EN
BANC
BRENT
SCHOOL, INC., AND REV. GABRIEL
DIMACHE,
Petitioners,
G. R. No. L-48494
February 5, 1990
-versus-
RONALDO
ZAMORA, Presidential Assistant for
Legal Affairs,
Office of the President and DOROTEO R.
ALEGRE,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
NARVASA, J.:
The question
presented by the proceedings at
bar [1]is whether or not the
provisions
of the Labor Code,[2]
as amended,[3]
have anathematized "fixed period employment" or employment for a term.
The root of the controversy at bar is an
employment
contract in virtue of which Doroteo R. Alegre was engaged as athletic
director
by Brent School, Inc. at a yearly compensation of P20,000.00.[4]
The contract fixed a specific term for its existence, five [5] years,
i.e., from July 18, 1971, the date of execution of the agreement,
to
July 17, 1976. Subsequent subsidiary agreements dated March 15, 1973,
August
28, 1973, and September 14, 1974 reiterated the same terms and
conditions,
including the expiry date, as those contained in the original contract
of July 18, 1971.[5]
Some three months
before the expiration of the
stipulated period, or more precisely on April 20,1976, Alegre was given
a copy of the report filed by Brent School with the Department of Labor
advising of the termination of his services effective on July 16, 1976.
The stated ground for the termination was "completion of contract,
expiration
of the definite period of employment." And a month or so later, on May
26, 1976, Alegre accepted the amount of P3,177.71, and signed a receipt
therefor containing the phrase, "in full payment of services for the
period
May 16, to July 17, 1976 as full payment of contract."
However, at the
investigation conducted by a Labor
Conciliator of said report of termination of his services, Alegre
protested
the announced termination of his employment. He argued that although
his
contract did stipulate that the same would terminate on July 17, 1976,
since his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business
of
his employer, and his employment had lasted for five years, he had
acquired
the status of a regular employee and could not be removed except for
valid
cause.[6]
The Regional Director considered Brent School's report as an
application
for clearance to terminate employment [not a report of termination],
and
accepting the recommendation of the Labor Conciliator, refused to give
such clearance and instead required the reinstatement of Alegre, as a
"permanent
employee," to his former position without loss of seniority rights and
with full back wages. The Director pronounced "the ground relied upon
by
the respondent [Brent] in terminating the services of the complainant
[Alegre]
as not sanctioned by P. D. 442," and, quite oddly, as prohibited by
Circular
No. 8, Series of 1969, of the Bureau of Private Schools.[7]
Brent School
filed a motion for reconsideration.
The Regional Director denied the motion and forwarded the case to the
Secretary
of Labor for review.[8]
The latter sustained the Regional Director.[9]
Brent appealed to the Office of the President. Again it was rebuffed.
That
Office dismissed its appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the Labor
Secretary's
decision, ruling that Alegre was a permanent employee who could not be
dismissed except for just cause, and expiration of the employment
contract
was not one of the just causes provided in the Labor Code for
termination
of services.[10]
The School is now
before this Court in a last
attempt at vindication. That it will get here. The employment contract
between Brent School and Alegre was executed on July 18, 1971, at a
time
when the Labor Code of the Philippines [P. D. 442] had not yet been
promulgated.
Indeed, the Code did not come into effect until November 1, 1974, some
three years after the perfection of the employment contract, and rights
and obligations thereunder had arisen and been mutually observed and
enforced.cralaw:red
At that time, i.e.,
before the advent of
the Labor Code, there was no doubt whatever about the validity of term
employment. It was impliedly but nonetheless clearly recognized by the
Termination Pay Law, R. A. 1052,[11]
as amended by R. A. 1787.[12]
Basically, this statute provided that
In cases of employment, without a
definite
period,
in a commercial, industrial, or agricultural establishment or
enterprise,
the employer or the employee may terminate at any time the employment
with
just cause; or without just cause in the case of an employee by serving
written notice on the employer at least one month in advance, or in the
case of an employer, by serving such notice to the employee at least
one
month in advance or one-half month for every year of service of the
employee,
whichever is longer, a fraction of at least six months being considered
as one whole year.
