February 2002 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. 140651 February 19, 2002 - ESTELITA G. HERRERA v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.:
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 140651. February 19, 2002.]
ESTELITA G. HERRERA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
BERNARDINO DAQUIOAG y Bangayan, FLORDELITA DAQUIOAG y Gamata and ESTELITA HERRERA y Garello, all public school teachers and residents of San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, were charged in an Information filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan for violation of Secs. 217 and 261 (z), Nos. 13, 15 and 21, in relation to Sec. 264, of BP Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code.
As found by the trial court, the synchronized elections for the national, provincial and municipal levels were held on 11 May 1992. Responding to the call for electoral vigilance, the Catholic parishioners of Baggao, Cagayan, organized the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV) to closely observe and monitor the conduct of the elections and to report to the proper authorities violations of the election laws and other pertinent regulations.
In the municipality of Baggao, Cagayan, the seat of government is in Barangay San Jose where the municipal hall, police station, office of the Commission on Elections and the municipal gymnasium are clustered in one (1) compound. Approximately three (3) kilometers from Barangay San Jose are Barangays Mocag and Mabini. During the 11 May 1992 elections, the polling places of Mocag and Mabini were located at Mocag Elementary School which had no electric power supply.
On 12 May 1992 or one (1) day after the synchronized elections, Arnold Alonzo, a PPCRV coordinator, received information that the ballot boxes of Precincts Nos. 35, 37, 37-A, 38, 38-A and 39 were not yet submitted to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer. Upon inquiries made, Arnold Alonzo learned that the spouses Bernardino Daquioag and Flordelita Daquioag were the poll chairmen in Precincts Nos. 38 and 39, respectively. Together with Joelcino Barcena, Alonzo went to the house of the Daquioags and found six (6) ballot boxes there belonging to Precincts Nos. 35, 37, 37-A, 38, 38-A and 39. The ballot boxes had incomplete padlocks and strewn on the table were several tally sheets and election returns. The watchers and the other members of the Board of Election Inspectors were not in the house. When asked why they brought home the ballot boxes, the Daquioags explained that they decided to bring home the ballot boxes since it was already late. Besides, they did not know they needed permission from the COMELEC registrar before they could do so.
Alonzo reported the incident to the COMELEC registrar who immediately formed a team to retrieve the ballot boxes. The ballot boxes were eventually brought to the municipal hall.
After some time, Alonzo learned that the ballot box in Precinct No. 51 was also unaccounted for. A report was made to the COMELEC registrar who again organized a team to retrieve the ballot box. The team, together with Alonzo, proceeded to the house of Estelita Herrera, the poll chairman for Precinct No. 51, and upon arrival, they saw the ballot box open in Herrera’s sala. Herrera admitted that she took the ballot box home because she had not yet finished accomplishing some forms that were required to be deposited inside the ballot box.
During the trial, the prosecution presented Arnold Alonzo as its sole witness. After the prosecution rested, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court. Upon evaluation of the evidence presented by the prosecution and after finding a prima facie case against the accused, the court a quo denied the demurrer to evidence. Instead of adducing its evidence, the defense opted to submit the case for resolution.
Convinced that the accused had indeed transferred the ballot boxes from the polling place to their respective houses without authority from the COMELEC, the trial court sentenced the accused to a prison term ranging from one (1) year of prision correccional as minimum to four (4) years of prision correccional as maximum in addition to disqualification to hold public office and to exercise the right of suffrage. 1
In their appeal brief filed with the Court of Appeals, the spouses Bernardino Daquioag and Flordelita Daquioag argued that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that the decision of the court a quo was based merely on surmises and conjectures. They posited that with only the testimony of Alonzo to rely on, the court below unfairly sentenced them to imprisonment and disqualification from holding public office and from exercising their right of suffrage.
The Daquioags also claimed that the trial court was without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case considering the inaction and non-participation of the COMELEC. They maintained that the COMELEC, being the constitutional body mandated by law to prosecute election offenses, had the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations. According to the Daquioags, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was without authority to investigate and prosecute the case.
