaii National Park; application of Hawaiian laws to offenses)

 Section 395e (Same; United States Commissioner; appointment; jurisdiction of offenses; appeals; rules of procedure; acting commissioners)

 Section 395f (Same; criminal offenses not covered by section 395c; jurisdiction of commissioner)

 Section 395g (Same; process to whom issued; arrests without process)

 Section 403c-1 (Shenandoah National Park and Great Smoky Mountains National Park; notice of assumption of police jurisdiction over Shenandoah Park by United States; exceptions)

 Section 403c-5 (Same; United States Commissioner; appointment; jurisdiction of offenses; appeals; rules of procedure)

 Section 403c-6 (Same; jurisdiction of other commissioners)

 Section 403c-7 (Same; commissioner's jurisdiction of offenses not covered by section 403c-2)

 Section 403c-8 (Same; process to whom directed, arrest without process)

 Section 415 (National Military Parks; arrest and prosecution of offenders)

Note to Subdivision (b)(5). 1. Foreign extradition proceedings are governed by the following statutes:
U.S.C., Title 18:

 Section 651 [now 3184] (Fugitives from foreign country)

 Section 652 [now 3185] (Fugitives from country under control of United States)

 Section 653 [now 3186] (Surrender of fugitive)

 Section 654 [now 3188] (Time allowed for extradition)

 Section 655 [now 3190] (Evidence on hearing)

 Section 656 [now 3191] (Witnesses for indigent defendants)

 Section 657 [now 3189] (Place and character of hearing)

 Section 658 [now 3181] (Continuance of provisions limited)

 Section 659 [now 3192] (Protection of accused)

 Section 660 [now 3193] (Agent receiving offenders; powers)

Interstate rendition or extradition proceedings are governed by the following statutes:
U.S.C., Title 18:

 Section 662 [now 3182, 3195] (Fugitives from State or Territory)

 Section 662c [now 752, 3183, 3195] (Fugitives from State or Territory; arrest and removal)

 Section 662d [now 3187, 3195] (Fugitives from State or Territory; provisional arrest and detention)

2. Proceedings relating to forfeiture of property used in connection with a violation of a statute of the United States are governed by various statutes, among which are following:
U.S.C., Title 16:

 Section 26 (Yellowstone Park; regulations for hunting and fishing in; punishment for violation; forfeitures)

 Section 65 (Yosemite and Sequoia National Parks; seizure and forfeiture of guns, traps, teams, horses, and so forth)

 Section 99 (Mount Rainier National Park; protection of game and fish; forfeitures of guns, traps, teams, and so forth)

 Section 117d (Mesa Verde National Park; forfeiture of property used for unlawful purpose)

 Section 128 (Crater Lake National Park; hunting and fishing; forfeitures or seizure of guns, traps, teams, etc., for violating regulations)

 Section 171 (Glacier National Park; hunting and fishing; forfeitures and seizures of guns, traps, teams, and so forth)

 Section 198d (Rocky Mountain National Park; forfeiture of property used in commission of offenses)

 Section 204d (Lassen Volcanic National Park; forfeiture of property used for unlawful purposes)

 Section 635 (Importing illegally taken skins; forfeiture)

 Section 706 (Arrests; search warrants)

 Section 727 (Upper Mississippi River Wild Life and Fish Refuge; powers of employees of Department of the Interior; searches and seizures)

 Section 772e (Penalties and forfeitures)
U.S.C., Title 18:

 Section 286 [now 492] (Forfeiture of counterfeit obligations, etc.; failure to deliver)

 Section 645 [now 3611] (Confiscation of firearms possessed by convicted felons)

 Section 646 [now 3617] (Remission or mitigation of forfeitures under liquor laws; possession pending trial)

 Section 647 [see 3616] (Use of confiscated motor vehicles)
U.S.C., Title 19:

 Section 483 [see 1595a] (Forfeitures; penalty for aiding unlawful importation)

 Section 1592 (Fraud; penalty against goods)

 Section 1602 (Seizure; report to collector)

 Section 1603 (Seizure; collector's reports)

 Section 1604 (Seizure; prosecution)

 Section 1605 (Seizure; custody)

 Section 1606 (Seizure; appraisement)

 Section 1607 (Seizure; value $1,000 or less)

 Section 1608 (Seizure; claims; judicial condemnation)

 Section 1609 (Seizure; summary of forfeiture and sale)

 Section 1610 (Seizure; value more than $1,000)

 Section 1611 (Seizure; sale unlawful)

 Section 1612 (Seizure; summary sale)

 Section 1613 (Disposition of proceeds of forfeited property)

 Section 1614 (Release of seized property)

 Section 1615 (Burden of proof in forfeiture proceedings)

 Section 1703 (Seizure and forfeiture of vessels)

 Section 1705 (Destruction of forfeited vessel)
U.S.C., Title 21:

 Section 334 (Seizure)

 Section 337 (Proceedings in name of United States; provision as to subpenas)
U.S.C., Title 22:

 Section 401 (Seizure of war materials intended for unlawful export generally; forfeiture)

 Section 402 (Seizure of war materials intended for unlawful export generally; warrant for detention of seized property)

 Section 403 (Seizure of war materials intended for unlawful export generally; petition for restoration of seized property)

 Section 404 (Seizure of war materials intended for unlawful export generally; libel and sale of seized property)

 Section 405 (Seizure of war materials intended for unlawful export generally; method of trial; bond for redelivery)

 Section 406 (Seizure of war materials intended for unlawful export generally; sections not to interfere with foreign trade)
U.S.C., Title 26:

 Section 3116 [now 7302] (Forfeitures and seizures)

3. Collection of fines and penalties is accomplished in the same manner as the collection of a civil judgment. See Rule 69(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [28 U.S.C., Appendix]. For mode of discharging indigent convicts imprisoned for non-payment of fine, see 18 U.S.C. 641 [now 3569].

