EN
BANC
ARTURO
M. TOLENTINO,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 115455
August 25, 1994
-versus-
THE
SECRETARY OF FINANCE
and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondents.
_____________________________________________
JUAN T.
DAVID,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 115525
August 25, 1994
-versus-
TEOFISTO
T. GUINGONA, JR., as Executive
Secretary,
ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, as Secretary of
Finance,
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, as Commissioner
of
Internal
Revenue and their Authorized Agents or
Representatives,
Respondents.
______________________________________________
RAUL S.
ROCO and the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Petitioners,
G. R. No. 115543
August 25, 1994
-versus-
THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF
INTERNAL
REVENUE
and THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS,
Respondents.
_____________________________________________________
PHILIPPINE
PRESS INSTITUTE, INC., EGP
PUBLISHING
CO., INC.,
PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC., JOSE L.
PAVIA,
and OFELIA L. DIMALANTA,
Petitioners,
G. R. No. 115544
August 25, 1994 -versus-
HON.
LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in Her Capacity as
Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, HON. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA,
JR., in His
Capacity as Executive Secretary and HON.
ROBERTO
B. DE OCAMPO,
in His Capacity as Secretary of Finance,
Respondents.
_____________________________________________________________
CHAMBER
OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS
ASSOCIATIONS,
INC.,
[CREBA],
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 115754
August 25, 1994
-versus-
THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent.
______________________________________________________________
KILOSBAYAN,
INC., JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO
A. RIGOS,
ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR.,
JOSE
T. APOLO,
EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE
ABCEDE,
CHRISTINE TAN, FELIPE L. GOZON, RAFAEL
G.
FERNANDO,
RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN,
QUINTIN
S. DOROMAL,
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY
AND NATIONALISM, INC. ["MABINI"],
FREEDOM
FROM DEBT
COALITION, INC., PHILIPPINE BIBLE
SOCIETY,
INC.chanrobles virtual law library
and WIGBERTO TAÑADA,
Petitioners,
G. R. No. 115781
August 25, 1994
-versus-
THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE,
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,
Respondents.
_______________________________________________________
PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES, INC.,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 115852
August 25, 1994
-versus-
THE
SECRETARY OF FINANCE
and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondents.
_______________________________________________________
COOPERATIVE
UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioners,
G. R. No. 115873
August 25, 1994
-versus-
HON.
LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in Her Capacity as
the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, HON. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA,
JR., in His
Capacity as Executive Secretary and HON.
ROBERTO
B. DE OCAMPO,
in His Capacity as Secretary of Finance,
Respondents.
_____________________________________________________________
PHILIPPINE
EDUCATIONAL PUBLISHERS
ASSOCIATION,
INC.chanrobles virtual law library
and ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE
BOOK-SELLERS,
Petitioners,
G. R. No. 115931
August 25, 1994
-versus-
HON.
ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, as the Secretary
of Finance,
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, as the
Commissioner
of Internal Revenue
and HON. GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR., in His
Capacity
as the
Commissioner of Customs,
Respondents.
______________________________________________________________
R
E S O L U T I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
The Value-Added
Tax [VAT] is levied on the sale,
barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or
exchange
of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or
gross
value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of
the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. Republic Act
No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and
enhance
its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.
These are various
suits for certiorari and prohibition
challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716 on various
grounds
summarized in the Resolution of July 6, 1994 of this Court, as follows:
I. Procedural Issues:
A. Does Republic Act No. 7716 violate
Art.
VI,
Section 24 of the Constitution?
B. Does it violate Art. VI, Section
26[2] of
the Constitution?
C. What is the extent of the power of
the
Bicameral
Conference Committee?
II. Substantive Issues:
A. Does the law violate the following
provisions
in the Bill of Rights [Art. III]?
1. Section1
2. Section 4
3. Section 5
4. Section 10
B. Does the law violate the following
other
provisions
of the Constitution?
1. Art. VI, Section 28[1]
2. Art. VI, Section 28[3]
These questions
will be dealt with in the order they
are stated above. As will presently be explained, not all of these
questions
are judicially cognizable because not all provisions of the
Constitution
are self-executing and, therefore, judicially enforceable. The other
departments
of the government are equally charged with the enforcement of the
Constitution
especially the provisions relating to them.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
The contention of
petitioners is that in enacting
Republic Act No. 7716 or the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, Congress
violated
the Constitution because, although H. No. 11197 had originated in the
House
of Representatives, it was not passed by the Senate but was simply
consolidated
with the Senate version [S. No. 1630] in the Conference Committee to
produce
the bill which the President signed into law. The following provisions
of the Constitution are cited in support of the proposition that
because
Republic Act No. 7716 was passed in this manner, it did not originate
in
the House of Representatives and it has not thereby become a law:
Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation,
revenue
or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills
of
local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
Id., Section 26[2]: No bill
passed
by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings
on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have
been
distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when
the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet
a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
It appears that
on various dates between July 22,
1992 and August 31, 1993, several bills[1]
were introduced in the House of Representatives seeking to amend
certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code relative to the
Value-Added
Tax or VAT. These bills were referred to the House Ways and Means
Committee
which recommended for approval a substitute measure, H. No. 11197,
entitled:
AN ACT
RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX [VAT]
SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING
FOR
THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 AND
110 OF TITLE IV, 112, 115 AND 116 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237 AND 238 OF
TITLE
IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113 AND 114 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED
The bill [H. No.
