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Prof. Joselito Guianan Chan's The Labor Code of the Philippines, Annotated Labor Standards & Social Legislation Volume I of a 3-Volume Series 2019 Edition (3rd Revised Edition)
 

 
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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
 

 
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
 

   
December-2009 Jurisprudence                 

  • A.C. No. 7054 - Conrado N. Que v. Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr.

  • A.M. No. P-09-2600 - Emma B. Ramos v. Apollo R. Ragot

  • A.M. No. P-09-2636 Formerly OCA IPI No. 07-2681-P - Atty. Eduardo Francisco v. Liza O. Galvez

  • A.M. No. P-09-2676 - Judge Juanita T. Guerrero v. Teresita V. Ong

  • A.M. No. RTJ-05-1953 - Mayor Hadji Amer R. Sampiano, et al. v. Judge Cader P. Indar, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Br. 12, Malabang, Lanao del Sur

  • A.M. No. RTJ-07-2055 - Heir of the late Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras v. Judge Clifton U. Ganay, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial court, Branch 31, Agoo, La Union

  • A.M. No. RTJ-09-2170 Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3094-RTJ - Heirs of Simeon Piedad, namely, Eliseo Piedad, et al. v. Executive Judge Cesar O. Estrena and Judge Gaudiso D. Villarin

  • G.R. No. 146548 : December 18, 2009 - HEIRS OF DOMINGO HERNANDEZ, SR., namely: SERGIA V. HERNANDEZ (Surviving Spouse), DOMINGO V. HERNANDEZ, JR., and MARIA LEONORA WILMA HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, v. PLARIDEL MINGOA, SR., DOLORES CAMISURA, MELANIE MINGOA AND

  • G.R. No. 147951 - Arsenio F. Olegario, et al. v. Pedro C. Mari, represented by Lilia C. Mari-Camba

  • G.R. No. 155125 - YSS Employees Union-Philippine Transport and General Organization v. YSS Laboratories, Inc.

  • G.R. No. 156208 - NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association, et al. v. The National Power Corporation, et al.

  • G.R. No. 149548, G.R. No. 167505, G.R. No. 167540, G.R. No. 167543, G.R. No. 167845, G.R. No. 169163 and G.R. No. 179650 - ROXAS and COMPANY, INC. v. DAMBA-NFSW AND THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM/DAMAYAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG BUKID SA ASYENDA ROXAS-NATIO

  • G.R. No. 157038 - Government Serive Insurance System v. Jean E. Raoet

  • G.R. No. 157867 - Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Hon. Salvador Abad Santos

  • G.R. No. 159788 - Sotero Roy Leonero, et al. v. Spouses Marcelino B. Barba, et al.

  • G.R. No. 159792 - Barangay Sangalang, represented by its Chairman Dante C. Marcellana v. Barangay Maguihan, represented by its Chairman Arnulfo Villarez

  • G.R. No. 160146 - Leslie Okol v. Slimmers World International, et al.

  • G.R. No. 160367 - Evelyn S. Cabungcal, et al. v. Sonia R. Lorenzo, et al.

  • G.R. No. 161424 - Republic of the Philippines v. Ignacio Leonor and Catalino Razon

  • G.R. No. 161929 - Lynn Paz T. Dela Cruz, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al.

  • G.R. No. 163117 - Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. v. Maria Letecia Fernandez, et al.

  • G.R. No. 162243, G.R. NO. 164516 and G.R. NO. 171875 - Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.

  • G.R. No. 163553 - Yun Kwan Byung v. Philippine Amusement Gaming Corporation

  • G.R. No. 164195 - Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, and Land Bank of the Philippines

  • G.R. No. 165109 - Manuel Mamba, et al. v. Edgar R. Lara, et al.

  • G.R. No. 165299 - Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Laguna Lake Development Authority

  • G.R. No. 165387 - Mayon Estate Corporation and Earthland Developer Corporation v. Lualhati Beltran

  • G.R. No. 166570 - Efren M. Herrera, et al. v. National Power Corporation, et al.

  • G.R. No. 166941 - Spouses Dennis Barias and Divina Barias v. Heirs of Bartolome Boneo, namely, Juanita Leopoldo, et al.

  • G.R. No. 168668 - Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), et al. v. Pearl City Manufacturing Corporation, et al.

  • G.R. No. 168897 - Gina M. Tiangco and Salvacion Jenny Manego v. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, Inc. and Jimmy Gow

  • G.R. No. 168756 and G.R. NO. 171476 - Shrimp Specialist, Inc., v. Fuji-Triumph Agri-Industrial Corporation

  • G.R. No. 170447 - Bievenido Di o and Renato Comparativo v. Pablo Olivarez

  • G.R. No. 170476 - People of the Philippines v. Ricardo Grande

  • G.R. No. 170661 - Ramon B. Formantes v. Duncan Pharmaceutical, Philis., Inc.

  • G.R. No. 171023 - Arsenio S. Quiambao v. Manila Electric Company

  • G.R. No. 171669 - Heirs of Rodrigo Yacapin, namely, Sol Belnas, et al. v. Felimon Belida (Deceased), represented by Merlyn B. Palos, et al.