4. The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. 921-929 [now 5031-5037], authorizes prosecution of a juvenile delinquent on the charge of juvenile delinquency, if the juvenile consents to this procedure. In such cases the court may be convened at any time and place, in chambers or otherwise, and the trial is without a jury. The purpose of excepting proceedings under the act is to make inapplicable to them the requirement of an arraignment in open court (Rule 10) and other similar provisions.

5. As habeas corpus proceedings are regarded as civil proceedings, they are not governed by these rules. The procedure in such cases is prescribed by 28 U.S.C. 451-466 [now 2241-2243, 2251-2253]. Appeals in habeas corpus proceedings are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 81(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [28 U.S.C., Appendix].

Note to Subdivision (c). 1. This rule is analogous to Rule 81(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [28 U.S.C., Appendix].

2. 1 U.S.C. § 1-6, containing general rules of construction, should be read in conjunction with this rule.

3. In connection with the definition of "attorney for the Government", see the following statutes:
U.S.C., Title 5:

 Section 291 [now 28 U.S.C. 501] (Establishment of Department)

 Section 293 [now 28 U.S.C. 505] (Solicitor General)

 Section 294 [now 28 U.S.C. 504] (Assistant to Attorney General)

 Section 295 [now 28 U.S.C. 506] (Assistant Attorneys General)

 Section 309 [now 28 U.S.C. 518] (Conduct and argument of cases by Attorney General and Solicitor General)

 Section 310 [now 28 U.S.C. 515] (Conduct of legal proceedings)

 Section 311 [former] (Performance of duty by officers of Department)

 Section 312 [now 28 U.S.C. 543, 547, 548] (Counsel to aid district attorneys)

 Section 315 [now 28 U.S.C. 515] (Appointment and oath of special attorneys or counsel)
U.S.C., Title 28:

 Section 481 [now 541] (District attorneys)

 Section 483 [now 542] (Assistant district attorneys)

 Section 485 [now 547] (District attorneys; duties)

4. The last sentence of this rule has particular reference to 18 U.S.C. 682 [now 3731]. (Appeals; on behalf of the United States; rules of practice and procedure), which authorizes the United States to appeal in criminal cases from a decision on a motion to quash, a demurrer or a special plea in bar, if the defendant has not been placed in jeopardy. It is intended that the right of the Government to appeal in such cases should not be affected as the result of the substitution of a motion under Rule 12 for a demurrer, motion to quash and a special plea in bar. The rule is equally applicable to any other statute employing the same terminology.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1948 AMENDMENT

Subdivision (a)(1).--To conform to the nomenclature of revised Title 28 with respect to district courts and courts of appeals (28 U.S.C. § 132(a), 43(a)); to eliminate special reference to the district courts for the District of Columbia, Hawaii and Puerto Rico which are now United States district courts for all purposes (28 U.S.C. § 88, 91, 119, 132, 133, 451), and to eliminate special reference to the court of appeals for the District of Columbia which is now a United States court of appeals for all purposes (28 U.S.C. § 41, 43).

Subdivision (b).--The amendment to paragraph (1) is to incorporate nomenclature of Revised Title 28 and in paragraphs (2), (3), (4), and (5) to insert proper reference to Title 18 and 28 in place of repealed acts.

Subdivision (c).--Under revised Title 28 the justices of the United States Court of Appeals and District Court for the District of Columbia become circuit and district judges (see 28 U.S.C. § 44, 133) and the use of the descriptive phrase "senior circuit judge" is abandoned in favor of the title "chief judge" in all circuits including the District of Columbia.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1966 AMENDMENT

Subdivision (a).--The first change reflects the granting of statehood to Alaska. The second change conforms to Section 3501 of the Canal Zone Code.

Subdivision (b).--The change is made necessary by the new provision in Rule 20(d).

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1972 AMENDMENT

Subdivisions (a) and (b) are amended to delete the references to "commissioners" and to substitute, where appropriate, the phrase "United States magistrates."

Subdivision (a)(2) is deleted. In its old form it makes reference to "rules applicable to criminal proceedings before commissioners," which are now replaced by the Rules of Procedure for the Trial of Minor Offenses before United States Magistrates (1971). Rule 1 of the magistrates' rules provides that they are applicable to cases involving "minor offenses" as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3401 "before United States magistrates." Cases involving "minor offenses" brought before a judge of the district court will be governed by the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts.

The last sentence of old subdivision (a)(2) is stricken for two reasons: (1) Whenever possible, cases should be brought before a United States magistrate rather than before a state or local judicial officer authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3041. (2) When a state or local judicial officer is involved, he should conform to the federal rules.

Subdivision (b)(4) makes clear that minor offense cases before United States magistrates are governed by the Rules of Procedure for the Trial of Minor Offenses before United States Magistrates (1971). See rule 1 of the magistrates' rules.

