ManilaEN
BANC
REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Represented by the Director of Lands,
Petitioner-Appellant,
G. R. No. L-55289
June 29, 1982
-versus-
JUDGE
CANDIDO P. VILLANUEVA
of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan,
Malolos Branch VII, and IGLESIA NI
CRISTO,
as a Corporation Sole, Represented by
ERAÑO G. MANALO, as Executive
Minister,
Respondents-Appellees.
D
E C I S I O N
AQUINO, J.:
Like L-49623,
"Manila Electric Company vs. Judge
Castro-Bartolome", this case involves the prohibition in Section 11,
Article
XIV of the Constitution that "no private corporation or association may
hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed
one thousand hectares in area."
Lots Nos. 568 and 569, located at Barrio
Dampol,
Plaridel, Bulacan, with an area of 313 square meters and an assessed
value
of P1,350 were acquired by the Iglesia ni Cristo on January 9, 1953
from
Andres Perez in exchange for a lot with an area of 247 square meters
owned
by the said church [Exh. "D"].
The said lots
were already possessed by Perez
in 1933. They are not included in any military reservation. They are
inside
an area which was certified as alienable or disposable by the Bureau of
Forestry in 1927. The lots are planted to santol and mango trees and
banana
plants. A chapel exists on the said land. The land had been declared
for
realty tax purposes. Realty taxes had been paid therefor [Exh. "N"].cralaw:red
On September 13,
1977, the Iglesia Ni Cristo,
a corporation sole, duly existing under Philippine laws, filed with the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan an application for the registration
of the two lots. It alleged that it and its predecessors-in-interest
had
possessed the land for more than thirty years. It invoked Section 48[b]
of the Public Land Law, which provides:
Chapter VIII. Judicial confirmation of
imperfect
or incomplete titles.-
Sec. 48. The following-described
citizens
of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and
the issuance of a certificate of title therefore, under the Land
Register
Act, to wit:
[b] Those who, by themselves or through
their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least
thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation
of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under
the provisions of this chapter." [As amended by Republic Act No. 1942,
approved on June 22, 1957].
The Republic of
the Philippines, through the Director
of Lands, opposed the application on the grounds that applicant, as a
private
corporation, is disqualified to hold alienable lands of the public
domain,
that the land applied for is public land not susceptible of private
appropriation
and that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have not been
in
the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land
since
June 12, 1945.
After hearing,
the trial court ordered the registration
of the two lots, as described in Plan Ap-04-001344 [Exh. "E"], in the
name
of the Iglesia ni Cristo, a corporation sole, represented by Executive
Minister Eraño G. Manalo, with office at the corner of Central
and
Don Mariano Marcos Avenues, Quezon City. From that decision, the
Republic
of the Philippines appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440.
The appeal should be sustained.cralaw:red
As correctly
contended by the Solicitor General,
the Iglesia ni Cristo, as a corporation sole or a juridical person, is
disqualified to acquire or hold alienable lands of the public domain,
like
the two lots in question, because of the constitutional prohibition
already
mentioned and because the said church is not entitled to avail itself
of
the benefits of section 48[b] which applies only to Filipino citizens
or
natural persons. A corporation sole [an "unhappy freak of English law"]
has no nationality [Roman Catholic Apostolic Adm. of Davao, Inc. vs.
Land
Registration Commission, 102 Phil. 596. See Register of Deeds vs. Ung
Siu
Si Temple, 97 Phil. 58 and sec. 49 of the Public Land Law].cralaw:red
The contention in
the comments of the Iglesia
ni Cristo [its lawyer did not file any brief] that the two lots are
private
lands, following the rule laid down in Susi vs. Razon and Director of
Lands,
48 Phil. 424, is not correct. What was considered private land in the
Susi
case was a parcel of land possessed by a Filipino citizen since time
immemorial,
as in Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L. ed.
594,
41 Phil. 935 and 7 Phil. 132. The lots sought to be registered in this
case do not fall within that category. They are still public lands. A
land
registration proceeding under section 48[b] "presupposes that the land
is public" [Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 10, 1967, 20
SCRA 641, 644].cralaw:red
As held in Oh Cho
vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil.