  • G.R. No. 171916 - Constantino A. Pascual v. Lourdes S. Pascual

  • G.R. No. 172092 - People of the Philippines v. Joey Tion y Cabadu

  • G.R. No. 172372 - The People of the Philippines v. Romar Teodoro y Vallejo

  • G.R. No. 172822 - MOF COMPANY, INC., v. SHIN YANG BROKERAGE CORPORATION

  • G.R. No. 173158 - Alejandro B. Ty and International Realty Corporation v. Queen's Row Subdivision, Inc., et al.

  • G.R. No. 173319 - Federico Miguel Olbes v. Hon. Danilo A. Buemio, etc. et al.

  • G.R. No. 173329 - Susan G. Po and Lilia G. Mutia v. Omerio Dampal

  • G.R. No. 173441 - Heirs of Sofia Quirong, etc. v. Development Bank of the Philippines

  • G.R. No. 173533 - Vicente N. Luna, Jr. v. Nario Cabales, Oscar Pabalan, et al.

  • G.R. No. 174480 - People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo Albalate, Jr.

  • G.R. No. 175115 - Lily O. Orbase v. Office of the Ombudsman and Adoracion Mendoza-Bolos

  • G.R. No. 175393 and G.R. NO. 177731 - Government Service Insurance System v. RTC of Pasig, et al.

  • G.R. No. 175466 - Bank of the Philippine Islands as successor-in-interest of Far East Bank and Trust Company v. SMP, Inc.

  • G.R. No. 175803 - Governor Ornaldo A. Fua, Jr., et al. v. The Commission on Audit, et al.

  • G.R. No. 175994 - Jesus Campos and Rosemarie Campos-Bautista v. Nenita Buevinida Pastrana, et al.

  • G.R. No. 176291 - Jorge B. Navarra v. Office of the Ombudsman, Samuel Namnama, et al.

  • G.R. No. 176951, G.R. No. 177499 and G.R. No. 178056 - League of cities of the Philippines, et al. v. COMELEC

  • G.R. No. 177384 - Josephine Wee v. Republic of the Philippines

  • G.R. No. 177404 and G.R. NO. 178097 - Land Bank of the Philippines v. Kumassie Plantation Company Incorporated

  • G.R. No. 177486 - Purisimo S. Buyco v. Nelson Baraquia

  • G.R. No. 177664 - CRC Agricultural Trading and Rolando B. Catindig v. National Labor Relations Commission and Roberto Obias

  • G.R. No. 177777 - People of the Philippines v. Fernando Gutierrez y Gatso

  • G.R. No. 178000 and 178003 - Liberato M. Carabeo v. Court of Appeals, et al.

  • G.R. No. 178606 - The Episcopal Diocese of the Northern Philippines v. The District Engineer, MPED-DPWH

  • G.R. No. 179328 - Rizalina P. Positos v. Jacob M. Chua

  • G.R. No. 179356 - Kepco Philippines Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

  • G.R. No. 179505 - First Philippine Holding Corporation v. Trans Middle East (Phils.) Equities Inc.

  • G.R. No. 179554 - Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc.

  • G.R. No. 178158 and G.R. NO. 180428 - Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Radstock Securities Limited and Philippine National Construction corporation

  • G.R. No. 179830 - Lintang Bedol v. Commssion on Elections

  • G.R. No. 179946 - The People of the Philippines v. Quirino Cabral y Valencia

  • G.R. No. 179952 - Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, etc. v. BA Finance Corporation and Malayan Insurance Co, Inc.

  • G.R. No. 180218 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DEVELOPMENT RESOURCES CORPORATION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 180439 - Resort Hotels Corporation, Rodolfo M. Cuenca Insvestment Corporation v. Development Bank of the Philippines and SM Investment Corp.

  • G.R. No. 181174 - Ma. Cristina Torres Braza, et al. v. The City Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza, represented by Leon Titular, et al.

  • G.R. No. 181455 and G.R. No. 182008 - Santiago Cua, Jr., et al. v. Miguel Ocampo Tan, et al.

  • G.R. No. 181556 - In Re: Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Intercity Savinds and Loan Bank, Inc., Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Stockholders of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc.

  • G.R. No. 181571 - Juno Batistis v. People of the Philippines

  • G.R. No. 182013 - Quasha Ancheta Pe a & Nolasco Law Office and Legeng International Reports, Limited v. The Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, et al.

  • G.R. No. 182161 - Rev. Father Robert P. Reyes v. Court of Appeals, et al.

  • G.R. No. 182216 - Plantation Bay Resort & Spa and Efren Belarmino v. Romel S. Dubrico, et al.

  • G.R. No. 182310 - People of the Philippines v. Jan Michael Tan and Archie Tan

  • G.R. No. 182336 - Elvira O. Ong v. Jose Casim Genio

  • G.R. No. 182430 - Leopoldo Abante v. KJGS Fleet Management Manila and/or Gur Domingo A. Macapayag, Kristian Gerhard Jebsens Skipsrenderi A/S

  • G.R. No. 182623 - Dionisio M. Musnit v. Sea Star Shipping Corporation and Sea Star Shipping Corporation, Ltd.

