July 1969 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1969 > July 1969 Decisions >
G.R. No. L-27792 July 28, 1969 - ANTONIO NARITO v. JOSE CARRIDO:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-27792. July 28, 1969.]
ANTONIO NARITO, Petitioner, v. JOSE CARRIDO, Respondent.
Buenaventura B. Blancaflor for Petitioner.
Juan Soliven for Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. ELECTION LAW; REVISED ELECTION CODE; PRE-PROCLAMATION PROCEEDINGS; JUDICIAL RECOUNT OF BALLOTS; DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE FIGURES AND WORDS IN THE ELECTION RETURNS CALL FOR JUDICIAL RECOUNT OF BALLOTS. — Where, as to the number of votes received by a candidate, there was a discrepancy between the figures and words appearing in the election return for one precinct, which conflict or discrepancy would materially affect the result of the election, and there was no showing of alteration or falsification committed on the said return, the case clearly calls for a judicial recount pursuant to Section 163 in relation to Section 168 of the Revised Election Code.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURE AND PURPOSE OF RECOUNT. — Recount is a special relief designed to meet a special need — to bring prompt settlement to a controversy that can be attained without going through, and awaiting the result of a laborious and long drawn election contest, and restore public tranquillity by dispelling doubt as to the true number (although not necessarily the validity) of votes cast for particular candidates in a given precinct.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DETERMINATION OF WHETHER DISCREPANCY EXISTS OR DOES NOT EXIST BETWEEN AUTHENTIC COPIES OF RETURNS IS A JUDICIAL FUNCTION. — The actual recount of the ballots by the Court of First Instance is but the necessary consequence of its resolution of a preliminary controversy, to wit, whether or not there are sufficient facts that would warrant the opening of the ballot boxes and the recount of the ballots, under Section 163 of the Election Code. The ascertaining that such basic facts do exist according to the evidence submitted by the parties is essentially a judicial function, and it is only after the court decides that the recount is legally justified that the actual recount takes place. Hence, while the actual recount does not in itself involve a decision in a judicial controversy, the preceding finding that a discrepancy exists or does not exist between the authentic copies of the returns, as required by the election law, is an exercise of the judicial power to ascertain the facts, pass upon their sufficiency, and apply the law to the controversy.
4. ID.; ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; AUTHORITY OF COMELEC LIMITED TO QUESTIONS PURELY ADMINISTRATIVE IN NATURE. — It cannot be claimed with certainty that the resolution of the question of whether or not an alleged discrepancy in election returns justifies the recounting of votes cast in the given precinct falls within the competence of the Commission on Elections, under its authority to "decide, save those involving the right to vote all administrative questions, affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election officials." To Us, the authority granted to the Common Elections by Section 2, Article X of the Constitution appears to be limited to questions purely administrative in nature. This is evident not only from the explicit withdrawal there from of the authority to rule on the issue of the right to vote but also from the enumeration of similar matters within the intended coverage of the provision, such as the determination of the number and location of polling places and the appointment of election inspectors, etc. The jurisdiction to order a recount not having been vested by the Constitution upon any entity or body, its conferment upon the Court of First Instance by the Election Code is within the power and prerogative of the legislature.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS; EXERCISE OF POWER BY A DEPARTMENT; LEGISLATURE CAN DETERMINE WHICH DEPARTMENT WILL EXERCISE POWER NOT PECULIARLY LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE OR JUDICIAL. — Realistically, the practical demands of efficient government would prevent strict observance of the principle of separation of powers. Thus, it has been said that in determining the constitutionality of the exercise of power by a department, the question to be asked is not whether the power is essentially legislative, executive or judicial, but whether it has been specifically vested in it by the Constitution, or properly incidental to the performance of the functions of the department. And where the power is not peculiarly or distinctly legislative, executive or judicial, it is within the authority of the legislature to determine where its exercise would belong.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONFERMENT OF AUTHORITY UPON TRIAL COURTS TO CONDUCT ACTUAL RECOUNT AFTER JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF THE NEED FOR RECOUNT, WITHIN LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION. — It may be that the physical recount of ballots could have been more properly entrusted to an administrative agency after the court decides that such recount is warranted; but as a mere adjunct inextricably linked to the latter, we think that it was within the legislative discretion to confer upon the trial court the authority to carry out the recount, for the sake of expediency, instead of burdening the parties with the task of resorting to another forum.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; PROCEDURE; APPEAL; ABSENCE THEREOF DOES NOT CONTRADICT EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER. — That the resulting findings of the court are not subject to appeal does not contradict the exercise of judicial power, for it is elementary that appeal is not an inherent right but a purely statutory creation.
