ManilaFIRST
DIVISION
THE
POLICE COMMISSION,Represented by
Its Chairman, CRISPINO M. DE CASTRO,JOSE G. LUKBAN, JOLLY BUGARINand EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Members,
Petitioners, |
G. R. No. L-34230
March 31, 1980
-versus-
HON.
GUARDSON R. LOOD, In His Capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of
First
Instanceof Rizal, Branch VI, Pasig, Rizal,GABRIEL PAILE and REYNALDO ALANO,
Respondents. |
R
E S O L U T I O N
TEEHANKEE, Acting
C.J.
:
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court sets
aside respondent Judge's Orders
granting the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction that would order
the reinstatement with back salaries of respondents Gabriel Paile and
Reynaldo
Alano in the service of the Makati Police Department and denying
petitioner
Police Commission's Motion for Reconsideration thereof, on the ground
that
the subsequent acquittal of respondents Paile and Alano in the criminal
action for grave coercion by the City Court of Manila does not bar
their
dismissal from the service by the petitioner, as ordered in an earlier
Decision upon their having been found administratively guilty in the
administrative
proceedings, which had proceeded independently of the criminal action
for
the same acts.
The case at bar
arose from the following incidents:
On December 12,
1968 Nicolas Alcantara and Zoilo
Maranon filed with the Police Commission [Polcom] an administrative
complaint
charging Captain Gabriel Paile, Corporal Reynaldo Alano and five other
members of the Makati Police Department with grave misconduct. The
succeeding
year, on September 26, Alcantara and Maranon filed with the City Court
of Manila twin criminal cases charging the same administrative
respondents
with grave coercion based on the same acts for which they had already
been
administratively charged. Four days thereafter, with the formalized
criminal
charges as basis and pursuant to the provisions of the second paragraph
of Section 16[1]
of the Police Act of 1966, Makati Acting Mayor Jose C. Luciano issued a
Memorandum Order effecting the suspension from office of the seven
accused
members of the Makati Police Department effective October 1, 1969.cralaw:red
Due investigation
by the Makati Board of Investigators
of the administrative charge against Paile et al. continued and was
terminated
with the submission of a report, with findings and recommendation, to
the
Polcom. On December 12, 1969, the Polcom rendered its decision
declaring
Paile et al. guilty of grave misconduct and ordering their dismissal
from
the service. Paile et al. moved to reconsider the decision of the
Polcom
to no avail for the said Commission, on November 2, 1970, denied their
motion for reconsideration.cralaw:red
In the meantime,
the City Court of Manila, under
date of October 14, 1970, rendered judgment in the criminal cases
against
Paile et al., acquitting them of the charges for grave coercion on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence.cralaw:red
On December 12,
1970, in implementation of the
said December 12, 1969 decision of the Polcom and denial of
reconsideration
order of November 2, 1970, finding Paile et al. guilty of grave
misconduct
and ordering their separation from the service, Acting Mayor Luciano
issued
Administrative Order No. 39, Series of 1970, ordering the dismissal of
the said respondents from the service effective December 2, 1970.cralaw:red
Six days
thereafter, on December 18, 1970 Paile
et al. filed with the Polcom their second "Motion for Reconsideration
and/or
New Trial." Without awaiting any response on the part of the Polcom to
their second motion, herein respondents, Paile and Alano, filed on
January
30, 1971 the present action for mandamus, prohibition and/or certiorari
[docketed as Civil Case No. 14335], with an application for the
issuance
of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal [Branch VI] presided by respondent Judge Guardson R.
Lood[2]
against the Polcom, the Mayor and the Chief of Police of Makati, and
the
Makati Board of Investigators. Paile and Alano, sought, inter alia,
the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction requiring
the Mayor of Makati to immediately reinstate them to their former
positions
in the Makati Police Department on their theory that, by reason of
their
acquittal of the criminal charges for grave coercion by the City Court
of Manila, the Mayor of Makati had "the duty specifically enjoined to
be
performed by him by the second paragraph of Section 16, R. A. No. 4864,
to immediately reinstate [them] and order the payment of the entire
salary
they failed to receive during their suspension." Herein petitioner
Polcom
duly opposed this petition on February 26, 1971.cralaw:red
After the
hearings held on the application for
preliminary mandatory injunction by respondent Judge as submitted for
Resolution
on March 27, 1971, respondent Judge issued his order dated March 30,
1971
stating "that from the pleadings and the evidences thus presented it
does
not appear that there are factual issues not otherwise covered and
ventilated
during the hearing and [that] the Court believes that the merits of the
case can be resolved on the basis of the pleadings and the evidence
adduced
and giving the parties three days "within which to file their comment
or
manifestation thereon as to whether they would prefer to submit the
case
for decision together with the resolution of the petition for issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction."