  • G.R. No. 182498 - Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Jr., chief, Philippine National Police (PNP), et al. v. Mary Jean B. Tagitis

  • G.R. No. 182626 - Hilario S. Ramirez v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.

  • G.R. No. 182645 - In the matter of the Heirship (Intestate Estates) of the late Hermogenes Rodriguez, et al., Rene B. Pascual v. Jaime M. Robles

  • G.R. No. 182735 - Sps. Rogelio Marcelo & Milagros v. Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIB)

  • G.R. No. 183233 - Virgilio G. Anabe v. Asian Construction (ASIAKONSTRUKT), et al.

  • G.R. No. 183297 - National Power Corporation v. Hon. Amer Ibrahim, etc., et al.

  • G.R. No. 183317 - Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc. v. The Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, et al.

  • G.R. No. 18335 - Juanito Tabigue, et al. v. International Copra Export Corporation (INTERCO)

  • G.R. No. 183908 - Joelson O. Iloreta v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. and Norbulk Shipping U.K. Ltd.

  • G.R. No. 184836 - Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller and Ferdinand N. Talabong v. Commission on Elections and Wilfredo F. Asilo

  • G.R. No. 184977 - Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. Ricky E. Dela Cruz, et al.

  • G.R. No. 185011 - People of the Philippines v. SP03 Sangki Ara y Mirasol, et al.

  • G.R. No. 185381 - People of the Philippines v. Danilo Cruz y Culala

  • G.R. No. 185477 - Herminio M. Gutierrez, et al. v. Flora Mendoza-Plaza, et al.

  • G.R. No. 185749 - Civil Service Commission v. Herminigildo L. Andal

  • G.R. No. 186234 - People of the Philippines v. Felix Palgan

  • G.R. No. 186242 - Government Service Insurance System v. City Treasurer and City Assessor of the City of Manila

  • G.R. No. 186460 - People of the Philippines v. Gualberto Cinco y Soyosa

  • G.R. No. 186965 - Temic Automotive Philippines, Inc. v. Temic Automotive Philippines, Inc., Employees Union

  • G.R. No. 187478 - Representative Danila Ramon S. Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Jesus L. Vicente

  • G.R. No. 187494 - People of the Philippines v. Elmer Barberos

  • G.R. No. 187838 - Adriatico Consortium, Inc. Primary Realty Corp., and Benito Cu-Uy-Gam v. Land Bank of the Philippines

  • G.R. No. 188240 - Michael L. San Miguel v. Commission on Elections and Christopher V. Aguilar

  • G.R. No. 189868 - KABATAAN PARTY-LIST, ET AL. v. COMELEC

  • G.R. No. 189698 - ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., v. COMELEC

  •  





     
     

    G.R. No. 162243, G.R. NO. 164516 and G.R. NO. 171875 - Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.

      G.R. No. 162243, G.R. NO. 164516 and G.R. NO. 171875 - Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.

    PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

    EN BANC

    [G.R. NO. 162243 : December 3, 2009]

    HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ substituted by HON. ELISEA G. GOZUN, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Petitioner, v. PICOP RESOURCES, INC., Respondent.

    [G.R. NO. 164516]

    PICOP RESOURCES, INC., Petitioner, v. HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ substituted by HON. ELISEA G. GOZUN, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Respondent.

    [G.R. NO. 171875]

    THE HON. ANGELO T. REYES (formerly Hon. Elisea G. Gozun), in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Petitioner, v. PAPER INDUSTRIES CORP. OF THE PHILIPPINES (PICOP), Respondent.

    R E S O L U T I O N

    CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

    The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus with the trial court is clear: the government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos, to enter into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP. Since the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, and since the 1969 Document itself has a proviso requiring compliance with the laws and the Constitution, the issues in this Motion for Reconsideration are the following: (1) firstly, is the 1969 Document a contract enforceable under the Non-Impairment Clause of the Constitution, so as to make the signing of the IFMA a ministerial duty? (2) secondly, did PICOP comply with all the legal and constitutional requirements for the issuance of an IFMA?cralawred

    To recall, PICOP filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an IFMA. In the middle of the processing of PICOP's application, however, PICOP refused to attend further meetings with the DENR. Instead, on 2 September 2002, PICOP filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition for Mandamus1 against then DENR Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez. PICOP seeks the issuance of a privileged writ of mandamus to compel the DENR Secretary to sign, execute and deliver an IFMA to PICOP, as well as to '

    [I]ssue the corresponding IFMA assignment number on the area covered by the IFMA, formerly TLA No. 43, as amended; b) to issue the necessary permit allowing petitioner to act and harvest timber from the said area of TLA No. 43, sufficient to meet the raw material requirements of petitioner's pulp and paper mills in accordance with the warranty and agreement of July 29, 1969 between the government and PICOP's predecessor-in-interest; and c) to honor and respect the Government Warranties and contractual obligations to PICOP strictly in accordance with the warranty and agreement dated July 29, [1969] between the government and PICOP's predecessor-in-interest. x x x.2

    On 11 October 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision granting PICOP's Petition for Mandamus, thus:

    WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Mandamus is hereby GRANTED.