The employer, upon whom no such notice
was
served
in case of termination of employment without just cause, may hold the
employee
liable for damages.
The employee, upon whom no such notice
was
served
in case of termination of employment without just cause, shall be
entitled
to compensation from the date of termination of his employment in an
amount
equivalent to his salaries or wages corresponding to the required
period
of notice.
There was, to
repeat, clear albeit implied recognition
of the licitness of term employment. R. A. 1787 also enumerated what it
considered to be just causes for terminating an employment without a
definite
period, either by the employer or by the employee without incurring any
liability therefor. Prior, thereto, it was the Code of Commerce which
governed
employment without a fixed period, and also implicitly acknowledged the
propriety of employment with a fixed period. Its Article 302 provided
that
In cases in which the contract of
employment
does not have a fixed period, any of the parties may terminate it,
notifying
the other thereof one month in advance. The factor or shop clerk shall
have a right, in this case, to the salary corresponding to said month.
The salary for
the month directed to be given by
the said Article 302 of the Code of Commerce to the factor or shop
clerk,
was known as the mesada [from mes, Spanish for "month"].
When Article 302 [together with many other provisions of the Code of
Commerce]
was repealed by the Civil Code of the Philippines, Republic Act No.
1052
was enacted avowedly for the precise purpose of reinstating the mesada.
Now, the Civil
Code of the Philippines, which
was approved on June 18, 1949 and became effective on August 30,1950,
itself
deals with obligations with a period in Section 2, Chapter 3, Title I,
Book IV; and with contracts of labor and for a piece of work, in
Sections
2 and 3, Chapter 3, Title VIII, respectively, of Book IV. No
prohibition
against term or fixed-period employment is contained in any of its
articles
or is otherwise deducible therefrom.cralaw:red
It is plain then
that when the employment contract
was signed between Brent School and Alegre on July 18, 1971, it was
perfectly
legitimate for them to include in it a stipulation fixing the duration
thereof. Stipulations for a term were explicitly recognized as
valid
by this Court, for instance, in Biboso v. Victorias Milling Co., Inc.,
promulgated on March 31, 1977,[13]
and J. Walter Thompson Co. (Phil.) v. NLRC, promulgated on December 29,
1983.[14]
The Thompson case involved an executive who had been engaged for a
fixed
period of three [3] years. Biboso involved teachers in a private school
as regards whom, the following pronouncement was made:
What is decisive is that petitioners
(teachers)
were well aware an the time that their tenure was for a limited
duration.
Upon its termination, both parties to the employment relationship were
free to renew it or to let it lapse. [p. 254].
Under American
law[15]
the principle is the same. "Where a contract specifies the period of
its
duration, it terminates on the expiration of such period."[16]
"A contract of employment for a definite period terminates by its own
terms
at the end of such period."[17] The status of legitimacy
continued
to be enjoyed by fixed-period employment contracts under the Labor Code
[Presidential Decree No. 442], which went into effect on November 1,
1974.
The Code contained explicit references to fixed period employment, or
employment
with a fixed or definite period. Nevertheless, obscuration of the
principle
of licitness of term employment began to take place at about this time.
Article 320,
entitled "Probationary and fixed
period employment," originally stated that the "termination of
employment
of probationary employees and those employed with a fixed period shall
be subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may
prescribe."
The asserted objective was to "prevent the circumvention of the right
of
the employee to be secured in their employment as provided in the Code."
Article 321 prescribed the just causes for
which
an employer could terminate "an employment without a definite period."