11197] was considered on second
reading starting November 6, 1993 and, on November 17, 1993, it was
approved
by the House of Representatives after third and final reading.
It was sent to the Senate on November 23,
1993
and later referred by that body to its Committee on Ways and Means.cralaw:red
On February 7,
1994, the Senate Committee submitted
its report recommending approval of S. No. 1630, entitled:
AN ACT
RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX [VAT]
SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING
FOR
THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, AND 110
OF TITLE IV, 112 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237, AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND
REPEALING
SECTIONS 113, 114 and 116 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE
CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
It was stated
that the bill was being submitted
"in substitution of Senate Bill No. 1129, taking into consideration
P.S.
Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197."
On February 8,
1994, the Senate began consideration
of the bill [S. No. 1630]. It finished debates on the bill and approved
it on second reading on March 24, 1994. On the same day, it approved
the
bill on third reading by the affirmative votes of 13 of its members,
with
one abstention. H. No. 11197 and
its
Senate version [S. No. 1630] were then referred to a conference
committee
which, after meeting four times [April 13, 19, 21 and 25, 1994],
recommended
that "House Bill No. 11197, in consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630,
be approved in accordance with the attached copy of the bill as
reconciled
and approved by the conferees."
The Conference
Committee bill, entitled: "AN
ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX
BASE
AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND
REPEALING
THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS
AMENDED,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," was thereafter approved by the House of
Representatives
on April 27, 1994 and by the Senate on May 2, 1994. The enrolled bill
was
then presented to the President of the Philippines who, on May 5, 1994,
signed it. It became Republic Act No. 7716. On May 12, 1994, Republic
Act
No. 7716 was published in two newspapers of general circulation and, on
May 28, 1994, it took effect, although its implementation was suspended
until June 30, 1994 to allow time for the registration of business
entities.
It would have been enforced on July 1, 1994 but its enforcement was
stopped
because this Court, by the vote of 11 to 4 of its members, granted a
temporary
restraining order on June 30, 1994.cralaw:red
First.
Petitioners' contention is
that Republic Act No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House
of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Section 24 of the
Constitution,
because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of two distinct
bills,
H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. In this connection, petitioners point out
that although Art. VI, SS 24 was adopted from the American Federal
Constitution,[2]
it is notable in two respects: the verb "shall originate" is qualified
in the Philippine Constitution by the word "exclusively" and the phrase
"as on other bills" in the American version is omitted. This means,
according
to them, that to be considered as having originated in the House,
Republic
Act No. 7716 must retain the essence of H. No. 11197.cralaw:red
This argument
will not bear analysis. To begin
with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is
required
by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of
Representatives.
It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the
House
may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be
a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version by the
conference
committee will be discussed later. At this point, what is important to
note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be
produced. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill
which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of
the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be
to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments" but
also
to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of
legislative
power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior
to the Senate.cralaw:red
The contention
that the constitutional design
is to limit the Senate's power in respect of revenue bills in order to
compensate for the grant to the Senate of the treaty-ratifying power[3]
and thereby equalize its powers and those of the House overlooks the
fact
that the powers being compared are different. We are dealing here with
the legislative power which under the Constitution is vested not in any
particular chamber but in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting
of
"a Senate and a House of Representatives."[4]
The exercise of the treaty-ratifying power is not the exercise of
legislative
power. It is the exercise of a check on the executive power. There is,
therefore, no justification for comparing the legislative powers of the
House and of the Senate on the basis of the possession of such
nonlegislative
power by the Senate. The possession of a similar power by the U.S.
Senate[5]
has never been thought of as giving it more legislative powers than the
House of Representatives.cralaw:red
In the United
States, the validity of a provision
[Section 37] imposing an ad valorem tax based on the weight of vessels,
which the U.S. Senate had inserted in the Tariff Act of 1909, was
upheld
against the claim that the provision was a revenue bill which
originated
in the Senate in contravention of Art. I, Section 7 of the U.S.
