ManilaFIRST
DIVISION
PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G. R. No. L-49044
October 12, 1983
-versus-
LAO WAN
SING alias GO TIOK,
alias WASING,
Defendant-Appellant.
D
E C I S I O N
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The records
disclose the following antecedents:
In an
Information, dated July 10, 1957, Lao Wan
Sing alias Go Tick alias Wasing was charged with the
crime
of Arson in Criminal Case No. 964 of the then Court of First Instance
of
Aklan, Branch 11, reading as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of June,
1956,
in the evening, in the Poblacion of Kalibo, Province of Aklan,
Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously set fire to a
certain
building owned by Lourdes Motus, knowing it to be occupied at the time
by persons, thereby exposing human lives to great danger and causing
complete
destruction of said building and other buildings and properties to the
damage and prejudice of their owners and other persons who have
interests
on said buildings and properties in the amount set opposite their
names,
to wit:
Lourdes L.
Motus
- P58,625.00
Antonio
Abanilla
- 25,760.00
Ester Laserna
Jurilla
- 14,000.00
Jose G.
Quimpo
- 40,000.00
Amada Q.
Concepcion
-
7,000.00
Fortunato
Quimpo
-
31,000.00
Modesta M.
Baltazar
-
24,000.00
Priscilla
Quimpo-Magno
-
20,000.00
Federico T. Luces
and Trinidad M.
Laserna
-
10,000.00
Antonio
Yu
-
11,301.00
Francisco L.
Sin
-
39,581.73
Chua
Eng
-
23,769.27
Remedios
Regalado
-
20,137.59
Kalibo Rural Bank,
Inc
-
3,667.56
Gregorio Q.
Mirto
-
53,200.00
Manuel
Alba
-
17,380.00
Maria L.
Abiera
-
2,392.90
Dafrosa
Martelino
-
1,760.00
P403,475.05
That the crime was committed with the
following
attendant aggravating circumstances:
On July 31,
judgment was rendered by then Judge Ramon
Avancena finding appellant guilty of the crime charged and sentence him
to suffer reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the various persons who
suffered
losses in the fire. From the trial court Decision, Lao lan Sing
appealed
to this Court in G. R. No. L-16379
On May 5, 1965,
during th ependency of the appeal,
appelant through Ceferino Santos, filed the first Motion for New Trial[1]
on the ground of recantation by two prosecution witnesses, particularly
Guillermo Vidal and Jose Narce, who exacuted their affidavits of
retraction
on February 8, 1965 and April 8, 1965, respectively [Exhibits "1"
and"6"].
Action on said Motion was deferred "until the case is taken up on the
merits."[2]
On December 17,
1971, this Court, through Mr.
Justice Jesus G. Barrera, rendered judgment in the appealed case,[3]
affirming in all respects the Decision of the Trial Court. On
January
30, 1967, appellant, through Atty. Vicente J. Francisco, filed a
prlnted
Motion for Reconsideration of Motion for New Trial,[4]
which was denied by this Court on May 24, 1967.[5] On June 6, 1967,
appellant's
Petition
for leave to file Second motion for Reconsideration or New Trial,
presented
by Atty. Vicente E. del Rosario, having been granted, appellant filed
said
Second Motion on June 27, 1967. In a Resolution, dated August 18,
1972, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Calixto Zaldivar,
granted
new trial and set aside the Decision of the lower Court dated July 31,
1959, as well as this Court's Decision of December 17, 1966 and its
Resolution
denying reconsideration dated May 24, 1967. In that Resolution, this
Court
"considered it necessary to ascertain the truthfulness of the
recantation
made by witnesses Narce and Vidal of their testimonies given at the
trial"
stating that "if the recantation of witnesses Vidal and Narce are true,
there is no more credibility and positive identification of appellant
with
the advertence that this resolution should not be construed as
reflecting
any opinion on the value and force of new evidence that may be
presented."[6]
Pursuant to said Resolution, the records were remanded to the lower
Court
for new trial.cralaw:red
The lower Court,
then presided by Judge Dominador
Quiroz, limited its authority pursuant to this Court's Resolution:
Only to determine the truthfulness of the
recantation
made by Guillermo Vidal and Jose Narce and render judgment in
accordance
therewith, such that this Court cannot disturb the findings of other
facts
not related thereto which had been found by this Court in the Decision
dated July 31, 1959 that was affirmed by the Supreme Court, and neither
has this Court to make a finding on those facts.