As for the petitioner Estelita G. Herrera, she claimed that she did not incur any delay in the transmittal of the ballot box and other election paraphernalia, citing Sec. 217 of the Omnibus Election Code which states in part that" (t)he treasurer and the election registrar, as the case may be, shall on the day after the election, require the members of the board of election inspectors who failed to send the objects referred to herein to deliver the same to him immediately and acknowledge receipt thereof in detail." Although she brought home the ballot box, Herrera argued that the same was returned to the election registrar the day after the elections and prior to any order issued by the registrar or municipal treasurer to return the same.
While Herrera admitted having transferred the ballot box from the polling place to her residence, she disputed the claim made by the prosecution that she did so without authority from the election registrar. According to her, the claim that the ballot box was transferred without authority is a negative assertion and, as such, the burden of proof fell on the prosecution.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of accused-appellants Bernardino Daquioag and Flordelita Daquioag as well as Estelita G. Herrera. 2 Citing Sec. 268 3 of the Omnibus Election Code, the appellate court ruled that the trial court had jurisdiction over the case. It further decreed that the issue raised by the Daquioags was not a question of jurisdiction but one that assailed the authority of the person who filed the Information. This must be alleged in a motion to quash, otherwise the same would be deemed waived.
The Court of Appeals likewise found the evidence presented by the prosecution to have sufficiently established the guilt of accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. It was clearly proved that the ballot boxes under their custody were brought to their respective houses without authority from the election registrar and were not immediately turned over to the office of the municipal treasurer.
Accused-appellants’ separate motions for reconsideration were denied. 4 Only accused-appellant Herrera interposed the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Specifically, petitioner Herrera alleges that the Information does not sufficiently charge the offense of which they were convicted. She maintains that the Information charges multiple offenses, to wit: violation of Sec. 217 (failure to immediately deliver ballot box and other election paraphernalia to the municipal treasurer), violation of Sec. 261(z), No. 13 (opening or destroying ballot box or removing or destroying its contents), violation of Sec. 261(z), No. 15 (failure to properly account for ballot box, documents and forms), and violation of Sec. 261(z), No. 21 (violating the integrity of any official ballot or election return).
Herrera claims that assuming the ballot box was indeed transferred, still, she could not be properly convicted considering the failure of the prosecution to prove that she was the poll chairman of Precinct No. 51. Neither was it specified in the information the particular barangay of which she was supposedly the poll chairman nor was there any proof that the transfer of the ballot box from the polling place to her residence was without authority from the COMELEC registrar.
The Office of the Solicitor General asserts that petitioner should have filed a motion to quash the Information if indeed she believed the Information was insufficient. Her failure to move to quash the Information before entering a plea is deemed a waiver of this right. Consequently, petitioner is estopped to enter any objection as regards the sufficiency or insufficiency of the Information.
The Solicitor General maintains that the Information is valid as it complied with Secs. 9 and 10, Rule 110, of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. He finds no necessity in specifically alleging that petitioner was the poll chairman of Precinct No. 51 as it is not an essential element of the offense charged.
In reply, petitioner insists she could not have waived her right to question the validity of the Information considering that the issue raised was grounded on no offense charged and not on insufficiency of the Information. She maintains that the election offense referred to in Sec. 217 was for failure by the members of the Board of Election Inspectors and watchers to immediately deliver the ballot box, supplies and all pertinent papers and documents to the city or municipal treasurer whereas the Information charges her with transferring the ballot boxes, tally sheets, election returns, and other election paraphernalia from the precinct or polling place to her residence. Petitioner insists that the fact that the election materials were not immediately delivered to the municipal treasurer must be stated and specified in the Information. She recalls that the municipal treasurer was not even mentioned in the Information. She also claims that the situs of Precinct No. 51 must be particularly identified considering that it is an essential element of the offense charged.
The following issues now confront the Court: (a) whether the Information is valid and sufficient; and, consequently, (b) whether petitioner was properly convicted of the offense of which she was charged.
Section 6, Rule 110, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.