8. ID.; ID.; AVAILABILITY OF DIFFERENT RELIEFS DOES NOT WARRANT WITHDRAWAL OF A MORE EXPEDITIOUS REMEDY. — The possibility of the parties’ availing of different reliefs should not warrant the withdrawal from them of a remedy that may yet be more accessible, adequate and expeditious.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURE AND PURPOSE OF RECOUNT. — Recount is a special relief designed to meet a special need — to bring prompt settlement to a controversy that can be attained without going through, and awaiting the result of a laborious and long drawn election contest, and restore public tranquillity by dispelling doubt as to the true number (although not necessarily the validity) of votes cast for particular candidates in a given precinct.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DETERMINATION OF WHETHER DISCREPANCY EXISTS OR DOES NOT EXIST BETWEEN AUTHENTIC COPIES OF RETURNS IS A JUDICIAL FUNCTION. — The actual recount of the ballots by the Court of First Instance is but the necessary consequence of its resolution of a preliminary controversy, to wit, whether or not there are sufficient facts that would warrant the opening of the ballot boxes and the recount of the ballots, under Section 163 of the Election Code. The ascertaining that such basic facts do exist according to the evidence submitted by the parties is essentially a judicial function, and it is only after the court decides that the recount is legally justified that the actual recount takes place. Hence, while the actual recount does not in itself involve a decision in a judicial controversy, the preceding finding that a discrepancy exists or does not exist between the authentic copies of the returns, as required by the election law, is an exercise of the judicial power to ascertain the facts, pass upon their sufficiency, and apply the law to the controversy.
4. ID.; ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; AUTHORITY OF COMELEC LIMITED TO QUESTIONS PURELY ADMINISTRATIVE IN NATURE. — It cannot be claimed with certainty that the resolution of the question of whether or not an alleged discrepancy in election returns justifies the recounting of votes cast in the given precinct falls within the competence of the Commission on Elections, under its authority to "decide, save those involving the right to vote all administrative questions, affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election officials." To Us, the authority granted to the Common Elections by Section 2, Article X of the Constitution appears to be limited to questions purely administrative in nature. This is evident not only from the explicit withdrawal there from of the authority to rule on the issue of the right to vote but also from the enumeration of similar matters within the intended coverage of the provision, such as the determination of the number and location of polling places and the appointment of election inspectors, etc. The jurisdiction to order a recount not having been vested by the Constitution upon any entity or body, its conferment upon the Court of First Instance by the Election Code is within the power and prerogative of the legislature.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS; EXERCISE OF POWER BY A DEPARTMENT; LEGISLATURE CAN DETERMINE WHICH DEPARTMENT WILL EXERCISE POWER NOT PECULIARLY LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE OR JUDICIAL. — Realistically, the practical demands of efficient government would prevent strict observance of the principle of separation of powers. Thus, it has been said that in determining the constitutionality of the exercise of power by a department, the question to be asked is not whether the power is essentially legislative, executive or judicial, but whether it has been specifically vested in it by the Constitution, or properly incidental to the performance of the functions of the department. And where the power is not peculiarly or distinctly legislative, executive or judicial, it is within the authority of the legislature to determine where its exercise would belong.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONFERMENT OF AUTHORITY UPON TRIAL COURTS TO CONDUCT ACTUAL RECOUNT AFTER JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF THE NEED FOR RECOUNT, WITHIN LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION. — It may be that the physical recount of ballots could have been more properly entrusted to an administrative agency after the court decides that such recount is warranted; but as a mere adjunct inextricably linked to the latter, we think that it was within the legislative discretion to confer upon the trial court the authority to carry out the recount, for the sake of expediency, instead of burdening the parties with the task of resorting to another forum.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; PROCEDURE; APPEAL; ABSENCE THEREOF DOES NOT CONTRADICT EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER. — That the resulting findings of the court are not subject to appeal does not contradict the exercise of judicial power, for it is elementary that appeal is not an inherent right but a purely statutory creation.