This was
reiterated by defense counsel, Atty. Ceferino
de los Santos, in a Manifestation before the commencement of the new
trial
when he said "the Supreme Court has limited the scope of authority on
the
trial of this Court to determine solely upon the veracity, truthfulness
and sincerity of the recantation of evidence, so that it is
indispensable
on the part of the accused to produce the two recantation witnesses.[7]
At the new trial,
presided by Judge Dominador
L. Quiroz and ultimately by Judge Amelia K. del Rosario, the following
testified for the defense: Narce, Vidal, Ambrosio Medel, brother-in-law
and witness to signature and thumbmark and who interpreted the
affidavit
in the language known to the affiant Narce, and Atty. Vicente S. Ocol,
Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City before
whom
Narce swore to his Affidavit. Three other witnesses were presented to
prove
failure to serve the subpoena on Narce originally, although ultimately
the latter was found and testified. The rebuttal witnesses for the
prosecution
were Dr. Gregorio Mirto, Cororacion Penaflor, Lourdes Motus and Dr.
Iluminado
Motus. The prosecution attempted to have NBI Agents Nos. 37 and 45, who
had conducted the investigation in this case, subpoenaed but was
informed
that the former had died while the latter had already retired and was
an
invalid.[8]
On June 18, 1977,
after new trial, the lower Court.
then presided by Judge Amelia K. del Rosario, rendered judgment
convicting
appellant anew. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused
having been
established beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby rendered
finding
the accused, Lao Wan Sin alias Go Tick alias Wasing,
guilty
of the crime of Arson punishable under par. 1. Art. 321 of the Revised
Penal Code, and considering the aggravating circumstance of having
committed
the crime on the occasion of a conflagration as provided for by Art.
14,
par. 7 of the said Code, sentences the said accused to suffer
imprisonment
of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify Jose G. Quimpo in the sum of
P16,000.00,
Kalibo Rural Bank in the sum of P3,677.56, Isidra Laserna Mirto in the
sum of P15,000.00, Natividad Laserna Abanilla in the sum of P6,000.00,
Lourdes Laserna Motus in the sum of P2,661.24, Modesto Laserna Baltazar
in the sum of P4,900.00 and Fortunato Quimpo in the sum of
P6,000.00, to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law, and
to
pay the costs.
From the
aforesaid judgment, appellant interposed
this appeal. After the filing of Briefs including a Supplemental
Brief by appellant, this Court considered the case submitted for
decision
on July 23,1979.[9] On September 28, 1979,
appellant,
through Atty. Ceferino de los Santos, filed another Motion for New Trial[10]
[the 4th, if we include the Motion for Reconsideration or Motion for
New
trial dated January 30, 1967] on the ground of "new and trial evidence
received/discovered" consisting of an Atty. Apolonia Francisco, one of
the private prosecutors during the original trial, who stated therein
that
she had the coached prosecution witnesses, Jose Narce and in
accordance
with an outline given to her by the spouses, Dr. and Mrs. Iluminado
Motus.[11]
The affidavit was sworn to before Asst. Fiscal Esmeraldo R. Acorda of
Quezon
City. The Solicitor General filed an opposition to the new trial prayed
for. This Court deferred action until the decision on the merits.
In this appeal,
appellant alleges:
I.chanrobles virtual law libraryThe lower court erred in not
finding
that
there are facts and circumstances showing that Vidal and Narce, the
prosecution
witnesses, had testified falsely in the first trial as shown by their
fabricated
testimony as suggested by those having great influence over themand also for valuable
consideration.chanrobles virtual law libraryII.chanrobles virtual law libraryThe lower court erred in
applying the
doctrine laid down in the case of People versus Saliling, No. L-27974,
February 27, 1976, 69 SCRA 427, in the case at bar to determine the
credibility
of, and the weight of evidence testified to, by the recanting witnesses
in the new trial.chanrobles virtual law libraryIII.chanrobles virtual law library
The lower court erred in not
finding
the
testimonies of Narce and Vidal in the new trial more credible than
those
of Dr. Gregorio Mirto and Dr. Iluminado Motus, let alone that of
Coronacion
Penaflor who had been already declared unreliable and not rehabilated
(sic)
in the Resolution of this Court dated August 18, 1972, and not
eliminating
their testimonies in the first trial.IV.chanrobles virtual law libraryThe lower court erred in giving
credit
or weight to the evidence presented by the prosecution during the new
trial,
the instant case having been prosecuted under the direction and control
of the private prosecutor instead of the Fiscal.chanrobles virtual law libraryV.chanrobles virtual law libraryThe lower court erred in finding
the
appellant
guilty of the crime chargedbeyond reasonable doubt.chanrobles virtual law library
The factual
findings made by this Court in the
Decision of December 17, 1966 follow:
The records show
that Rizal Street is the business
section of Kalibo, Aklan Province. It runs from north to south. On the
north, it opens into 19 Martirez Street, which intersects it
perpendicularly.