Constitution.[6]
Nor is the power to amend limited to adding a provision or two in a
revenue
bill emanating from the House. The U.S. Senate has gone so far as
changing
the whole of bills following the enacting clause and substituting its
own
versions. In 1883, for example, it struck out everything after the
enacting
clause of a tariff bill and wrote in its place its own measure, and the
House subsequently accepted the amendment. The U.S. Senate likewise
added
847 amendments to what later became the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of
1909;
it dictated the schedules of the Tariff Act of 1921; it rewrote an
extensive
tax revision bill in the same year and recast most of the tariff bill
of
1922.[7]
Given, then, the power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate
can propose its own version even with respect to bills which are
required
by the Constitution to originate in the House.cralaw:red
It is insisted,
however, that S. No. 1630 was
passed not in substitution of H. No. 11197 but of another Senate bill
[S.
No. 1129] earlier filed and that what the Senate did was merely to
"take
[H. No. 11197] into consideration" in enacting S. No. 1630. There is
really
no difference between the Senate preserving H. No. 11197 up to the
enacting
clause and then writing its own version following the enacting clause
[which,
it would seem, petitioners admit is an amendment by substitution], and,
on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the same
subject matter. In either case the result are two bills on the same
subject.cralaw:red
Indeed, what the
Constitution simply means is
that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills
authorizing
an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local
application
must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected
as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be
expected
to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other
hand,
the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the
same
problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to
bear on the enactment of such laws.cralaw:red
Nor does the
Constitution prohibit the filing
in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of
the
bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is
withheld
pending receipt of the House bill. The Court cannot, therefore,
understand
the alarm expressed over the fact that on March 1, 1993, eight months
before
the House passed H. No. 11197, S. No. 1129 had been filed in the
Senate.
After all it does not appear that the Senate ever considered it. It was
only after the Senate had received H. No. 11197 on November 23, 1993
that
the process of legislation in respect of it began with the referral to
the Senate Committee on Ways and Means of H. No. 11197 and the
submission
by the Committee on February 7, 1994 of S. No. 1630. For that matter,
if
the question were simply the priority in the time of filing of bills,
the
fact is that it was in the House that a bill [H. No. 253] to amend the
VAT law was first filed on July 22, 1992. Several other bills had been
filed in the House before S. No. 1129 was filed in the Senate, and H.
No.
11197 was only a substitute of those earlier bills.cralaw:red
Second. Enough
has been said to
show that it was within the power of the Senate to propose S. No. 1630.
We now pass to the next argument of petitioners that S. No. 1630 did
not
pass three readings on separate days as required by the Constitution[8]
because the second and third readings were done on the same day, March
24, 1994. But this was because on February 24, 1994[9]
and again on March 22, 1994,[10]
the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential
certification
dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading
the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President
certifies
to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section
26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a
law:
[i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] t has
been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is
finally approved.cralaw:red
In other words,
the "unless" clause must be read
in relation to the "except" clause, because the two are really
coordinate
clauses of the same sentence. To construe the "except" clause as simply
dispensing with the second requirement in the "unless" clause [i.e.,
printing and distribution three days before final approval] would not
only
violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate the very premise of
the "except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment
of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or
emergency.
For if it is only the printing that is dispensed with by presidential
certification,
the time saved would be so negligible as to be of any use in insuring
immediate
enactment. It may well be doubted whether doing away with the necessity
of printing and distributing copies of the bill three days before the
third
reading would insure speedy enactment of a law in the face of an
emergency
requiring the calling of a special election for President and
Vice-President.
Under the Constitution, such a law is required to be made within seven
days of the convening of Congress in emergency session.[11]
That upon the
certification of a bill by the President,
the requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing and
distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of
legislative
practice. For example, the bill defining the certiorari jurisdiction of
this Court which, in consolidation with the Senate version, became
Republic
Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third readings in the House of
Representatives
on the same day [May 14, 1968] after the bill had been certified by the
President as urgent.[12]
There is,
therefore, no merit in the contention
that presidential certification dispenses only with the requirement for
the printing of the bill and its distribution three days before its
passage
but not with the requirement of three readings on separate days, also.cralaw:red
It is
nonetheless, urged that the certification
of the bill in this case was invalid because there was no emergency,
the
condition stated in the certification of a "growing budget deficit" not
being an unusual condition in this country.cralaw:red
It is noteworthy
that no member of the Senate
saw it fit to controvert the reality of the factual basis of the
certification.
To the contrary, by passing S. No. 1630 on second and third readings on
March 24, 1994, the Senate accepted the President's certification.
Should
such certification be now reviewed by this Court, especially when no
evidence
has been shown that, because S. No. 1630 was taken up on second and
third
readings on the same day, the members of the Senate were deprived of
the
time needed for the study of a vital piece of legislation?
The sufficiency
of the factual basis of the suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law under Art.