In the instant case, the Information reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The undersigned Provincial Prosecutor hereby accuses Bernardino Daquioag, Flordelita Daquioag and Estelita Herrera of Violation of Sections 217 and 261 (z), Nos. 13, 15 and 21 in relation to Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Bilang 881), as amended, committed as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That on or about May 12, 1992, in the Municipality of Baggao, Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Bernardino Daquioag, being then the Poll Chairman of Precinct No. 38, Flordelita Daquioag, being then the Poll Chairman of Precinct No. 38-A and Estelita Herrera being then the Poll Chairman of Precinct No. 51 of Barangays Mabini and Mocag, Baggao, Cagayan, respectively, without authority from the Commission on Elections did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transfer the ballot boxes, tally sheets, election returns and other election paraphernalia used in the Election of May 11, 1992 from their respective precincts /polling places abovementioned to their respective residences, and while in their respective residences opened the ballot boxes in their possession without authority/Order from the Commission on Elections and failed to account said ballot boxes in their respective possession to the Municipal Treasurer and/or Election Registrar of the Municipality of Baggao immediately after the counting of votes, thus, violating the integrity and sanctity of the ballots and/or election returns used in the Election of May 11, 1992. 5
Plainly, the Information states the names of the accused, i.e., Bernardino Daquioag, Flordelita Daquioag and Estelita Herrera, all public school teachers and poll chairmen, and they were specifically charged with violating Secs. 217 and 261 (z), Nos. 13, 15 and 21 of BP Blg. 881 allegedly committed on 12 May 1992 in Baggao, Cagayan, by transferring without authority from the COMELEC ballot boxes and other election paraphernalia from their respective polling places to their residences. In a plethora of cases, this Court has ruled that the information is sufficient where it clearly states the designation of the offense by the statute and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense 6 Verily, there is no question that the assailed Information is sufficient.
As a general rule, the complaint or information must charge only one (1) offense. 7 Admittedly, the instant Information charges petitioner with several offenses, to wit: (a) failure to immediately deliver ballot box and other election paraphernalia to the municipal treasurer, 8 (b) opening or destroying ballot box or removing or destroying its contents; 9 (c) failure to properly account for ballot box, documents and forms; 10 and (4) violating the integrity of any official ballot or election return. 11
The remedy of petitioner would have been to move to quash the Information at any time before entering a plea 12 on the ground that more than one offense was charged in the Information. 13 The failure of petitioner to assert this ground in a motion to quash before she pleaded to the Information is deemed a waiver. 14 Consequently, she may be validly convicted of as many offenses as are charged in the Information and may be proved by the People. 15 Luckily for, Petitioner, the trial court found her guilty only of violating Sec. 217 of BP Blg. 881 and exonerated her of the other charges.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On the other hand, petitioner is correct in saying that she could still assail the sufficiency of the Information on the ground that it charges no offense. Pursuant to Sec. 9, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this objection is not deemed waived despite her failure to enter her objection in a motion to quash before arraignment.
According to petitioner, the Information charges no offense because the offense referred to in Sec. 217 is failure by the members of the board of election inspectors and watchers to immediately deliver the ballot box, supplies and all pertinent papers and documents to the city or municipal treasurer, whereas the Information charges her with transferring the ballot boxes, tally sheets, election returns and other election paraphernalia from the polling place to her residence.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The argument is specious. Plainly, it is a strained interpretation of what constitutes an offense under Sec. 217. 16 It was precisely because of petitioner’s act of transferring the ballot box from the polling place to her residence that the ballot box and other election paraphernalia were detoured and not delivered immediately to the office of the municipal treasurer. Significantly, it is not even contested that upon the termination of the counting of votes the subject ballot box was transferred from the polling place to petitioner’s residence and not to the municipal treasurer’s office. This transfer was the proximate cause of the delay in the delivery of the ballot boxes and other election paraphernalia.
That the Information was not so worded in the terms defining the offense is not fatal for the prosecution. It has long been established that it is not necessary that the acts and omissions complained of as constituting the offense be stated in the terms of the statute defining the offense. 17 Thus —
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
In the instant case, the Information recites that on 12 May 1992, in Baggao, Cagayan, Estelita Herrera, being then the poll chairman of Precinct No. 51, transferred the ballot box and other election paraphernalia in her possession from the polling place to her residence without authority from the COMELEC, in violation of Sec. 217, BP Blg. 881. Undoubtedly, petitioner being a public school teacher would have found no difficulty understanding that the essence of her offense is the act of transferring the ballot box without authority from the polling place thus delaying its transmittal to the office of the municipal treasurer. The Information was stated in plain and simple words that petitioner could not complain that she was not adequately apprised of the charges against her.chanrobles.com : red
This Court agrees with the Solicitor General that there is no need to specifically state in the Information the barangay in which Precinct No. 51 is located, that petitioner is the poll chairman thereat and that the transfer was unauthorized. These are not essential elements of the crime. Nevertheless, the court below found that, indeed, petitioner was the poll chairman in Precinct No. 51, in the municipality of Baggao, Cagayan, and the transfer was made without the knowledge and authority of the COMELEC registrar. We find no reason to digress from this factual finding of the court a quo.
