FIRST
DIVISION
HEIRS OF JACOBO BOLUS,Namely JAKE B. BOLUS,ELIZABETH BOLUS-NERI,RICARDO B. BOLUS,EMMANUEL B. BOLUS,CORAZON BOLUS,CARLITO BOLUSand ROMEO BOLUS,
Petitioners, |
G. R. No. 107036
February 9, 1993
-versus-
THE
COURT OF APPEALSand SPOUSES RICARDO
and GLICERIA JIMENEZ,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
CRUZ, J.:
The spouses
Ricardo and Gliceria Jimenez filed
an action for ejectment in the Municipal Trial Court of Metro Manila
against
the heirs of Jacobo Bolus, the original lessee, on the ground of
non-payment
of rentals and unauthorized sub-leasing.
In their answer,
the defendants argued inter alia
that the court had no jurisdiction over the case as the ownership of
the
leased premises by the plaintiffs was in issue: there was no cause of
action
because the lessees had in fact made prior consignation of the claimed
rentals; and the action was premature for non-compliance with P. D.
1508.cralaw:red
The trial court,
brushing aside the challenge
to its jurisdiction held that the issue to be decided was not ownership
but possession of the subject property. It then proceeded to declare,
on
the basis of the evidence before it, that the defendants had indeed
defaulted
in the payment of the rentals from 1988 to 1991.cralaw:red
The decision
nevertheless did not order the ejectment
of the defendants in view of the valuable improvements they had made on
the property. Applying Article 1687 of the Civil Code, Judge Francisco
D. Villanueva allowed the defendants to stay for two more years in the
subject property to enable them to look for another place to transfer
and
to recover the substantial amounts they had spent for the improvements
they had made on the land. At the same time, however, he increased the
rentals from P100.00 to P3,000.00 a month.[1]
The decision was
appealed by the defendants to
and affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Metro Manila, which agreed
with the court a quo that they had not really paid rentals from 1988 to
1991 and deposited their arrearages only after the decision of the
Municipal
Trial Court was rendered on June 5, 1991. At that, the deposit was made
only in the form of a supersedeas bond for the purpose of staying the
immediate
execution of the appealed decision.[2]
Judge Oscar L.
Leviste did not discuss the validity
of the increased rental but deleted the two-year extension of the
lease.
His reason was that extension of the lease pursuant to Article 1687 was
not allowed if the ground for ejectment was non-payment of rentals.[3]
The petitioners
appealed to the respondent court,
again raising the issue of jurisdiction as well as the validity of the
increased rental. They also questioned the revocation of the two-year
extension
of the lease. The Court of Appeals upheld the Regional Trial Court in a
decision dated April 30, 1992,[4]
and denied their motion for reconsideration on September 2, 1992.[5]
In the present
petition, the respondent court
is faulted for sustaining the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Court;
for finding that the defendants were in default in the payment of their
rentals; for approving the increase of their rentals to P3,000.00; and
for disauthorizing the two-year extension of their lease.
These are our rulings.cralaw:red
On the issue of
jurisdiction, the firmly settled
principle is that a municipal court has jurisdiction over forcible
entry
or unlawful detainer cases even if the question of the ownership of the
property is raised by the defendant.[6]
The exception is where the question of title is so involved in the
ejectment
case that it cannot be decided unless the title to the property is
first
ascertained.[7]
That situation
does not obtain in the present
case. In fact, the defendants do not even claim the leased property and
invoke only a right of pre-emption thereto under P. D. 1508. That is
only
an inchoate right that has yet to be perfected. Moreover, they have
acknowledged
their status as mere lessees and their obligation to pay their accrued
rentals to the private respondents. They have done this not only
expressly
in their pleadings[8]
but also by their act of consigning the said rentals before and after
the
period from 1984 to 1988.[9]
The question of
default is factual and was decided
by all the three courts below against the defendants. Their findings
are
conclusive on this Court, there being no satisfactory showing that they
were reached arbitrarily or without basis.cralaw:red
Regarding the
extension of the period of the lease,
the view that this could not be granted because the defendants were in
default in their rentals is not supported by law or doctrine. There is
no such prohibition in Article 1687, which reads in full as follows:
Art. 1687. If the period for the lease
has
not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent
agreed
upon is annual, from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to
week,
if the rent as weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid
daily.