VII,
Section 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the
delegation
of extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, Section
23[2],
is subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may
be
at hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of
bills,
which involves doing away with procedural requirements designed to
insure
that bills are duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should
elicit a different standard of review.cralaw:red
Petitioners also
invite attention to the fact
that the President certified S. No. 1630 and not H. No. 11197. That is
because S. No. 1630 was what the Senate was considering. When the
matter
was before the House, the President likewise certified H. No. 9210 the
pending in the House.cralaw:red
Third.
Finally it is contended that
the bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 is the bill which the
Conference
Committee prepared by consolidating H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. It is
claimed that the Conference Committee report included provisions not
found
in either the House bill or the Senate bill and that these provisions
were
"surreptitiously" inserted by the Conference Committee. Much is made of
the fact that in the last two days of its session on April 21 and 25,
1994
the Committee met behind closed doors. We are not told, however,
whether
the provisions were not the result of the give and take that often mark
the proceedings of conference committees.cralaw:red
Nor is there
anything unusual or extraordinary
about the fact that the Conference Committee met in executive sessions.
Often the only way to reach agreement on conflicting provisions is to
meet
behind closed doors, with only the conferees present. Otherwise, no
compromise
is likely to be made. The Court is not about to take the suggestion of
a cabal or sinister motive attributed to the conferees on the basis
solely
of their "secret meetings" on April 21 and 25, 1994, nor read anything
into the incomplete remarks of the members, marked in the transcript of
stenographic notes by ellipses. The incomplete sentences are probably
due
to the stenographer's own limitations or to the incoherence that
sometimes
characterize conversations. William Safire noted some such lapses in
recorded
talks even by recent past Presidents of the United States.cralaw:red
In any event, in
the United States conference
committees had been customarily held in executive sessions with only
the
conferees and their staffs in attendance.[13]
Only in November 1975 was a new rule adopted requiring open sessions.
Even
then a majority of either chamber's conferees may vote in public to
close
the meetings.[14] As to the possibility of
an
entirely
new bill emerging out of a Conference Committee, it has been explained:
Under congressional rules of procedure,
conference
committees are not expected to make any material change in the measure
at issue, either by deleting provisions to which both houses have
already
agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this is a difficult
provision
to enforce. Note the problem when one house amends a proposal
originating
in either house by striking out everything following the enacting
clause
and substituting provisions which make it an entirely new bill. The
versions
are now altogether different, permitting a conference committee to
draft
essentially a new bill.[15]
The result is a
third version, which is considered
an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," the only requirement for
which being that the third version be germane to the subject of the
House
and Senate bills.[16]
Indeed, this
Court recently held that it is within
the power of a conference committee to include in its report an
entirely
new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the
Senate
bill.[17]
If the committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two
provisions,
there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions,
collectively
considered as an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," so long as
such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the
committee.
After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both
houses
of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department.
The
charge that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a third
legislative
chamber is thus without any basis.[18]
Nonetheless, it
is argued that under the respective
Rules of the Senate and the House of Representatives a conference
committee
can only act on the differing provisions of a Senate bill and a House
bill,
and that contrary to these Rules the Conference Committee inserted
provisions
not found in the bills submitted to it. The following provisions are
cited
in support of this contention:
Rules of the Senate
Rule XII:
Section 26. In the event that the Senate
does
not agree with the House of Representatives on the provision of any
bill
or joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a conference
committee
of both Houses which shall meet within ten days after their composition.
The President shall designate the
members of the
conference committee in accordance with subparagraph (c), Section 3 of
Rule III.
Each Conference Committee Report
shall
contain
a detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or
amendments
to the subject measure, and shall be signed by the conferees.
The consideration of such report
shall
not be
in order unless the report has been filed with the Secretary of the
Senate
and copies thereof have been distributed to the Members.
[Emphasis
added].
Rules of the House of Representatives
Rule XIV:
Section 85. Conference Committee
Reports.-
In the event that the House does not agree with the Senate on the
amendments
to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be settled by
conference
committees of both Chambers.
The consideration of conference
committee reports
shall always be in order, except when the journal is being read, while
the roll is being called or the House is dividing on any question. Each
of the pages of such reports shall be signed by the conferees. Each
report
shall contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the
changes
in or amendments to the subject measure.
The consideration of such report
shall
not be
in order unless copies thereof are distributed to the Members:
Provided,
That in the last fifteen days of each session period it shall be deemed
sufficient that three copies of the report, signed as above provided,
are
deposited in the office of the Secretary General.
[Emphasis
added].
