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LUISA
CRUZ VDA.
DE
JOSE, ET AL.,
G.
R.
No. L-2015
January
6, 1950
-versus-
EUGENIA DE LA PAZ, Defendant-Appellee. BENGZON,
J :
This litigation concerning
a parcel of land in the Municipality of Cainta was submitted to the
Court
of First Instance of Rizal upon a stipulation of facts. From a Decision
dismissing the case, the plaintiffs have appealed, and they claim that
the Court a quo erred in disregarding certain portions of the
stipulation
and consequently in absolving the defendant.
Vivencio Cruz married Magdalena Domingo in 1886. Magdalena died in 1897. In 1911 Vivencio Cruz married Fidela Lira. He died in 1940, leaving a testament, the fifth clause of which reads as follows:
The children mentioned
in this paragraph are the plaintiffs in this case, being the offspring
of Vivencio Cruz with his first wife, Magdalena Domingo. [Fidela Lira
bore
him no children]. The lot described therein is the land now in
dispute,
which the defendant possesses as successor in interest of Fidela Lira,
who got the land pursuant to the testament of Vivencio Cruz above
mentioned.
Plaintiffs contend: [1] that the land should be declared as reservable property and [2] that they are entitled to the possession of the same upon the second marriage of Fidela Lira in 1941 to Angelo Javier or at least after her death in February, 1945. Defendant replies that the plaintiffs are estopped to claim such reservation, inasmuch as they agreed to the terms of the testament above recited, whereby the lot was bequeathed to Fidela Lira in exchange for her usufructuary rights. The plaintiffs counter with the assertion that the legacy was null and void, because the property belonged exclusively to their mother Magdalena, and that it passed to the possession of Vivencio Cruz merely as a trustee. Magdalena's exclusive ownership is flatly denied by the defendant. The stipulation of facts contains this statement about the realty in dispute:
It is not clear from the
above that the property was private property of Magdalena. If it were
paraphernal,
the phrase "dejo a su fallecimiento sin liquidar" would be out
of
place, because usually no liquidation is made of paraphernal - but of
conjugal
property.[1]
On the other hand, it is not inaccurate to refer to conjugal property
as
property which Magdalena "dejo a su fallecimiento" because in
truth
she has a half interest in such property. This doubt, however, is
dispelled
by the third paragraph in the testament of Vivencio Cruz which, denying
that Magdalena had brought landed paraphernal property to the marriage,
implies necessarily that this immovable property was conjugal. It says,
"tanto mi primera como mi actual esposa [referring to
Fidela
Lira]
no han aportado en nuestro matrimonio ninguna clase de bien inmueble."
Note that the testament is made a part of the stipulation of facts.
[1]
It is the duty of a husband, upon the death of his wife to liquidate
the
affairs of the conjugal partnership without delay. [Pamitten vs. Lasam,
60 Phil., 908].
Besides, there is a prima facie presumption that the property in the hands of the spouses is conjugal.[2] Wherefore, all the arguments of the plaintiffs founded upon the alleged exclusive ownership of the property by their mother Magdalena Domingo have no persuasive force; and the trial judge did not err in refusing to hold that the lot was paraphernal property of Magdalena. Plaintiffs might argue that, granting the lot was community property, still they are entitled to one-half thereof as heirs of their mother Magdalena. However, they are not in a position to repudiate the provisions of the testament of their father under which they enjoyed the benefits of the renunciation effected by Fidela Lira in exchange for the legacy of this lot. Anyway this was not their proposition in the lower court, wherein they asserted in the complaint that Vivencio Cruz was the owner of the property because he had inherited it from the relatives of his wife Magdalena Domingo. Plaintiffs invoke Article 968 of the Civil Code which provides that "the widower or widow who contracts a second marriage shall be obliged to reserve for the children and descendants of the first marriage the ownership of all the property acquired from the deceased spouse by will, by intestate succession, by donation, or by any other lucrative title; but not his or her half of the conjugal property." They maintain that according to this article Fidela was duty bound to reserve to them this particular lot which she had acquired from the deceased Vivencio Cruz. On this point we think the appellee is correct in pointing out that the article does not apply, because Fidela, who contracted a second marriage, did not have children in her first marriage with Vivencio Cruz. "Persona obligada a reservar. — Se impone la obligacion al conyuge sobreviviente que tenga hijos del matrimonio disuelto o descendientes de esos hijos, que posea bienes de los declarados reservables en los articulos 968 y 969, y que, o contraiga segundas nupcias, o tenga en estado de viudez un hijo natural reconocido." [Manresa, Vol. VII, 6th Ed., p. 246]. Wherefore, finding no reason to reverse the appealed judgment, We hereby affirm it, with costs. So ordered. Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur. _______________________________ Endnotes: [2] Article 1407, Civil Code, Sison vs. Ambalada, 30 Phil., 118; Viloria vs. Aquino, 28 Phil., 258. |
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