Along the northern side of 19 Martirez Street, is the Kalibo Plaza.cralaw:red
At around 5:40
o'clock in the afternoon of June
17, 1956, a fire broke out at what is known as Juanas Store located on
the western side of Rizal Street. The fire spread northward, engulfing
the next store, the Novelty Store and the Masings Store and, finally,
the
Municipal Building of Kalibo, which occupied the western corner of 19
Martirez
and Rizal Streets. The fire also spread to two doors to the south,
until
it reached the Ang Tong Suy Store, which was also engulfed, and then
stopped.cralaw:red
When this fire at
the eastern side of Rizal Street
was already dying, and the roof of the Municipal Building of Kalibo had
already collapsed, black smoke was seen coming from the direction of
the
kitchen of the New Plaza Bazar, owned by herein appellant, and located
on the eastern side of Rizal Street across the municipal building. Said
kitchen of appellant was located on the ground floor of the Abanilla
Building,
which was also partly occupied by the Kalibo Rural Bank. This second
fire
spread eastward and southward, and then jumped to the houses on the
western
side of Rizal street, grazing to the ground several houses, burning
practically,
the entire business section of Kalibo.cralaw:red
It should also be
mentioned. that opposite the
municipal building across Rizal Street stood the Laserna Building,
which
belonged to the Laserna sisters.[12]
One of the sisters. Lourdes, which is married to Iluminado Motus, an
optometrist,
resided in a portion at the upper slot of that building and operated a
drug store on the ground floor.[13]
The other Laserna sister is married to Dr. Gregorio Mirto and they own
the Mirto Building. between the Laserna Building and the Mirto Building
stood the Abanilla Building. These three structures are adjoining to
one
another and had interconnecting doors accessed to and from the Laserna
Drug Store, dining room and kitchen of appellant.cralaw:red
The store
owned by appellant is known as
the New Plaza Bazaar in the Laserna Building on the eastern corner of
Rizal
and Martirez Street, and is adjacent to the Laserna Drug Store.[14]
The rear of the New Plaza Bazaar is connected to its dining room and
thence
to the appellant's kitchen. There are doors and corridors
leading
the Laserna Drug Store to said dining room and kitchen. The appellant's
kitchen is actually located in th area of the Abanilla Building from
where
there is also access to appellant's kitchen. Presumably, the
"kitchen"
is restaurant as it adjoins other "kitchens" toward the south belonging
to other individuals.cralaw:red
The case for the
prosecution during the original
trial centered on the testimonies of Jose Narce, Guillermo Vidal,
Coronacion
Peñaflor and Dr. Iluminado Motus. In respect to Coronacion
Peñaflor's
testimony, referring in particular to appellant's identification, this
Court's finding in the Resolution of August 18, 1972, was:
We find that the testimony of Coronacion
Penaflor
cannot be taken as positive identification of the appellant, because
she
never stated that she saw appellant in the kitchen, but that she only
heard
a voice which she recognized to be that of appellant.[15]
That testimony
was to this effect:
Coronacion Penaflor stated that on the
day of
the fire, she was a cook at Chin Guan store adjacent to that of
appellant.
While evacuating some goods from said store to a clump of bananas some
25 meters away, she heard someone from appellant's kitchen, saying
"O-o-oh"
and recognized the voice to be that the appellant. She then noticed
fire
and smoke in appellant's kitchen. She immediately ran outside and
shouted
Wasing [appellant] again burned his kitchen. Looking to the left, she
saw
flames leaping from appellant's kitchen door. She then ran to the place
where she had left her personal belongings.[16]
The gist of the
testimony of Narce, then 22 years
old, single, a houseboy, who reached only Grade 1, during the original
trial was that he knows only how to write his name; that at the time of
the fire, he was a houseboy of Branding and Amading Kimpo; that when he
heard the bells ringing, he went out to the street and saw the fire at
Juana's store. Having been a houseboy of the Motuses for three years,
he
proceeded to the drugstore of his former employers to help evacuate the
medicines and other things. He recognized appellant who was dressed in
white shirt and pants also going back and forth evacuating his things.