There is no merit in petitioner’s asseveration that the burden of proof rests on the prosecution to prove that the transfer of the ballot box and other election paraphernalia from the polling place to her residence was done without authority from the COMELEC. As a matter of fact, it suffices for the prosecution to establish only that upon termination of the counting of votes, the ballot box was moved by petitioner from the polling place to her residence, and not directly to the office of the municipal treasurer.
Once the prosecution has established these facts, it has already successfully built a prima facie case against the defense. The burden of evidence is shifted to the defense once the prosecution has produced sufficient evidence to be entitled as a matter of law to a ruling in its favor. 18 It is not incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce positive evidence to support a negative averment the truth of which is fairly indicated by established circumstances and which, if untrue, could readily be disproved by the production of documents or other evidence probably within the defendant’s possession or control. 19
In the instant case, after filing a demurrer to evidence and upon its denial, the defense could have simply presented in evidence a written authorization from the COMELEC that the transfer, if indeed there was, was valid. Once it has proved that the transfer was authorized, there is no doubt in the mind of this Court that the case of the prosecution would have crumbled on its face. The predicament in which petitioner is presently embroiled is the result of her own negligence. The case of United States v. Tria 20 is edifying —
The prosecution had the difficult office of proving a negative. In making proof under such circumstances it has, perhaps, not presented either the best evidence or the complete evidence. This, however, is due to the fact that what may be considered, technically speaking, the best or the completest evidence is entirely within the control of the appellants themselves, who refused to produce, or, at least, refrained from producing, it. Under such circumstances, there rests upon the prosecution the necessity of producing simply the best evidence obtainable under the circumstances. That such evidence may not be the best evidence, legally speaking, is no fault of the prosecution. That inability is the result of the attitude of the appellants themselves. Under such circumstances the prosecution need do no more primarily than make a prima facie case from the best evidence obtainable under the circumstances. Justice and the law require of the people only that they establish, prima facie, the guilt of the accused by producing for that purpose the best evidence within their power. If that evidence is otherwise free from legal objection or exception, it may properly serve as the basis of a conviction.
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardy indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him.
. . . In this case it was only necessary for the accused for a complete destruction of the complainant’s prima facie case to take the stand and, by a few words, bring themselves within the provisions of the law. No hardship was imposed upon them (Citation omitted).
Where the subject-matter of a negative averment in an indictment, or a fact relied upon by defendant as a justification or excuse, relates to him personally or otherwise lies peculiarly within his knowledge, the general rule is that the burden of proof as to such averment or fact is on him (Citations omitted).
None of the appellants took the stand as a witness in his own behalf. The case made out by the prosecution remains entirely unmet.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 21 December 1998, which affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 5, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, finding petitioner Estelita G. Herrera guilty of violating Sec. 217 of BP Blg. 881 and sentencing her to suffer imprisonment ranging from one (1) year of prision correccional as minimum to four (4) years of prision correccional as maximum, disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage, and its Resolution dated 25 October 1999 denying reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
As found by the trial court, the synchronized elections for the national, provincial and municipal levels were held on 11 May 1992. Responding to the call for electoral vigilance, the Catholic parishioners of Baggao, Cagayan, organized the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV) to closely observe and monitor the conduct of the elections and to report to the proper authorities violations of the election laws and other pertinent regulations.
In the municipality of Baggao, Cagayan, the seat of government is in Barangay San Jose where the municipal hall, police station, office of the Commission on Elections and the municipal gymnasium are clustered in one (1) compound. Approximately three (3) kilometers from Barangay San Jose are Barangays Mocag and Mabini. During the 11 May 1992 elections, the polling places of Mocag and Mabini were located at Mocag Elementary School which had no electric power supply.