And Article 319 undertook to define "employment without a fixed period"
in the following manner:[18]
An employment shall be deemed to be
without a
definite period for purposes of this Chapter where the employee has
been
engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable
in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the
employment
has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement
of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is
seasonal
in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
The question
immediately provoked by a reading of
Article 319 is whether or not a voluntary agreement on a fixed term or
period would be valid where the employee "has been engaged to perform
activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade
of the employer." The definition seems a non sequitur. From the
premise that the duties of an employee entail "activities which are
usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer"
the conclusion does not necessarily follow that the employer and
employee
should be forbidden to stipulate any period of time for the performance
of those activities. There is nothing essentially contradictory between
a definite period of an employment contract and the nature of the
employee's
duties set down in that contract as being "usually necessary or
desirable
in the usual business or trade of the employer." The concept of the
employee's
duties as being "usually necessary or desirable in the usual business
or
trade of the employer" is not synonymous with, or identical to,
employment
with a fixed term. Logically, the decisive determinant in term
employment
should not be the activities that the employee is called upon to
perform,
but the day certain agreed upon by the parties for the commencement and
termination of their employment relationship, a "day certain" being
understood
to be "that which must necessarily come, although it may not be known
when."[19]
Seasonal employment and employment for a particular project are merely
instances of employment in which a period, where not expressly set
down,
necessarily implied.
Of course, the
term "period" has a definite and
settled signification. It means, "Length of existence; duration. A
point
of time marking a termination as of a cause or an activity; an end, a
limit,
a bound; conclusion; termination. A series of years, months or days in
which something is completed. A time of definite length, the period
from
one fixed date to another fixed date."[20]
It connotes a "space of time which has an influence on an obligation as
a result of a juridical act, and either suspends its demandableness or
produces its extinguishment."[21]
It should be apparent that this settled and familiar notion of a
period,
in the context of a contract of employment, takes no account at all of
the nature of the duties of the employee; it has absolutely no
relevance
to the character of his duties as being "usually necessary or desirable
to the usual business of the employer," or not.cralaw:red
Subsequently, the
foregoing articles regarding
employment with "a definite period" and "regular" employment were
amended
by Presidential Decree No. 850, effective December 16, 1975.
Article 320, dealing with "probationary and fixed
period employment," was altered by eliminating the reference to persons
"employed with a fixed period" and was renumbered [becoming Article
271].
The Article[22]
now reads:
Probationary employment. - Probationary
employment shall not exceed six months from the date the employee
started
working, unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement
stipulating
a longer period. The services of an employee who has been engaged in a
probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails
to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable
standards
made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his
engagement.
An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be
considered a regular employee.
Also amended by
P. D. 850 was Article 319 [entitled
"Employment with a fixed period," supra] by (a) deleting
mention
of employment with a fixed or definite period; (b) adding a general
exclusion
clause declaring irrelevant written or oral agreements "to the
contrary";
and (c) making the provision treat exclusively of "regular" and
"casual"
employment. As revised, said article, renumbered 270,[23]
now reads:
Regular and Casual Employment.- The
provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and
regardless
of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to
be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities
which
are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of
the
employer except where the employment has been fixed for a specific
project
or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been
determined
at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or
service
to be employed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the
duration
of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to he
casual if
it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: provided, that, any
employee
who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is
continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with
respect
to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall
continue
while such actually exists.
The first
paragraph is identical to Article 319 except
that, as just mentioned, a clause has been added, to wit: "The
provisions
of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of
the oral agreements of the parties." The clause would appear to be
addressed
inter alia to agreements fixing a definite period for employment. There
is withal no clear indication of the intent to deny validity to
employment
for a definite period. Indeed, not only is the concept of regular
employment
not essentially inconsistent with employment for a fixed term, as above
pointed out, Article 272 of the Labor Code, as amended by said P. D.
850,
still impliedly acknowledged the propriety of term employment: it
listed
the "just causes" for which "an employer may terminate employment
without
a definite period," thus giving rise to the inference that if the
employment
be with a definite period, there need be no just cause for termination
thereof if the ground be precisely the expiration of the term agreed
upon
by the parties for the duration of such employment.