To be sure,
nothing in the Rules limits a conference
committee to a consideration of conflicting provisions. But Rule XLIV,
Section 112 of the Rules of the Senate is cited to the effect that "If
there is no Rule applicable to a specific case the precedents of the
Legislative
Department of the Philippines shall be resorted to, and as a supplement
of these, the Rules contained in Jefferson's Manual." The following is
then quoted from the Jefferson's Manual:
The managers of a
conference must confine themselves
to the differences committed to them and may not include subjects not
within
disagreements, even though germane to a question in issue.cralaw:red
Note that
according to Rule XLIX, Section 112,
in case there is no specific rule applicable, resort must be to the
legislative
practice. The Jefferson's Manual is resorted to only as supplement. It
is common place in Congress that conference committee reports include
new
matters which, though germane, have not been committed to the
committee.
This practice was admitted by Senator Raul S. Roco, petitioner in G. R.
No. 115543, during the oral argument in these cases. Whatever, then,
may
be provided in the Jefferson's Manual must be considered to have been
modified
by the legislative practice. If a change is desired in the practice it
must be sought in Congress since this question is not covered by any
constitutional
provision but is only an internal rule of each house. Thus, Art. VI,
Section
16[3] of the Constitution provides that "Each House may determine the
rules
of its proceedings."
This observation
applies to the other contention
that the Rules of the two chambers were likewise disregarded in the
preparation
of the Conference Committee Report because the Report did not contain a
"detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of changes in, or
amendments
to, the subject measure." The Report used brackets and capital letters
to indicate the changes. This is a standard practice in bill-drafting.
We cannot say that in using these marks and symbols, the Committee
violated
the Rules of the Senate and the House. Moreover, this Court is not the
proper forum for the enforcement of these internal Rules. To the
contrary,
as we have already ruled, "parliamentary rules are merely procedural
and
with their observance the courts have no concern."[19]
Our concern is with the procedural requirements of the Constitution for
the enactment of laws. As far as these requirements are concerned, we
are
satisfied that they have been faithfully observed in these cases.cralaw:red
Nor is there any
reason for requiring that the
Committee's Report in these cases must have undergone three readings in
each of the two houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to
negotiation
since each house may seek modifications of the compromise bill. The
nature
of the bill, therefore, requires that it be acted upon by each house on
a "take it or leave it" basis, with the only alternative that if it is
not approved by both houses, another conference committee must be
appointed.
But then again the result would still be a compromise measure that may
not be wholly satisfying to both houses.cralaw:red
Art. VI, Section
26[2] must, therefore, be construed
as referring only to bills introduced for the first time in either
house
of Congress, not to the conference committee report. For if the purpose
of requiring three readings is to give members of Congress time to
study
bills, it cannot be gainsaid that H. No. 11197 was passed in the House
after three readings; that in the Senate it was considered on first
reading
and then referred to a committee of that body; that although the Senate
committee did not report out the House bill, it submitted a version [S.
No. 1630] which it had prepared by "taking into consideration" the
House
bill; that for its part the Conference Committee consolidated the two
bills
and prepared a compromise version; that the Conference Committee Report
was thereafter approved by the House and the Senate, presumably after
appropriate
study by their members. We cannot say that, as a matter of fact, the
members
of Congress were not fully informed of the provisions of the bill. The
allegation that the Conference Committee usurped the legislative power
of Congress is, in our view, without warrant in fact and in law.cralaw:red
Fourth. Whatever
doubts there may
be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved
in its favor. Our cases[20]
manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is
conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment.
Not
even claims that a proposed constitutional amendment was invalid
because
the requisite votes for its approval had not been obtained[21]
or that certain provisions of a statute had been "smuggled" in the
printing
of the bill[22]
have moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a coequal
branch of the government. There is no reason now to depart from this
rule.cralaw:red
No claim is here
made that the "enrolled bill"
rule is absolute. In fact in one case[23]
we "went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to
determine
whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate
in view of the fact that the President of the Senate himself, who had
signed
the enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so
that
in effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider.cralaw:red
But where
allegations that the constitutional
procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed have no more
basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee
"surreptitiously"
inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should
decline
the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard
the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the
respect
due the other two departments of our government.cralaw:red
Fifth. An
additional attack on the formal validity
of Republic Act No. 7716 is made by the Philippine Airlines, Inc.,
petitioner
in G. R. No. 11582, namely, that it violates Art. VI, Section 26[1]
which
provides that "Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one
subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof." It is contended that
neither
H. No. 11197 nor S. No. 1630 provided for removal of exemption of PAL
transactions
from the payment of the VAT and that this was made only in the
Conference
Committee bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 without reflecting
this
fact in its title.cralaw:red
The title of
Republic Act No. 7716 is:
AN ACT
RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX [VAT]
SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR
THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE
NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.chanrobles virtual law library
Among the
provisions of the NIRC amended is Section
103, which originally read:
Section 103. Exempt
Transactions.-
The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:
[q] Transactions which are exempt under
special
laws or international agreements to which the Philippines is a
signatory.