In subdivision (b)(5) the word "civil" is added before the word "forfeiture" to make clear that the rules do apply to criminal forfeitures. This is clearly the intention of Congress. See Senate Report No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Dec. 16, 1969, at 160:

Subsection (a) provides the remedy of criminal forfeiture. Forfeiture trials are to be governed by the Fed. R. Crim. P. But see Fed. R. Crim. P. 54(b)(5).

Subdivision (c) is amended to list the defined terms in alphabetical order to facilitate the use of the rule. There are added six new definitions.

"Federal magistrate" is a phrase to be used whenever the rule is intended to confer authority on any federal judicial officer including a United States magistrate.

"Judge of the United States" is a phrase defined to include district court, court of appeals, and supreme court judges. It is used in the rules to indicate that only a judge (not to include a United States magistrate) is authorized to act.

"Magistrate" is a term used when both federal and state judicial officers may be authorized to act. The scope of authority of state or local judicial officers is clarified by the enumeration of those rules (3, 4, and 5) under which they are authorized to act.

"United States magistrate" is a phrase which refers to the federal judicial officer created by the Federal Magistrates Act (28 U.S.C. § 631-639).

Also added are cross references to the statutory definitions of "minor offense" and "petty offense."

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1982 AMENDMENT

Note to Subdivision (a). The amendment of subdivision (a) conforms to 48 U.S.C. § 1694(c), which provides that "the rules heretofore or hereafter promulgated and made effective by the Congress or the Supreme Court of the United States pursuant to Titles 11, 18, and 28 shall apply to the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands and appeals therefrom where appropriate, except as otherwise provided in articles IV and V of the covenant provided by the Act of March 24, 1976 (90 Stat. 263)." The reference is to the "Covenant To Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America." Article IV of the covenant provides that except when exercising "the jurisdiction of a district court of the United States," the District Court will be considered a court of the Northern Mariana Islands for the purposes of determining the requirements of indictment by grand jury or trial by jury." Article V provides that "neither trial by jury nor indictment by grand jury shall be required in any civil action or criminal prosecution based on local law, except when required by local law."

Note to Subdivision (b)(4). This change is necessitated by the recent amendment of 18 U.S.C. § 3401 by the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979.

Note to Subdivision (c). The first amendment to subdivision (c) conforms to 48 U.S.C. § 1694(c), which states: "The terms 'attorney for the government' and 'United States Attorney' as used in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 54(c)) shall, when applicable to cases arising under the laws of the Northern Mariana Islands, include the attorney general of the Northern Mariana Islands or any other person or persons as may be authorized by the laws of the Northern Marianas to act therein."

The second amendment to subdivision (c) eliminates any reference to minor offenses. By virtue of the recent amendment of 18 U.S.C. § 3401 by the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, the term "minor offense" is no longer utilized in the statute. It is likewise no longer used in these rules. See amendments to Rules 5(b) and 9(d).

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1990 AMENDMENT

Rule 54(b) is amended to conform the rule to Rule 58. Subsection (c) is technical. No substantive change is intended.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1991 AMENDMENT

The amendment to 54(a) conforms the Rule to legislative changes affecting the prosecution of federal cases in Guam and the Virgin Islands by indictment or information. The "except" clause in Rule 54(a) addressing the availability of indictments by grand jury in Guam has been effectively repealed by Public Law 98-454 (1984), 48 U.S.C. § 1424-4 which made the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (including Rule 7, relating to use of indictments) applicable in Guam notwithstanding Rule 54(a). That legislation apparently codified what had been the actual practice in Guam for a number of years. See 130 Cong. Rec., H25476 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1984). With regard to the Virgin Islands, Public Law 98-454 (1984) also amended 48 U.S.C. § 1561 and 1614(b) to permit (but not require) use of indictments in the Virgin Islands.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1993 AMENDMENT

The Rule is amended to conform to the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 [P.L. 101-650, Title III, Section 321] which provides that each United States magistrate appointed under section 631 of title 28, United States Code, shall be known as a United States magistrate judge.

COMMITTEE NOTES--1999 AMENDMENT

The amendment to Rule 54(a) is a technical amendment removing the reference to the court in the Canal Zone, which no longer exists.

GAP Report_Rule 54. The Committee made no changes to the published draft.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Act of March 24, 1976 (90 Stat. 263), referred to in subd. (a), is Pub. L. 94-241, Mar. 24, 1976, 90 Stat. 263, which is classified generally to subchapter I (§ 1801 et seq.) of chapter 17 of Title 48, Territories and Insular Possessions. The covenant provided by the Act is set out as a note under section 1801 of Title 48. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Tables.

1988 Amendment

Subd. (c). Pub. L. 100-690 substituted "has the meaning set forth in 18 U.S.C. 19" for "means a class B or C misdemeanor or an infraction" in definition of "Petty offense".

1984 Amendment

Subd. (b)(3). Pub. L. 98-473, § 209(e), struck out "under 18 U.S.C. § 3043, and" after "for good behavior".

Subd. (c). Pub. L. 98-473, § 215(e), in definition of "Petty offense" substituted "means a class B or C misdemeanor or an infraction" for "is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1(3).

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1984 AMENDMENT

Amendment by section 215(e) of Pub. L. 98-473 effective Nov. 1, 1987, and applicable only to offenses committed after the taking effect of such amendment, see section 235(a)(1) of Pub. L. 98-473, set out as an Effective Date note under section 3551 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1956 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Order of April 9, 1956, became effective 90 days thereafter.