On 12 May 1992 or one (1) day after the synchronized elections, Arnold Alonzo, a PPCRV coordinator, received information that the ballot boxes of Precincts Nos. 35, 37, 37-A, 38, 38-A and 39 were not yet submitted to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer. Upon inquiries made, Arnold Alonzo learned that the spouses Bernardino Daquioag and Flordelita Daquioag were the poll chairmen in Precincts Nos. 38 and 39, respectively. Together with Joelcino Barcena, Alonzo went to the house of the Daquioags and found six (6) ballot boxes there belonging to Precincts Nos. 35, 37, 37-A, 38, 38-A and 39. The ballot boxes had incomplete padlocks and strewn on the table were several tally sheets and election returns. The watchers and the other members of the Board of Election Inspectors were not in the house. When asked why they brought home the ballot boxes, the Daquioags explained that they decided to bring home the ballot boxes since it was already late. Besides, they did not know they needed permission from the COMELEC registrar before they could do so.
Alonzo reported the incident to the COMELEC registrar who immediately formed a team to retrieve the ballot boxes. The ballot boxes were eventually brought to the municipal hall.
After some time, Alonzo learned that the ballot box in Precinct No. 51 was also unaccounted for. A report was made to the COMELEC registrar who again organized a team to retrieve the ballot box. The team, together with Alonzo, proceeded to the house of Estelita Herrera, the poll chairman for Precinct No. 51, and upon arrival, they saw the ballot box open in Herrera’s sala. Herrera admitted that she took the ballot box home because she had not yet finished accomplishing some forms that were required to be deposited inside the ballot box.
During the trial, the prosecution presented Arnold Alonzo as its sole witness. After the prosecution rested, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court. Upon evaluation of the evidence presented by the prosecution and after finding a prima facie case against the accused, the court a quo denied the demurrer to evidence. Instead of adducing its evidence, the defense opted to submit the case for resolution.
Convinced that the accused had indeed transferred the ballot boxes from the polling place to their respective houses without authority from the COMELEC, the trial court sentenced the accused to a prison term ranging from one (1) year of prision correccional as minimum to four (4) years of prision correccional as maximum in addition to disqualification to hold public office and to exercise the right of suffrage. 1
In their appeal brief filed with the Court of Appeals, the spouses Bernardino Daquioag and Flordelita Daquioag argued that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that the decision of the court a quo was based merely on surmises and conjectures. They posited that with only the testimony of Alonzo to rely on, the court below unfairly sentenced them to imprisonment and disqualification from holding public office and from exercising their right of suffrage.
The Daquioags also claimed that the trial court was without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case considering the inaction and non-participation of the COMELEC. They maintained that the COMELEC, being the constitutional body mandated by law to prosecute election offenses, had the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations. According to the Daquioags, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was without authority to investigate and prosecute the case.
As for the petitioner Estelita G. Herrera, she claimed that she did not incur any delay in the transmittal of the ballot box and other election paraphernalia, citing Sec. 217 of the Omnibus Election Code which states in part that" (t)he treasurer and the election registrar, as the case may be, shall on the day after the election, require the members of the board of election inspectors who failed to send the objects referred to herein to deliver the same to him immediately and acknowledge receipt thereof in detail." Although she brought home the ballot box, Herrera argued that the same was returned to the election registrar the day after the elections and prior to any order issued by the registrar or municipal treasurer to return the same.
While Herrera admitted having transferred the ballot box from the polling place to her residence, she disputed the claim made by the prosecution that she did so without authority from the election registrar. According to her, the claim that the ballot box was transferred without authority is a negative assertion and, as such, the burden of proof fell on the prosecution.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of accused-appellants Bernardino Daquioag and Flordelita Daquioag as well as Estelita G. Herrera. 2 Citing Sec. 268 3 of the Omnibus Election Code, the appellate court ruled that the trial court had jurisdiction over the case. It further decreed that the issue raised by the Daquioags was not a question of jurisdiction but one that assailed the authority of the person who filed the Information. This must be alleged in a motion to quash, otherwise the same would be deemed waived.
The Court of Appeals likewise found the evidence presented by the prosecution to have sufficiently established the guilt of accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. It was clearly proved that the ballot boxes under their custody were brought to their respective houses without authority from the election registrar and were not immediately turned over to the office of the municipal treasurer.