Respondents [as
therein petitioners] filed their
manifestation dated April 1, 1971 expressing their "desire that only
the
petition for issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
be
considered[3]
while petitioner Polcom [and its corespondents in the proceeding below]
filed [after securing an extension] their manifestation dated April 12,
1971 stating that "they prefer to submit the merits of the case for
decision
together with the resolution on Petitioners' application for a writ of
preliminary injunction on the basis of the pleadings and the evidence
heretofore
adduced, provided, however, that the parties be given a period of
thirty
[30] days from receipt of the relevant court order within which to
submit
their respective memoranda."[4]
On April 7, 1971,
respondent Judge issued his
order of the same date resolving in effect the case on the merits and
declared
respondents' dismissal from the service as without authority of law,
null
and void and without force and effect", and directed the issuance of
the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction upon a P500 bond
ordering
the Mayor of Makati "to reinstate them to their respective positions as
Captain and Corporal in the Makati Police Department, with all the
rights
and privileges thereto appertaining including the payment of their
salaries
during the period of their suspension from office".cralaw:red
On April 22,
1971, the Polcom sent Paile et al.
a communication returning to them their second Motion for
Reconsideration
and/or New Trial "without action" citing the provisions of paragraph
9.04,
Section 1 of its Memorandum Circular No.12 which allow, in
administrative
cases brought before it, only one petition for reconsideration and for
the added reason that the "decision on the matter has already become
final
and executory." This communication was, however, returned to the Polcom
unclaimed.cralaw:red
Subsequently, on
May 3, 1971, the Polcom sought
reconsideration of the challenged order dated April 7, 1971, which
reconsideration
Paile et al. opposed on May 22, 1971. On July 16, 1971, respondent
Judge
issued an order holding in abeyance his resolution of the Polcom's
motion
for reconsideration, pending action of this Court on an indorsement of
the Secretary of Justice relating to administrative charges filed by
Nicolas
Alcantara against him as presiding judge of the court below.cralaw:red
On August 24,
1971 the Polcom moved with respondent
judge for the immediate resolution of its pending motion for
reconsideration,
which motion was denied on September 8, 1971. The Polcom thus filed
with
this Court the instant petition for certiorari on October 20, 1971 to
assail
the orders of the presiding Judge of the Court a quo [1] dated
April
7, 1971 granting the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction; [2]
dated
July 16, 1971 holding in abeyance resolution of the Polcom's motion for
reconsideration; and [3] dated September 8, 1971 denying the said
Commission's
"Motion to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration."
During the
pendency of the petition at bar, the
Court, on October 25, 1971, acting on the administrative complaint
[docketed
as Administrative Case No. 211-J] filed by Alcantara against herein
respondent
judge, resolved to dismiss the said complaint as premature and enjoined
respondent judge to resolve the pending motion for reconsideration as
well
as to report to the Court the action taken by him on the said motion.
Pursuant
thereto, respondent Judge resolved petitioner Polcom's pending motion
for
reconsideration on December 20, 1971 by denying the same.cralaw:red
Hence, the
petition at bar now refers only to
the setting aside of respondent judge's orders of April 7, 1971 and
December
20, 1971 granting the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and
declaring
respondents' dismissal from the service as "null and void," and denying
the Polcom's motion for reconsideration thereof, respectively.cralaw:red
The Court finds
the petition to be meritorious
and the challenged orders are, therefore, nullified and set aside.cralaw:red
As indicated
above, respondent judge adjudged
the dismissal from service of respondents as "without authority of law,
null and void and without force and effect" on two grounds, to wit: [1]
the acquittal of said respondents Paile and Alano of the criminal
charges
for grave coercion by the City Court of Manila on October 14, 1970; and
[2] the pendency of their second "Motion for Reconsideration and/or New
Trial" filed with the Polcom on December 18, 1970, after the Mayor had
already implemented the Polcom decision of dismissal of December 12,
1969
through the administrative order of dismissal [six days earlier] of
December
12, 1970 ordering their dismissal effective December 2, 1970.cralaw:red
Respondent judge
was in error on both counts and
acted with grave abuse of discretion in adjudging respondents'
dismissal
to be "null and void" and in issuing the writ of mandatory injunction
ordering
their reinstatement with back salaries.cralaw:red
1. It is a
fundamental principle of administrative
law, as reaffirmed by the Court in Philippines National Railways v.