TERMINATION OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF THE CANAL ZONE

For termination of the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone at end of the "transition period", being the 30 month period beginning Oct. 1, 1979, and ending midnight Mar. 31, 1982, see Paragraph 5 of Article XI of the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977 and sections 2101 and 2201 to 2203 of Pub. L. 96-70, title II, Sept. 27, 1979, 93 Stat. 493, formerly classified to sections 3831 and 3841 to 3843, respectively, of Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse.

Rule 55. Records

The clerk of the district court and each United States magistrate judge shall keep records in criminal proceedings in such form as the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts may prescribe. The clerk shall enter in the records each order or judgment of the court and the date such entry is made.

(As amended Dec. 27, 1948, eff. Oct. 20, 1949; Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966; Apr. 24, 1972, eff. Oct. 1, 1972; Apr. 28, 1983, eff. Aug. 1, 1983; Apr. 22, 1993, eff. Dec. 1, 1993.)

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1944

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 79 [28 U.S.C., Appendix], prescribed in detail the books and records to be kept by the clerk in civil cases. Subsequently to the effective date of the civil rules, however, the Act establishing the Administrative Office of the United States Courts became law (Act of August 7, 1939; 53 Stat. 1223; 28 U.S.C. 444-450 [now 332-333, 456, 601-610]). One of the duties of the Director of that Office is to have charge, under the supervision and direction of the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, of all administrative matters relating to the offices of the clerks and other clerical and administrative personnel of the courts, 28 U.S.C. 446 [now 604, 609]. In view of this circumstance it seemed best not to prescribe the records to be kept by the clerks of the district courts and by the United States commissioners, in criminal proceedings, but to vest the power to do so in the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts with the approval of the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1948 AMENDMENT

To incorporate nomenclature provided for by Revised Title 28 U.S.C., § 331.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1966 AMENDMENT

Rule 37(a)(2) provides that for the purpose of commencing the running of the time for appeal a judgment or order is entered "when it is entered in the criminal docket." The sentence added here requires that such a docket be kept and that it show the dates on which judgments or orders are entered therein. Cf. Civil Rule 79(a).

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1983 AMENDMENT

The Advisory Committee Note to original Rule 55 observes that, in light of the authority which the Director and Judicial Conference have over the activities of clerks, "it seems best not to prescribe the records to be kept by clerks." Because of current experimentation with automated record-keeping, this approach is more appropriate than ever before. The amendment will make it possible for the Director to permit use of more sophisticated record-keeping techniques, including those which may obviate the need for a "criminal docket" book. The reference to the Judicial Conference has been stricken as unnecessary. See 28 U.S.C. § 604.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1993 AMENDMENT

The Rule is amended to conform to the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 [P.L. 101-650, Title III, Section 321] which provides that each United States magistrate appointed under section 631 of title 28, United States Code, shall be known as a United States magistrate judge.

Rule 56. Courts and Clerks

The district court shall be deemed always open for the purpose of filing any proper paper, of issuing and returning process and of making motions and orders. The clerk's office with the clerk or a deputy in attendance shall be open during business hours on all days except Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, but a court may provide by local rule or order that its clerk's office shall be open for specified hours on Saturdays or particular legal holidays other than New Year's Day, Birthday of Martin Luther King, Jr., Washington's Birthday, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Columbus Day, Veterans Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day.

(As amended Dec. 27, 1948, eff. Oct. 20, 1949; Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966; Dec. 4, 1967, eff. July 1, 1968; Mar. 1, 1971, eff. July 1, 1971; Apr. 25, 1988, eff. Aug. 1, 1988.)

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1944

1. The first sentence of this rule is substantially the same as Rule 77(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [28 U.S.C., Appendix], except that it is applicable to circuit courts of appeals as well as to district courts.

2. In connection with this rule, see 28 U.S.C. [former] 14 (Monthly adjournments for trial of criminal causes) and sec. 15 [now 141] (Special terms). These sections "indicate a policy of avoiding the hardships consequent upon a closing of the court during vacations," Abbott v. Brown, 241 U.S. 606, 611.

3. The second sentence of the rule is identical with the first sentence of Rule 77(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [28 U.S.C., Appendix].

4. The term "legal holidays" includes Federal holidays as well as holidays prescribed by the laws of the State where the clerk's office is located.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1948 AMENDMENT

To incorporate nomenclature provided for by Revised Title 28, U.S.C. § 43(a).

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1966 AMENDMENT

The change is in conformity with the changes made in Rule 45. See the similar changes in Civil Rule 77(c) made effective July 1, 1963.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1968 AMENDMENT

The provisions relating to courts of appeals are included in Rule 47 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1971 AMENDMENT

The amendment adds Columbus Day to the list of legal holidays. See the Note accompanying the amendment of Rule 45(a).

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1988 AMENDMENT

The amendment is technical. No substantive change is intended.

Rule 57. Rules by District Courts

(a) In General.

(1) Each district court acting by a majority of its district judges may, after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity to comment, make and amend rules governing its practice. A local rule shall be consistent with--but not duplicative of--Acts of Congress and rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. § 2072 and shall conform to any uniform numbering system prescribed by the Judicial Conference of the United States.

(2) A local rule imposing a requirement of form shall not be enforced in a manner that causes a party to lose rights because of a nonwillful failure to comply with the requirement.

(b) Procedure When There Is No Controlling Law. A judge may regulate practice in any manner consistent with federal law, these rules, and local rules of the district. No sanction or other disadvantage may be imposed for noncompliance with any requirement not in federal law, federal rules, or the local district rules unless the alleged violator has been furnished in the particular case with actual notice of the requirement.

