Republic of the
PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST
DIVISION
ERNESTO
CO Y STO. DOMINGO,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. L-52200
August 21, 1980
-versus-
COURT
OF APPEALS
and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
R
E S O L U T I O N
DE CASTRO,
J
.:
This Petition
was given limited due course with
the sole issue of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the
mitigating
circumstance of minority. Charged with the crime of homicide
before
the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IX for the death of Oscar
Ralar y Cristobal in the evening of February 2, 1968 at the corner of
Craig
and Laong Laan Streets, Sampaloc, Manila, petitioner was found guilty
of
the accusation, without any mitigating circumstance in his favor. He
was
sentenced to fourteen [14] years, eight [8] months and one [1] day to
seventeen
[17] years and four [4] months of reclusion temporal.
From the
foregoing judgment, petitioner appealed
to the Court of Appeals. On May 31, 1978, the said Court rendered a
Decision
affirming the judgment of the lower court with modification that
petitioner
should be entitled to the mitigating circumstances of provocation and
voluntary
surrender. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reduced petitioner's
penalty
to an indeterminate term of imprisonment from two [2] years, four [4]
months
and one [1] day of prision correccional, as minimum to eight [8] years
and one [1] day of prision mayor, as maximum.cralaw:red
In this petition,
petitioner alleges that the
Court of Appeals erred in rejecting his plea of self defense and in not
crediting to his favor the additional mitigating circumstances of
minority
and obfuscation. Since We find no reason to disturb the finding of the
respondent court relative to the plea of self defense and provocation
was
already appreciated in favor of petitioner, and, therefore, obfuscation
which was based on the same circumstance which gave rise to provocation
may no longer be credited to him,[1]
We limit discussion on petitioner's claim of minority with respect to
which
the Solicitor General was required to comment.[2]
According to
petitioner, he was born on May 7,
1950, so that on February 2, 1968, when the stabbing incident occurred,
petitioner was only 17 years old. In support of said claim, petitioner
submits to this Court the original copy of the birth certificate
showing
that Ernesto Co Pineda y Sto. Domingo was born on May 7, 1950. In
addition,
petitioner invites the attention of this Court to the following:
[1] Exhibit "H", an extract from the
police
blotter
of the Manila Police Department, Detective Bureau, dated February 3,
1968,
wherein it appears that petitioner is 17 years old;
[2] Exhibit "I", "Salaysay" of
petitioner
taken before Patrolman R. Rivera, Detective Bureau, Manila Police
Department
on February 3, 1968, wherein petitioner stated that he was 17 years old;
[3] Exhibit "3-A", a medical
certificate
dated
March 16, 1968 issued to petitioner by the Philippine General Hospital
wherein it appears that petitioner is 17 years old; and
[4] Page 32 of the transcript of
stenographic
notes taken at the hearing before the lower court on October 28, 1968,
wherein it appears that petitioner, in answer to the question of the
court a quo, stated that he was born on May 7, 1950.
In his comment,
the Solicitor General asserts that
petitioner has failed to establish his minority. He claims that since
the
birth certificate was submitted for the first time before this Court,
the
same is inadmissible in evidence. He also questions the veracity of the
birth certificate because the full name of the child in the birth
certificate
is "Ernesto Co Pineda", while herein petitioner is named "Ernesto Co y
Sto. Domingo", alleging that petitioner's "unexplained failure to offer
the same in evidence before the court a quo would simply be an
attempt
to avoid close scrutiny and examination by the prosecution for fear
that
its falsity might be exposed."
As regards the
documents presented as proof of
his claim of minority, the Solicitor General claims that the
information
or data as to his date of birth and age at the time of the fateful
incident,
as reflected therein, were all elicited from and supplied by petitioner
himself, while his declaration with respect to his age and date of
birth,
is equally self-serving.cralaw:red
We find
petitioner entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of minority.cralaw:red
Although it is
true the birth certificate was
not presented during the trial, the same must be admitted by Us, if
only
to satisfy Our sense of justice and fairness, and to stress further
that
substantial justice may not be denied merely on ground of technicality,
following the same course of action We took in People vs. Jose,[3]
in which it was held:
But even on the hypothesis that George
Tillman
is guilty of the offense charged, the death sentence cannot be imposed
upon him as there is in his favor the circumstance of minority or being
less than eighteen [18] years of age when he allegedly committed the
offense
[See Manifestation and Ex Parte Motion dated October 20, 1975,
submitted
by Francisco R. Sotto, one of the counsels for accused George Tillman,
pp. 283-289 Record]. Although the Solicitor General objects to the
consideration
of this piece of evidence, consisting of the duly authenticated birth
certificate
of George Tillman showing that he was born on January 18, 1949, as it
was
not offered and formally presented in evidence during the trial, this
Court
resolved in its Resolution of January 8, 1976, to consider the
circumstance
of George Tillman's minority in the imposition of the penalty on him.