    The Respondent DENR Secretary Hon. Heherson Alvarez is hereby ordered:

    1. to sign, execute and deliver the IFMA contract and/or documents to PICOP and issue the corresponding IFMA assignment number on the area covered by the IFMA, formerly TLA No. 43, as amended;

    2. to issue the necessary permit allowing petitioner to act and harvest timber from the said area of TLA No. 43, sufficient to meet the raw material requirements of petitioner's pulp and paper mills in accordance with the warranty and agreement of July 29, 1969 between the government and PICOP's predecessor-in-interest; andcralawlibrary

    3. to honor and respect the Government Warranties and contractual obligations to PICOP strictly in accordance with the warranty and agreement dated July 29, 1999 (sic) between the government and PICOP's predecessor-in-interest (Exhibits "H", "H-1" to "H-5", particularly the following:

    a) the area coverage of TLA No. 43, which forms part and parcel of the government warranties;

    b) PICOP tenure over the said area of TLA No. 43 and exclusive right to cut, collect and remove sawtimber and pulpwood for the period ending on April 26, 1977; and said period to be renewable for [an]other 25 years subject to compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements as well as with existing policy on timber concessions; andcralawlibrary

    c) The peaceful and adequate enjoyment by PICOP of the area as described and specified in the aforesaid amended Timber License Agreement No. 43.

    The Respondent Secretary Alvarez is likewise ordered to pay petitioner the sum of P10 million a month beginning May 2002 until the conversion of TLA No. 43, as amended, to IFMA is formally effected and the harvesting from the said area is granted.3

    On 25 October 2002, the DENR Secretary filed a Motion for Reconsideration.4 In a 10 February 2003 Order, the RTC denied the DENR Secretary's Motion for Reconsideration and granted PICOP's Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Mandatory Injunction.5 The fallo of the 11 October 2002 Decision was practically copied in the 10 February 2003 Order, although there was no mention of the damages imposed against then DENR Secretary Alvarez.6 The DENR Secretary filed a Notice of Appeal7 from the 11 October 2002 Decision and the 10 February 2003 Order.

    On 19 February 2004, the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals affirmed8 the Decision of the RTC, to wit:

    WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with modification that the order directing then DENR Secretary Alvarez "to pay petitioner-appellee the sum of P10 million a month beginning May, 2002 until the conversion to IFMA of TLA No. 43, as amended, is formally effected and the harvesting from the said area is granted" is hereby deleted.9

    Challenging the deletion of the damages awarded to it, PICOP filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration10 of this Decision, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a 20 July 2004 Resolution.11

    The DENR Secretary and PICOP filed with this Court separate Petitions for Review of the 19 February 2004 Court of Appeals Decision. These Petitions were docketed as G.R. No. 162243 and No. 164516, respectively. These cases were consolidated with G.R. No. 171875, which relates to the lifting of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining the execution pending appeal of the foregoing Decision.

    On 29 November 2006, this Court rendered the assailed Decision on the Consolidated Petitions:

    WHEREFORE, the Petition in G.R. No. 162243 is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it affirmed the RTC Decision granting the Petition for Mandamus filed by Paper Industries Corp. of the Philippines (PICOP) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition in G.R. No. 164516 seeking the reversal of the same Decision insofar as it nullified the award of damages in favor of PICOP is DENIED for lack of merit. The Petition in G.R. No. 171875, assailing the lifting of the Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in favor of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources is DISMISSED on the ground of mootness.12

    On 18 January 2006, PICOP filed the instant Motion for Reconsideration, based on the following grounds:

    I.

    THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CONTRACT WITH PRESIDENTIAL WARRANTY SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC ON 29 JUNE 1969 ISSUED TO PICOP IS A MERE PERMIT OR LICENSE AND IS NOT A CONTRACT, PROPERTY OR PROPERTY RIGHT PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION

    II.

    THE EVALUATION OF PICOP'S MANAGEMENT OF THE TLA 43 NATURAL FOREST CLEARLY SHOWED SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE FOR KEEPING THE NATURAL FOREST GENERALLY INTACT AFTER 50 YEARS OF FOREST OPERATIONS. THIS COMPLETES THE REQUIREMENT FOR AUTOMATIC CONVERSION UNDER SECTION 9 OF DAO 99-53.

    III.

    WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT, IN REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, MISAPPRECIATED THE EVIDENCE, TESTIMONIAL AND DOCUMENTARY, WHEN IT RULED THAT:

    i.

    PICOP FAILED TO SUBMIT A FIVE-YEAR FOREST PROTECTION PLAN AND A SEVEN-YEAR REFORESTATION PLAN FOR THE YEARS UNDER REVIEW.

    ii.

    PICOP FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE PAYMENT OF FOREST CHARGES.

    iii.

    PICOP DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENT FOR A CERTIFICATION FROM THE NCIP THAT THE AREA OF TLA 43 DOES NOT OVERLAP WITH ANY ANCESTRAL DOMAIN.

    iv.

