ManilaFIRST
DIVISION
ROBERTO
ANTONIO, DIONISIO BENSION,CONRADA CHAN, MARINO CUMLAT,VICENTE DIMACUHA, PROCOPIO
ESPEJON, ET AL.,
Petitioners, |
G. R. No. 77656
August 31, 1987
-versus-
HON.
COURT OF APPEALS,
SPECIAL ELEVENTH DIVISION, HON.
ANTONIA C. MACANDOG,in Her Capacity as Then PresidingJudge of the Regional Trial Court
ofCaloocan City, Branch CXXand ALICIA BILAN,
Respondents. |
D
E C I S I O N
GANCAYCO, J:
This is a
Petition for
Certiorari and
Mandamus
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It seeks to annul
the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals[1]
promulgated on March 10, 1987 which denied the admission of the
petitioners'
motion for reconsideration of the Decision[2]
earlier rendered. Also, it prays that a writ of preliminary injunction
be immediately issued to restrain the respondent Regional Trial Court
in
Caloocan City, Branch CXX, from implementing its Order dated March 6,
1987
which issued a writ of execution in accordance with the Court of
Appeals
Decision on the case, thereby asking that said court be directed to
defer
or stay the execution pending the resolution of this petition and an
annulment
case allegedly appealed with the Court of Appeals.
The petitioners
are lessees of an apartment building
located in No. 121, 2nd Street, 9th Avenue, Caloocan City. This
property
was foreclosed by the Government Service Insurance System [GSIS] after
its original owner failed to pay back his loan. After due notice
to the petitioners and all others concerned, the property was sold to
the
private respondent at a public bidding held on July 29, 1982. It
appears
that petitioners deliberately did not participate in the said bidding
because
they believed that, as tenants therein, they have priority in law to
acquire
the property. Their thinking was that their participation would be
deemed
a waiver of their right to question the act of the GSIS in selling the
property and would adversely affect their offer to buy the same.cralaw:red
The award or sale
of the property to the private
respondent was duly approved by the GSIS Board of Trustees in its
Resolution
No. 772 adopted on August 20, 1982. It was then certified that the
possession
and administration of the property had been transferred to the private
respondent A conditional deed of sale was executed in favor of private
respondent by the GSIS stating that for all intents and purposes, the
private
respondent is the owner of the property. The GSIS advised the
petitioners
that they should now pay their rent and arrearages to the private
respondent.
But despite repeated written demands, the petitioners failed and
refused
to settle their accounts.cralaw:red
After a barangay
conciliation proceeding proved
futile, the private respondent filed a complaint for ejectment against
the petitioners with the Metropolitan Trial Court in that locality.
Said
Court rendered judgment on January 8, 1985, ordering the petitioners to
vacate the premises occupied by them and to pay certain amounts as
damages.
Not satisfied therewith, the petitioners appealed to the respondent
Regional
Trial Court which, on August 20, 1985, rendered a Decision affirming in
toto the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court.cralaw:red
The petitioners
then filed a petition for review
on certiorari with the respondent Court of Appeals. This case was
docketed
as CA-G. R. SP No. 07828. On December 5, 1986, the respondent
Court
of Appeals rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for review.
Later,
an entry of judgment dated February 3, 1987 was duly certified
thereupon
by the Clerk of Court attesting to the fact that the judgment became
final
and executory as of January 22, 1987. The records of the case were
consequently
remanded to the respondent Regional Trial Court on February 11, 1987.cralaw:red
On February 23,
1987, the petitioners, through
their new counsel, filed an "Appearance And Motion For Leave To Admit
Motion
For Reconsideration, Together With the Motion For Reconsideration With
Prayer For Issuance Of Temporary Restraining Order," with the
respondent
Court of Appeals. They moved that the respondent Court of Appeals admit
their motion for reconsideration, which was obviously filed beyond the
reglementary period for filing the same, alleging that their counsel of
record abandoned them and migrated to the United States without at
least
informing them that a Decision was rendered against them.cralaw:red
The petitioners'
motion was denied by the respondent
Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated March 10, 1987, now put in
issue.
It is hereunder reproduced, thus:
Now before this Court is an Appearance
and
Motion
for Leave to Admit Motion for Reconsideration' filed by petitioners in
the above-entitled case on February 23, 1987 on the ground that their
former
counsel, Atty. Funelas, had abandoned the case and is now abroad,
together
with the corresponding Motion For Reconsideration With Prayer for
Issuance
of Temporary Restraining Order.