890, "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase
or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule
would
be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and
of his predecessors- in-interest since time immemorial, for such
possession
would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the
public domain or that it had been a private property even before the
Spanish
conquest. "
In Uy Un vs.
Perez, 71 Phil. 508, it was noted
that the right of an occupant of public agricultural land to obtain a
confirmation
of his title under Section 48[b] of the Public Land Law is a "derecho
dominical incoativo" and that before the issuance of the
certificate
of title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of
the land since it still pertains to the State. The lower court's
judgment is reversed and set aside. The application for registration of
the Iglesia Ni Cristo is dismissed with costs against said applicant.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.
Barredo,
Makasiar, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera,
Escolin, Vasquez, Relova, and Gutierrez, Jr.,
JJ
.,
concur.
Concepcion, Jr.,
J., is on leave.
Plana, J.,
took no part.
Separate
Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J.,
Concurring:
In the
result, for the same reasons I have
already
given in Manila Electric Co. vs. Judge Floreliana Castro-Bartolome, G.
R. No. L-49623.
DE CASTRO, J.,
Dissenting:
Justice
Teehankee cites in his dissenting opinion
the case of Herico vs. Dar,[1]
the Decision in which I am the ponente, as reiterating a
supposedly
well-established doctrine that lands of the public domain which, by
reason
of possession and cultivation for such a length of time, a grant by the
State to the occupant is presumed, and the land thereby ceases to form
part of the public domain, but is segregated therefrom as to be no
longer
subject to the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose under the
public land laws or statutes. He would thus consider said land as no
longer
public land but "private" lands and therefore, not within the
prohibition
of the New Constitution against corporations from acquiring public
lands
which provides that "no private corporation or association may hold
alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand
hectares."[2]
I cannot
subscribe to the view that the land as
above-described has become private land, even before title thereto,
which
is, as of this stage, said to be still "an incomplete or imperfect
title,"
has been fully vested on the occupant, through the prescribed procedure
known as judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title.[3]
This is the only legal method by which full and absolute title to the
land
may be granted, to convert the land into a truly private land. To
secure
such judicial title, only the courts can be resorted to. The Director
of
Lands has lost authority over the land, insofar as its disposition is
concerned.
His authority is limited to another form of disposition of public land,
referred to as administrative legalization, resulting in the issuance
of
free patents, also based on possession, in which case, as in the
issuance
of homestead and sales patents, the land involved in undoubtedly public
land. The possessor of a piece of public land would have the option to
acquire title thereto through judicial confirmation or administrative
legalization.
The difference is that in the latter case, the area disposable to a
citizen-applicant
by the Director of Lands is limited to 24 hectares. There is no limit
to
the area subject to judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect
title,
except possibly the limit fixed for a State grant under old Spanish
laws
and decrees, which certainly is much larger than that set for free
patents.cralaw:red
It is because of
the divestiture of authority
of the Director of Lands to dispose of the land subject to judicial
confirmation
of incomplete and imperfect title that some statements are found in
many
cases, such as those cited by Justice Teehankee, to the effect that
such
land has ceased to be public land. What these statements, however,
really
mean is that the land referred to no longer forms part of the mass of
public
domain still disposable by the Director of Lands, under the authority
granted
him by the public land statutes. It, however, would not follow that the
land covered by Section 48 of the Public Land Act has itself become
private
land. The fact that its disposition is provided for in the aforecited
Act
which deals with "public land" gives rise to the very strong
implication,
if not a positive conclusion, that the land referred to is still public
land. Only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for
confirmation
of title would the land become privately owned land, for in the same
proceeding,
the court may declare it public land, depending on the evidence.cralaw:red
The discussion of
the question of whether the
land involved is still public or already private land is, however,
entirely
pointless, or an Idle exercise, if We consider the provision of Section
14, Article XIV of the Constitution which appears to have been lost
sight
of, which provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private
lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations,
or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.