Domingo[5]
that "the administrative case may generally proceed against a
respondent
independently of a criminal action for the same act or omission and
requires
only a preponderance of evidence to establish administrative guilt as
against
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the criminal charge," as in the
analogous
cases provided by Art. 33 of the Civil Code.[6]
Here, the administrative case against respondents did proceed
independently
of the criminal action and resulted in an earlier administrative
verdict
of dismissal from the service rendered on December 12, 1969.
Admittedly,
as stated in respondent judge's challenged order of April 7, 1971
itself
"separate petitions for reconsideration filed by the respondents were
denied
on November 2, 1970",[7]
and the decision was executed on December 12, 1970 with the Makati
Mayor's
implementing order separating them from the service by virtue of the
Polcom's
final order of November 2 denying reconsideration. The subsequent
acquittal
of said respondents as accused in the criminal case as per the City
Court's
judgment dated October 14, 1970 was of no consequence since such
acquittal
merely relieved them from criminal liability but in no way carried with
it relief from the administrative liability of dismissal from the
service
under the final order of the Polcom in the administrative case.cralaw:red
The ruling of
this Court in Gatmaitan vs. Manila
Railroad Co.[8]
is wholly applicable here, mutatis mutandis: "It is true that
on
September 30, 1957 appellant was acquitted in the criminal cases
mentioned
heretofore, but it is not denied that said acquittal was based merely
on
reasonable doubt regarding his guilt. We have heretofore held that
conviction
in a criminal case is not indispensable to warrant the dismissal of an
employee by his employer; it being enough that the latter had proof of
the former's guilt of breach of trust or other sufficient reason
[National
Labor Union vs. Standard, etc., 40 O.G. 3503]. Therefore,
appellant
having been duly investigated and found guilty of gross negligence and
conduct prejudicial to the interest of his employer, We must
necessarily
conclude that his conviction in the criminal actions already mentioned
was not indispensable to warrant his dismissal from the service, nor
did
his acquittal on reasonable doubt in any way affect the previous order
for his dismissal."
In City of Butuan
vs. Ortiz,[9]
the Court of First Instance had rendered judgment ordering the
reinstatement
of the administrative respondent pending termination of the
administrative
case pending against him upon the Court's finding that his suspension
had
been continued for more than 60 days. However, respondent therein had
not
asked for execution of the favorable final judgment for his
reinstatement
until after the administrative case had been decided against him and he
was about to be removed from the service: The Court held that execution
of the judgment of reinstatement was barred by the final administrative
order of dismissal, since "a supervening cause or reason had arisen
which
[has] rendered the decision of the Court ordering reinstatement no
longer
enforceable. "Here, it is obvious that the subsequent acquittal on
October
14, 1970 in the criminal case could in no way affect or set aside the
previous
administrative order of December 12, 1969 for respondents' dismissal
from
the service, as reiterated in the Polcom's order of November 2, 1970
denying
reconsideration. Respondents were found by the Polcom, upon valid and
proven
charge, unfit to remain further in the service of the Makati Police
Department
and the Polcom's decision has long become final and has been executed.
Respondent judge was without power to reverse or modify the same in the
absence of grave abuse, fraud or oppression and none has been alleged
or
shown here.cralaw:red
2. Respondent
Judge reasoned in his challenged
order that "the administrative proceedings before the respondent Polcom
had not in fact been terminated, and as a matter of fact, there is no
showing
that the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial had in fact been
resolved.
The result, therefore, is that the dismissal of the petitioners thus
partook
of the nature of a punishment even while their case is under
consideration,
a clear violation of their constitutional right to be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved."
This is patent
error. The proceedings in the administrative
case before the Polcom had been terminated with its denial of
respondents'
first motion for reconsideration of the dismissal verdict per its Order
of November 2, 1970, copies of which had been admittedly received by
them.