(c) Effective Date and Notice. A local rule so adopted shall take effect upon the date specified by the district court and shall remain in effect unless amended by the district court or abrogated by the judicial council of the circuit in which the district is located. Copies of the rules and amendments so made by any district court shall upon their promulgation be furnished to the judicial council and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and shall be made available to the public.

(As amended Dec. 27, 1948, eff. Oct. 20, 1949; Dec. 4, 1967, eff. July 1, 1968; Apr. 29, 1985, eff. Aug. 1, 1985; Apr. 22, 1993, eff. Dec. 1, 1993; Apr. 27, 1995, eff. Dec. 1, 1995.)

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1944

Note to Subdivision (a). This rule is substantially a restatement of 28 U.S.C. 731 [now 2071] (Rules of practice in district courts). A similar provision is found in Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [28 U.S.C., Appendix].

Note to Subdivision (b). 1. One of the purposes of this rule is to abrogate any existing requirement of conformity to State procedure on any point whatsoever. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [28 U.S.C., Appendix] have been held to repeal the Conformity Act, Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 10.

2. While the rules are intended to constitute a comprehensive procedural code for criminal cases in the Federal courts, nevertheless it seemed best not to endeavor to prescribe a uniform practice as to some matters of detail, but to leave the individual courts free to regulate them, either by local rules or by usage. Among such matters are the mode of impaneling a jury, the manner and order of interposing challenges to jurors, the manner of selecting the foreman of a trial jury, the matter of sealed verdicts, the order of counsel's arguments to the jury, and other similar details.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1948 AMENDMENT

To incorporate nomenclature provided for by Revised Title 28, U.S.C., § 43(a).

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1968 AMENDMENT

The provisions relating to the court of appeals are included in Rule 47 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1985 AMENDMENT

Rule 57 has been reformulated to correspond to Fed.R.Civ.P. 83, including the proposed amendments thereto. The purpose of the reformulation is to emphasize that the procedures for adoption of local rules by a district court are the same under both the civil and the criminal rules. In particular, the major purpose of the reformulation is to enhance the local rulemaking process by requiring appropriate public notice of proposed rules and an opportunity to comment on them. See Committee Note to Fed.R.Civ.P. 83.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1993 AMENDMENT

The Rule is amended to conform to the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 [P.L. 101-650, Title III, Section 321] which provides that each United States magistrate appointed under section 631 of title 28, United States Code, shall be known as a United States magistrate judge.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1995 AMENDMENT

Subdivision (a). This rule is amended to reflect the requirement that local rules be consistent not only with the national rules but also with Acts of Congress. The amendment also states that local rules should not repeat national rules and Acts of Congress.

The amendment also requires that the numbering of local rules conform with any numbering system that may be prescribed by the Judicial Conference. Lack of uniform numbering might create unnecessary traps for counsel and litigants. A uniform numbering system would make it easier for an increasingly national bar to locate a local rule that applies to a particular procedural issue.

Paragraph (2) is new. Its aim is to protect against loss of rights in the enforcement of local rules relating to matters of form. The proscription of paragraph (2) is narrowly drawn--covering only nonwillful violations and only those involving local rules directed to matters of form. It does not limit the court's power to impose substantive penalties upon a party if it or its attorney stubbornly or repeatedly violates a local rule, even one involving merely a matter of form. Nor does it affect the court's power to enforce local rules that involve more than mere matters of form--for example, a local rule requiring that the defendant waive a jury trial within a specified time.

Subdivision (b). This rule provides flexibility to the court in regulating practice when there is no controlling law. Specifically, it permits the court to regulate practice in any manner consistent with Acts of Congress, with rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. § 2072, and with the district's local rules. This rule recognizes that courts rely on multiple directives to control practice. Some courts regulate practice through the published Federal Rules and the local rules of the court. Some courts also have used internal operating procedures, standing orders, and other internal directives. Although such directives continue to be authorized, they can lead to problems. Counsel or litigants may be unaware of the various directives. In addition, the sheer volume of directives may impose an unreasonable barrier. For example, it may be difficult to obtain copies of the directives. Finally, counsel or litigants may be unfairly sanctioned for failing to comply with a directive. For these reasons, the amendment disapproves imposing any sanction or other disadvantage on a person for noncompliance with such an internal directive, unless the alleged violator has been furnished in a particular case with actual notice of the requirement.

There should be no adverse consequence to a party or attorney for violating special requirements relating to practice before a particular judge unless the party or attorney has actual notice of those requirements. Furnishing litigants with a copy outlining the judge's practices--or attaching instructions to a notice setting a case for conference or trial--would suffice to give actual notice, as would an order in a case specifically adopting by reference a judge's standing order and indicating how copies can be obtained.

Rule 58. Procedure for Misdemeanors and Other Petty Offenses

(a) Scope.

(1) In General. This rule governs the procedure and practice for the conduct of proceedings involving misdemeanors and other petty offenses, and for appeals to district judges in such cases tried by United States magistrate judges.

(2) Applicability of Other Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In proceedings concerning petty offenses for which no sentence of imprisonment will be imposed the court may follow such provisions of these rules as it deems appropriate, to the extent not inconsistent with this rule. In all other proceedings the other rules govern except as specifically provided in this rule.

(3) Definition. The term "petty offenses for which no sentence of imprisonment will be imposed" as used in this rule, means any petty offenses as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 19 as to which the court determines, that, in the event of conviction, no sentence of imprisonment will actually be imposed.