" As previously stated, by express provision of the Constitution, no
corporation
or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain, except by
lease, not to exceed 1,000 hectares in area.[4]
Hence, even if the land involved in the present case is considered
private
land, the cited section prohibits its acquisition by the Meralco or
Iglesia
which admittedly are "corporations or association" within the meaning
of
the aforecited provision of the New Constitution. This observation
should
end all arguments on the issue of whether the land in question is
public
or private land. Although it may further be observed that supposing a
corporation
has been in possession of a piece of public land from the very
beginning,
may it apply for judicial confirmation of the land in question to
acquire
title to it as owner after possessing the land for the requisite length
of time? The answer is believed obvious - it may not. If its possession
is not from the beginning but has commenced only upon the transfer to
it
by the prior possessor, may the corporation apply? The answer is just
as
obvious with more reason, it may not.cralaw:red
This separate
opinion should have had no need
to be written because the majority opinion written by Justice Aquino is
already well-reasoned out and supported by applicable authorities. I
was
impelled to write it only because in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Teehankee, the case of Herico vs. Dar [supra] which is my ponencia
was cited in support of his position. This separate opinion
then is
more to show and explain that whatever has been stated by me in the Dar
case should be interpreted in the light of what I have said in his
separate
opinion, which I believe, does not strengthen Justice Teehankee's
position
a bit.
FERNANDO, C.J.,
Dissenting:
It is with
regret that unlike in the case of
Meralco v. Judge Castro-Bartolome,[1]
where I had a brief concurrence and dissent, I am constrained to
dissent
in the ably-written opinion of Justice Aquino. I join him in according
the utmost respect and deference to this provision in the Constitution:
"No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in
area;"[2]
If the matter before Us be viewed solely from the standpoint of
respondent
appellee Iglesia ni Cristo being a corporation sole, then I would have
no hesitancy in sustaining the conclusion that if the land be
considered
public, its registration would have to be denied. For me, that is not
the
decisive consideration. It is my view that the Bill of Rights provision
on religious freedom which bans the enactment of any law prohibiting
its
free exercise, the "enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without
discrimination or preference, [being] forever allowed."[3]
This is not the first time the Court has occasion to recognize the high
estate that freedom of religion occupies in our hierarchy of values.
Even
as against the fundamental objectives, constitutionally enshrined, of
social
justice and protection to labor, the claim of such free exercise and
enjoyment
was recognized in the leading case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers'
Union.[4]
Here, the Iglesia ni Cristo, as a corporation sole, seeks the
registration.
The area involved in the two parcels of land in question is 313 square
meters. As admitted in the opinion of the Court, a chapel is therein
located.
It is that basic consideration that leads me to conclude that the
balancing
process, which finds application in constitutional law adjudication,
equally
requires that when two provisions in the Constitution may be relevant
to
a certain factual situation calls for the affirmance of the decision of
respondent Judge allowing the registration.[5]
There is for me another obstacle to a partial concurrence. The right of
the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao to register land
purchased
from a Filipino citizen was recognized in The Roman Catholic Apostolic
Administrator of Davao v. Land Registration.[6]
As I view it, therefore, the decision of respondent Judge is equally
entitled
to affirmance on equal protection grounds.[7]
Hence, this brief dissent.
TEEHANKEE, C.J.,
Dissenting:
Involved in
these two cases are the applications
of petitioner Meralco, a nationalized domestic corporation, in the
first
case, and respondent Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious corporation sole,
in
the second case [both admittedly Filipino corporations qualified to
hold
and own private lands], for judicial confirmation of their titles to
small
parcels of land, residential in character as distinguished from
strictly
agricultural land, acquired by them by purchase or exchange from
private
persons publicly recognized as the private owners [who have been in the
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the lands under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty (30)
years immediately preceding the filing of the applications].