On his third trip from the second floor, Narce saw appellant pick up
the
lighted kerosene lamp from a table near the stairs and thereafter bring
the lamp to the dining room adjoining. The witness followed appellant
to
the dining room and while he was about two arms-lengths from him
[appellant],
the latter removed the glass funnel of the lamp, increased the flame
and
placed said lamp on one of the shelves where there were boxes of shoes.
When the accused left, Narce transferred the lamp to a table and took
some
shoes and merchandise to the plaza. When he returned, he passed by the
kitchen door intending to hide some shoes for himself when he saw
appellant
holding a can of petroleum with one side raised and afterwards lighting
a match and placing it on a pile of wood. Black smoke then rose and red
flames followed. Fearful of what he saw, Narce ran away and went to the
bodega of one, Garcia, where he used to sleep. Two days later, or on
the
following Tuesday, Narce told Dr. and Mrs. Iluminado Motus at the house
of Mrs. Motus' mother about appellant's having set fire to his kitchen.[17]
In Narce's
Affidavit of Retraction executed on
April 8, 1965, sworn to before Vicente S. Ocol, Clerk of Court of
Quezon
City, he stated that the "facts" he had testified to were not true and
that he had testified under pressure from the Motuses who promised to
give
him work, and that "in conscience, I have to right the wrong I have
done
and do justice to the innocent."[18]
During the new
trial, Narce, then 35 years old,
testified that after he heard the bells warning of the fire, he went to
the plaza and stood at the bandstand and saw the fire at Juana's store;
that flames were flying all around; that fire was seen from the kitchen
of Abanilla; that when he went down from the bandstand, he met Dr. and
Mrs. Motus whom he helped gather medicines. Narce emphasized that he
did
not go to the drugstore. He also declared that during the original
trial,
he testified upon the prodding of the Motuses and upon promise of a job
and that he would be given P200.00 if they win the case; that he,
Vidal,
and Coronacion Penaflor were coached Atty. Apolonia Francisco at the
Motus
residence; and that when he executed the Affidavit of Retraction, he
was
working on and off in Pasay City and lived with one Ambrocio Medel.[19]
As to how he
happened to execute said Affidavit,
he testified that he met the accused accidentally in Quiapo who told
him
"as if you kill me when you testify in the trial in Kalibo, I did not
do
anything in connection with that fire" and that if Narce symphathized
with
him, the former should help because he would be staying for 30 years in
jail and might die there. Appellant further told him that Vidal had
already
executed an affidavit, and because of that Narce felt "bolstered".
Narce
did not have a permanent job at that time.[20]
Narce's Affidavit was thereafter prepared at the house of Atty. de los
Santos in Quezon City[21]
and he swore the same before the Clerk of Court of the Court of First
Instance
of Quezon City. The contents of the Affidavit were translated to Narce
by Ambrosia Medel, a driver, and with whom he was living.[22]
Medel was also jobless at the time.cralaw:red
Coming now to
Vidal. This Court in its Decision
in L-16379 synthesized his testimony during the original trial when he
was then 20 years old, married, a laborer, thus:
Guillermo Vidal testified that while the
fire
on the western side of Rizal Street was raging, he helped the family of
Dr. and Mrs. Gregorio Mirto [another fire victim] evacuate their
personal
belongings from their house, which was near the appellant's store.
After
most of the Mirto's personal belongings had been evacuated, they told
him
to help in the evacuation of the effects of the Laserna Drugstore,
which
was next door to appellant's store. As he approached the kitchen of
appellant
to go to Laserna Drugstore, he saw appellant, in white trousers and
shirt,
bending over a pile of firewood in his kitchen. Suddenly, flame and
smoke
rose from the firewood. Due to fear, he turned back and went to the
plaza.
He there found the Mirtos attending to their children and belongings,
but
he did not tell them or anybody else on the incident he saw in
appellant's
kitchen. Because he got wet by the rain that fell on the night of the
fire,
he contracted fever which lasted for about 5 days. While
recovering
from the fever, his father visited him, and it was in him that he told
that the fire which destroyed several houses of Kalibo came from the
kitchen
of appellant and was set by the latter. His father then
advised
him not to tell anybody about it to avoid involvement in its
consequences.