(b) Pretrial Procedures.

(1) Trial Document. The trial of a misdemeanor may proceed on an indictment, information, or complaint or, in the case of a petty offense, on a citation or violation notice.

(2) Initial Appearance. At the defendant's initial appearance on a misdemeanor or other petty offense charge, the court shall inform the defendant of:

(A) the charge, and the maximum possible penalties provided by law, including payment of a special assessment under 18 U.S.C. § 3013, and restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3663;

(B) the right to retain counsel;

(C) the right to request the appointment of counsel if the defendant is unable to obtain counsel, unless the charge is a petty offense for which an appointment of counsel is not required;

(D) the right to remain silent and that any statement made by the defendant may be used against the defendant;

(E) the right to trial, judgment, and sentencing before a district judge, unless:

(i) the charge is a Class B misdemeanor motor-vehicle offense, a Class C misdemeanor, or an infraction; or

(ii) the defendant consents to trial, judgment, and sentencing before a magistrate judge;

(F) the right to trial by jury before either a United States magistrate judge or a district judge, unless the charge is a petty offense; and

(G) the right to a preliminary examination in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3060, and the general circumstances under which the defendant may secure pretrial release, if the defendant is held in custody and charged with a misdemeanor other than a petty offense.

(3) Consent and Arraignment.

(A) Plea Before a United States Magistrate Judge. A magistrate judge shall take the defendant's plea in a Class B misdemeanor charging a motor-vehicle offense, a Class C misdemeanor, or an infraction. In every other misdemeanor case, a magistrate judge may take the plea only if the defendant consents either in writing or orally on the record to be tried before the magistrate judge and specifically waives trial before a district judge. The defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or with the consent of the magistrate judge, nolo contendere.

(B) Failure to Consent. In a misdemeanor case--other than a Class B misdemeanor charging a motor-vehicle offense, a Class C misdemeanor, or an infraction--magistrate judge shall order the defendant to appear before a district judge for further proceedings on notice, unless the defendant consents to trial before the magistrate judge.

(c) Additional Procedures Applicable Only to Petty Offenses for Which No Sentence of Imprisonment Will Be Imposed. With respect to petty offenses for which no sentence of imprisonment will be imposed, the following additional procedures are applicable:

(1) Plea of Guilty or Nolo Contendere. No plea of guilty or nolo contendere shall be accepted unless the court is satisfied that the defendant understands the nature of the charge and the maximum possible penalties provided by law.

(2) Waiver of Venue for Plea and Sentence. A defendant who is arrested, held, or present in a district other than that in which the indictment, information, complaint, citation or violation notice is pending against that defendant may state in writing a wish to plead guilty or nolo contendere, to waive venue and trial in the district in which the proceeding is pending, and to consent to disposition of the case in the district in which that defendant was arrested, is held, or is present. Unless the defendant thereafter pleads not guilty, the prosecution shall be had as if venue were in such district, and notice of the same shall be given to the magistrate judge in the district where the proceeding was originally commenced. The defendant's statement of a desire to plead guilty or nolo contendere is not admissible against the defendant.

(3) Sentence. The court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to be heard in mitigation. The court shall then immediately proceed to sentence the defendant, except that in the discretion of the court, sentencing may be continued to allow an investigation by the probation service or submission of additional information by either party.

(4) Notification of Right to Appeal. After imposing sentence in a case which has gone to trial on a plea of not guilty, the court shall advise the defendant of the defendant's right to appeal including any right to appeal the sentence. There shall be no duty on the court to advise the defendant of any right of appeal after sentence is imposed following a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, except that the court shall advise the defendant of any right to appeal the sentence.

(d) Securing the Defendant's Appearance; Payment in Lieu of Appearance.

(1) Forfeiture of Collateral. When authorized by local rules of the district court, payment of a fixed sum may be accepted in suitable cases in lieu of appearance and as authorizing the termination of the proceedings. Local rules may make provision for increases in fixed sums not to exceed the maximum fine which could be imposed.

(2) Notice to Appear. If a defendant fails to pay a fixed sum, request a hearing, or appear in response to a citation or violation notice, the clerk or a magistrate judge may issue a notice for the defendant to appear before the court on a date certain. The notice may also afford the defendant an additional opportunity to pay a fixed sum in lieu of appearance, and shall be served upon the defendant by mailing a copy to the defendant's last known address.

(3) Summons or Warrant. Upon an indictment or a showing by one of the other documents specified in subdivision (b)(1) of probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, the court may issue an arrest warrant or, if no warrant is requested by the attorney for the prosecution, a summons. The showing of probable cause shall be made in writing upon oath or under penalty for perjury, but the affiant need not appear before the court. If the defendant fails to appear before the court in response to a summons, the court may summarily issue a warrant for the defendant's immediate arrest and appearance before the court.

(e) Record. Proceedings under this rule shall be taken down by a reporter or recorded by suitable sound equipment.

(f) New Trial. The provisions of Rule 33 shall apply.

(g) Appeal.

(1) Decision, Order, Judgment or Sentence by a District Judge. An appeal from a decision, order, judgment or conviction or sentence by a district judge shall be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

(2) Decision, Order, Judgment or Sentence by a United States Magistrate Judge.