8. ID.; ID.; AVAILABILITY OF DIFFERENT RELIEFS DOES NOT WARRANT WITHDRAWAL OF A MORE EXPEDITIOUS REMEDY. — The possibility of the parties’ availing of different reliefs should not warrant the withdrawal from them of a remedy that may yet be more accessible, adequate and expeditious.
D E C I S I O N
CASTRO, J.:
Before us is a petition brought by Antonio Narito to set aside the resolutions of the Court of Appeals of February 6, 1967, 1 March 2, 1967, 2 and May 31, 1967. 3 In a separate petition Narito prayed that he be allowed to litigate as pauper before this Court, which we granted in our resolution of July 18, 1967.
The petitioner was the defendant in Civil Case L-25 of Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, entitled "Jose Carrido, Plaintiff v. Antonio Narito, Defendant." Judgment was rendered against Narito in the said case: he then appealed to the Court of Appeals where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. 38782-R. He received a notice from the clerk of the said court requiring him, within the specified time, to pay the appellate docket fee and to file forty copies of the printed record on appeal. He paid the docket fee of P53, but claiming to be old and a very poor man, he prayed that the Court of Appeals allow him to file a typewritten or mimeographed record on appeal, which request was denied in the resolution of February 6, 1967. His subsequent motions to have the Court of Appeals reconsider its action were likewise denied, the court reiterating its order that he file a printed record on appeal.
In support of his petition to be granted the privilege to litigate before the Court of Appeals as a pauper, the petitioner alleges he is already 67 years old and is a very poor man with a family to support; that his property consists of a very small parcel of land planted to coconuts containing an area of about two hectares and assessed at P200, from which he can gather only "very few nuts" due to recent typhoons in the province of Camarines Sur which destroyed about 100 fruit-bearing coconut trees on his land; that he would find it difficult, if not impossible, to raise the amount of P250 to cover the cost of printing a record on appeal, as he can hardly afford to buy rice to feed his family, substituting therefor root crops like camote and banana; and that our Constitution provides that a man should not be deprived of the right to free access to the courts by reason of poverty.
On July 18, 1967 this Court allowed the petitioner to litigate as a pauper before it, 4 and required the respondent Court of Appeals to file an answer to the petition. 5
On August 3, 1967 the Court of Appeals filed its answer, denying the statements made in the petition that there were "several typhoons" that swept the Bicol region which destroyed coconut trees on the two-hectare land possessed by the petitioner, and that the latter has obtained the services of his lawyer for free, the truth being that the petitioner paid his lawyer P400 in attorney’s fees as found by the lower court. As special defenses, the respondent court averred that the petitioner is not as impecunious as he claims to be, as he is the owner and is in possession of a two-hectare coconut land; that he is likewise in possession of the two parcels of land subject of the litigation below with a total area of more than 2-1/2 hectares planted to coconuts and bananas, whose products he has been appropriating, including the plaintiff-appellee’s share therein; that the harvest of coconuts takes place three to four times a year; that the petitioner not being really poor, the constitutional provision that no person shall be denied access to courts due to poverty may not be invoked by him; that granting, arguendo, that the petitioner is a poor man, his motion to appeal as pauper should have been filed with the lower court.
It is noteworthy that the petitioner made no attempt to controvert the special defenses set forth by the respondent Court, particularly those alleging his ownership and possession of the 2-1/2 hectares of land from which he allegedly derives three or four harvests of coconuts a year; and that he had paid his lawyer the amount of P400 in attorney’s fees. The respondent court’s defense tending as it does to destroy the petitioner’s claim to poverty, the latter should have incurred no delay in disputing its allegations, nor overlooked his duty to make immediate reply thereto if he is to convince this Court of the merit of his claim.
However, without going into the merits of the petitioner’s prayer that he be considered a pauper for the reasons advanced by him, it is our considered view that his: present petition does not merit serious consideration. For the Rules provide in no uncertain terms that the trial court, not the appellate court, is the proper forum to ventilate one’s claim to be allowed to litigate as a pauper. Thus Section 16, Rule 41, provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Where a party desiring to appeal shall establish to the satisfaction of the trial court that he is a pauper and unable to pay the expenses of prosecuting the appeal, and that the case is of such importance, by reason of the amount involved, or the nature of the question raised, that it ought to be reviewed by the appellate court, the trial judge may enter an order entitling the party to appeal as pauper. The clerk shall transmit to the appellate court the entire record of the case, including the evidence taken on trial and the record on appeal, and the case shall be heard in the appellate court upon the original record so transmitted without printing the same.