Notwithstanding his father's advice, however, he told Mrs. Mirto about
the aforesaid incident at appellant's kitchen, when he saw her one day
weeping and lamenting on the loss of her house.[23]
In his
Affidavit of Retraction executed on February
18, 1965, and sworn to before Gregorio L. Lira, Clerk of Court, Court
of
First Instance of Iloilo, he stated that his testimony during the
original
trial that he saw appellant as the one inside the kitchen setting fire
to a pile of firewood and papers in his kitchen, was a mere guess and
that
he testified the way he did upon the urgings of the Motuses and the
Mirtos,
who were among the victims in the Kalibo fire, and whom he could not
refuse
due to the many favors they had showered on him; and that, in the
conflicting
emotions between gratitude and peace of mind he "had to ease and clear
my conscience and to do justice to the innocent."[24]
At the new trial,
Vidal, then 36 years old, married,
already a public school teacher in elementary education, declared that
the second fire started from the Abanilla kitchen which he had seen
from
the window of the second storey of the Mirto residence. He declared
that
he did not go to the drugstore of the Motuses nor was he instructed by
Dr. Mirto to help the Motuses although he helped in saving the Mirto
properties.
He allegedly pinpointed appellant upon the urgings of his benefactors,
the Motuses, who gave him a job after enduring hardship in his former
employment
after his stint with the Mirtos.[25]
On how he
happened to execute his Affidavit, he
stated that while he was on vacation in Batan, Aklan, as he was then
residing
in Ampatuan, Cotabato, he met the accused accidentally in Kalibo,
Aklan.
The accused told him that "because you have testified in the trial and
now I will be sentenced for 30 years imprisonment and probably I will
die
there". As his conscience was disturbed, he told the accused that he
would
retract. He then went to Iloilo City where he met the accused at the
Happy
Landing Hotel on February 17 where he showed the draft of the statement
that he had prepared to Atty. Ceferino de los Santos. The latter made a
slight correction and thereafter they proceeded to the Court of First
Instance
at Iloilo City where the Affidavit was typewritten and subscribed to
the
same before the Clerk of Court of said Court.[26]
As heretofore
stated, the function of the lower
Court during the new trial, with which defense counsel was in
conformity,
was to determine the veracity of the recantation of evidence by Narce
and
Vidal. We affirm the lower Court's finding in this regard when it said:
After painstakingly going over the
voluminous
record, the testimonies of Vidal and Narce both during the original
trial
and during the new trial on the participation of the accused, the
circumstances
under which they were given, especially the circumstances behind the
execution
of the affidavits of retraction, the Court has come to the conclusion
that
the testimonies of Guillermo Vidal and Jose Narce during the original
trial
are true, while those given during the new trial are afterthoughts to
save
the accused, thus complying with the purpose of the new trial, that is
to ascertain the truthfulness of the recantation of these witnesses.[27]
As between
Narce's two versions, one given at the
original trial and the other at the new trial, that given at the
original
trial deserves more credence. As noted by the lower Court:
The Court had gone over his lengthy
testimony
during the original trial. He was able to testify on detail about the
lay-out
of the premises of the drugstore of Mrs. Motus and of the premises
occupied
by the accused and the actuations of the accused. An illiterate man
like
him, if merely coached to tell a lie, could not possibly testify on
those
details and acquit himself during the very detailed and meticulous
cross-examination.
The fact that the witness, on
cross-examination
mentioned four times on having seen the accused get the lighted lamp
near
the stairs in the drugstore of Mrs. Motus when the matter was not
directly
the subject of inquiry cannot be taken by the court as having been
answered
as an automaton. He was asked on how many times he went up and down the
stairs and the witness answered in addition that the third time he went
down he saw the accused, it was to clarify the point that it was on
that
particular going down that he saw the accused.[28]
Narce's allegation during the new trial
that
he merely stood at the bandstand of the plaza when the fire was raging
cannot be believed. Even appellant admitted that he saw Narce at the
scene
of the fire running and dropping a pair of Besa Shoes in the process,[29]
thereby negating Narce's contention that he did not go to the drugstore
of the Motuses at all.
As to Narce's
execution of his Affidavit of Retraction,
We quote with approval the lower Court's assessment thereof:
Narce testified that the accused, upon
meeting
him in Quiapo, said: "You are here, Jose. I have been looking for you
for
a long time." This speaks of efforts of the accused to locate the
witnesses
to get their retraction as an ultimate remedy for an acquittal.
Narce had no permanent job when he met
the
accused
in Manila. He went there in 1958 to look for work. In fact he
told
the accused that he was trying his luck in Manila where he might find a
job.
