January 1962 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. L-12996 January 31, 1962 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. v. ANTONIO ALBERT:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-12996. January 31, 1962.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTONIO ALBERT, Defendant-Appellant.
Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Leido, Andrada, Perez & Associates, for Defendant-Appellant.
R E S O L U T I O N
DIZON, J.:
The matter before us is a motion for reconsideration filed by appellant praying that our decision promulgated on December 28, 1961 be set aside and that another be rendered absolving him from liability in connection with the deficiency tax in question, the 5% surcharge thereon and the 1% monthly interest from October 16, 1953. Appellant contends that he is not barred from contesting the assessment in question, there being no evidence in the record to sustain a finding that the Bureau of Internal Revenue’s letter of June 21, 1955 (Exh. D) was sent to, and received by him on the aforesaid date or on any other date thereafter.
The lower court found that, upon the evidence before it, the period of 30 days within which appellant could have appealed from the deficiency assessment to the sequence, that said assessment had become final, demandable and beyond appellant’s power to assail or contest. This finding we cannot review, appellant having taken this appeal directly to us to raise questions purely of law.
Moreover, the record shows that the answer filed by appellant expressly admitted that he had received the assessment notice on or before October 14, 1953. This notwithstanding, his answer made no mention of his protest against, or motion for reconsideration of the assessment aforesaid; to the contrary, it admitted (Rec. on App., p. 15) that appellant "had not appealed from the aforesaid assessment to the Court of Tax Appeals" and while denying that the same had become final, the only reasons adduced in support of such denial were (1) that the allegation made in the complaint regarding the executory and final character of the assessment was a mere conclusion of law and that (2) at any event, appellant’s failure to appeal" has not rendered the assessment final in the sense that it can no longer be resisted, controverted or disputed by the defendant in a judicial proceeding brought against the latter." The appellant, therefore, clearly failed to allege that the assessment had not become final because he had not received any notice of denial thereof or that there was no evidence to prove the exact date on which such notice, if any was sent, was received by them. For this reason, we are of the opinion that he is without right to raise these points for the first time on appeal in connection with his first assignment of error.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and De Leon, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
The lower court found that, upon the evidence before it, the period of 30 days within which appellant could have appealed from the deficiency assessment to the sequence, that said assessment had become final, demandable and beyond appellant’s power to assail or contest. This finding we cannot review, appellant having taken this appeal directly to us to raise questions purely of law.
Moreover, the record shows that the answer filed by appellant expressly admitted that he had received the assessment notice on or before October 14, 1953. This notwithstanding, his answer made no mention of his protest against, or motion for reconsideration of the assessment aforesaid; to the contrary, it admitted (Rec. on App., p. 15) that appellant "had not appealed from the aforesaid assessment to the Court of Tax Appeals" and while denying that the same had become final, the only reasons adduced in support of such denial were (1) that the allegation made in the complaint regarding the executory and final character of the assessment was a mere conclusion of law and that (2) at any event, appellant’s failure to appeal" has not rendered the assessment final in the sense that it can no longer be resisted, controverted or disputed by the defendant in a judicial proceeding brought against the latter." The appellant, therefore, clearly failed to allege that the assessment had not become final because he had not received any notice of denial thereof or that there was no evidence to prove the exact date on which such notice, if any was sent, was received by them. For this reason, we are of the opinion that he is without right to raise these points for the first time on appeal in connection with his first assignment of error.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and De Leon, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
