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EGYPTAIR
and SAYED EZZAT,
G. R. No. L-63185 February 27, 1987 -versus-NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
FERNAN, J.: In this Petition for Certiorari, Egyptair and Sayed Ezzat assail the affirmance by the National Labor Relations Commission of the Labor Arbiter's Decision granting monetary awards to John Joseph for his illegal dismissal as Egyptairs marketing adviser. The records show that on June 1, 1962, John Joseph was employed as sales promotion and press relations officer by the United Arab Airlines [UAA] which later became known as Egyptair. Thereafter, he was appointed by said company as acting sales manager. While holding said position from July, 1963 until December, 1967, Joseph concurrently acted as sales manager of Atlantic Pacific Corporation [ATPACO], the general sales agent of UAA.cralaw:red Joseph's appointment as sales manager in the Philippines effective December 15, 1967, was confirmed by the general commercial manager of UAA, Mohamed S. El Hakim. In addition to a monthly salary of P1,750, Joseph was also given a commission corresponding to two percent [2%] of the "net revenue realized from sales wholly on UAA services [direct or interline], provided, that the amount of sectors commissionable exceeded US $50.00." On April 15, 1969, the district manager in the Philippines of Egyptair, Mr. Gamal El-Desouki, informed Joseph that effective April 1, 1969, his gross salary had been increased to P2,000 a month. Said district manager also informed Joseph of the amendment of his 2% commission, as follows: [1] sales on UAA routes, up to the amount of $500,000: one-half percent [1/2%] of the net amount excluding sectors amount of which is less than $50; and [2] sales on UAA routes over the amount of $ 500,000: one percent [1%] of the net amount. The records do not show whether the head office of UAA had approved said amendment.cralaw:red On January 22, 1974, Joseph was appointed marketing adviser to Sayed Ezzat, Egyptair's manager in the Philippines. Four months later, he received a letter from Ezzat reading:
The case was practically tried de novo and on August 22, 1977, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring that Joseph was not a managerial employee of Egyptair and that it was Egyptair which considered Joseph resigned from the service, thus constructively dismissing him from the service without just cause. The dispositive portion of that Decision states:
[2] As unpaid salary from May 1-20, 1974, in the amount of P l,976.00; [3] As cash commutation of the balance of earned vacation leave privileges, computed at fifteen [15] days for every year of service, as follows: P1,407.50 x 10 yrs. or a total of P14,075.00; [4] Unpaid 2% commission for the period covered by January 1971 to January, 1974, computed on the basis of net revenue on sales in the amount of US $600.00 per month or P4,500 per month for thirty-five [35] months or a total of P157,560.00.
Petitioners contend that since they "improved" Joseph's position from sales manager to marketing adviser. Joseph was holding a managerial position so that his dismissal without a clearance from the Ministry of Labor was legal. They add that the employer-employee relationship between them and Joseph was converted into a "consultancy" or a principal-agent relationship when Joseph accepted the position of marketing adviser.[4] The issue regarding the relationship between petitioners and private respondent is one involving a question of fact as it requires the presentation of evidence. Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, before whom the issue was thoroughly ventilated, found private respondent to be a non-managerial employee of petitioner Egyptair. Except where there is a grave abuse of discretion, which does not obtain in the case at bar, the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter and the Commission are binding upon this Court.[5] Similarly, We are bound by the findings of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that Joseph did not abandon his job from January 23, 1974 until May 6, 1974. The NLRC found that as marketing adviser, Joseph had to work outside his office in order to solicit passengers and cargoes for the petitioners' from the different airline agents and shippers.[6] Besides, petitioners' allegation that Joseph abandoned his job is belied by the fact that two days after receiving Sayed Ezzat's letter terminating his services, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. It would be illogical for him to have left his job and later on, file said complaint.[7] Furthermore, petitioner airline's own actuation proves that at least from January, 1974 to April 1974, it still considered Joseph as an employee because it paid him his salary for said months.[8] Other than the alleged abandonment of work, petitioners failed to present convincing reasons for their precipitate dismissal of Joseph. As the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the dismissal was for a just cause, petitioners' failure to do so necessarily meant that said dismissal was not justified.[9] Another factor which made Joseph's dismissal illegal is that it was effected without prior clearance from the Ministry of Labor. The importance of said prior clearance cannot be over-emphasized because without it, a dismissal is also conclusively presumed to be without just cause.[10] The other matters presented by petitioners before this Court, like the actual date of employment of Joseph, his claim for the unpaid 2% commission on sales from January, 1971 to January, 1974, and his claim for the cash equivalent of his earned vacation and sick leave benefits for 1974, deserve scant consideration. They have been passed upon by the respondent commission and, in the absence of sufficient proof that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion, We see no reason to disturb its findings and conclusions.cralaw:red But there is one more contention which, although unmeritorious, deserves consideration, petitioners' allegation that Joseph's claim for commissions has prescribed. They assert that the unpaid 2% commissions for January, 1971 to January, 1974 have prescribed because the claims "should have been filed within one [1] year from the date it accrued, that is, from year to year."[11] The basis of petitioners' argument is the second paragraph of Article 292 of the Labor Code which provides that:
Petitioners' averment that the 1971 commissions should have been claimed within one year or in 1972 militates against the interest of the employee. If adopted, said interpretation of Article 292, paragraph 2, would run roughshod against Article 4 of the Labor Code which states that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Code should be resolved in favor of Labor. Moreover, it would be contrary to the very intent of Article 292 to allow the filing of money claims which had accrued prior to the effectivity of the Labor Code within a year from said date.cralaw:red WHEREFORE, the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is hereby affirmed. Costs against the petitioners.cralaw:red SO ORDERED.cralaw:red Paras, Padilla,
Bidin, and Cortes, JJ.,
concur.
[1]
Records, p. 345, Exh. "A" quoted in Public Respondent's Comment and
Brief,
Rollo, pp. 59 & 144, respectively.
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