    PICOP FAILED TO HAVE PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH AND APPROVAL FROM THE SANGUNIAN CONCERNED, AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 27 OF THE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991.

    v.

    PCIOP FAILED TO SECURE SOCIAL ACCEPTABILITY UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1586.

    IV

    THE MOTIVATION OF ALVAREZ IN RECALLING THE CLEARANCE FOR AUTOMATIC CONVERSION HE ISSUED ON 25 OCTOBER 2001 WAS NOT DUE TO ANY SHORTCOMING FROM PICOP BUT DUE TO HIS DETERMINATION TO EXCLUDE 28,125 HECTARES FROM THE CONVERSION AND OTHER THINGS.

    On 15 December 2008, on Motion by PICOP, the Third Division of this Court resolved to refer the consolidated cases at bar to the Court en banc. On 16 December 2008, this Court sitting en banc resolved to accept the said cases and set them for oral arguments. Oral arguments were conducted on 10 February 2009.

    PICOP's Cause of Action: Matters PICOP Should Have Proven to Be Entitled to a Writ of Mandamus

    In seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the issuance of an IFMA in its favor, PICOP relied on a 29 July 1969 Document, the so-called Presidential Warranty approved by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos in favor of PICOP's predecessor-in-interest, Bislig Bay Lumber Company, Inc. (BBLCI). PICOP's cause of action is summarized in paragraphs 1.6 and 4.19 of its Petition for Mandamus:

    1.6 Respondent Secretary impaired the obligation of contract under the said Warranty and Agreement of 29 July 1969 by refusing to respect the tenure; and its renewal for another twenty five (25) years, of PICOP over the area covered by the said Agreement which consists of permanent forest lands with an aggregate area of 121,587 hectares and alienable and disposable lands with an aggregate area of approximately 21,580 hectares, and petitioner's exclusive right to cut, collect and remove sawtimber and pulpwood therein and the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the said area as described and specified in petitioner's Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 guaranteed by the Government, under the Warranty and Agreement of 29 July 1969.13

    4.19 Respondent is in violation of the Constitution and has impaired the obligation of contract by his refusal to respect: a) the tenurial rights of PICOP over the forest area covered by TLA No. 43, as amended and its renewal for another twenty five (25) years; b) the exclusive right of PICOP to cut, collect and remove sawtimber and pulpwood therein; and c) PICOP's peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the said area which the government guaranteed under the Warranty and Agreement of 29 July 1969.14

    The grounds submitted by PICOP in its Petition for Mandamus are as follows:

    I

    Respondent secretary has unlawfully refused and/or neglected to sign and execute the IFMA contract of PICOP even as the latter has complied with all the legal requirements for the automatic conversion of TLA No. 43, as amended, into an IFMA.

    II

    Respondent Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of jurisdiction in refusing to sign and execute PICOP's IFMA contract, notwithstanding that PICOP had complied with all the requirements for Automatic Conversion under DAO 99-53, as in fact Automatic Conversion was already cleared in October, 2001, and was a completed process.

    III

    Respondent Secretary has impaired the obligation of contract under a valid and binding warranty and agreement of 29 July 1969 between the government and PICOP's predecessor-in-interest, by refusing to respect: a) the tenure of PICOP, and its renewal for another twenty five (25) years, over the TLA No.43 area covered by said agreement; b) the exclusive right to cut, collect and remove sawtimber and pulpwood timber; and c) the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the said area.

    IV

    As a result of respondent Secretary's unlawful refusal and/or neglect to sign and deliver the IFMA contract, and violation of the constitutional rights of PICOP against non-impairment of the obligation of contract (Sec. 10, Art. III, 1997 [sic] Constitution), PICOP suffered grave and irreparable damages.15

    Petitions for Mandamus are governed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, Section 3 of which provides:

    SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus .' Whenany tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent. (Emphasis supplied.)

    PICOP is thus asking this Court to conclude that the DENR Secretary is specifically enjoined by law to issue an IFMA in its favor. An IFMA, as defined by DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 99-53,16 is -

    [A] production-sharing contract entered into by and between the DENR and a qualified applicant wherein the DENR grants to the latter the exclusive right to develop, manage, protect and utilize a specified area of forestland and forest resource therein for a period of 25 years and may be renewed for another 25-year period, consistent with the principle of sustainable development and in accordance with an approved CDMP, and under which both parties share in its produce.17

    PICOP stresses the word "automatic" in Section 9 of this DAO No. 99-53:

    Sec. 9. Qualifications of Applicants. - The applicants for IFMA shall be:

    (a) A Filipino citizen of legal age; or,

    (b) Partnership, cooperative or corporation whether public or private, duly registered under Philippine laws.