Still later,
however, said Article 272 [formerly
Article 321] was further amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 130,[24]
to eliminate altogether reference to employment without a definite
period.
As lastly amended, the opening lines of the Article [renumbered 283],
now
pertinently read: "An employer may terminate an employment for any of
the
following just causes." B. P. 130 thus, completed the elimination of
every
reference in the Labor Code, express or implied, to employment with a
fixed
or definite period or term.cralaw:red
It is in the
light of the foregoing description
of the development of the provisions of the Labor Code bearing on term
or fixed-period employment that the question posed in the opening
paragraph
of this opinion should now be addressed. Is it then the legislative
intention
to outlaw stipulations in employment contracts laying down a definite
period
therefor? Are such stipulations in essence contrary to public policy
and
should not on this account be accorded legitimacy? On the one hand,
there
is the gradual and progressive elimination of references to term or
fixed-period
employment in the Labor Code, and the specific statement of the rule[25]
that:
Regular and Casual Employment. -
The
provisions
of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of
the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be
regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which
are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of
the
employer except where the employment has been fixed for a specific
project
or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been
determined
at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or
service
to be employed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the
duration
of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be
casual if
it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: provided, that, any
employee
who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is
continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with
respect
to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall
continue
while such actually exists.
There is, on
the other hand, the Civil Code, which
has always recognized, and continues to recognize, the validity and
propriety
of contracts and obligations with a fixed or definite period, and
imposes
no restraints on the freedom of the parties to fix the duration of a
contract,
whatever its object, be it specie, goods or services, except the
general
admonition against stipulations contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy.[26]
Under the Civil Code, therefore, and as a general proposition,
fixed-term
employment contracts are not limited, as they are under the present
Labor
Code, to those by nature seasonal or for specific projects with
pre-determined
dates of completion; they also include those to which the parties by
free
choice have assigned a specific date of termination.
Some familiar
examples may be cited of employment
contracts which may be neither for seasonal work nor for specific
projects,
but to which a fixed term is an essential and natural appurtenance:
overseas
employment contracts, for one, to which, whatever the nature of the
engagement,
the concept of regular employment will all that it implies does not
appear
ever to have been applied, Article 280 of the Labor Code not
withstanding;
also appointments to the positions of dean, assistant dean, college
secretary,
principal, and other administrative offices in educational
institutions,
which are by practice or tradition rotated among the faculty members,
and
where fixed terms are a necessity, without which no reasonable rotation
would be possible. Similarly, despite the provisions of Article 280,
Policy,
Instructions No. 8 of the Minister of Labor[27]
implicitly recognize that certain company officials may be elected for
what would amount to fixed periods, at the expiration of which they
would
have to stand down, in providing that these officials", may lose their
jobs as president, executive vice-president or vice-president, etc.
because
the stockholders or the board of directors for one reason or another
did
not re-elect them."
There can of
course be no quarrel with the proposition
that where from the circumstances it is apparent that periods have been
imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee,
they
should be struck down or disregarded as contrary to public policy,
morals,
etc. But where no such intent to circumvent the law is shown, or stated
otherwise, where the reason for the law does not exist, e.g.,
where
it is indeed the employee himself who insists upon a period or where
the
nature of the engagement is such that, without being seasonal or for a
specific project, a definite date of termination is a sine qua non,
would
an agreement fixing a period be essentially evil or illicit, therefore
anathema? Would such an agreement come within the scope of Article 280
which admittedly was enacted "to prevent the circumvention of the right
of the employee to be secured in his employment?"
