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NAGKAHIUSANG MANGGAGAWA SA CUISON HOTEL-
G. R. No. L-64336
August 3l, 1983
-versus-
HON. LABOR ARBITER JOSE O. LIBRON,
FERNANDO, C.J.: The principal
basis of this certiorari proceeding
filed on June 25, 1983 arose from a clarificatory order of respondent
labor
arbiter in response to a motion of private respondent "seeking to be
informed
as to the full meaning and legal consequences resulting from the
declaration
of a strike as illegal such as what is embodied"[1]
in his Decision dated June 10, 1983. Its disposition portion reads:
"[Wherefore,
premises considered], the strike staged on April 15, 1983 should be, as
it is hereby, declared illegal and, therefore, the respondent union and
its members are permanently enjoined from staging such illegal strike;
ordering and declaring, pursuant to Article 265, par. [a] of the Labor
Code, as amended, all the union officers led by Carlito Eleazar,
Marciano
Macaraya and Cesar Yap to have lost their employment status for
participating
in an illegal strike and committing unlawful acts during the strike;
and
ordering the respondent union to pay the petitioner the amount of Pesos
Three Hundred Thirty Nine Thousand [P339,000.00], representing losses
in
income suffered during the illegal strike in the concept of actual
damage.[2]
The clarificatory Order continues: "The consequences resulting from the
declaration of a strike as illegal, which is final and immediately
executory,
carries with it sanctions on the immediate incidents thereto such as
picketing,
obstruction of ingress and egress, the banners and streamers being hung
in the premises and make-shifts built within the immediate vicinity of
the establishment struck. Once the strikers are permanently enjoined
from
staging the illegal strike, the picketing staged should also be
simultaneously
lifted, the obstruction of ingress and egress removed and the
make-shifts
taken out. In other words, the injunction of the illegal strike and the
incidents thereto is self-executing and it behooves upon the party
concerned
to seek, if necessary, the assistance of the law enforcers to enforce
the
same.[3]
Its last paragraph reads: "The other matters in the aforequoted
dispositive
portion of our decision, that of termination of the employment status
of
union officers and the award of damages, are also final and executory,
unless appealed to the Commission within the reglementary period.[4]
Hence this petition.
Three days later, on June 28, 1983, this Court issued a Resolution of the following tenor: "The Court after considering the pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues raised in this Petition for Certiorari with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order filed on June 25, 1983, resolved to require the respondents to file an [Answer], not a Motion to Dismiss, within ten [10] days from notice. The Court further resolved to [issue] a [Temporary Restraining Order] enjoining respondent Labor Arbiter or any person or persons acting for and in his behalf from proceeding with the execution and/or enforcement of his questioned Decision dated June 13, 1983 as well as his Orders dated June 15 and 17, 1983 in Case No. NLRC 1121-LRXI- 83, effective immediately and until further orders from his Court.[5] The above restraining order had to be issued because as contended in the petition, the order of the labor arbiter certainly cannot be declared final and executory upon the mere issuance thereof. That is manifestly in contravention of the law. Article 223 of the Labor Code is quite explicit on the matter, a period of ten [10] days being granted either or both to the parties involved from receipt of any order to appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission.[6] Moreover, the wholesale condemnation of peaceful picketing is likewise clearly bereft of support in law. As pointed out in a very recent Decision decided this year, Phil. Assn. of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. CFI of Rizal.[7] It need not be stressed that peaceful picketing is embraced in freedom of expression. As emphatically declared in Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Philnabank Employees' Association: "From the time of Mortera v. Court of Industrial Relations, a 1947 Decision, this Court has been committed to the view that peaceful picketing is part of the freedom of speech guarantee of the Constitution." Reference was made in such opinion to Associated Labor Union v. Gomez. In that case, the Court characterized the orders complained of as being "fatally defective, suffering as it did from the infirmity that peaceful picketing was enjoined." It is in that sense that Presidential Decree No. 849 was a step in the right direction for the status of picketing was again accorded due recognition.[8] In the Answer, reference was made to the alleged commission of acts of violence against non-striking employees and even against the fifty eight-year old "sickly and paralytic" President[9] of respondent. It is to be understood, of course, that the peaceful picketing authorized cannot countenance acts of illegality. The interim Batasang Pambansa has spoken on the subject thus: "[e] No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares."[10] At any rate, the case needs no further discussion as on August 17, 1983, the following manifestation and motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner through counsel: "1. The labor dispute between the parties which resulted in the present case has been settled on August 15, 1983, and the workers are back to their work. 2. In view thereof, the above-entitled can has become moot and academic. "[11] WHEREFORE, the case is dismissed for being moot and academic. Teehankee,
Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.,
Melencio Herrera, Plana, Escolin,Vasquez, Relova, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
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[1]
Clarificatory Order, Annex "C" to Petition, 1.
[2] Decision, Annex "A" to Petition, 12. [3] clarificatory Order, Annex "C" to Petition, 1-2. [4] Ibid., 2. [5] Resolution of this Court dated June 28, 1983. [6] Article 223, insofar as pertinent, reads as follows: "Art. 223. Appeal Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiters or compulsory arbitrations are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties within ten [10] days from receipt of such awards, orders, or decisions. Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the following grounds: [a] If there is a prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter or compulsory arbitrator; [b] If the decision, order, or award was secured through fraud or coercion, including graft and corruption; [c] If made purely on questions of law; and [d] If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would cause grave or irreparable or injury to the appellant. [7] L-49580, January 17, 1983, 120 SCRA 1. [8] Ibid., 5-6. [9] Answer, 3. [10] Batas Pambansa Blg. 227, Section 6 [1982]. [11] Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss. |
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