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EN
BANC
LUISA
CRUZ VDA.
DE
JOSE, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
G.
R.
No. L-2015
January
6, 1950
-versus-
EUGENIA DE
LA PAZ,
Defendant-Appellee.
D
E C I S I
O N
BENGZON,
J :
This litigation concerning
a parcel of land in the Municipality of Cainta was submitted to the
Court
of First Instance of Rizal upon a stipulation of facts. From a Decision
dismissing the case, the plaintiffs have appealed, and they claim that
the Court a quo erred in disregarding certain portions of the
stipulation
and consequently in absolving the defendant.
Vivencio Cruz married
Magdalena Domingo in 1886. Magdalena died in 1897. In 1911 Vivencio
Cruz
married Fidela Lira. He died in 1940, leaving a testament, the fifth
clause
of which reads as follows:
"Quinto. — Lego
a mi esposa Fidela Lira la parte de gananciales que me corresponde en
los
bienes que hemos adquirido entre de nuestro matrimonio; lego tambien a
la misma el terreno palayero de cinco (5) balitas en el sitio de
Tatlong
Cauayan, dentro de la jurisdiccion del municipio de Cainta, provincia
de
Rizal, segun el plano II-4653 con un area de 35,949 metros cuadrados,
con
la condicion de que haga renuncia de su derecho de usufructo que
señala
la ley sobre la porcion de los bienes que mis hijos me han de heredar,
de lo contrario y si no se hace tal renuncia, este legado no tendra
valor
y efecto alguno."
The children mentioned
in this paragraph are the plaintiffs in this case, being the offspring
of Vivencio Cruz with his first wife, Magdalena Domingo. [Fidela Lira
bore
him no children]. The lot described therein is the land now in
dispute,
which the defendant possesses as successor in interest of Fidela Lira,
who got the land pursuant to the testament of Vivencio Cruz above
mentioned.
Plaintiffs contend:
[1] that the land should be declared as reservable property and [2]
that
they are entitled to the possession of the same upon the second
marriage
of Fidela Lira in 1941 to Angelo Javier or at least after her death in
February, 1945.
Defendant replies that
the plaintiffs are estopped to claim such reservation, inasmuch as they
agreed to the terms of the testament above recited, whereby the lot was
bequeathed to Fidela Lira in exchange for her usufructuary rights. The
plaintiffs counter with the assertion that the legacy was null and
void,
because the property belonged exclusively to their mother Magdalena,
and
that it passed to the possession of Vivencio Cruz merely as a trustee.
Magdalena's exclusive
ownership is flatly denied by the defendant.
The stipulation of
facts contains this statement about the realty in dispute:
"Que la parcela
de terreno arriba descrito era parte de los bienes que Magdalena
Domingo
dejo a su fallecimiento sin liquidar, en poder de su esposo Vivencio
Cruz,
como conyuge superstite; y por tal motivo este continuo en posesion de
dichos bienes hasta su fallecimiento [de Vivencio Cruz], como asi se
hizo
constar en el parrafo tercero de su referido testamento."
It is not clear from the
above that the property was private property of Magdalena. If it were
paraphernal,
the phrase "dejo a su fallecimiento sin liquidar" would be out
of
place, because usually no liquidation is made of paraphernal - but of
conjugal
property.[1]
On the other hand, it is not inaccurate to refer to conjugal property
as
property which Magdalena "dejo a su fallecimiento" because in
truth
she has a half interest in such property. This doubt, however, is
dispelled
by the third paragraph in the testament of Vivencio Cruz which, denying
that Magdalena had brought landed paraphernal property to the marriage,
implies necessarily that this immovable property was conjugal. It says,
"tanto mi primera como mi actual esposa [referring to
Fidela
Lira]
no han aportado en nuestro matrimonio ninguna clase de bien inmueble."
Note that the testament is made a part of the stipulation of facts.
Besides, there is a
prima facie presumption that the property in the hands of
the
spouses
is conjugal.[2]
Wherefore, all the arguments of the plaintiffs founded upon the alleged
exclusive ownership of the property by their mother Magdalena Domingo
have
no persuasive force; and the trial judge did not err in refusing to
hold
that the lot was paraphernal property of Magdalena.
Plaintiffs might argue
that, granting the lot was community property, still they are entitled
to one-half thereof as heirs of their mother Magdalena. However, they
are
not in a position to repudiate the provisions of the testament of their
father under which they enjoyed the benefits of the renunciation
effected
by Fidela Lira in exchange for the legacy of this lot. Anyway this was
not their proposition in the lower court, wherein they asserted in the
complaint that Vivencio Cruz was the owner of the property because he
had
inherited it from the relatives of his wife Magdalena Domingo.
Plaintiffs invoke
Article
968 of the Civil Code which provides that "the widower or widow who
contracts
a second marriage shall be obliged to reserve for the children and
descendants
of the first marriage the ownership of all the property acquired from
the
deceased spouse by will, by intestate succession, by donation, or by
any
other lucrative title; but not his or her half of the conjugal
property."
They maintain that according to this article Fidela was duty bound to
reserve
to them this particular lot which she had acquired from the deceased
Vivencio
Cruz. On this point we think the appellee is correct in pointing out
that
the article does not apply, because Fidela, who contracted a second
marriage,
did not have children in her first marriage with Vivencio Cruz.
"Persona obligada
a reservar. — Se impone la obligacion al conyuge sobreviviente que
tenga
hijos del matrimonio disuelto o descendientes de esos hijos, que posea
bienes de los declarados reservables en los articulos 968 y 969, y que,
o contraiga segundas nupcias, o tenga en estado de viudez un hijo
natural
reconocido." [Manresa, Vol. VII, 6th Ed., p. 246].
Wherefore, finding
no reason to reverse the appealed judgment, We hereby affirm it, with
costs.
So ordered.
Moran, C.J.,
Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes and Torres, JJ.,
concur.
_______________________________
Endnotes: [1]
It is the duty of a husband, upon the death of his wife to liquidate
the
affairs of the conjugal partnership without delay. [Pamitten vs. Lasam,
60 Phil., 908].
[2]
Article 1407, Civil Code, Sison vs. Ambalada, 30 Phil., 118; Viloria
vs.
Aquino, 28 Phil., 258.
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