Among the transactions exempted from the VAT were those of PAL because
it was exempted under its franchise (P.D. No. 1590) from the payment of
all "other taxes now or in the near future," in consideration of the
payment
by it either of the corporate income tax or a franchise tax of 2%.
As a result of
its amendment by Republic Act No.
7716, Section 103 of the NIRC now provides:
Section 103. Exempt Transactions.-
The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:
[q] Transactions which are exempt under
special
laws, except those granted under Presidential Decree Nos. 66, 529, 972,
1491, 1590.
The effect of
the amendment is to remove the exemption
granted to PAL, as far as the VAT is concerned.
The question is
whether this amendment of Section
103 of the NIRC is fairly embraced in the title of Republic Act No.
7716,
although no mention is made therein of P. D. No. 1590 as among those
which
the statute amends. We think it is, since the title states that the
purpose
of the statute is to expand the VAT system, and one way of doing this
is
to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before.
To insist that P. D. No. 1590 be mentioned in the title of the law, in
addition to Section 103 of the NIRC, in which it is specifically
referred
to, would be to insist that the title of a bill should be a complete
index
of its content.cralaw:red
The
constitutional requirement that every bill
passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed
in its title is intended to prevent surprise upon the members of
Congress
and to inform the people of pending legislation so that, if they wish
to,
they can be heard regarding it. If, in the case at bar, petitioner did
not know before that its exemption had been withdrawn, it is not
because
of any defect in the title but perhaps for the same reason other
statutes,
although published, pass unnoticed until some event somehow calls
attention
to their existence. Indeed, the title of Republic Act No. 7716 is not
any
more general than the title of PAL's own franchise under P. D. No.
1590,
and yet no mention is made of its tax exemption. The title of P. D. No.
1590 is:
AN ACT
GRANTING A NEW FRANCHISE TO PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES, INC. TO ESTABLISH, OPERATE, AND MAINTAIN AIR TRANSPORT
SERVICES
IN THE PHILIPPINES AND BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND OTHER COUNTRIES.chanrobles virtual law library
The trend in our
cases is to construe the constitutional
requirement in such a manner that courts do not unduly interfere with
the
enactment of necessary legislation and to consider it sufficient if the
title expresses the general subject of the statute and all its
provisions
are germane to the general subject thus expressed.[24]
It is further
contended that amendment of petitioner's
franchise may only be made by special law, in view of Section 24 of P.
D. No. 1590 which provides:
This franchise, as amended, or any
section or
provision hereof may only be modified, amended, or repealed expressly
by
a special law or decree that shall specifically modify, amend, or
repeal
this franchise or any section or provision thereof.
This provision
is evidently intended to prevent the
amendment of the franchise by mere implication resulting from the
enactment
of a later inconsistent statute, in consideration of the fact that a
franchise
is a contract which can be altered only by consent of the parties. Thus
in Manila Railroad Co. v.Rafferty,[25]
it was held that an Act of the U.S. Congress, which provided for the
payment
of tax on certain goods and articles imported into the Philippines, did
not amend the franchise of plaintiff, which exempted it from all taxes
except those mentioned in its franchise. It was held that a special law
cannot be amended by a general law.
In contrast, in
the case at bar, Republic Act
No. 7716 expressly amends PAL's franchise [P. D. No. 1590] by
specifically
excepting from the grant of exemptions from the VAT PAL's exemption
under
P. D. No. 1590. This is within the power of Congress to do under Art.
XII,
Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides that the grant of a
franchise
for the operation of a public utility is subject to amendment,
alteration
or repeal by Congress when the common good so requires.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
A. Claims of
Press Freedom, Freedom of Thought
and Religious Freedom
The Philippine
Press Institute [PPI], petitioner
in G. R. No. 115544, is a non-profit organization of newspaper
publishers
established for the improvement of journalism in the Philippines. On
the
other hand, petitioner in G. R. No. 115781, the Philippine Bible
Society
[PBS], is a nonprofit organization engaged in the printing and
distribution
of bibles and other religious articles. Both petitioners claim
violations
of their rights under Sections 4 and 5 of the Bill of Rights as a
result
of the enactment of the VAT Law.cralaw:red
The PPI questions
the law insofar as it has withdrawn
the exemption previously granted to the press under Section 103 [f] of
the NIRC. Although the exemption was subsequently restored by
administrative
regulation with respect to the circulation income of newspapers, the
PPI
presses its claim because of the possibility that the exemption may
still
be removed by mere revocation of the regulation of the Secretary of
Finance.
On the other hand, the PBS goes so far as to question the Secretary's
power
to grant exemption for two reasons: [1] The Secretary of Finance has no
power to grant tax exemption because this is vested in Congress and
requires
for its exercise the vote of a majority of all its members;[26]
and [2] the Secretary's duty is to execute the law.cralaw:red
Section 103 of
the NIRC contains a list of transactions
exempted from VAT. Among the transactions previously granted exemption
were:
[f] Printing, publication, importation or
sale
of books and any newspaper, magazine, review, or bulletin which appears
at regular intervals with fixed prices for subscription and sale and
which
is devoted principally to the publication of advertisements.
