ManilaSECOND
DIVISION
PROCESO
FLORA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
G. R. No. L-24086
January 22, 1980
-versus-
MELITON
PAJARILLAGA,JUANITO SABAS and
FLORENTINO C. CARIASO,
Defendants-Appellees.
D
E C I S I O N
BARREDO,
J
.:
Appeal from the
Decision of the Court of First
Instance of La Union in Civil Case No. 1976 dismissing the action filed
by herein plaintiff-appellant Proceso Flora, to annul the judgment
rendered
by the City Court of Cabanatuan City in Civil Case No. 3316, entitled
"Juanito
Sabas vs. Proceso Flora", in which said appellant, as the defendant
therein,
was declared in default, and the judgment was for him to pay the unpaid
wages of the plaintiff as welder-mechanic in his [defendant] auto
repair
shop in San Fernando, La Union in the sum of P2,147.30 together with
P480.00
as differential pay.
Appellant alleged
in his subject complaint for
annulment that in that Civil Case No. 3316 of the Municipal Court of
Cabanatuan
City, he was served with summons on February 13, 1964 and that on March
5, 1964, his lawyer, Atty. Manalo D. Cacanindin, filed a motion to
dismiss,
sent by registered mail, on the grounds of improper venue and pendency
of another action, there being then a labor case between the parties
regarding
the same matter alleged in the complaint before the office of the Labor
Attorney in San Fernando, La, Union. It is not disputed, however, that
the said motion was actually received by the Court in Cabanatuan City
only
on March 18, 1964.cralaw:red
In the meanwhile,
on March 10, 1964, the Cabanatuan
court issued an order simply ordering that inasmuch as defendant had
not
yet then filed his answer notwithstanding his having been served with
summons
on February 13, 1964, the case was set for hearing on March 23, 1964 at
2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. But on March 13, 1964, on motion of
plaintiff,
the court declared defendant in default, allowing plaintiff to present
his evidence ex-parte. Copy of the order was sent to defendant
by
registered mail on March 16, 1964 but the same was returned unclaimed
on
May 6, 1964. On March 23, 1964, the above-mentioned judgment was
rendered,
copy of which was also sent by registered mail to defendant Flora who
allegedly
refused to receive the same and was, therefore, returned as unclaimed
on
May 27, 1964.cralaw:red
On March 19,
1964, the day after receiving Flora's
motion to dismiss, the court denied, for reasons not revealed in the
record,
said motion. Copy of said order of denial was also sent to defendant
Flora
by ordinary mail. [page 16, Record on Appeal].cralaw:red
Aside from the
motion to dismiss, on April 13,
1964, defendant Flora also filed thru counsel a motion dated April 3,
1964
to lift the order of default, which, while set for hearing by counsel
on
April 25, 1964 was submitted by the same counsel for resolution without
further argument in a manifestation dated April 22, 1964. It was based
on [1] that the failure of defendant to file his motion to dismiss
within
the reglementary period was due to excusable neglect; [2] that the
defendant
has a good, valid and meritorious defense; and [3] that the defendant
had
never intended to waive the supposedly improper laying of the venue.
[There
are no copies in the record of the purported affidavits of merits
claimed
to have been attached thereto]. Appellant opposed the motion on April
28,
1964. And on May 2, 1964, the motion was denied. Copy of the
order
was sent by registered mail to Atty. Cacanindin on May 7, 1964.