The financial situation of Jose Narce at
the
time he met the accused makes the Court suspect that he was an easy
prey
to an offer of remuneration in consideration for executing an Affidavit
of Retraction.[30]
As rebuttal
witnesses during the new trial, both
Dr. Motus and Mrs. Lourdes Motus emphatically denied that Narce had
testified
originally upon their proddings and upon promise of a job at the Park
View
Lot. As they respectively testified, at the time, that hotel had not
yet
been constructed. And if he was employed thereafter, it was more likely
to help him with a job and because they needed helpers. The Motuses
learned
of what appellant had done when Narce himself disclosed it to them a
few
days after the fire. The Motuses told him to relate what he had seen.[31]
Vidal's original
testimony is likewise more credible.
As the Trial Court had aptly pointed out:
Again, like Jose Narce, the testimony of
Guillermo
Vidal during 'he original trial was vivid and detailed and the witness
was which only one who is telling the truth can withstand."[32]
At the new trial, Vidal declared that he
testified
for the prosecution because he was indebted both to the Motuses and to
the Mirtos, who had sent him to school,[33]
and that he left the Mirtos because of their insistence that he should
testify. This was rebutted by Dr. Gregorio Mirto, however, who stated
that
Vidal left their place and transferred to the Magnolia Kiosk upon their
own suggestion because they could no longer cope with expenses due to
their
losses in the fire.[34]
As this Court
has held, retraction of witnesses at
a new trial made after a judgment of conviction as in this case is to
be
taken warily and to be rejected where rebutted by other witnesses.[35] Besides, even assuming
that
Narce
and Vidal owed the Motuses and the Mirtos a debt of gratitude, it does
not necessarily follow that to repay them, they would testify falsely
against
appellant and charge him with a crime as serious as Arson.
Vidal's pretense
that he prepared the draft of
his own Affidavit of Retraction is negated by the fact that during the
new trial, he even requested the help of an interpreter so he could
speak
in Hiligaynon because his diction and expression in English was poor.
And
yet the Affidavit was in good English. As the Trial Court had observed:
It is likewise not believable that the
witness
who admits he is short of English and diction would take the trouble of
drafting Exhibit "1" knowing that he was to meet Atty. de los Santos,
the
counsel of the accused, who could more easily draft the statement as to
accurately contain what he wanted to be contained.
The Court has reason to suspect that the
witness
so testified to the Court of his sincerity and of the originality of
Exhibit
"1".[36]
Vidal also
denied having received any money from
appellant in Iloilo City so he could meet with Atty. Ceferino de los
Santos
thereat. The fact remains, however, that he had to stay overnight at
the
Happy Landing Hotel in order to be able to meet with said counsel and
thereafter
had to go back to Cotabato. As the Trial Court opined, "it could not
believe
that the accused could have allowed the witness who was to do him a
favor
to undertake the expenses in Iloilo."
The defense also
stresses that the delay of Narce
and Vidal in immediately informing other people that appellant had set
fire to his own kitchen proves that their testimony is unworthy of
belief.
The delay has been satisfactorily explained, however. Both were seized
by fear when they saw what appellant had done. Vidal was also afraid of
physical harm on his person. Besides, the evidence shows that Narce had
disclosed to the Motuses two days after the fire what he had witnessed,
while Vidal had also done to the same to his father first and then to
Dr.
Mirto.cralaw:red
That Dr. Motus
did not reveal the information
furnished him by Narce and Vidal to the PC and the Municipal Council,
of
which he was a member, was also explained by him in that he feared
reprisals
against the witnesses besides the fact that they might succumb to
pressure,
specially considering that investigation was conducted at the bandstand
at the public plaza. The Motuses, instead, preferred to solicit the aid
of the NBI at Iloilo. In fact, they brought Jose Narce to the NBI
in Iloilo as early as July, 1956, or the month following the fire.
Narce's
affidavit was taken by the NBI and signed before NBI agents. It is to
be
noted also that the Motuses and the Mirtos adhered to their testimonies
during the original trial and did not lose interest in the case despite
the lapse of 23 years from the date of the occurrence of the fire and
the
dates of their subsequent testimonies at the new trial, not to speak of
their requests for early resolution in this case.[37]
They would have had no motive to impute the serious crime of Arson to
appellant
unless they had been informed by Narce and Vidal, respectively. The NBI
and the Fiscal conducted their own respective investigations, which
also
accounts for the delay in the filing of the criminal charge.cralaw:red
In their
testimonies during the new trial, Narce
and Vidal also declared that the second fire started at the Abanilla
building
implying that it did not start from appellant's kitchen. That kitchen,
however, is just on the first floor of the Abanilla building.