This dissent is
based on the failure of the majority
to adhere to established doctrine since the 1909 case of Cariño
and the 1925 case of Susi down to the 1980 case of Herico, infra,
pursuant to the Public Land Act, as amended, that where a possessor has
held the open, exclusive and unchallenged possession of alienable
public
land for the statutory period provided by law ([30] years now under
amendatory
Rep. Act No. 1942 approved on June 22, 1957), the law itself mandates
that
the possessor "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate
of title" and" by legal fiction [the land] has already ceased to be of
the public domain and has become private property." Accordingly, the
prohibition
of the 1973 Constitution and of the Public Land Act against private
corporations
holding lands of the public domain has no applicability in the present
cases. What Meralco and Iglesia have acquired from their
predecessors-in-interest
had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private
property
at the time of the sale to them and, therefore, their applications for
confirmation of title by virtue of their predecessors-in-interest's
vested
right and title may be duly granted.cralaw:red
The land covered
by the Meralco application of
November 26, 1976 consists of two [2] small lots with a total area of
165
square meters located at Tanay, Rizal with an assessed value of
P3,270.00.
This land was possessed by Olimpia Ramos before World War II which
broke
out in the Pacific in 1941. Olimpia Ramos sold the land on July 3, 1947
to the Spouses Rafael Piguing and Minerva Inocencio who constructed a
house
thereon. But because the Meralco had installed the "anchor guy" of its
steel posts on the land, the Piguing spouses sold the land to the
Meralco
on August 13, 1976. The land had been declared for realty tax purposes
since 1945 and realty taxes were regularly paid thereon. It is
residential
in character as distinguished from strictly agricultural land. It is
likewise
established that it is not included in any military reservation and
that
since 1927 it had been certified as part of the alienable or disposable
portion of the public domain.cralaw:red
The land covered
by the Iglesia application of
September 3, 1977 likewise consists of two [2] small lots located in
Barrio
Dampol, Plaridel, Bulacan with a total area of 313 square meters and
with
an assessed value of P1,350.00. The land was acquired by the Iglesia on
January 9, 1953 from Andres Perez in exchange for a lot owned by the
Iglesia
with an area of 247 square meters. The land was already possessed by
Perez
in 1933. Admittedly also it is not included in any military reservation
and is inside an area which was certified since 1927 as part of the
alienable
or disposable portion of the public domain. A chapel of the Iglesia
stands
on the said land. It had been duly declared for realty tax purposes in
the name of the Iglesia and realty taxes were regularly paid thereon.cralaw:red
Respondent Judge
in the Meralco case sustained
the Republic's opposition and dismissed the application, holding that
under
both the provisions of the new Constitution and the Public Land Act,
Meralco,
being a corporation and not a natural person, is not qualified to apply
for the registration of title over the public land.cralaw:red
On the other
hand, in the Iglesia case, the Republic
presented no evidence in support of its opposition but expressly
"submitted
the case for decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by the
applicant."
Respondent judge in the case accordingly granted the application for
registration
of the land in the name of the Iglesia, holding that it had been
"satisfactorily
established that applicant [Iglesia] and its predecessors-in-interest
have
been in open, continuous, public and adverse possession of the land
under
a bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty [30] years
prior
to the filing of the application" and is, therefore, entitled to the
registration
applied for under the Public Land Act, as amended.cralaw:red
Both decisions
are now with the Court for review.
I hold that both applications for registration should be granted by
virtue
of the prevailing principle as enunciated since the 1925 case of Susi
vs.
Razon and Director of Lands[1]
and reaffirmed in a long line of cases down to the 1980 case of Herico
vs. Dar[2]
that the lands in question ceased, ipso jure, or by operation
of
law, to be lands of the public domain upon completion of the statutory
period of open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and unchallenged
possession
thereof by the applicants' predecessors-in-interest who were qualified
natural persons and entitled to registration by right of acquisitive
prescription
under the provisions of the Public Land Act, and that accordingly the
judgment
in the Meralco case should be reversed and a new judgment entered
granting
Meralco's application, while the judgment in the Iglesia case should
stand
affirmed. The principal issue at bar may thus be stated:
It is expressly
provided in Section 48, par. [b]
of the Public Land Act [Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Rep.