As it is evident
from even only the three examples
already given that Article 280 of the Labor Code, under a narrow and
literal
interpretation, not only fails to exhaust the gamut of employment
contracts
to which the lack of a fixed period would be an anomaly, but would also
appear to restrict, without reasonable distinctions, the right of an
employee
to freely stipulate with his employer the duration of his engagement,
it
logically follows that such a literal interpretation should be eschewed
or avoided. The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to
preclude
absurdity in its application. Outlawing the whole concept of term
employment
and subverting to boot the principle of freedom of contract to remedy
the
evil of employer's using it as a means to prevent their employees from
obtaining security of tenure is like cutting off the nose to spite the
face or, more relevantly, curing a headache by lopping off the head.cralaw:red
It is a salutary
principle in statutory construction
that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences
were
never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of
which
the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable,
mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences.[28] Nothing is better settled
than
that courts are not to give words a meaning which would lead to absurd
or unreasonable consequences. That is a principle that goes back to In
re Allen decided on October 27, 1903, where it was held that a
literal
interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to
absurd
results. That is a strong argument against its adoption. The words of
Justice
Laurel are particularly apt. Thus: "The fact that the construction
placed
upon the statute by the appellants would lead to an absurdity is
another
argument for rejecting it."[29]
We have, here,
then a case where the true intent
of the law is clear that calls for the application of the cardinal rule
of statutory construction that such intent or spirit must prevail over
the letter thereof, for whatever is within the spirit of a statute is
within
the statute since adherence to the letter would result in absurdity,
injustice
and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the
statute.[30]
Accordingly, and
since the entire purpose behind
the development of legislation culminating in the present Article 280
of
the Labor Code clearly appears to have been, as already observed, to
prevent
circumvention of the employee's right to be secure in his tenure, the
clause
in said Article indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written
or oral agreements conflicting with the concept of regular employment
as
defined therein, should be construed to refer to the substantive evil
that
the Code itself has singled out: agreements entered into precisely to
circumvent
security of tenure. It should have no application to instances where a
fixed period of employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by
the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being
brought
to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating
his consent, or where it satisfactorily appears that the employer and
employee
dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral
dominance
whatever being exercised by the former over the latter. Unless, thus,
limited
in its purview, the law would be made to apply to purposes other than
those
explicitly stated by its framers; it thus becomes pointless and
arbitrary,
unjust in its effects and apt to lead to absurd and unintended
consequences.cralaw:red
Such
interpretation puts the seal on Bibiso[31]
upon the effect of the expiry of an agreed period of employment as
still
a good rule as reaffirmed in the recent case of Escudero vs. Office of
the President [G. R. No. 57822, April 26, 1989] where, in the fairly
analogous
case of a teacher being served by her school a notice of termination
following
the expiration of the last of three successive fixed-term employment
contracts,
the Court held:
Reyes [the teacher's] argument is not
persuasive.
It loses sight of the fact that her employment was probationary,
contractual
in nature, and one with a definitive period. At the expiration of the
period
stipulated in the contract, her appointment was deemed terminated and
the
letter informing her of the non-renewal of her contract is not a
condition sine qua non before Reyes may be deemed to have
ceased in the
employ
of petitioner UST. The notice is a mere reminder that Reyes' contract
of
employment was due to expire and that the contract would no longer be
renewed.
It is not a letter of termination. The interpretation that the notice
is
only a reminder is consistent with the court's finding in Labajo, supra.[32]
Paraphrasing
Escudero, respondent Alegre's employment
was terminated upon the expiration of his last contract with Brent
School
on July 16, 1976 without the necessity of any notice. The advance
written
advice given the Department of Labor with copy to said petitioner was a
mere reminder of the impending expiration of his contract, not a letter
of termination, nor an application for clearance to terminate which
needed
the approval of the Department of Labor to make the termination of his
services effective. In any case, such clearance should properly have
been
given, not denied.
WHEREFORE, the
public respondent's Decision complained
of is reversed and set aside. Respondent Alegre's contract of
employment
with Brent School having lawfully terminated with and by reason of the
expiration of the agreed term of period thereof, he is declared not
entitled
to reinstatement and to the other relief awarded and confirmed on
appeal
in the proceedings below. No pronouncement as to costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortés,
Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado,
JJ.