Accused-appellants’ separate motions for reconsideration were denied. 4 Only accused-appellant Herrera interposed the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Specifically, petitioner Herrera alleges that the Information does not sufficiently charge the offense of which they were convicted. She maintains that the Information charges multiple offenses, to wit: violation of Sec. 217 (failure to immediately deliver ballot box and other election paraphernalia to the municipal treasurer), violation of Sec. 261(z), No. 13 (opening or destroying ballot box or removing or destroying its contents), violation of Sec. 261(z), No. 15 (failure to properly account for ballot box, documents and forms), and violation of Sec. 261(z), No. 21 (violating the integrity of any official ballot or election return).
Herrera claims that assuming the ballot box was indeed transferred, still, she could not be properly convicted considering the failure of the prosecution to prove that she was the poll chairman of Precinct No. 51. Neither was it specified in the information the particular barangay of which she was supposedly the poll chairman nor was there any proof that the transfer of the ballot box from the polling place to her residence was without authority from the COMELEC registrar.
The Office of the Solicitor General asserts that petitioner should have filed a motion to quash the Information if indeed she believed the Information was insufficient. Her failure to move to quash the Information before entering a plea is deemed a waiver of this right. Consequently, petitioner is estopped to enter any objection as regards the sufficiency or insufficiency of the Information.
The Solicitor General maintains that the Information is valid as it complied with Secs. 9 and 10, Rule 110, of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. He finds no necessity in specifically alleging that petitioner was the poll chairman of Precinct No. 51 as it is not an essential element of the offense charged.
In reply, petitioner insists she could not have waived her right to question the validity of the Information considering that the issue raised was grounded on no offense charged and not on insufficiency of the Information. She maintains that the election offense referred to in Sec. 217 was for failure by the members of the Board of Election Inspectors and watchers to immediately deliver the ballot box, supplies and all pertinent papers and documents to the city or municipal treasurer whereas the Information charges her with transferring the ballot boxes, tally sheets, election returns, and other election paraphernalia from the precinct or polling place to her residence. Petitioner insists that the fact that the election materials were not immediately delivered to the municipal treasurer must be stated and specified in the Information. She recalls that the municipal treasurer was not even mentioned in the Information. She also claims that the situs of Precinct No. 51 must be particularly identified considering that it is an essential element of the offense charged.
The following issues now confront the Court: (a) whether the Information is valid and sufficient; and, consequently, (b) whether petitioner was properly convicted of the offense of which she was charged.
Section 6, Rule 110, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.
In the instant case, the Information reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The undersigned Provincial Prosecutor hereby accuses Bernardino Daquioag, Flordelita Daquioag and Estelita Herrera of Violation of Sections 217 and 261 (z), Nos. 13, 15 and 21 in relation to Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Bilang 881), as amended, committed as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That on or about May 12, 1992, in the Municipality of Baggao, Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Bernardino Daquioag, being then the Poll Chairman of Precinct No. 38, Flordelita Daquioag, being then the Poll Chairman of Precinct No. 38-A and Estelita Herrera being then the Poll Chairman of Precinct No. 51 of Barangays Mabini and Mocag, Baggao, Cagayan, respectively, without authority from the Commission on Elections did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transfer the ballot boxes, tally sheets, election returns and other election paraphernalia used in the Election of May 11, 1992 from their respective precincts /polling places abovementioned to their respective residences, and while in their respective residences opened the ballot boxes in their possession without authority/Order from the Commission on Elections and failed to account said ballot boxes in their respective possession to the Municipal Treasurer and/or Election Registrar of the Municipality of Baggao immediately after the counting of votes, thus, violating the integrity and sanctity of the ballots and/or election returns used in the Election of May 11, 1992. 5
Plainly, the Information states the names of the accused, i.e., Bernardino Daquioag, Flordelita Daquioag and Estelita Herrera, all public school teachers and poll chairmen, and they were specifically charged with violating Secs. 217 and 261 (z), Nos. 13, 15 and 21 of BP Blg. 881 allegedly committed on 12 May 1992 in Baggao, Cagayan, by transferring without authority from the COMELEC ballot boxes and other election paraphernalia from their respective polling places to their residences. In a plethora of cases, this Court has ruled that the information is sufficient where it clearly states the designation of the offense by the statute and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense 6 Verily, there is no question that the assailed Information is sufficient.