Act
No. 1942, approved on June 22, 1957] that citizens of the Philippines
who
are natural persons who have occupied lands of the public domain but
whose
titles have not been perfected or completed may apply to the
corresponding
Court of First Instance for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance
of the certificate of title therefor under the Land Registration Act in
cases where they "by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest
have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions
of this chapter."[3]
In such cases, is the land ipso jure or by operation of law
converted
into private land upon completion of the 30th year of continuous and
unchallenged
occupation of the land such that thereafter as such private land, it
may
be duly transferred to and owned by private corporations or does such
land,
as held by respondent judge in the Meralco case, remain part of the
public
domain and does not become private land until after actual judicial
confirmation
proceedings and the formal court order for the issuance of the
certificate
of title?
1. This issue has
been squarely resolved by this
Court since the 1925 case of Susi vs. Razon [and a long line of cases,
infra]. It is established doctrine as first held therein
that an
open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public
domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act provision in
force
at the time [from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law] by a private
individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective
title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the
public
domain and becomes private property.cralaw:red
[At that time in
1925 in the Susi case, such possession
was required "from July 26, 1894" as then provided for in Section 45
(b)
of the old Public Land Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926; whereas at
present
as provided for in the corresponding Section 48, par. (b) of the later
and subsisting Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by
Rep. Act No. 1942 approved on June 22, 1957, in force since 1957, the
period
of open and unchallenged possession was reduced to "at least thirty
years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription. This is
admitted
in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Aquino, wherein it is stated that
"[I]n
the Susi case, this Court applied Section 45 (b) of Act No. 2874 which
corresponds to what is now Section 48(b). It was held that the long
possession
of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since July
26,
1894 gave rise to the conclusive presumption that the occupant had
complied
with all the conditions essential to a Government grant and was, thus,
entitled to a certificate of title."[4]
The text of the corresponding Section 48(b), as amended by Rep. Act
1942
referred to is reproduced verbatim in Mr. Justice Aquino's
opinion[5]
and quotes the reduced statutory period of open and unchallenged
possession
of "at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application."]
Accordingly, the
Court held that Susi, as the
rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period,
acquired
the same by operation of law as a grant from the Government, "not only
a right to a grant," and the land thereby "already ceased to be of the
public domain and had become private property at least by presumption"
as expressly provided in the Act. Therefore, any supposed sale by the
Director
of Lands of the same land to another person was void and of no effect
and
Susi as the rightful possessor could recover the land as his private
property
from the supposed vendee who did not acquire any right thereto since it
had ceased to be land of the public domain. The Court thus specifically
held therein, as applied to the specific facts of the case, that:
In favor of Valentin Susi, there is,
moreover,
the presumption juris et de jure, established in paragraph [b]
of
Section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the
necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he
has
been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his
predecessors,
of an agricultural land of the public domain, openly, continuously,
exclusively
and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of
title
to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that
when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had
already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but
a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of
title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by
the
courts, an application therefor is sufficient, under the provisions of
Section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had
acquired
the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to
be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption,
of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands.
Consequently,
in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands
disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control,
and
the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not
thereby acquire any right.[6]
2. The
above-quoted ruling in Susi has been affirmed
and reaffirmed by this Court in a long unbroken line of cases, as
follows:
In Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza,[7]
the Court held that "[I]n the case of Susi vs. Razon, et al., 48 Phil.
424, it was observed that where all the necessary requirements for a
grant
by the Government are complied with through actual physical possession
openly, continuously, and publicly, with a right to a certificate of
title
to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874,
amending
Act No. 926 [carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141],
the possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law
not
only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary
that a certificate of title be issued in order that said grant may be
sanctioned
by the courts an application therefor being sufficient under the
provisions of Section 47 of Act No. 2874 [reproduced as Section 50,
Commonwealth
Act No. 141]," and "[C]onsidering that this case was dismissed by the
trial
court merely on a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's
action
is already barred by the statute of limitations, which apparently is
predicated
on the theory that a decree of registration can no longer be impugned
on
the ground of fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the
decree,
which theory does not apply here because the property involved is
allegedly
private in nature and has ceased to be part of the public domain, we
are
of the opinion that the trial court erred in dismissing the case
outright
without giving plaintiff a chance to prove his claim."