Considering that the decision sought to
be
reconsidered
dated December 5, 1986 had become final, entry of judgment having been
issued on February 3, 1987 and the records remanded to the court a
quo
on February 11, 1987, for which reason the said decision has become
final
and this Court has become bereft of jurisdiction to act thereupon, the
abovementioned Motions are hereby noted. Parenthetically, and merely
for
purposes of record, it is observed that counsel of record of
petitioners
is the Law Office of Funelas, Perez and Associates and not Atty.
Funelas
alone. Therefore, the fact that Atty. Funelas has abandoned the case
and
is now abroad is not a valid ground for the late filing of the motion
for
reconsideration.[3]
Earlier, on
March 6, 1987, the respondent Regional
Trial Court issued an Order[4]
for a writ of execution to be issued against the petitioners for the
enforcement
of the decision in CA-G. R. No. 07828.
Henceforth, the petitioners, believing that
they
were deprived of their day in court when the respondent Court of
Appeals
denied their motion for reconsideration, instituted this petition.
As their initial
argument in this petition and
as contained in their "Appearance And Motion For Leave To Admit Motion
For Reconsideration," the petitioners maintain that they were deprived
of their day in court - equivalent to a denial of due process of law -
when their motion for reconsideration was refused due course by the
respondent
Court of Appeals. They alleged that their counsel at that time, Atty.
Pitty
A. Funelas, virtually abandoned them by leaving abroad without at least
notifying them. So, when the Court of Appeals decision was rendered and
a copy was sent to Atty. Funelas, no notice thereof was ever received
by
the petitioners. The petitioners only had knowledge of the judgment
against
them after it was eventually entered in the Book of Entries of
Judgments
for being final and executory.cralaw:red
A certain Romeo
S. Obligar, representing himself
as the former messenger of Atty. Funelas, executed an affidavit on
February
19, 1987 stating, among others, that while getting the mails from the
Post
Office last January 6, 1987, for his new employer, he received the
decision
in CA-G. R. SP No. 07828; that since the records of that case was with
Atty. Funelas, he was not able to contact the petitioners herein; and
that
he forgot all about said decision until a secretary informed him that
the
petitioners were verifying the said case when they happened to visit
the
office of his new employer.cralaw:red
We agree with the
Court of Appeals in denying
the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. It is well-settled that
after
the lapse of fifteen [15] days from notice of judgment, the same
becomes
final and the Court of Appeals loses jurisdiction over the case. And
the
subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration cannot disturb the
finality
of the judgment nor restore jurisdiction which had already been lost.[5]
The court a quo cannot decide the case anew. Decision rendered
anew
notwithstanding the finality of the original one is null and void.[6]
In this case, the
messenger, Mr. Obligar, received
a copy of the decision on January 6, 1987. This decision became final
and
executory on January 22, 1987. Thus, the motion for reconsideration
filed
by the petitioners on February 23, 1987, could not be acted upon on the
merits and could only be noted by the respondent Court of Appeals. It
was
properly denied.cralaw:red
The negligence
attributed by the petitioners to
their then counsel, Atty. Funelas, is not excusable. Clear and as it
can
be seen from the pleadings filed that the petitioners' counsel of
record
is the Law Office of Funelas Perez and Associates and not Atty. Funelas
alone. Atty. Funelas signed the documents in his capacity as the
representative
of the said law firm. The respondent Court of Appeals made this same
observation
in its questioned resolution.cralaw:red
In an attempt to
belie the preceding observation,
the petitioners submitted to this Court another affidavit executed by
Mr.
Obligar dated March 17, 1987. This affidavit stated that the Law Firm
of
Funelas, Perez and Associates was actually composed of only Atty.
Funelas;
that Atty. Perez was only a partner in name, never handled any case of
the law office, and did not actually report in said office; that there
were no associates of Atty. Funelas; and that said law firm was
dissolved
in August, 1986. This affidavit has no evidentiary value. It was
executed
and submitted after the questioned resolution was already promulgated.
