ManilaFIRST
DIVISION
ADAMSON
OZANAM EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION,
INC.,
Also Known As ADAMSON UNIVERSITY,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 86819
November 9, 1989
-versus-
ADAMSON
UNIVERSITY FACULTY AND
EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION and CONRADO MAGLAYA,COMMISSIONER
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONSCOMMISSION,
Respondents.
R
E S O L U T I O N
GANCAYCO, J.:
The Adamson
Ozanam Educational Institution, Inc.
also known as the Adamson University [AU] was granted by the then
Ministry
of Education, Culture and Sports [MECS], the authority to increase
their
tuition fees by 10% and 5% for the school year 1983-84. The Adamson
University
Faculty and Employees Association [AUFEA], believing that under P. D.
No.
451, 60% thereof should be allocated for the increase in salaries and
wages
of the members of the faculty and other members of the school, filed a
complaint in the Ministry of Labor and Employment [MOLE] against the AU
for the recovery of the said 60%.
The contention of
the AU is that P. D. No. 451
was repealed by the Education Act of 1982, which took effect on
September
12, 1982, and that assuming that B. P. No. 451 was not repealed,
complainant
is not entitled to any benefit considering that there was no actual
incremental
proceeds in the tuition fee increase for the school year 1983-84 upon
which
to base the 60% allocation.cralaw:red
In a Decision of
the Labor Arbiter dated March
31, 1986, the complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. The AUFEA
appealed
therefrom to the National Labor Relations Commission [NLRC] wherein in
due course, a Decision was rendered on September 30, 1988 setting aside
the appealed Decision and ordering the AU to remit to the members of
AUFEA,
the amount of P1,298,160.00 representing the 60% share in the
incremental
proceeds of the tuition fees collected for the school year 1983-84. A
motion
for reconsideration of the said Decision filed by the AU was denied in
a Resolution dated January 30, 1989 for having been filed out of time.cralaw:red
Hence, the herein
Petition for Certiorari filed
by the AU. On February 22, 1989, the Court dismissed the petition for
failure
to sufficiently show that respondent commission had committed a grave
abuse
of discretion in rendering its questioned judgment. A motion for
reconsideration
hereof was filed by petitioner to which respondents were required to
file
their comment. The desired comments having been submitted and the reply
thereto filed by petitioner, the Court finds a cogent basis to grant
the
motion for reconsideration. The Petition is based on the following
arguments:
SERVICE OF THE DECISION UPON THE
SECURITY
GUARD OF THE TOEFEMI BUILDING, WHERE RESPONDENT'S FORMER COUNSEL USED
TO
HOLD OFFICE, IS INEFFECTIVE AND DOES NOT CAUSE THE RUNNING OF THE
10-DAY
PERIOD FOR AN APPEAL.BASED ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE,
THE
SUBJECT
DECISION PROMULGATED ON 30 SEPTEMBER 1988 IS CONTRARY TO THE DOCTRINE
LAID
DOWN IN CEBU INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY ET AL. VS. HON. BLAS OPLE, ET
AL.
On the first
issue, it appears that the Decision
of the NLRC dated September 30, 1988 was served to the office of the
counsel
for petitioner on October 11, 1988 through the security guard of the
building.
The office of then counsel for petitioner, Atty. Andres Narvasa [now
member
of this Court] was located at the Toefemi building. The copy of the
Decision
was addressed to Atty. Roberto I. Santos of said law office. However,
at
the time of said service, the said law office was already dissolved as
Atty. Narvasa was appointed as a member of this Court. Nevertheless, a
copy of said Decision was transmitted by the former office of now Mr.
Justice
Narvasa to the present counsel of record for petitioner on November 5,
1988 who promptly filed a motion for reconsideration on November 15,
1988.cralaw:red
In denying the
motion for reconsideration, the
NLRC observed that the former counsel of petitioner did not withdraw
nor
file a manifestation that his office had been dissolved so he cannot
continue
to act as counsel thereof. Thus, the question that arises is
whether
the service of the copy of the Decision upon the security guard of the
building where the former office of petitioner's counsel was located
was
sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law. Section 4, Rule
13 of the Rules of Court which is suppletory to the rules of the NLRC,
provides as follows:
Section 4. Personal Service. -
Service
of the papers may be made by delivering personally a copy to the party
or his attorney, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk or with
a person having charge thereof. If no person is found in his office, or
his office is not known, then by leaving the copy, between the hours of
eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the party's or
attomey's
residence, if known, with a person of sufficient discretion to receive
the same. [Emphasis supplied].
Under the
foregoing rule, service of papers should
be delivered personally to the party or attorney or by leaving it at
his
office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. The
service
of the court's order upon any person other than the party's counsel is
not legally effective.[1]
Where the copy of the decision is served on a person who is neither a
clerk
or one in charge of the attorney's office, such service is invalid and
the decision does not, therefore, become executory.[2]
The security guard of the building where the attorney is holding office
is neither the office clerk nor a person in charge thereof as
contemplated
in the rules. In PLDT vs. NLRC,[3]
this Court ruled that the service of the decision at the ground floor
of
a party's building when the office is at the 9th floor is not a valid
service.