In Lacaste vs. Director of Lands,[8]
the Court stressed that by force of possession, the land in question
became
private property on the strength of the Susi doctrine.
In Manarpaac us. Cabanatan,[9]
the Court quoted with favor the text of the above-quoted ruling of
Susi,
and its ratio decidendi thus:
The Director of Lands contends that the
land
in question being of the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot
maintain
an action to recover possession thereof.
If, as above stated, that land, the
possession
of which is in dispute, had already become, by operation of law,
private
property, there is lacking only the judicial sanction of his title
Valentin
Susi has the right to bring an action to recover the possession thereof
and hold it.
In Miguel vs. Court of Appeals,[10]
the Court again held that where possession has been continuous,
uninterrupted,
open, adverse and in the concept of an owner, there is a presumption
juris
et de jure that all necessary condition for a grant by the State have
been
complied with and he would have been, by force of law, entitled to the
registration of his title to the land [citing Pamintuan vs. Insular
Government,
8 Phil. 485 and Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424].
In the latest 1980 case of Herico vs. Dar,[11]
"the Court once more reiterated the Susi doctrine that "[A]nother
obvious
error of the respondent Court is in holding that after one year from
the
issuance of the Torrens Title, the same can no longer be reopened to be
declared null and void, and has become absolute and indefeasible.
Secondly,
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent
court
held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's
proven
occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by
himself
and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on
petitioner as to segregate the land from the mass of public land.
Thereafter,
it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent.
This is as provided in Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June
22, 1957, amending Section 48-b of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which
provides:
As interpreted in several cases when the conditions as specified in the
foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant
without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land,
therefore,
ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the
Director
of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is a mere
formality,
the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as
would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued
upon
the strength of said patent."
3. In fine, since under the Court's
settled
doctrine,
the acquisitive prescription of alienable or disposable public lands
provided
for now in Section 48, par. [b] of the Public Land Act takes place by
operation
of law and the public land is converted to and becomes private property
upon as showing of open and unchallenged possession under bona fide
claim
of ownership by the applicants' predecessors-in-interest for the
statutory
period of thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application
and "it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued
in
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the court" which right is
expressly
backed up by the conclusive presumption or presumption juris et de
jure
of the statute that the possessor has "performed all the conditions
essential
to a Government grant," the applicant Meralco cannot be said to be
barred
as a corporation from filing the application for registration of the
private
property duly acquired by it.
4. It should be noted that respondent
judge's
decision in the Meralco case expressly finds as established facts that
the Meralco's predecessors-in- interest had possessed and occupied as
owners
the land in question for at least over 35 years; Olimpia Ramos having
possessed
the same since the last world war in 1941 and then having sold the same
on July 3, 1947 to the Piguing spouses who built a house thereon and
continuously
possessed the same until they sold the same in turn to the Meralco on
August
13, 1976,[12]
Meralco's predecessors-in-interest had, therefore, acquired by
operation
of the Public Land Act a Government grant to the property, as well as
acquired
ownership thereof by right of acquisitive prescription over the land
which
thereby became private property. The very definition of prescription as
a mode of acquiring ownership as set forth in Art. 1106 of the Civil
Code
provides that "By prescription one acquires ownership and other real
rights
through lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down
by law." The law does I not provide that one acquires ownership of a
land
by prescription only after his title thereto is judicially confirmed.
To
this same effect is the ruling in Cariño vs. Insular Government,[13]
wherein the U.S. Supreme Court speaking through Justice Holmes held
that:
It is true that the language of
Articles 4
and
5 attributes title to those "who may prove" possession for the
necessary
time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in
registration
proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have
recommended
an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not
calculated
to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family
possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words
"may prove" [acrediten], as well, or better, in view of the other
provisions,
might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation.
There
are indications that registration was expected from all, but none
sufficient
to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but
simply
to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier
law.