It was not necessary for Polcom to resolve the belated second motion
for
reconsideration and/or new trial, as in fact Polcom returned the same
unacted
to respondents per its communication of April 22, 1971, calling
attention
to its Rules allowing only one motion for reconsideration and adding
that
the decision of dismissal had already become final and had been
executed
[which communication was returned to it unclaimed by respondents].cralaw:red
The Court further
notes that respondents themselves
appear to have doubted the merit and efficacy of their second motion,
for
they abandoned the same with the filing of their petition in the Court
below on January 30, 1971. Furthermore, the fact that respondents did
not
even claim the Polcom communication of April 22, 1971 strengthens the
impression
that they lacked reliance on the effectiveness of their second motion
for
reconsideration and abandoned the same. At any rate, the Polcom's
action
was certainly a final denial and termination of the proceeding since
its
rules did not allow a second motion and its dismissal verdict had long
been executed as of December 12, 1970, long before the filing of
respondents' petition in the court below.cralaw:red
Finally,
respondents question the validity of
the Polcom rules allowing only one motion for reconsideration and its
authority
to issue the same. Assuming arguendo that the Polcom should
have
considered the merits of their second motion, the same was anchored on
the fact of respondents' acquittal in the criminal case. As already
shown
above, said second motion is entirely bereft of merit since such
acquittal
was an entirely separate matter and could not affect or set aside the
earlier
final administrative order for their dismissal from the service.cralaw:red
Respondent Judge
had in his challenged orders
addressed the core issue of law [having found no crucial factual
issues]
and adjudged respondents dismissal from the service as "null and void"
on the above grounds which the Court has found to be in error and
without
basis in law. The mandatory injunction for reinstatement issued by
respondent
judge was in excess of its jurisdiction and authority and with this
Court
having now upheld the validity of respondents' dismissal by virtue of
the
Polcom's final verdict in the administrative case, the case below has
become
moot.cralaw:red
ACCORDINGLY, the
orders of the respondent Judge
dated April 7, 1971 and December 20, 1971, are hereby set aside and
respondent
Judge's successor as presiding Judge of Branch VI of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal is hereby permanently enjoined from any further
proceedings
in Civil Case No. 14335 other than to dismiss the same.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Makasiar,
Fernandez, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., concur.
Guerrero, J., took no part.cralaw:red
___________________________________
Endnotes
[1]
The second paragraph of Section 16, Republic Act 4864 [Police Act of
1966],
reads, to wit:
When
a member
of the police
force or agency is accused in court of any felony or violation of law
by
the city or municipal attorney or by the chief of the municipal police
or the provincial or assistant provincial fiscal or city or assistant
city
fiscal, as the case may be, the city mayor or municipal mayor
concerned,
shall immediately suspend the accused from office pending the final
decision
by the court, and in case of acquittal, the accused shall be entitled
to
immediate reinstatement and the payment of the entire salary he failed
to receive during his suspension: Provided, however, that trial and
disposition
of criminal cases against members of the police force shall be accorded
priority by the courts.
[2]
Judge Lood was afterwards appointed on January 7, 1977 as Associate
Justice
of the Court of Appeals and later was elected in April 1978 as a member
of the Interim Batasang Pambansa.
[3]
Annex "G", Petition.
[4]
Annex "I", Petition.
[5]
42 SCRA 142, 149 [1971].
[6]Such analogous cases were discussed extensively in the footnote as
follows:
"Art. 33, Civil Code, provides that 'In cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such
civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. and
shall
require only a preponderance of evidence."
Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 3019
[Anti-Graft Law] likewise recognizes that administrative proceedings
may
proceed independently against the accused, in providing that "Sec. 13.
Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any
criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the
provisions
of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be
suspended
from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose
all
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted,
he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries nd benefits
which
he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative
proceedings have been filed against him."
Further analogy is found in the
provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, in relation to Rule 111,
Sec.
3, par. [c], which permit a separate civil action for damages after
acquittal
of the accused in the criminal case on the ground of the prosecution's
failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt except where the
penal
action is extinguished with a declaration in the final judgment that
the
fact from which the civil action might arise 'did not exist. 'The
pertinent
legal provisions read:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Art. 29. When the accused
in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for
the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may
require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the
complaint should be found to be malicious. [Civil Code].
[c] Extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil
might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the
civil
action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided
by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the
thing
and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered. [Rule III,
Sec.
3].
[7]
Annex "H"; Petition, p. 3, at p. 60, Rollo.
[8]
21 SCRA 191, 193 [1967].
[9]
3 SCRA 659 [1961]; See also Subido vs. Gopengco, 27 SCRA 455 [1969].
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