As a general rule, the complaint or information must charge only one (1) offense. 7 Admittedly, the instant Information charges petitioner with several offenses, to wit: (a) failure to immediately deliver ballot box and other election paraphernalia to the municipal treasurer, 8 (b) opening or destroying ballot box or removing or destroying its contents; 9 (c) failure to properly account for ballot box, documents and forms; 10 and (4) violating the integrity of any official ballot or election return. 11
The remedy of petitioner would have been to move to quash the Information at any time before entering a plea 12 on the ground that more than one offense was charged in the Information. 13 The failure of petitioner to assert this ground in a motion to quash before she pleaded to the Information is deemed a waiver. 14 Consequently, she may be validly convicted of as many offenses as are charged in the Information and may be proved by the People. 15 Luckily for, Petitioner, the trial court found her guilty only of violating Sec. 217 of BP Blg. 881 and exonerated her of the other charges.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On the other hand, petitioner is correct in saying that she could still assail the sufficiency of the Information on the ground that it charges no offense. Pursuant to Sec. 9, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this objection is not deemed waived despite her failure to enter her objection in a motion to quash before arraignment.
According to petitioner, the Information charges no offense because the offense referred to in Sec. 217 is failure by the members of the board of election inspectors and watchers to immediately deliver the ballot box, supplies and all pertinent papers and documents to the city or municipal treasurer, whereas the Information charges her with transferring the ballot boxes, tally sheets, election returns and other election paraphernalia from the polling place to her residence.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The argument is specious. Plainly, it is a strained interpretation of what constitutes an offense under Sec. 217. 16 It was precisely because of petitioner’s act of transferring the ballot box from the polling place to her residence that the ballot box and other election paraphernalia were detoured and not delivered immediately to the office of the municipal treasurer. Significantly, it is not even contested that upon the termination of the counting of votes the subject ballot box was transferred from the polling place to petitioner’s residence and not to the municipal treasurer’s office. This transfer was the proximate cause of the delay in the delivery of the ballot boxes and other election paraphernalia.
That the Information was not so worded in the terms defining the offense is not fatal for the prosecution. It has long been established that it is not necessary that the acts and omissions complained of as constituting the offense be stated in the terms of the statute defining the offense. 17 Thus —
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
In the instant case, the Information recites that on 12 May 1992, in Baggao, Cagayan, Estelita Herrera, being then the poll chairman of Precinct No. 51, transferred the ballot box and other election paraphernalia in her possession from the polling place to her residence without authority from the COMELEC, in violation of Sec. 217, BP Blg. 881. Undoubtedly, petitioner being a public school teacher would have found no difficulty understanding that the essence of her offense is the act of transferring the ballot box without authority from the polling place thus delaying its transmittal to the office of the municipal treasurer. The Information was stated in plain and simple words that petitioner could not complain that she was not adequately apprised of the charges against her.chanrobles.com : red
This Court agrees with the Solicitor General that there is no need to specifically state in the Information the barangay in which Precinct No. 51 is located, that petitioner is the poll chairman thereat and that the transfer was unauthorized. These are not essential elements of the crime. Nevertheless, the court below found that, indeed, petitioner was the poll chairman in Precinct No. 51, in the municipality of Baggao, Cagayan, and the transfer was made without the knowledge and authority of the COMELEC registrar. We find no reason to digress from this factual finding of the court a quo.
There is no merit in petitioner’s asseveration that the burden of proof rests on the prosecution to prove that the transfer of the ballot box and other election paraphernalia from the polling place to her residence was done without authority from the COMELEC. As a matter of fact, it suffices for the prosecution to establish only that upon termination of the counting of votes, the ballot box was moved by petitioner from the polling place to her residence, and not directly to the office of the municipal treasurer.