To the same effect is the Court's ruling
in
Legarda
and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, that "an owner does not obtain
title
by virtue of certificate but rather obtains his certificate by virtue
of
the fact that he has a fee simple title."
5. Since the public land became private
property
upon completion of the 30th year of continuous, exclusive, and
unchallenged
possession of the applicant Meralco's predecessors-in-interest,
particularly
the Piguing spouses who sold the private land to the Meralco, there is
no justification for denying the Meralco's application for registration
of its duly acquired title to the land. Meralco's
predecessors-in-interest
had acquired ownership of the land by acquisitive prescription as
provided
by the Public Land Act and by the Civil Code. The land became private
property
and Meralco duly acquired it by right of purchase. To deny Meralco's
application
to register the property because it is not a natural person is
unjustified
because neither the new constitutional ban under the 1973 Constitution
against private corporations owning lands of the public domain or the
Public
Land Act's limitation on the right of application for confirmation of
imperfect
title to lands of the public domain can be invoked any longer as the
land
had long ceased to be public land but had become private property.
Meralco's
application in effect seeks confirmation of the acquisition of
ownership
of the land which had become private property of its
predecessors-in-interest,
the Piguing spouses who thru their open and unchallenged possession of
the land for over thirty years acquired title thereto by acquisitive
prescription
and by conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act itself. There is
no
legal nor constitutional obstacle to such title being transferred to
the
Meralco by right of purchase and traditio for it is not claimed
that
there is any legal prohibition against the Piguing spouses transferring
the ownership of the land to others [whether natural persons or
corporations]
such as the applicant Meralco, even before the formal issuance of the
certificate
of title to them.
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of
Meralco's
application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only
citizens
of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of
their title would be impractical and would just give rise to
multiplicity
of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not
having
filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing
spouses
as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is
no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being
refiled
with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors
[as such natural persons] with the end result of their application
being
granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by
operation
of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great
cost
of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the
overcrowded
court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it
here
and now. [See Francisco vs. City of Davao,[14]].
The ends of justice would best be served,
therefore,
by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform
to the evidence, i.e., as filed in the names of the original
persons
who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal
confirmation
of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and
mandate
of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein
corporations
[both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own
private
lands] and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the
private
lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
7. All that has been said here applies of
course
with equal force to the Iglesia case, save that as already stated at
the
beginning hereof, the Iglesia application was granted because the
Republic
presented no evidence in support of its opposition and respondent judge
held in effect that the property had ceased to be land of the public
domain
and had become private property, the title to which could be duly
issued
in the name of the Iglesia as the transferee of its predecessors-
in-interest.
8. It should bear emphasis that what are
involved
here are small parcels of land, of 165 square meters in the Meralco
case
used for installation of an "anchor guy" for its steel posts in
connection
with its tasks as a nationalized domestic corporation to furnish
electrical
service to the consumer public, and of 313 square meters in the Iglesia
case used as the site of its church built thereon to minister to the
religious
needs of its members. In no way, may the letter, intent and spirit of
the
prohibition of the 1973 Constitution against corporations "holding
alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand
hectares
in area" [which is beamed against the undue control and exploitation of
our public lands and natural resources by corporations, Filipino and
foreign-controlled]
be deemed violated or disregarded by the granting of the applications
at
bar. The two corporations in truth and in fact do not hold the small
parcels
of land at bar for their own use or benefit but for the sole use and
benefit
of the public.
9. With reference to the separate
concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice De Castro wherein he would blunt the "supposedly
(sic) well-established doctrine" [at page 1] from the 1909 case of
Cariño and the 1925 case of Susi down to the 1980 case of Herico
[supra, at pages 5 to 11] and support the contrary
pronouncement
in Mr. Justice Aquino's main opinion that "as between the State and the
Meralco, the said land is still public land. It would cease to be
public
land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino
citizen claiming it under Section 48[b] [of the Public Land Act]" (at
page
5), suffice it to cite his own pronouncement in Herico [reiterating the
well-established and prevailing doctrine which this Court has not
overturned,
as it cannot overturn the mandate of the statute that the unchallenged
possessor for at least 30 years is "conclusively presumed to have
performed
all the conditions essential to a government grant"] wherein Mr.