Coronacion
Penaflor also testified at the original trial and confirmed at the new
trial that she saw a sudden burst of fire followed by heavy dark smoke
inside the kitchen of the New Plaza Bazar. True, this Court discounted
her testimony in the Resolution dated August 18, 1972, supra,
however,
what was rejected was her identification of appellant and not the rest
of her testimony.cralaw:red
The defense also
intimates that the Abanilla fire
could have been caused by flames flying from the Masing store across
the
street which could have reached the powder and chemicals kept by
Abanilla
who was a manufacturer of fireworks and firecrackers. The evidence does
not disclose, however, any explosion which would surely have occurred
if
that were the case.cralaw:red
The defense
contention that the active prosecution
of the case was done by the private prosecutor and, therefore, the
evidence
presented cannot be given weight or credit is not deserving of any
serious
consideration. While the private prosecutor actively conducted the
trial,
an Assistant Fiscal was always present and the proceedings were under
his
direction and control.cralaw:red
In the
Supplemental Memorandum filed on December
6, 1982, appellant, through another counsel, Atty. Gil Venerando R.
Racho,
additionaly contends that respondent Trial Court erred in failing to
make
in its Decision findings of fact other than findings on truthfulness of
the recantation considering that the former judgment was set aside and,
therefore, the theory is advanced that the Decision under review should
be declared null and void.[38]
As already explained, it was this Court that had limited the scope of
authority
of the lower Court at the new trial to ascertaining the truthfulness of
the recantation made. This was confirmed by Atty. Ceferino de los
Santos
in his manifestation before the lower Court prior to the new trial, and
reiterated by Atty. Felix V. Macalalag, who appeared as collaborating
counsel,
that "the Supreme Court sent back the records to this Court to
determine
better whether the recantation should be given faith".[39]
Appellant's brief also admits that "the only issue raised before the
Court
of origin on the new trial is whether the recantation made by Vidal and
Narce of their testimonies given at the trial are true".[40]
Further, there is
absolutely no basis to the allegation
of the defense in its Supplemental Memorandum that appellant has been
denied
due process of law by the Court a quo because of "absence of
evidence
on record to support its findings". Basically, the issue is one of
credibility
as between the contradictory testimonies of Narce and Vidal during the
original trial and at the new trial, and our own conclusions support
those
of the lower Court.cralaw:red
Appellant's
additional argument is that the lower
Court erred in applying the doctrine in People vs. Saliling, 69 SCRA
427
[1976], reading:
It would be a dangerous rule for courts
to
reject
testimonies solemnly taken before courts of justice simply because the
witnesses who had given them later on change their mind for one reason
or another, for such a rule would make solemn trials a mockery and
place
the investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.
Affidavits
of retraction can be easily secured from poor and ignorant witnesses
usually
for a monetary consideration. Recanted testimony is exceedingly
unreliable.
There is always the probability that it may later be repudiated. So
courts
are wary or reluctant to allow a new trial based on retracted testimony.
Even assuming
it to be inapplicable, actually, the
ruling in said case was not the only basis of the Trial Court for
rejecting
the recanted testimonies. That Court made a careful comparison between
the original and retracted testimonies, the circumstances under which
they
were given, as well as the motives behind the changes in testimony.
Thereby,
the Court a quo correctly applied the criteria laid down in
People
vs. Ubina et al., 97 Phil. 526, as follows:
The rule should be that a testimony
solemnly
given in court should not be lightly set aside and that before this can
be done, both the previous testimony and the subsequent one be
carefully
compared, the circumstances under which each given carefully the
reasons
or motives for the change carefully scrutinized - in other words, all
the
expedients devised by man to determine the credibility of witnesses
should
be utilized to determine which of the contradictory testimonies
represents
the truth.[41]
Lastly, the
Motion for New Trial[42]
based on the Affidavit of Atty. Apolonia Francisco must be denied. As
pointed
out by the lower Court, if Atty. Francisco conferred with the witnesses
before they were presented, that was but natural. In fact, the Motuses
admitted that Atty. Francisco met with Narce, Vidal, and Coronacion
Penaflor,
but merely to elicit from them what they knew and not to coach them nor
to coerce them to testify against appellant. The Motuses and Dr. Mirto
all denied having coached Narce and Vidal, respectively, as the latter
two alleged during the new trial. In the words of Dr. Motus, they did
not
coach Narce because he knows better what he had seen and on what he
will
testify.[43]
Coronacion Penaflor likewise denied having been coached by either the
Motuses,
the Mirtos or Atty. Francisco. She admitted that Atty. Francisco had
convened
Narce, Vidal and herself and asked them whether they had knowledge of
the
case, and when they replied in the affirmative, she just told them to
tell
the truth when they testify in Court.[44]
And on cross examination, she declared that she had also given a sworn
statement to the NBI, the PC, and the Municipal Council,[45]
thereby negating the defense contention that she was merely "coached"
on
how to testify during the original trial.