Once the prosecution has established these facts, it has already successfully built a prima facie case against the defense. The burden of evidence is shifted to the defense once the prosecution has produced sufficient evidence to be entitled as a matter of law to a ruling in its favor. 18 It is not incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce positive evidence to support a negative averment the truth of which is fairly indicated by established circumstances and which, if untrue, could readily be disproved by the production of documents or other evidence probably within the defendant’s possession or control. 19
In the instant case, after filing a demurrer to evidence and upon its denial, the defense could have simply presented in evidence a written authorization from the COMELEC that the transfer, if indeed there was, was valid. Once it has proved that the transfer was authorized, there is no doubt in the mind of this Court that the case of the prosecution would have crumbled on its face. The predicament in which petitioner is presently embroiled is the result of her own negligence. The case of United States v. Tria 20 is edifying —
The prosecution had the difficult office of proving a negative. In making proof under such circumstances it has, perhaps, not presented either the best evidence or the complete evidence. This, however, is due to the fact that what may be considered, technically speaking, the best or the completest evidence is entirely within the control of the appellants themselves, who refused to produce, or, at least, refrained from producing, it. Under such circumstances, there rests upon the prosecution the necessity of producing simply the best evidence obtainable under the circumstances. That such evidence may not be the best evidence, legally speaking, is no fault of the prosecution. That inability is the result of the attitude of the appellants themselves. Under such circumstances the prosecution need do no more primarily than make a prima facie case from the best evidence obtainable under the circumstances. Justice and the law require of the people only that they establish, prima facie, the guilt of the accused by producing for that purpose the best evidence within their power. If that evidence is otherwise free from legal objection or exception, it may properly serve as the basis of a conviction.
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardy indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him.
. . . In this case it was only necessary for the accused for a complete destruction of the complainant’s prima facie case to take the stand and, by a few words, bring themselves within the provisions of the law. No hardship was imposed upon them (Citation omitted).
Where the subject-matter of a negative averment in an indictment, or a fact relied upon by defendant as a justification or excuse, relates to him personally or otherwise lies peculiarly within his knowledge, the general rule is that the burden of proof as to such averment or fact is on him (Citations omitted).
None of the appellants took the stand as a witness in his own behalf. The case made out by the prosecution remains entirely unmet.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 21 December 1998, which affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 5, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, finding petitioner Estelita G. Herrera guilty of violating Sec. 217 of BP Blg. 881 and sentencing her to suffer imprisonment ranging from one (1) year of prision correccional as minimum to four (4) years of prision correccional as maximum, disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage, and its Resolution dated 25 October 1999 denying reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Decision penned by then Judge Hilarion L. Aquino (now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals), RTC-Br. 5, Tuguegarao, Cagayan; Original Records, pp. 6-19.
2. Decision penned by Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr., concurred in by Associate Justices Salome A. Montoya and Ruben T. Reyes; Original Records, pp. 104-115.
3. Sec. 268. Jurisdiction of Courts. — The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts.
4. Rollo, p. 7.
5. Original Records, p. 4.
6. Sta. Rita v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119891, 21 August 1995, 247 SCRA 484.
7. Except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses; Section 13, Rule 110, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
8. Sec. 217, BP Big. 881.
9. Sec. 261 (z), No. 13, BP Blg. 881.
10. Id., No. 15, id.
11. Id., No. 21, id.
12. Sec. 1, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
13. Sec. 3 (f), id.
14. Sec. 9, id.
15. People v. Dulay, G.R. Nos. 95156-94, 18 January 1993, 217 SCRA 132.
16. Sec. 217. Delivery of the ballot boxes, keys and section supplies and documents. — Upon the termination of the counting of votes, the board of election inspectors shall place in the compartment for valid ballots, the envelopes for used ballots herein before referred to, the unused ballots, the tally board or sheet, a copy of the election returns, and the minutes of its proceedings, and then shall lock the ballot box with three padlocks and such safety devices as the Commission may prescribe. Immediately after the box is locked, the three keys of the padlocks shall be placed in three separate envelopes and shall be sealed and signed by all the members of the board of elections inspectors. The authorized representatives of the Commission shall forthwith take delivery of said envelopes, signing a receipt therefor, and deliver without delay one envelope to the provincial treasurer, another to the provincial fiscal and the other to the provincial election supervisor.
The ballot box, all supplies of the board of election inspectors and all pertinent papers and documents shall immediately be delivered by the board of elections inspectors and the watchers to the city or municipal treasurer who shall keep his office open all night on the day of election if necessary for this purpose, and shall provide the necessary facilities for said delivery at the expense of the city or municipality. The treasurer and the election registrar, as the case may be, shall on the day after the election require the members of the board of election inspectors who failed to send the objects referred to herein to deliver the same to him immediately and acknowledge receipt thereof in detail.
17. Sec. 9, Rule 110, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
18. Francisco, Vicente J., The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Evidence, Vol. VII, Part II, 1997 Ed., p. 4.
19. Id., p. 25.
20. 17 Phil. 306-308 [1910].