, concur.
Fernan, C.J.,
took no part.
Separate
Opinion
SARMIENTO, J.,
Concurring and Dissenting:
I am agreed
that the Labor Code has not foresaken
"term employments" held valid in Biboso V. Victorias Milling Company,
Inc.
[No. L-44360, March 31, 1977, 76 SCRA 250]That, notwithstanding, I
can
not liken employment contracts to ordinary civil contracts in which the
relationship is established by stipulations agreed upon. Under the very
Civil Code:
Art. 1700. The relations between capital
and
labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with public
interest
that labor contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions,
collective
bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working
conditions,
hours of labor and similar subjects.
Art. 1702. In case of doubt, all labor
legislation
and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and
decent
living for the laborer.
The courts (or
labor officials) should nevertheless
be vigilant as to whether or not the termination of the employment
contract
is done by reason of expiration of the period or to cheat the employee
out of office. The latter amounts to circumvention of the law.
_________________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Commenced by Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, Rules of Court
since,
as petitioners point out, "Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, and
its implementing Rules and Regulations [in force at the time] do not
provide
for an appeal from the decision of the President of the Philippines" in
labor cases.
[2]
P. D. 442, eff. Nov. 1, 1974.
[3]
By, inter alia, P.D. 850, eff. Dec. 16, 1975, and B.P. 130, eff. Aug.
21,
1981.
[4]
Rollo, p. 38, Annex A, Petition for Review.
[5]
Petition for Review, Annexes D, B and C, Rollo, pp. 39-40.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 40-41, Re-Report of Termination, etc., Application for
Clearance
No. 2137, Annex D, Petition for Review.
[7]
Id., p. 41. The circular is addressed "To Heads of all Chinese Schools"
and entitled "Standardization of Salaries and Stabilizations of
Positions
in Chinese Schools."
[8]
Id., p. 44, Annex F, Petition.
[9]
Id., p. 45, Annex G, Petition.
[10]
Id., pp. 6-10, Decision of the Presidential Assistant for Legal
Affairs,
O. P. Case No. 0308, Case No. 2137, June 13, 1978.
[11]
Eff. June 12, 1954.
[12]
Eff. June 21, 1957.
[13]
76 SCRA 250.
[14]
126 SCRA 458.
[15]
American law is the source of much of our own labor legislation. R. A.
No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act, the bulk of the
provisions
of which have been incorporated in the Labor Code, was based on U.S.
statutes:
the National Labor Relations Act, the Taft-Hartley Labor Act, etc.
[16]
17 Am Jur 2d 411, footnoting omitted.
[17]
56 C.J.S., 74-75, footnoting omitted.
[18]
Emphasis supplied.
[19]
Article 1193 [Third Paragraph], Civil Code.
[20]
Capiral v. Manila Electric Co., 119 Phil. 124, cited in Philippine Law
Dictionary, Moreno, 3d ed.
[21]
Op. cit., citing Lirag Textile Mills Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 63 SCRA
382.
[22]
Subsequently renumbered Article 281 by B.P. Blg. 130, eff. Aug 21, 1981.
[23]
And still later renumbered Art. 280 by B. P. Big. 130, supra; Emphasis
supplied.
[24]
Eff. Aug 21, 1981.
[25]
Article 280 [formerly Art. 270 (and initially, Art. 319)], Labor Code;
emphasis supplied.
[26]
Art. l306, Civil Code.
[27]
Promulgated April 26, 1976, more than four months after the issuance of
P. D. 850.
[28]
People vs. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542, 561.
[29]
Automotive Parts & Equipment Co., Inc. vs. Lingad, 30 SCRA 248,
255,
citing cases; Footnotes omitted.
[30]
Hidalgo vs. Hidalgo 33 SCRA 105,115.
[31]
Supra, p. 4
[32]
Referring to Labajo vs. Alejandro, G. R. No. 80383, September 26, 1988,
pp. 10-11. |