Admittedly,
no appeal was made from the judgment by default.[1]
The complaint now
is whether the motion to dismiss
in question was filed on July 10, 1964 in the Court of First Instance
of
La Union, that is to say, 109 days [the trial court erroneously
computed
the period as two months and 17 days p. 17, Record on Appeal]
after
the judgment by default was rendered and evidently more than 60 days
after
defendant learned thereof. Apparently, this must have been one of the
considerations
why appellant opted to file an independent action for annulment in La
Union
instead of a petition for relief in Nueva Ecija.cralaw:red
Anyway, in the
light of the foregoing circumstances,
appellee moved to dismiss the now subject complaint for annulment on
the
ground of improper venue, reasoning out at the same time that the
appropriate
remedy of appellant was a petition for relief under Section 1, Rule 38,
Rules of Court, the venue of which was in Nueva Ecija. Appellant
opposed
the motion contending that his cause of action is not fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable neglect, but illegality and nullity of the
judgment
of the Cabanatuan court, "the defendant Meliton Pajarillaga, as
municipal
judge of Cabanatuan City, [having received the evidence of the
plaintiff
in Civil Case No. 3316] without giving the plaintiff therein his day in
court and thereafter rendered a decision dated June 18, 1964 (sic)
a copy of which was never furnished the herein plaintiff." [p. 13,
Record
on Appeal].cralaw:red
Upon the issues
thus joined by the parties, his
Honor granted the dismissal prayed for, not only on the ground that
venue
had been improperly laid but on the more substantial basis that the
proceedings
leading to the judgment and execution in dispute were "perfectly valid,
legal and regularly obtained." [p. 23, Record on Appeal].cralaw:red
To begin with,
note should be taken of the fact
that appellants' motion to dismiss was mailed on March 5, 1964, whereas
he was served with summons on February 13, 1964. In other words,
considering
that February, 1964 had 29 days, 1964 being a leap year, said motion
was
filed 21 days after the service of the summons. Obviously, therefore,
pursuant
to Section 4 of Rule 5, which provides that the answer of defendant
must
be filed within twenty [20] days, appellant was already in default when
his motion to dismiss was filed. We are not informed of the ground on
which
appellants' motion to dismiss was denied by the Cabanatuan court, but
in
any event, there was valid reason for the declaration of default. And
there
being no copy in the record of the motion to lift the order of default,
We are without basis for determining the propriety of the denial
thereof.cralaw:red
Moreover, it was
incorrect, after all, to maintain
that venue was improperly laid because in reality, the defect was not
of
venue in its strict sense, but improper procedure, since what should
have
been filed should have been a petition for relief in the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that under
Republic
Act 1171, the venue in labor cases, like the case here in question, is
"where the defendant or any of the defendants reside or may be found,
or
where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election
of
the plaintiff."
Additionally,
appellant has not taken the trouble
to reply to appellee's contention on page 6 of his mimeographed brief,
that appellant's motion to lift the order of default was not filed
within
the reglementary period of one [1] day specified in Section 13 of Rule
5, thus justifying the conclusion that indeed the pertinent rule had
not
been complied with. And as to the argument vigorously advanced that
appellant
was not notified of the judgment impugned by him, suffice it to say
that
said judgment was sent to him by registered mail but the same was
returned
unclaimed. There must have been some confusion why the same was not
sent
to his lawyer like the order denying the motion to lift the order of
default.
[He was not entitled to notice of the order denying his motion to
dismiss
because when the denial which was not a final order was
issued,
the court had not yet received any motion to lift the order of default,
per Section 9, Rule 13].cralaw:red
Considering,
however, that this is a labor case
that has been pending for more than fifteen years, We hold that any
doubt
as to the tenability of counsel's contention should be resolved in
favor
of the appellee-laborer. In this connection, We consider it to be
within
the spirit of Section 11 [2] of Article X of the Constitution of the
Philippines
that should there be any uncertainty in the mind of the court for more
than eighteen months after an appeal is submitted to it for decision,
regarding
the merits thereof, the decision of the trial court should be affirmed,
without even the need of reasoning out such affirmance, as an exception
to the general requirement of Section 9 of the same Article that every
decision of a court of record should state the facts and the law on
which
it is based. On at least these bases, the Court holds that judgment
herein
should be for appellee.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the
subject appealed judgment is affirmed.cralaw:red
Antonio,
Concepcion, Jr., Santos, and Abad Santos,
JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., concurs in the result.cralaw:red
____________________________
Endnote
[1]
Whether or not such an appeal could have been legally made has not yet
been definitely settled. |