    However, in the case of application for conversion of TLA into IFMA, an automatic conversion after proper evaluation shall be allowed, provided the TLA holder shall have signified such intention prior to the expiry of the TLA, PROVIDED further, that the TLA holder has showed satisfactory performance and have complied in the terms of condition of the TLA and pertinent rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied.)18

    This administrative regulation provision allowing automatic conversion after proper evaluation can hardly qualify as a law, much less a law specifically enjoining the execution of a contract. To enjoin is "to order or direct with urgency; to instruct with authority; to command."19 " Enjoin' is a mandatory word, in legal parlance, always; in common parlance, usually."20 The word "allow," on the other hand, is not equivalent to the word "must," and is in no sense a command.21

    As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.22

    The execution of agreements, in itself, involves the exercise of discretion. Agreements are products of negotiations and mutual concessions, necessitating evaluation of their provisions on the part of both parties. In the case of the IFMA, the evaluation on the part of the government is specifically mandated in the afore-quoted Section 3 of DAO No. 99-53. This evaluation necessarily involves the exercise of discretion and judgment on the part of the DENR Secretary, who is tasked not only to negotiate the sharing of the profit arising from the IFMA, but also to evaluate the compliance with the requirements on the part of the applicant.

    Furthermore, as shall be discussed later, the period of an IFMA that was merely automatically converted from a TLA in accordance with Section 9, paragraph 2 of DAO No. 99-53 would only be for the remaining period of the TLA. Since the TLA of PICOP expired on 26 April 2002, the IFMA that could have been granted to PICOP via the automatic conversion provision in DAO No. 99-53 would have expired on the same date, 26 April 2002, and the PICOP's Petition for Mandamus would have become moot.

    This is where the 1969 Document, the purported Presidential Warranty, comes into play. When PICOP's application was brought to a standstill upon the evaluation that PICOP had yet to comply with the requirements for such conversion, PICOP refused to attend further meetings with the DENR and instead filed a Petition for Mandamus, insisting that the DENR Secretary had impaired the obligation of contract by his refusal to respect: a) the tenurial rights of PICOP over the forest area covered by TLA No. 43, as amended, and its renewal for another twenty-five (25) years; b) the exclusive right of PICOP to cut, collect and remove sawtimber and pulpwood therein; and c) PICOP's peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the said area which the government guaranteed under the Warranty and Agreement of 29 July 1969.23

    PICOP is, thus, insisting that the government is obligated by contract to issue an IFMA in its favor because of the 1969 Document.

    A contract, being the law between the parties, can indeed, with respect to the State when it is a party to such contract, qualify as a law specifically enjoining the performance of an act. Hence, it is possible that a writ of mandamus may be issued to PICOP, but only if it proves both of the following:

    1) That the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause; andcralawlibrary

    2) That the 1969 Document specifically enjoins the government to issue the IFMA.

    If PICOP fails to prove any of these two matters, the grant of a privileged writ of mandamus is not warranted. This was why we pronounced in the assailed Decision that the overriding controversy involved in the Petition was one of law.24 If PICOP fails to prove any of these two matters, more significantly its assertion that the 1969 Document is a contract, PICOP fails to prove its cause of action.25 Not even the satisfactory compliance with all legal and administrative requirements for an IFMA would save PICOP's Petition for Mandamus.

    The reverse, however, is not true. The 1969 Document expressly states that the warranty as to the tenure of PICOP is "subject to compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements as well as with existing policy on timber concessions." Thus, if PICOP proves the two above-mentioned matters, it still has to prove compliance with statutory and administrative requirements for the conversion of its TLA into an IFMA.

    Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

    PICOP uses the same argument '' that the government is bound by contract to issue the IFMA '' in its refusal to exhaust all administrative remedies by not appealing the alleged illegal non-issuance of the IFMA to the Office of the President. PICOP claimed in its Petition for Mandamus with the trial court that:

    1.10 This petition falls as an exception to the exhaustion of administrative remedies. The acts of respondent DENR Secretary complained of in this petition are patently illegal; in derogation of the constitutional rights of petitioner against non-impairment of the obligation of contracts; without jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction; and moreover, the failure or refusal of a high government official such as a Department head from whom relief is brought to act on the matter was considered equivalent to exhaustion of administrative remedies (Sanoy v. Tantuico, 50 SCRA 455 [1973]), and there are compelling and urgent reasons for judicial intervention (Bagatsing v. Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306 [1976]).

    Thus, if there has been no impairment of the obligation of contracts in the DENR Secretary's non-issuance of the IFMA, the proper remedy of PICOP in claiming that it has complied with all statutory and administrative requirements for the issuance of the IFMA should have been with the Office of the President. This makes the issue of the enforceability of the 1969 Document as a contract even more significant.

    The Nature and Effects of the Purported 29 July 1969 Presidential Warranty

    Base Metals Case

    PICOP challenges our ruling that the 1969 Document is not a contract. Before we review this finding, however, it must be pointed out that one week after the assailed Decision, another division of this Court promulgated a Decision concerning the very same 1969 Document. Thus, in PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation,26 five other Justices who were still unaware of this Division's Decision,27 came up with the same conclusion as regards the same issue of whether former President Marcos's Presidential Warranty is a contract:

    Finally, we do not subscribe to PICOP's argument that the Presidential Warranty dated September 25, 1968 is a contract protected by the non-impairment clause of the 1987 Constitution.