Republic Act
No. 7716 amended Section 103 by deleting
paragraph [f] with the result that print media became subject to the
VAT
with respect to all aspects of their operations. Later, however, based
on a memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, respondent Secretary of
Finance
issued Revenue Regulations No. 11-94 dated June 27, 1994, exempting the
"circulation income of print media pursuant to Section 4 Article III of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution guaranteeing against abridgment of
freedom
of the press, among others." The exemption of "circulation income" has
left income from advertisements still subject to the VAT.
It is unnecessary
to pass upon the contention
that the exemption granted is beyond the authority of the Secretary of
Finance to give, in view of PPI's contention that even with the
exemption
of the circulation revenue of print media, there is still an
unconstitutional
abridgment of press freedom because of the imposition of the VAT on the
gross receipts of newspapers from advertisements and on their
acquisition
of paper, ink and services for publication. Even on the assumption that
no exemption has effectively been granted to print media transactions,
We find no violation of press freedom in these cases.cralaw:red
To be sure, We
are not dealing here with a statute
that on its face operates in the area of press freedom. The PPI's claim
is simply that as applied to newspapers, the law abridges press
freedom.
Even with due recognition of its high estate and its importance in a
democratic
society, however, the press is not immune from general regulation by
the
State. It has been held:
The publisher of a newspaper has no
immunity
from the application of general laws. He has no special privilege to
invade
the rights and liberties of others. He must answer for libel. He may be
punished for contempt of court. Like others, he must pay equitable and
nondiscriminatory taxes on his business.[27]
The PPI does
not dispute this point, either.
What it contends
is that by withdrawing the exemption
previously granted to print media transactions involving printing,
publication,
importation or sale of newspapers, Republic Act No. 7716 has singled
out
the press for discriminatory treatment and that within the class of
mass
media the law discriminates against print media by giving broadcast
media
favored treatment. We have carefully examined this argument, but we are
unable to find a differential treatment of the press by the law, much
less
any censorial motivation for its enactment. If the press is now
required
to pay a value-added tax on its transactions, it is not because it is
being
singled out, much less targeted, for special treatment but only because
of the removal of the exemption previously granted to it by law. The
withdrawal
of exemption is all that is involved in these cases. Other
transactions,
likewise previously granted exemption, have been delisted as part of
the
scheme to expand the base and the scope of the VAT system. The law
would
perhaps be open to the charge of discriminatory treatment if the only
privilege
withdrawn had been that granted to the press. But that is not the case.cralaw:red
The situation in
the case at bar is indeed a far
cry from those cited by the PPI in support of its claim that Republic
Act
No. 7716 subjects the press to discriminatory taxation. In the cases
cited,
the discriminatory purpose was clear either from the background of the
law or from its operation. For example, in Grosjean v. American Press
Co.,[28]
the law imposed a license tax equivalent to 2% of the gross receipts
derived
from advertisements only on newspapers which had a circulation of more
than 20,000 copies per week. Because the tax was not based on the
volume
of advertisement alone but was measured by the extent of its
circulation
as well, the law applied only to the thirteen large newspapers in
Louisiana,
leaving untaxed four papers with circulation of only slightly less than
20,000 copies a week and 120 weekly newspapers which were in serious
competition
with the thirteen newspapers in question. It was well known that the
thirteen
newspapers had been critical of Senator Huey Long, and the
Long-dominated
legislature of Louisiana respondent by taxing what Long described as
the
"lying newspapers" by imposing on them "a tax on lying." The effect of
the tax was to curtail both their revenue and their circulation. As the
U.S. Supreme Court noted, the tax was "a deliberate and calculated
device
in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which
the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties."[29]
The case is a classic illustration of the warning that the power to tax
is the power to destroy.cralaw:red
In the other case[30]
invoked by the PPI, the press was also found to have been singled out
because
everything was exempt from the "use tax" on ink and paper, except the
press.
Minnesota imposed a tax on the sales of goods in that state. To protect
the sales tax, it enacted a complementary tax on the privilege of
"using,
storing or consuming in that state tangible personal property" by
eliminating
the residents' incentive to get goods from outside states where the
sales
tax might be lower. The Minnesota Star Tribune was exempted from both
taxes
from 1967 to 1971. In 1971, however, the state legislature amended the
tax scheme by imposing the "use tax" on the cost of paper and ink used
for publication. The law was held to have singled out the press because
[1] there was no reason for imposing the "use tax" since the press was
exempt from the sales tax and [2] the "use tax" was laid on an
"intermediate
transaction rather than the ultimate retail sale." Minnesota had a
heavy
burden of justifying the differential treatment and it failed to do so.