Justice
De Castro categorically reiterated for the Court that "as interpreted
in
several cases the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of
law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of
the public domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose of. The application for confirmation is a mere formality, the
lack
of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be
evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the
strength
of said patent."
It only remains
to point out, in order to avoid misapprehension
or confusion, that Mr. Justice De Castro's seemingly querulous
statement
that "the discussion of the question of whether the land involved is
still
public or already private land, is however, entirely pointless or an
idle
exercise, if We consider the provision of Section 14, Article XIV of
the
Constitution which appears to have been lost sight of, which provides
that
"save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred
or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified
to acquire or hold lands of the domain'" [at page 2] that "hence, even
if the land involved in the present case is considered private land,
the
cited section prohibits its acquisition by the Meralco or Iglesia which
admittedly are 'corporations' or associations within the meaning of the
aforecited provision of the New Constitution. The observation should
end
all arguments on the issue of whether the land in question is public or
private land" [idem] might mislead one to the wrong conclusion
that
corporations with 60% Filipino ownership may not own private lands when
the express provisions of Art. XIV, Section 9[15]
and Section 14 as quoted by himself as well as the counterpart
provisions
of the 1935 Constitution have always expressly permitted Filipino-owned
corporations to own private lands, and the only change effected in the
1973 Constitution is Section 11 which now prohibits even such Filipino
corporations to own or hold lands of the public domain except by lease
not to exceed 1,000 hectares in area.
ACCORDINGLY, I
vote for reversal of respondent
court's judgment in the Meralco case and for the entry of a new
judgment
granting Meralco's application and for affirmance of judgment in the
second
case granting the Iglesia application.
__________________________________
Endnotes
DE CASTRO, J.,
Concurring:
[1]
45 SCRA 437.
[2]
Section 11, Article XIV, Constitution.
[3]
See Section 48 of the Public Land Act.
[4]
Section 11, Article XIV, Constitution.
FERNANDO,
C.J., Dissenting:
[1]
G. R. No. L-49623.
[2]
Article XIV, Section 11 of the Constitution.
[3]
According to Article IV, Section 8 of the Constitution: "No law shall
be
made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No
religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights."
[4]
G. R. No. L-25246, September 12, 1974, 59 SCRA 54.
[5]
Cf. De la Llana v. Alba, G. R. No. 57883, March 12,1982.
[6]
102 PhiL 596 [1957].
[7]
According to Article IV, Section I of the Constitution: "No person
shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
TEEHANKEE, C.J.,
Dissenting:
[1]
48 Phil. 424.
[2]
95 SCRA 437 [Jan. 22, 1980], citing Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424;
Mesina
vs. Vda. de Sonza, 108 Phil. 251 [1960].
[3]
Emphasis supplied.
[4]
At page 6; Emphasis supplied.
[5]
At pages 4 & 5 thereof.
[6]
Emphasis supplied.
[7]
108 Phil. 251, 253 & 255 [1960].
[8]
63 Phil. 654, 655 [1936], citing Delos Reyes us. Razon 38 Phil. 480:
Susi
vs. Razon, supra, and PNB vs. Luis, 53 Phil. 649. See also Balboa vs.
Farrales,
51 Phil. 498, 503 [1928].
[9]
21 SCRA 743, 747-748 (1967).
[10]
29 SCRA 760, 779 (1969).
[11]
95 SCRA 437, 443-444, per De Castro, J.
[12]
Record p. 22.
[13]
41 Phil. 935 [1909], 212 U.S. 449, 53 Lawyer's Ed. 594; Emphasis
supplied.
[14]
12 SCRA 628,634; p. 898
[15]
"Sec. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, or
utilization
of any of the natural resources of the Philippines shall be limited to
citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at
least
sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens."
[Art.
XIV, 1973 Constitution]. |