    An examination of the Presidential Warranty at once reveals that it simply reassures PICOP of the government's commitment to uphold the terms and conditions of its timber license and guarantees PICOP's peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of the areas which are the basic sources of raw materials for its wood processing complex. The warranty covers only the right to cut, collect, and remove timber in its concession area, and does not extend to the utilization of other resources, such as mineral resources, occurring within the concession.

    The Presidential Warranty cannot be considered a contract distinct from PTLA No. 47 and FMA No. 35. We agree with the OSG's position that it is merely a collateral undertaking which cannot amplify PICOP's rights under its timber license. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause is edifying. We declared:

    Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan v. Director of Forestry, this Court held:

    "x x x A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or a privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.

    'A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it a property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation' ( C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People v. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576). x x x"

    We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary:

    "x x x Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302]."

    Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

    "SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed."

    cannot be invoked.

    The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual undertaking assuring PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an interpretation would result in the complete abdication by the State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control and supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources in the area.28

    The Motion for Reconsideration was denied with finality on 14 February 2007. A Second Motion for Reconsideration filed by PICOP was denied on 23 May 2007.

    PICOP insists that the pronouncement in Base Metals is a mere obiter dictum, which would not bind this Court in resolving this Motion for Reconsideration. In the oral arguments, however, upon questioning from the ponente himself of Base Metals, it was agreed that the issue of whether the 1969 Document is a contract was necessary in the resolution of Base Metals:

    JUSTICE TINGA:

    And do you confirm that one of the very issues raised by PICOP in that case [PICOP Resources Inc. v. Base Metal Mineral Resources Corporation] revolves around its claim that a Presidential Warranty is protected by the non-impairment c[l]ause of the Constitution.

    ATTY. AGABIN:

    Yes, I believe that statement was made by the Court, your Honor.

    JUSTICE TINGA:

    Yes. And that claim on the part of PICOP necessarily implies that the Presidential Warranty according to PICOP is a contract protected by the non-impairment clause.

    ATTY. AGABIN:

    Yes, Your Honor.

    JUSTICE TINGA:

    Essentially, the PICOP raised the issue of whether the Presidential Warranty is a contract or not.

    ATTY. AGABIN:

    Yes, Your Honor.

    JUSTICE TINGA:

    And therefore any ruling on the part of the Court on that issue could not be an obiter dictum.

    ATTY. AGABIN:

    Your Honor, actually we believe that the basic issue in that case was whether or not Base Metals could conduct mining activities underneath the forest reserve allotted to PICOP and the Honorable Court ruled that the Mining Act of 1995 as well as the Department Order of DENR does not disallow mining activity under a forest reserve.

    JUSTICE TINGA:

    But it was PICOP itself which raised the claim that a Presidential Warranty is a contract. And therefore be, should be protected on the under the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.

    ATTY. AGABIN:

    Yes, Your Honor. Except that -

    JUSTICE TINGA:

    So, how can you say now that the Court merely uttered, declared, laid down an obiter dictum in saying that the Presidential Warranty is not a contract, and it is not being a contract, it is not prohibited by the non-impairment clause.

    ATTY. AGABIN:

    This Honorable Court could have just ruled, held that the mining law allows mining activities under a forest reserve without deciding on that issue that was raised by PICOP, your Honor, and therefore we believe'.

    JUSTICE TINGA:

    It could have been better if PICOP has not raised that issue and had not claimed that the Presidential Warranty is not a contract.

    ATTY. AGABIN:

    Well, that is correct, your Honor except that the Court could have just avoided that question. Because'

    JUSTICE TINGA:

    Why[?]

    ATTY. AGABIN:

    It already settled the issue, the basic issue.

    JUSTICE TINGA:

    Yes, because the Court in saying that merely reiterated a number of rulings to the effect that the Presidential Warranty, a Timber License for that matter is not a contract protected by the non-impairment laws.

    ATTY. AGABIN:

    Well, it is our submission, your Honor, that it is obiter because, that issue even a phrase by PICOP was not really fully argued by the parties for the Honorable Court and it seems from my reading at least it was just an aside given by the Honorable Court to decide on that issue raised by PICOP but it was not necessary to the decision of the court.

    JUSTICE TINGA:

    It was not necessary[?]

    ATTY. AGABIN:

    To the decision of the Court.

    JUSTICE TINGA:

    It was.

    ATTY. AGABIN:

    It was not necessary.

    JUSTICE TINGA:

    It was.

    ATTY. AGABIN:

    Yes.

    JUSTICE TINGA:

    And PICOP devoted quite a number of pages in [its] memorandum to that issue and so did the Court [in its Decision].

    ATTY. AGABIN:

    Anyway, your Honor, we beg the Court to revisit, not to'29

    Interpretation of the 1969 Document That Would Be in Harmony with the Constitution

    To remove any doubts as to the contents of the 1969 Document, the purported Presidential Warranty, below is a complete text thereof:

    Republic of the Philippines
    Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources
    OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
    Diliman, Quezon City

    D-53, Licenses (T.L.A. No. 43)
    Bislig Bay Lumber Co., Inc.
    (Bislig, Surigao)

    July 29, 1969

    Bislig Bay Lumber Co., Inc.
    [unreadable word] Bldg.
    Makati, Rizal

    S i r s:

    This has reference to the request of the Board of Investments through its Chairman in a letter dated July 16, 1969 for a warranty on the boundaries of your concession area under Timber License Agreement No. 43, as amended.