"A petition to be allowed to appeal as pauper shall not be entertained by the appellate court."cralaw virtua1aw library
Even before the adoption of the Revised Rules, this Court had uniformly frowned upon appellate courts entertaining petitions to appeal as pauper, holding that the task of determining the merits of such petitions properly devolves upon the trial court, even though the old Rules contained no provision, as does the present one, expressly withholding from an appellate Court the right to entertain petitions to appeal as pauper. The reason behind the policy is that whether a party-litigant is so poor as to qualify him to litigate as a pauper, is a question of fact which can best be determined by a trial court. This was explicitly explained in this Court’s resolution of September 4, 1951, dismissing a motion for reconsideration filed by the plaintiffs-appellants in G.R. L-4998, Jose Alcantara, Et. Al. v. Mariano Tuazon y de la Paz, Et Al., thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A petition to be allowed to appeal as pauper cannot be entertained by this Court as appellate court. Such petition must be filed with the trial court under Section 16, Rule 41, of the Rules of Court. The reason is that the trial court is the court which may properly decide or pass upon the question of fact, which may require presentation of evidence, whether the appellant is pauper and may appeal as such, and whether the case is of such importance that, by reason not only of the amount involved but of the nature of the question raised in the court below, it ought to be reviewed by the appellate court. It is not for this Court to examine the facts and law of the case for the first time in order to pass upon this last requirement."cralaw virtua1aw library
There is not even the least pretense that the petitioner had asked, much less was allowed by, the trial court to prosecute his defense therein as a pauper, and that the permission stood unrevoked when he interposed his appeal to the Court of Appeals, so as to entitle him to continue litigating as a pauper, on the strength of Comia v. Judge Castillo, 75 Phil. 526.
ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is denied. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., is on official leave.
The petitioner was the defendant in Civil Case L-25 of Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, entitled "Jose Carrido, Plaintiff v. Antonio Narito, Defendant." Judgment was rendered against Narito in the said case: he then appealed to the Court of Appeals where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. 38782-R. He received a notice from the clerk of the said court requiring him, within the specified time, to pay the appellate docket fee and to file forty copies of the printed record on appeal. He paid the docket fee of P53, but claiming to be old and a very poor man, he prayed that the Court of Appeals allow him to file a typewritten or mimeographed record on appeal, which request was denied in the resolution of February 6, 1967. His subsequent motions to have the Court of Appeals reconsider its action were likewise denied, the court reiterating its order that he file a printed record on appeal.
In support of his petition to be granted the privilege to litigate before the Court of Appeals as a pauper, the petitioner alleges he is already 67 years old and is a very poor man with a family to support; that his property consists of a very small parcel of land planted to coconuts containing an area of about two hectares and assessed at P200, from which he can gather only "very few nuts" due to recent typhoons in the province of Camarines Sur which destroyed about 100 fruit-bearing coconut trees on his land; that he would find it difficult, if not impossible, to raise the amount of P250 to cover the cost of printing a record on appeal, as he can hardly afford to buy rice to feed his family, substituting therefor root crops like camote and banana; and that our Constitution provides that a man should not be deprived of the right to free access to the courts by reason of poverty.
On July 18, 1967 this Court allowed the petitioner to litigate as a pauper before it, 4 and required the respondent Court of Appeals to file an answer to the petition. 5
On August 3, 1967 the Court of Appeals filed its answer, denying the statements made in the petition that there were "several typhoons" that swept the Bicol region which destroyed coconut trees on the two-hectare land possessed by the petitioner, and that the latter has obtained the services of his lawyer for free, the truth being that the petitioner paid his lawyer P400 in attorney’s fees as found by the lower court. As special defenses, the respondent court averred that the petitioner is not as impecunious as he claims to be, as he is the owner and is in possession of a two-hectare coconut land; that he is likewise in possession of the two parcels of land subject of the litigation below with a total area of more than 2-1/2 hectares planted to coconuts and bananas, whose products he has been appropriating, including the plaintiff-appellee’s share therein; that the harvest of coconuts takes place three to four times a year; that the petitioner not being really poor, the constitutional provision that no person shall be denied access to courts due to poverty may not be invoked by him; that granting, arguendo, that the petitioner is a poor man, his motion to appeal as pauper should have been filed with the lower court.