However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and no period for the
lease
has been set, the courts may fix a longer term for the lease after the
lessee has occupied the premises for over one year. If the rent is
weekly,
the courts may likewise determine a longer period after the lessee has
been in possession for over six months. In case of daily rent, the
courts
may also fix a longer period after the lessee has stayed in the place
for
over one month.
We sustained
such an extension in the case of Divino
v. Marcos[10]
although non-payment of rentals was the ground invoked for the
ejectment
of the lessees. Through Mr. Justice Jose Ma. Paredes, this Court
observed:
The lot in question has been rented to
the
petitioner
for about 20 years and his predecessor- in-interest for more. Even
though
rentals had been paid monthly, still no period for the duration of the
lease had been set. The lease had been consistently and tacitly renewed
["tacita reconduccion"] until the ejectment case was filed [Co
Tiam
v. Diaz, 75 Phil. 672; Villanueva v. Canlas, 77 Phil. 381; Art. 1670,
N.C.C.;
Art. 1566, Old Civil Code]. Having made substantial or additional
improvements
on the lot, and considering the difficulty of looking for another place
to which petitioner could transfer such improvements, and the length of
his occupancy of the lot [since 1936], and the impression acquired by
him
that he could stay on the premises, as long as he could pay the
rentals,
it would seem that there exists just grounds for granting the extension
of lease and that the extension of two years granted by the trial
court,
is both fair and equitable.
The petitioners
herein are in a similar situation
as they have been leasing the property since 1979 and, as observed by
the
lower courts , have introduced valuable improvements thereon. The Court
also notes that the validity of the extension was not appealed by the
private
respondents, who thereby accepted the same. The issue was not even
raised
by the petitioners in their appeal. We now come to the increase of the
monthly rental by the Metropolitan Trial Court from P100.00 a month to
P3,000.00.
Since the
stipulated rental was P100.00 per month,
any increase thereof should be in accordance with B. P. 25, the
original
law regulating the rentals of dwelling units and lots, and all the
succeeding
amendatory laws. B. P. 25, which was applicable to all residential
units
with monthly rentals not exceeding P300.00, provided that such rentals
could not be increased by more than 10% every year. It had an initial
duration
of five years from 1979 but its effectivity was extended to June 1985
by
B. P. 267, and again extended to December 1987 by B. P. 877, with the
following
authorized rates of increase:
Period
Max. Increase
July 1, 1985 to Dec. 31,
1985
10%
Jan. 1, 1986 to Dec. 31,
1986
20%
Jan. 1, 1987 to Dec. 31,
1987
20%
On January 1,
1988, the effectivity of B. P. 877
was extended to December 31, 1989, by R. A. 6643, which provided a
maximum
increase also of 20%. Another extension on the same terms was made for
3 more years or until December 31, 1991, by R. A. 6828. On January 1,
1993,
R. A. 7644 gave still another extension from January 1, 1993 to
December
31, 1997, but the maximum increase was retained at 20% per year.
Applying these
laws, We find the following monthly
rentals to be demandable from the petitioners for the years indicated:
The
Metropolitan Trial Court held, after resolving
the factual question of default, that the petitioners should start
paying
the new rentals from November 1990, when the complaint for ejectment
was
filed. Accordingly, they should pay the increased monthly rent of
P483.00
for November 1990 to December 31, 1990; P580.00 for January 1,1991 to
December
31, 1991; P696.00 for January 1, 1992 to December 13, 1992 and P835.50
for January 1, 1993 to 1993, with legal interest. The two-year
extension
of the lease is commuted from the date the decision of the Metropolitan
Trial Court became final as to the private respondents, who did not
appeal.
WHEREFORE, the
appealed decision is hereby affirmed
except as to the amount of the rentals to be paid by the petitioners,
which
should be computed in accordance with the discussion in the body of
this
opinion.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Padilla,
Griño-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ.,
concur.cralaw:red
____________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Rollo, pp. 37-42.
[2]
Ibid., pp. 43-45.
[3]
Id., p.45.
[4]
id., pp. 45-56.
[5]
id., p. 57.
[6]
Manlapaz v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 795 citing Lopez v. Santiago,
107
Phil. 668; De Gaerlan v. Martinez, 85 Phil 375; De la Cruz v. Burgos,
28
SCRA 977.
[7]
Luna v. Nable, 67 Phil. 340.
[8]
Annex B, Rollo, pp. 31, 32.
[9]
Rollo, p. 14.
[10]
4 SCRA 186. |