From the
foregoing, it is clear that the service
of the decision dated October 11, 1988 on the security guard of the
building
where the then counsel for petitioner was holding office was an invalid
service and the running of the period within which to appeal therefrom
or file a motion for reconsideration cannot be deemed to commence
thereby.cralaw:red
While it is true
that said former counsel of petitioner
failed to withdraw his appearance, the NLRC can take judicial notice of
the fact that Mr. Justice Narvasa was already elevated to the Supreme
Court
at the time the decision in this case was promulgated. Since its
decisions
are reviewable by the Supreme Court, such matter of public knowledge
should
be within the judicial notice of the NLRC because of the nature of
their
functions.[4]
On the second
issue, the order of respondent NLRC
to petitioner to remit to the respondent AUFEA the sum of P1,298,160.00
representing its 60% share in the increment tuition fees collected for
the school year 1983-1984 is predicated on the argument that: [1] MECS
Order No. 25 took effect on April 1, 1985 and prior thereto, this Court
has ruled that the 60% incremental proceeds should be applied to the
basic
salaries and wages; and [2] inasmuch as the CBA was concluded two (2)
days
after petitioner was granted the authority to increase its tuition
fees,
it does not necessarily follow that the parties intended that the CBA
benefits
will be taken from the said incremental proceeds.cralaw:red
We disagree.cralaw:red
In the case of
Cebu Institute of Technology vs.
Hon. Blas Ople,[5]
this Court ruled that P. D. No. 451 was repealed by B. P. 232 effective
September 11, 1982. From the said date, the governing law on the
disposition of the 60% incremental proceeds on the tuition fees are the
appropriate provisions of B. P. Blg. 232, which, in pertinent part,
provides
as follows:
Not less than sixty [60] percent of the
incremental
tuition proceeds shall be used for salaries or wages, allowances and
fringe
benefits of faculty and support staff, including cost of living
allowance,
imputed costs of contributed services, thirteenth [13th] month pay,
retirement
fund contributions, social security, medicare, unpaid school personnel
claims, and payment as may be prescribed by mandated wage orders, collective
bargaining agreements and voluntary employer practices xxx
[Sec.
42; Italics supplied].
Accordingly, as
of September 11, 1982, Section 3[a]
of P. D. 451 which limits the disposition of said 60% incremental
proceeds
increase in tuition fees to those of salaries and wages is deemed
abrogated
by way of repeal.[6]
Indeed even prior thereto, this Court ruled in the University of the
East
vs. UE Faculty Association[7]
as follows:
We are underscoring such modification
because
as We see it, it settles the second main issue. We have stated at the
outset
as to whether or not increase of salaries of wages or allowances or
benefits
secured by collective bargaining may be charged against the incremental
proceeds [60%] under P. D. 451. We read the latest
Malacañang
decision to mean that increase of salaries even those secured bv
collective
bargaining may be charged to the 60% incremental proceeds of MEC
authorized
tuition fee increases. xxx [Italics supplied].
MECS Order No.
25 finds legal support in B. P. Blg.
232, otherwise known as the Educational Act of 1982 as said MECS Order
is an implementing administrative rule interpretative of a pre-existing
statute and not declarative of certain rights with obligation
thereunder.
The same should be given retroactive effect and its effectivity should
be on September 11, 1982, which is the date of effectivity of B. P.
Blg.
232, not April 1, 1985. Remedial or curative statutes are by nature
intended
to be retroactive.[8]
And this is as it
should be as rules and regulations
are and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect a
general
provision of the law.[9]
Thus, guided by the Cebu Institute of Technology which
declared
the automatic repeal of P. D. 451, respondent NLRC committed a grave
error
in ruling that petitioner cannot charge to the 60% incremental proceeds
the items under paragraph 7.4 of the MECS Order No. 25 including
collective
bargaining.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the
motion for reconsideration is granted
and the Resolution of February 22, 1989 is set aside; the petition is
granted
so that the questioned Decision of the NLRC dated September 30, 1988
and
its Resolution dated January 20, 1989 are hereby reversed and set aside
while the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated March 31, 1986 dismissing
the complaint for lack of merit is hereby affirmed without
pronouncement
as to costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Cruz,
Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ.,
concur.
Narvasa, J., no part.cralaw:red
___________________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Vecino vs. Court of Appeals, 76 SCRA 98 [1977].
[2]
Tuazon et al. vs. Molina et al., 103 SCRA 365 [1981].
[3]
128 SCRA 402 [1984].
[4]Section 1, Rule 129, Rules of Court.
[5]
156 SCRA 629 [1987].
[6]
Lichauco & Company, Inc. vs. Silverio Apostol, et al., 44 Phil. 138
[1922] and Compania General de Tabacos vs. Collector of Customs 46
Phils.
8 [1982].
[7]
117 SCRA 554 [1982].
[8]
Victorias Milling, Inc. vs. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555
[1962].
[9]
U.S. vs. Molina, 29 Phil. 119 [1914]; People vs, santos 63 Phil. 300
[1936]. |