(A) Interlocutory Appeal. A decision or order by a magistrate judge which, if made by a district judge, could be appealed by the government or defendant under any provision of law, shall be subject to an appeal to a district judge provided such appeal is taken within 10 days of the entry of the decision or order. An appeal shall be taken by filing with the clerk of court a statement specifying the decision or order from which an appeal is taken and by serving a copy of the statement upon the adverse party, personally or by mail, and by filing a copy with the magistrate judge.

(B) Appeal From Conviction or Sentence. An appeal from a judgment of conviction or sentence by a magistrate judge to a district judge shall be taken within 10 days after entry of the judgment. An appeal shall be taken by filing with the clerk of court a statement specifying the judgment from which an appeal is taken, and by serving a copy of the statement upon the United States Attorney, personally or by mail, and by filing a copy with the magistrate judge.

(C) Record. The record shall consist of the original papers and exhibits in the case together with any transcript, tape, or other recording of the proceedings and a certified copy of the docket entries which shall be transmitted promptly to the clerk of court. For purposes of the appeal, a copy of the record of such proceedings shall be made available at the expense of the United States to a person who establishes by affidavit the inability to pay or give security therefor, and the expense of such copy shall be paid by the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.

(D) Scope of Appeal. The defendant shall not be entitled to a trial de novo by a district judge. The scope of ¹ appeal shall be the same as an appeal from a judgment of a district court to a court of appeals.
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¹ So in original. Probably should be followed by "the".

(3) Stay of Execution; Release Pending Appeal. The provisions of Rule 38 relating to stay of execution shall be applicable to a judgment of conviction or sentence. The defendant may be released pending appeal in accordance with the provisions of law relating to release pending appeal from a judgment of a district court to a court of appeals.

(Added May 1, 1990, eff. Dec. 1, 1990; amended Apr. 30, 1991, eff. Dec. 1, 1991; Apr. 22, 1993, eff. Dec. 1, 1993; Apr. 11, 1997, eff. Dec. 1, 1997.)

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1990

This new rule is largely a restatement of the Rules of Procedure for the Trial of Misdemeanors before United States Magistrates which were promulgated in 1980 to replace the Rules for the Trial of Minor Offenses before United States Magistrates (1970). The Committee believed that a new single rule should be incorporated into the Rules of Criminal Procedure where those charged with its execution could readily locate it and realize its relationship with the other Rules. A number of technical changes have been made throughout the rule and unless otherwise noted, no substantive changes were intended in those amendments. The Committee envisions no major changes in the way in which the trial of misdemeanors and petty offenses are currently handled.

The title of the rule has been changed by deleting the phrase "Before United States Magistrates" to indicate that this rule may be used by district judges as well as magistrates. The phrase "and Petty Offenses" has been added to the title and elsewhere throughout the rule because the term "misdemeanor" does not include an "infraction." See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a). A petty offense, however, is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 19 as a Class B misdemeanor, a Class C misdemeanor, or an infraction, with limitations on fines of no more than $5,000 for an individual and $10,000 for an organization.

Subdivision (a) is an amended version of current Magistrates Rule 1. Deletion of the phrase "before United States Magistrates under 18 U.S.C. § 3401" in Rule 1(a) will enable district judges to use the abbreviated procedures of this rule. Consistent with that change, the term "magistrate" is amended to read "the court," wherever appropriate throughout the rule, to indicate that both judges and magistrates may use the rule. The last sentence in (a)(1) has been amended to reflect that the rule also governs an appeal from a magistrate's decision to . An appeal from a district judge's decision would be governed by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Subdivision (a)(2) rephrases prior language in Magistrate Rule 1(b). Subdivision (a)(3) adds a statutory reference to 18 U.S.C. § 19, which defines a petty offense as a "Class B misdemeanor, a Class C misdemeanor, or an infraction" with the $5,000 and $10,000 fine limitations noted supra. The phrase "regardless of the penalty authorized by law" has been deleted.

Subdivision (b) is an amended version of current Magistrates Rule 2. The last sentence in current Rule 2(a) has been deleted because 18 U.S.C. § 3401(a), provides that a magistrate will have jurisdiction to try misdemeanor cases when specially designated to do so by the district court or courts served by the Magistrate.

Subdivision (b)(2) reflects the standard rights advisements currently included in Magistrates Rule 2 with several amendments. Subdivision (b)(2)(A) specifically requires that the defendant be advised of all penalties which may be imposed upon conviction, including specifically a special assessment and restitution. A number of technical, nonsubstantive, changes have been made in the contents of advisement of rights. A substantive change is reflected in subdivision (b)(2)(G), currently Magistrates Rule 2(b)(7), and (8). That rule currently provides that, unless the prosecution is on an indictment or information, a defendant who is charged with a misdemeanor other than a petty offense has a right to a preliminary hearing, if the defendant does not consent to be tried by the magistrate. As amended, only a defendant in custody has a right to a preliminary hearing.

Subdivision (b)(3)(A) is based upon Magistrates Rule 2(c) and has been amended by deleting the last sentence, which provides that trial may occur within 30 days "upon written consent of the defendant." The change is warranted because the Speedy Trial Act does not apply to petty offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 3172(2). Subdivision (b)(3)(B), "Failure to Consent," currently appears in Magistrates Rule 3(a). The first sentence has been amended to make it applicable to all misdemeanor and petty offense defendants who fail to consent. The last sentence of Rule 3(a) has been deleted entirely. Because the clerk is responsible for all district court case files, including those for misdemeanor and petty offense cases tried by magistrates, it is not necessary to state that the file be transmitted to the clerk of court.