Hence, it could not have affected or influenced the adjudication of the
said resolution.cralaw:red
It is safe to
presume that a law firm which registered
and represented itself as such, with at least two named partners, is
composed
of at least two lawyers. And if it is true that this law office was
earlier
dissolved, the winding up process is presumed to have been performed in
a regular manner, with all the obligations properly accounted for. Very
concrete evidence must be presented in order that these presumptions
may
be rebutted. At most, the affidavit must be classified as a mere
afterthought and a futile attempt to contradict the findings of the
respondent
Court of Appeals.cralaw:red
Recently, this
Court laid down a ruling that is
applicable to this case. It reads:
When a party appears by attorney in an
action
or proceeding all court, all notices required to be given therein must
be given to their attorney and not to the client. Hence, a notice given
to the client and not to his attorney is not a notice in law.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that the
client
is bound by the negligence or failings of counsel. It is the duty of an
attorney to himself and to his clients to invariably adopt a system
whereby
he can be sure of receiving promptly all judicial notices during his
absence
from his address of record. The attorney must so arrange matters that
communications
sent by mail addressed to his office or residence, may reach him
promptly.[7]
In the motion
for reconsideration, the sole issue
presented for reconsideration was a mere amplification of one argument
already passed upon by the respondent Court of Appeals in its
decision.
On January 18, 1983, before the ejectment case was instituted, the
petitioners
filed a complaint in the then Court of First Instance to annul the
award
in a public auction of the leased premises by the GSIS to the private
respondent
for they claimed that as tenants therein, they have the priority in law
over the same. The court, in a decision rendered on January 28, 1985,
dismissed
the case for lack of a cause of action. Now, this case is allegedly
pending
appeal in the Court of Appeals.
The issue, thus,
advanced in the motion for reconsideration
is whether the pendency of an annulment case of an award in public
auction
is prejudicial to an ejectment suit as to warrant the suspension of the
latter proceeding. We quote with approval the holding of the
respondent
Court of Appeals on this matter, thus:
The pendency of an action for title filed
by
the defendants [now petitioners] with the Regional Trial Court does not
have the effect of removing the ejectment case from the jurisdiction of
the Metropolitan Trial Court. The rule is well-settled that an action
for
ownership or annulment of title is not a bar to an action for forcible
entry and detainer [Alviar, et al. vs. Pampolina, et al., 84 Phil. 45,
at p. 47; Padilla vs. de Jesus, et al., 95 Phil. 688, at p. 691;
Aguilar
vs. Cabrera, et al., 74 Phil. 658, at p. 868].[8]
In an ejectment
case, the issue is possession; while
in an annulment case, the issue is ownership.[9]
Therefore, an ejectment case can very well proceed independently of an
annulment case. The only recognized exception to the preceding doctrine
is the situation wherein the question of possession is so intertwined
with
the question of ownership to the effect that the question of possession
cannot be resolved without resolving the question of ownership. This
case
at bar does not fall within the exception. Accordingly, the
petitioners'
position that this ejectment proceeding should be suspended in
deference
to an annulment proceeding presently pending in another forum must
necessarily
be rejected.
The order of the
respondent Regional Trial Court
for the issuance of a writ of execution was effective because the
decision
in the ejectment case had already become final and executory. Its
implementation
cannot be stayed.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the
instant Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus with preliminary injunction is hereby dismissed for lack
of
merit. With costs against petitioners. This is immediately executory.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Teehankee, C.J.,
Narvasa, and Cruz, JJ.,
concur.
Paras, J., took no part.cralaw:red
______________________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Penned by Justice Lorna S. Lombos dela Fuente; concurred in by Justices
Gloria C. Paras and Celso L. Magsino of the Special Eleventh Division.
[2]
Ibid.
[3]
Resolution of the CA. pp. 180-181, Rollo.
[4]
P. 112, Rollo.
[5]
Pfleider vs. Victoriano, L-49809, June 30, 1980, 98 SCRA 491; Bolanos
vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, L-68458, August 7, 1985, 138 SCRA 99.
[6]
Comia vs. Nicolas, L-26079, September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 492.
[7]
Republic of the Philippines vs. Hon. Jose P. Arro, et alL-48241,
June
11, 1987.
[8]
Decision of the Court of Appeals, p. 77, Rollo.
[9]
Sy vs. Dalman; L-19200, February 27, 1968, 22 SCRA 834, See also
Section
32 [2] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which makes a distinction between
ownership
and possession as justiciable controversies. |