March 2007 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence
G.R. No. 147117 - MABINI EPIE, JR. ET AL. v. THE HON. NELSONIDA T. ULAT-MARREDO
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 148117 : March 22, 2007]
MABINI EPIE, JR. and RODRIGO PALASI, Petitioners, v. THE HON. NELSONIDA T. ULAT-MARREDO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, La Trinidad, Benguet and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated September 15, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 55684.
The facts of the case as gleaned from the records are:
In an Information dated September 22, 1998, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet Province charged Mabini Epie, Jr. and Rodrigo Palasi, petitioners, with violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705,2 as amended. The Informtion reads:
That on or about the 6th day of September 1998, along the Halsema National Highway at Acop, Municipality of Tublay, Province of Benguet, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually aiding each other and without any authority of law or without any license or permit granted by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess and transport 870 bd. ft. of Benguet Pine lumber having a total market value of TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIXTY PESOS (P24,360.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, to the damage and prejudice of the GOVERNMENT in the actual sum aforesaid.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, La Trinidad, Benguet (presided by respondent Judge Nelsonida T. Ulat-Marredo), docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-CR-3138.
When arraigned, both petitioners, with the assistance of counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that at around 2:30 p.m. of September 6, 1998, SPO2 Alberto Ngina of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Tublay Station received an information from a confidential agent that a jeepney with Plate No. AYB 117 at Km. 96, Atok, Benguet was loaded with Benguet pine lumber.
SPO2 Ngina immediately relayed the information to SPO4 Rentao Quitoriano and SPO1 Domingo Pulig. They then swiftly established a checkpoint in Acop, Tublay, Benguet.
At around 4:00 p.m. of the same day, the PNP operatives spotted the jeepney heading toward La Trinidad. They flagged it down but it did not stop. Hence, they chased the vehicle up to Shilan, La Trinidad where it finally halted.
The police saw five persons inside the jeepney then loaded with assorted vegetables, like womboc3 and chili.
When SPO4 Quitoriano lifted a womboc, he found some pieces of lumber under it. The driver and his companions admitted they have no permit to transport the lumber. The police immediately arrested and investigated petitioners, Marso Insiong Dumpit, Armando Palasi, and Ben Arinos. Only petitioners were charged with violation of Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code.
After the prosecution presented its evidence, petitioners, through counsel, filed a "Motion to Suppress Evidence of the Prosecution" on the ground that the pieces of Benguet pine lumber were illegally seized.
In a Resolution4 dated July 26, 1999, respondent judge denied the motion.
Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration. Likewise, it was denied in a Resolution dated September 27, 1999.
Subsequently, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55684 assailing the said Resolutions of the trial court.
On September 15, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petition, holding that respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction; that the search conducted without warrant by the police officers is valid; and that the confiscated pieces of lumber are admissible in evidence against the accused.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision. However, it was denied in a Resolution5 dated April 11, 2001.
Hence, the instant petition raising the sole issue of whether the police officers have a probable cause to believe that the subject vehicle was loaded with illegal cargo and that, therefore, it can be stopped and searched without a warrant.
In this jurisdiction, the fundamental law of the land recognizes and protects the right of a person to privacy against unreasonable intrusions by the agents of the State. This right to undisturbed privacy is guaranteed by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 3(2), also of Article III, provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the above provision shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Hence, as a general rule, a search and seizure must be carried through with judicial warrant, otherwise, such search and seizure constitutes derogation of a constitutional right.6
The above rule, however, is not devoid of exceptions. In People v. Sarap,7 we listed the exceptions where search and seizure may be conducted without warrant, thus: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of the evidence in plain view; (5) search when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. The only requirement in these exceptions is the presence of probable cause. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched.8 In People v. Aruta,9 we ruled that in warrantless searches, probable cause must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. There is no hard and fast rule or fixed formula in determining probable cause for its determination varies according to the facts of each case.
Here, the search involved a moving vehicle, an instance where a warrantless search and seizure may be conducted by peace officers. The only issue we should determine is whether there was probable cause to justify such warrantless search and seizure.
We recall that at around 2:30 p.m. of September 6, 1998, a confidential informer disclosed to SPO2 Ngina that a passenger jeepney with Plate No. AYB 117 loaded with Benguet pine lumber was at Km. 96, Atok, Benguet. The lumber was covered with assorted vegetables. A PNP roadblock was then placed in Acop, Tublay, Benguet to intercept the jeepney. At around 4:00 p.m. of that same day, the police spotted the vehicle. They flagged it down but it did not stop, forcing the police to chase it until it reached Shilan, La Trinidad. A search of the vehicle disclosed several pieces of Benguet pine lumber. Petitioners could not produce the required DENR permit to cut and transport the same.
In People v. Vinecarao,10 we ruled that where a vehicle sped away after noticing a checkpoint and even after having been flagged down by police officers, in an apparent attempt to dissuade the police from proceeding with their inspection, there exists probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that the persons on board said vehicle were officers of the law or that the vehicle contained objects which were instruments of some offense. This ruling squarely applies to the present case. Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she ruled that the warrantless search is valid and that the lumber seized is admissible in evidence against petitioners.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55684. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Endnotes:
1 Rollo, pp. 27-37. Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis with Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and Associate Justice Alicia L. Santos concurring (all retired).
2 The Revised Forestry Code, as amended by P.D. No. 865, P.D. No. 1559, Batas Pambansa Blg. 83, P.D. No. 1775 (January 14, 1981), Executive Order No. 277, s. 1987, and Republic Act No. 7161.
3 Chinese cabbage, also known in Cordillera dialects as "wongbok."
4 Rollo, pp. 81-86.
5 Id., p. 39.
6 Lui v. Matillano, G.R. No. 141176, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 449, 474, citing People v. Barros, 231 SCRA 557 (1994).
7 G.R. No. 132165, March 26, 2003, 399 SCRA 503.
8 Sony Music Entertainment (Phils.), Inc. v. Español, G.R. No. 156804, March 14, 2005, 453 SCRA 360, 371, citing People v. Aruta, infra note 9.
9 351 Phil. 868 (1998).
10 G.R. No. 141137, January 30, 2004, 420 SCRA 280.