Subdivision (c) is an amended version of current Magistrates Rule 3 with the exception of Rule 3(a), which, as noted supra is now located in subdivision (b)(3)(B) of the new rule. The phrase "petty offense for which no sentence of imprisonment will be imposed" has been deleted because the heading for subdivision (c) limits its application to those petty offenses. The Committee recognizes that subdivision (c)(2) might result in attempted forum shopping. See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 467 F. Supp. 86 (W.D. La. 1979), affm'd, 615 F. 2d 251 (5th Cir. 1980). In order to maintain a streamlined and less formal procedure which is consistent with the remainder of the Rule, subdivision (c)(2) does not require the formal "consent" of the United States Attorneys involved before a waiver of venue may be accomplished. Cf. Rule 20 (Transfer From the District for Plea and Sentence). The Rule specifically envisions that there will be communication and coordination between the two districts involved. To that end, reasonable efforts should be made to contact the United States Attorney in the district in which the charges were instituted. Subdivision (c)(4), formerly Rule 3(d), now specifically provides that the defendant be advised of the right to appeal the sentence. This subdivision is also amended to provide for advising the defendant of the right to appeal a sentence under the Sentencing Reform Act when the defendant is sentenced following a plea of guilty. Both amendments track the language of Rule 32(a)(2), as amended by the Sentencing Reform Act.

Subdivision (d) is an amended version of Magistrates Rule 4. The amendments are technical in nature and no substantive change is intended.

Subdivision (e) consists of the first sentence of Magistrates Rule 5. The second sentence of that Rule was deleted as being inconsistent with 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) which gives the court discretion to decide how the proceedings will be recorded. The third sentence is deleted to preclude routine waivers of a verbatim record and to insure that all petty offenses are recorded.

Subdivision (f) replaces Magistrates Rule 6 and simply incorporates by reference Rule 33.

Subdivision (g) is an amended version of Magistrates Rule 7. Because the new rule may be used by both magistrates and judges, subdivision (g)(1) was added to make it clear that the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure govern any appeal in a case tried by a district judge pursuant to the new rule. Subdivision (g)(2)(B), based upon Magistrates Rule 7(b), now provides for appeal of a sentence by a magistrate and is thus consistent with the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f). Finally, subdivision (g)(3) is based upon Magistrates Rule 7(d) but has been amended to provide that a stay of execution is applicable, if an appeal is taken from a sentence as well as from a conviction. This change is consistent with the recent amendment of Rule 38 by the Sentencing Reform Act.

The new rule does not include Magistrates Rules 8 and 9. Rule 8 has been deleted because the subject of local rules is covered in Rule 57. Rule 9, which defined a petty offense, is now covered in 18 U.S.C. § 19.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1991 AMENDMENT

The amendments are technical. No substantive changes are intended.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1993 AMENDMENT

The Rule is amended to conform to the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 [P.L. 101-650, Title III, Section 321] which provides that each United States magistrate appointed under section 631 of title 28, United States Code, shall be known as a United States magistrate judge.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1997 AMENDMENT

The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Sec. 202, amended 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(a) to remove the requirement that a defendant must consent to a trial before a magistrate judge in a petty offense that is a class B misdemeanor charging a motor vehicle offense, a class C misdemeanor, or an infraction. Section 202 also changed 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b) to provide that in all other misdemeanor cases, the defendant may consent to trial either orally on the record or in writing. The amendments to Rule 58(b)(2) and (3) conform the rule to the new statutory language and include minor stylistic changes.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, referred to in subd. (g)(1), are set out in the Appendix to Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.

Rule 59. Effective Date

These rules take effect on the day which is 3 months subsequent to the adjournment of the first regular session of the 79th Congress, but if that day is prior to September 1, 1945, then they take effect on September 1, 1945. They govern all criminal proceedings thereafter commenced and so far as just and practicable all proceedings then pending.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1944

This rule is based on Act of June 29, 1940 (54 Stat. 688; 18 U.S.C. 687 [now 3771]). It is substantially the same as Rule 86 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [28 U.S.C., Appendix].

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1966 AMENDMENTS; TRANSMISSION TO CONGRESS; RESCISSION

Sections 2 to 4 of Order of the Supreme Court dated February 26, 1966, provided:

"2. That the foregoing amendments and additions to the Rules of Criminal Procedure shall take effect on July 1, 1966, and shall govern all criminal proceedings thereafter commenced and so far as just and practicable all proceedings then pending.

"3. That the Chief Justice be, and he hereby is, authorized to transmit to the Congress the foregoing amendments and additions to the Rules of Criminal Procedure in accordance with the provisions of title 18, U.S.C., section 3771.

"4. That Rule 19 and subdivision (c) of Rule 45 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts, promulgated by this court on December 26, 1944, effective March 21, 1946, are hereby rescinded, effective July 1, 1966."

Rule 60. Title

These rules may be known and cited as the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

SHORT TITLE OF 1975 AMENDMENT

Pub. L. 94-64, § 1, July 31, 1975, 89 Stat. 370, provided: "That this Act [amending rules 4, 9, 11, 12, 12.1, 12.2, 15, 16, 17, 20, 32 and 43 of these rules and enacting provisions set out as a note under rule 4] may be cited as the 'Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Amendments Act of 1975'."

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES--1944

This rule is similar to Rule 85 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [28 U.S.C., Appendix], which reads as follows:

These rules may be known and cited as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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• APPENDIX OF FORMS