It is noteworthy that the petitioner made no attempt to controvert the special defenses set forth by the respondent Court, particularly those alleging his ownership and possession of the 2-1/2 hectares of land from which he allegedly derives three or four harvests of coconuts a year; and that he had paid his lawyer the amount of P400 in attorney’s fees. The respondent court’s defense tending as it does to destroy the petitioner’s claim to poverty, the latter should have incurred no delay in disputing its allegations, nor overlooked his duty to make immediate reply thereto if he is to convince this Court of the merit of his claim.
However, without going into the merits of the petitioner’s prayer that he be considered a pauper for the reasons advanced by him, it is our considered view that his: present petition does not merit serious consideration. For the Rules provide in no uncertain terms that the trial court, not the appellate court, is the proper forum to ventilate one’s claim to be allowed to litigate as a pauper. Thus Section 16, Rule 41, provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Where a party desiring to appeal shall establish to the satisfaction of the trial court that he is a pauper and unable to pay the expenses of prosecuting the appeal, and that the case is of such importance, by reason of the amount involved, or the nature of the question raised, that it ought to be reviewed by the appellate court, the trial judge may enter an order entitling the party to appeal as pauper. The clerk shall transmit to the appellate court the entire record of the case, including the evidence taken on trial and the record on appeal, and the case shall be heard in the appellate court upon the original record so transmitted without printing the same.
"A petition to be allowed to appeal as pauper shall not be entertained by the appellate court."cralaw virtua1aw library
Even before the adoption of the Revised Rules, this Court had uniformly frowned upon appellate courts entertaining petitions to appeal as pauper, holding that the task of determining the merits of such petitions properly devolves upon the trial court, even though the old Rules contained no provision, as does the present one, expressly withholding from an appellate Court the right to entertain petitions to appeal as pauper. The reason behind the policy is that whether a party-litigant is so poor as to qualify him to litigate as a pauper, is a question of fact which can best be determined by a trial court. This was explicitly explained in this Court’s resolution of September 4, 1951, dismissing a motion for reconsideration filed by the plaintiffs-appellants in G.R. L-4998, Jose Alcantara, Et. Al. v. Mariano Tuazon y de la Paz, Et Al., thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A petition to be allowed to appeal as pauper cannot be entertained by this Court as appellate court. Such petition must be filed with the trial court under Section 16, Rule 41, of the Rules of Court. The reason is that the trial court is the court which may properly decide or pass upon the question of fact, which may require presentation of evidence, whether the appellant is pauper and may appeal as such, and whether the case is of such importance that, by reason not only of the amount involved but of the nature of the question raised in the court below, it ought to be reviewed by the appellate court. It is not for this Court to examine the facts and law of the case for the first time in order to pass upon this last requirement."cralaw virtua1aw library
There is not even the least pretense that the petitioner had asked, much less was allowed by, the trial court to prosecute his defense therein as a pauper, and that the permission stood unrevoked when he interposed his appeal to the Court of Appeals, so as to entitle him to continue litigating as a pauper, on the strength of Comia v. Judge Castillo, 75 Phil. 526.
ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is denied. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., is on official leave.
Endnotes:
1. Denying petitioner’s motion to file only typewritten record on appeal and brief, and requiring him in file printed copies thereof.
2. Denying motion in reconsider resolution of February 6, 1967.
3. Denying motion in reconsider resolution of March 2, 1967, to admit 15 mimeographed copies of appellant’s record on appeal, and in give due course in his appeal.
4. Permission was given on the basis of petitioner’s verified petition supported by an affidavit executed by the Assistant Provincial Assessor of Camarines Sur (annex A).
5. The Court treats the petition, considering its allegations, as an original action brought before it. See Acar v. Hon. Rosal, L-21707, March 18, 1967, for authority of this Court to issue writs of certiorari and mandamus to compel a trial court to allow a party to litigate as pauper.