In
the exercise of Our sound discretion and so as not to allow sheer
technicality
to overcome Our sense of justice in considering the merits of this
case,
We hereby admit in evidence the birth certificate showing that George
Tillman
was a minor of seventeen [17] years, five [5] months and sixteen [16]
days
at the time of the commission of the crime in question since there is
no
doubt as to its veracity.
The Solicitor
General's claim that the discrepancy
between the name of the petitioner and the full name appearing in the
birth
certificate arouses doubts and suspicion is without basis. Petitioner
ably
explained that the child whose name appears in the birth certificate as
"Ernesto Co Pineda" is the same Ernesto Co y Sto. Domingo who is the
petitioner
herein, said petitioner's name having been shortened to "Ernesto Co y
Sto.
Domingo" because his father's name is lengthy and consists of two
words.
At any rate, the birth certificate clearly shows that petitioner
Ernesto
Co y Sto. Domingo was born to the spouses Pablo Co Pineda and Lucia
Sto.
Domingo on May 7,1950.
We are not
likewise persuaded by the Solicitor
General's contention that petitioner's unexplained failure to present
the
birth certificate in the court a quo lends doubt as to its
veracity.
For petitioner has likewise ably explained that he deemed it not
necessary
anymore to submit the same since the prosecution has not questioned the
entries in Exhibits "H", "Q", and "3-A", more particularly as to his
age
which were uniformly stated as 17 years old. Moreover, in the hearing
in
the lower court, petitioner has testified that he was 17 years old at
the
time of the commission of the offense. Contrary to the Solicitor
General's
contention, petitioner's testimony is not a self-serving evidence. In
National
Development Co. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission,[4]
this Court, elucidating on the nature of self-serving evidence and the
ground for its exclusion, said:
The right of a party to be present and
give
evidence
as provided in Section 49 would be meaningless if it did not include
the
right to testify in his own behalf. Indeed, the Rules of Court enjoins
that "neither parties nor other persons interested in the outcome of a
case shall be excluded." For while a party's interest may, to some
extent,
affect his credibility, his interest alone is not a ground for
disregarding
his testimony. The argument that the testimony of an interested party
is
self-serving and, therefore, is inadmissible in evidence misses the
essential
nature of self-serving evidence and the ground for its exclusion.
Self-serving
evidence is evidence made by a party out of court at one time; it does
not include a party's testimony as a witness in court. It is excluded
on
the same ground as any hearsay evidence, that is the lack of
opportunity
for cross-examination by the adverse party, and on the consideration
that
its admission would open the door to fraud and to fabrication of
testimony.
On the other hand, a party's testimony in court is sworn and affords
the
other party the opportunity for cross-examination.
The penalty for
homicide is reclusion temporal. Considering
that petitioner is entitled to special mitigating circumstance of
minority,
being 17 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, the
penalty
shall be the next lower than that prescribed by law,[5]
which is prision mayor. Considering further that there are two other
ordinary
mitigating circumstances of provocation and voluntary surrender, the
penalty
should be reduced by another one degree,[6]
which is prision correccional in this case "in the period that [the
court]
may deem applicable, according to the number and nature of such
circumstances,"[7]
We are of the opinion that with the mitigating circumstances attendant,
petitioner's penalty should be fixed within the medium period. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner's penalty should be four [4]
months, one [1] day of arresto mayor as minimum to three [3] years, two
[2] months of prision correccional as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing, the Decision
of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with modification that petitioner
is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four [4] months,
one [1] day of arresto mayor as minimum to three [3] years, two [2]
months
of prision correccional as maximum.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Teehankee,
Makasiar, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., concur.
Fernandez, J., is on leave.cralaw:red
___________________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Aquino, Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, p. 240, citing Llanes, CA 52 OG
865;
Felipe Luna 76 Phil. 101; Yaon 8 ACR 675; Oscar Ramirez, CA 46 O. G.
6119,
Basalo, 53 Phil. 940.
[2]
p. 50, Rollo.
[3]
71 SCRA 281.
[4]
19 SCRA 866.
[5]
Art. 68[2] of the Revised Penal Code.
[6]
Art. 64[5], Ibid.
[7]
lbid. |