    We are made to understand that your company is committed to support the first large scale integrated wood processing complex hereinafter called: "The Project") and that such support will be provided not only in the form of the supply of pulpwood and other wood materials from your concession but also by making available funds generated out of your own operations, to supplement PICOP's operational sources of funds and other financial arrangements made by him. In order that your company may provide such support effectively, it is understood that you will call upon your stockholders to take such steps as may be necessary to effect a unification of managerial, technical, economic and manpower resources between your company and PICOP.

    It is in the public interest to promote industries that will enhance the proper conservation of our forest resources as well as insure the maximum utilization thereof to the benefit of the national economy. The administration feels that the PICOP project is one such industry which should enjoy priority over the usual logging operations hitherto practiced by ordinary timber licensees: For this reason, we are pleased to consider favorably the request.

    We confirm that your Timber License Agreement No. 43, as amended (copy of which is attached as Annex "A" hereof which shall form part and parcel of this warranty) definitely establishes the boundary lines of your concession area which consists of permanent forest lands with an aggregate area of 121,587 hectares and alienable or disposable lands with an aggregate area of approximately 21,580 hectares.

    We further confirm that your tenure over the area and exclusive right to cut, collect and remove sawtimber and pulpwood shall be for the period ending on April 26, 1977; said period to be renewable for other 25 years subject to compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements as well as with existing policy on timber concessions.

    The peaceful and adequate enjoyment by you of your area as described and specified in your aforesaid amended Timber License Agreement No. 43 is hereby warranted provided that pertinent laws, regulations and the terms and conditions of your license agreement are observed.

    Very truly yours,

    (Sgd.) FERNANDO LOPEZ
    Secretary of Agriculture
    and Natural Resources

    Encl.:

    RECOMMENDED BY:

    (Sgd.) JOSE VIADO
    Acting Director of Forestry

    APPROVED:

    (Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
    President of the Philippines

    ACCEPTED:

    BISLIG BAY LBR. CO., INC.

    By:

    (Sgd.) JOSE E. SORIANO
    President

    PICOP interprets this document in the following manner:

    6.1 It is clear that the thrust of the government warranty is to establish a particular area defined by boundary lines of TLA No. 43 for the PICOP Project. In consideration for PICOP's commitment to pursue and establish the project requiring huge investment/funding from stockholders and lending institutions, the government provided a warranty that ensures the continued and exclusive right of PICOP to source its raw materials needs from the forest and renewable trees within the areas established.

    6.2 As a long-term support, the warranty covers the initial twenty five (25) year period and is renewable for periods of twenty five (25) years provided the project continues to exist and operate. Very notably, the wording of the Presidential Warranty connotes that for as long as the holder complies with all the legal requirements, the term of the warranty is not limited to fifty (50) years but other twenty five (25) years.

    6.3 Note must be made that the government warranted that PICOP's tenure over the area and exclusive right to cut, collect and remove saw timber and pulpwood shall be for the period ending on 26 April 1977 and said period to be renewable for other 25 years subject to "compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements as well as existing policy on timber requirements". It is clear that the renewal for other 25 years, not necessarily for another 25 years is guaranteed. This explains why on 07 October 1977, TLA No. 43, as amended, was automatically renewed for another period of twenty five (25) years to expire on 26 April 2002.30

    PICOP's interpretation of the 1969 Document cannot be sustained. PICOP's claim that the term of the warranty is not limited to fifty years, but that it extends to other fifty years, perpetually, violates Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution which provides:

    Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

    Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga's interpretation of the 1969 Document is much more in accord with the laws and the Constitution. What one cannot do directly, he cannot do indirectly. Forest lands cannot be alienated in favor of private entities. Granting to private entities, via a contract, a permanent, irrevocable, and exclusive possession of and right over forest lands is tantamount to granting ownership thereof. PICOP, it should be noted, claims nothing less than having exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted possession of its concession areas,31 where all other entrants are illegal,32 and where so-called "illegal settlers and squatters" are apprehended.33

    IFMAs are production-sharing agreements concerning the development and utilization of natural resources. As such, these agreements "may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law." Any superior "contract" requiring the State to issue TLAs and IFMAs whenever they expire clearly circumvents Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, which provides for the only permissible schemes wherein the full control and supervision of the State are not derogated: co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements within the time limit of twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years.

    On its face, the 1969 Document was meant to expire on 26 April 2002, upon the expiration of the expected extension of the original TLA period ending on 26 April 1977:

    We further confirm that your tenure over the area and exclusive right to cut, collect and remove sawtimber and pulpwood shall be for the period ending on April 26, 1977; said period to be renewable for other 25 years subject to compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements as well as with existing policy on timber concessions.???r?bl?

    G.R. No. 162243, G.R. NO. 164516 and G.R. NO. 171875 - Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.


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