As to the
non-presentation by the prosecution
of Atty. Francisco as a rebuttal witness, it manifested that it was due
to her senility as she was then around 80 years of age.[46]
Although the defense stoutly denies such condition, it is to be noted
that
neither did it present her as its own witness to affirm the contents of
her Affidavit.cralaw:red
All told, other
than their own self-serving claim,
We have found no evidence to support the assertions of Narce and Vidal
that during the original trial, they had falsely testified against
appellant
out of extraneous considerations such as gratitude, or because they
were
coached to testify in a particular way. Our findings are that their
testimonies
during the original trial represent the truth.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the
judgment appealed from is hereby
affirmed in toto. The Motion for New Trial filed by the defense
on September 28, 1979 is hereby denied.cralaw:red
Costs against
accused-appellant, Lao Wan Sin alias
Co Tiok, alias Wasing.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Abad Santos,[**]
Plana, Escolin,[**]and Relova, JJ.,
concur.cralaw:red
___________________________________________
Endnotes
[**]
Associate Justices Vicente
Abad Santos and Venicio Escolin were
designated
to sit in the First Division vice Associate Justices Claudio Teehankee,
Chairman, and Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. who are on official leave,
pursuant
to Special Order No. 251 dated September 23, 1983.
[1]
pp. 108 120, Rollo, L-16379.
[2]
p. 121, Ibid.
[3]
G. R. No. L-16379. IS SCRA 1076 [1966].
[4]
p. 148 Rollo. L-l6379.
[5]
p. 11 7, Ibid.
[6]
Resolution, p. 208, Rollo of G.R. No. L-16379.
[7]
T.S.N., October 24, 1973, pp. 5-6.
[8]
T.S.N., April 25, 1975, pp. 566-567.
[9]
p.90, Rollo
[10]
p. 91, Ibid.
[11]
p. 98, Ibid.
[12]
T.S.N., July 9, 1958, p. 93; July 10, 1958, pp. 23-24.
[13]
T.S.N., Id., pp. 27-28.
[14]
T.S.N., July 9, 1958, pp. 93 and 101,
[15]
p. 207, Rollo of G. R. No. L-16379.
[16]
Decision, G. R. No. L-16379,18 SCRA 1079-1080.
[17]
T.S.N., December 18, 1958, pp. 221-239, Vol. 1; December 19, 1958, pp.
545-623; December 20, 1958, pp. 277-322, Vol. 11
[18]
Exhibit 6Ap 1725-l-,26, Original Record, Vol. 111.
[19]
T.S.N., October 1, 1974 pp. 320-364.
[20]
T.S.N., October 3, 1974, p. 102.
[21]
T.S.N., Ibid., p. 108.
[22]
T.S.N., Ibid., p. 113.
[23]
Decision, G. R. No. L-16379,18 SCRA 1079.
[24]
p. 120, Rollo, G.R. L-16379.
[25]
T.S.N., January 21, 1974, pp. 403-455.
[26]
T.S.N., January 23, 1974, pp. 472-48-0.
[27]
Decision. pp. 29-30, Rollo, pp. 36-37.
[28]
Decision, pp. 14-15, Rollo, pp. 21-22.
[29]
T.S.N., February 26, 1959, p. 632, Vol. I.
[30]
pp. 145-146, Appellant's Brief.
[31]
T.S.N., April 25, 1975, pp. 569-621.
[32]
Decision, p. 26, Rollo, p. 33.
[33]
T.S.N., January 21, 1974, pp. 421-422, T.S.N., January 23, 1973, p. 468.
[34]
T.S.N., April 23, 1975, pp. 186-187.
[35]
People vs. Castelo, et al., 11 SCRA 193 [1964].
[36]
p. 153, Appellant's Brief.
[37]
pp. 140; 144, Rollo and L-16379, p. 197.
[38]
Temporary Rollo, G. R. No. L-49044.
[39]
T.S.N., October 24, 1973, pp. 5-17.
[40]
pp. 4-5, Appellant's Brief.
[41]
People vs. Ubiña, et al., 97 Phil. 526 [1955].
[42]
p. 91, Rollo.
[43]
T.S.N., April 2 5, 1975, p. 597.
[44]
T.S.N., April 25, 1975, pp. 531-535.
[45]
T.S.N., Ibid., p. 536.
[46]
p. 117. |