In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court found the law to be discriminatory
because the legislature, by again amending the law so as to exempt the
first $100,000 of paper and ink used, further narrowed the coverage of
the tax so that "only a handful of publishers pay any tax at all and
even
fewer pay any significant amount of tax."[31]
The discriminatory purpose was thus very clear.cralaw:red
More recently, in
Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc.
v. Ragland,[32]
it was held that a law which taxed general interest magazines but not
newspapers
and religious, professional, trade and sports journals was
discriminatory
because while the tax did not single out the press as a whole, it
targeted
a small group within the press. What is more, by differentiating on the
basis of contents [i.e., between general interest and special
interests
such as religion or sports] the law became "entirely incompatible with
the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press."
These cases come
down to this: that unless justified,
the differential treatment of the press creates risks of suppression of
expression. In contrast, in the cases at bar, the statute applies to a
wide range of goods and services. The argument that, by imposing the
VAT
only on print media whose gross sales exceeds P480,000 but not more
than
P750,000, the law discriminates[33]
is without merit since it has not been shown that as a result the class
subject to tax has been unreasonably narrowed. The fact is that this
limitation
does not apply to the press along but to all sales. Nor is
impermissible
motive shown by the fact that print media and broadcast media are
treated
differently. The press is taxed on its transactions involving printing
and publication, which are different from the transactions of broadcast
media. There is thus a reasonable basis for the classification.cralaw:red
The cases
canvassed, it must be stressed, eschew
any suggestion that "owners of newspapers are immune from any forms of
ordinary taxation." The license tax in the Grosjean case was declared
invalid
because it was "one single in kind, with a long history of hostile
misuse
against the freedom of thepress."[34]
On the other hand, Minneapolis Star acknowledged that "The First
Amendment
does not prohibit all regulation of the press [and that] the States and
the Federal Government can subject newspapers to generally applicable
economic
regulations without creating constitutional problems."[35]
What has been
said above also disposes of the
allegations of the PBS that the removal of the exemption of printing,
publication
or importation of books and religious articles, as well as their
printing
and publication, likewise violates freedom of thought and of
conscience.
For as the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held in Jimmy Swaggart
Ministries
v. Board of Equalization,[36]
the Free Exercise of Religion Clause does not prohibit imposing a
generally
applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials by a
religious
organization.cralaw:red
This brings us to
the question whether the registration
provision of the law,[37]
although of general applicability, nonetheless is invalid when applied
to the press because it lays a prior restraint on its essential
freedom.
The case of American Bible Society v. City of Manila[38]
is cited by both the PBS and the PPI in support of their contention
that
the law imposes censorship. There, this Court held that an ordinance of
the City of Manila, which imposed a license fee on those engaged in the
business of general merchandise, could not be applied to the
appellant's
sale of bibles and other religious literature. This Court relied on
Murdock
v. Pennsylvania,[39]
in which it was held that, as a license fee is fixed in amount and
unrelated
to the receipts of the taxpayer, the license fee, when applied to a
religious
sect, was actually being imposed as a condition for the exercise of the
sect's right under the Constitution. For that reason, it was held, the
license fee "restrains in advance those constitutional liberties of
press
and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise."[40]
But in this case,
the fee in Section 107, although
a fixed amount [P1,000], is not imposed for the exercise of a privilege
but only for the purpose of defraying part of the cost of registration.
The registration requirement is a central feature of the VAT system. It
is designed to provide a record of tax credits because any person who
is
subject to the payment of the VAT pays an input tax, even as he
collects
an output tax on sales made or services rendered. The registration fee
is thus a mere administrative fee, one not imposed on the exercise of a
privilege, much less a constitutional right.cralaw:red
For the foregoing
reasons, we find the attack
on Republic Act No. 7716 on the ground that it offends the free speech,
press and freedom of religion guarantees of the Constitution to be
without
merit. For the same reasons, we find the claim of the Philippine
Educational
Publishers Association [PEPA] in G. R. No. 115931 that the increase in
the price of books and other educational materials as a result of the
VAT
would violate the constitutional mandate to the government to give
priority
to education, science and technology [Art. II, Section 17] to be
untenable.
B. Claims of Regressivity, Denial of Due
Process,
Equal Protection, and Impairment of Contracts
There is basis
for passing upon claims that on
its face the statute violates the guarantees of freedom of speech,
press
and religion. The possible "chilling effect" which it may have on the
essential
freedom of the mind and conscience and the need to assure that the
channels
of communication are open and operating importunately demand the
exercise
of this Court's power of review.cralaw:red
There is,
however, no justification for passing
upon the claims that the law also violates the rule that taxation must
be progressive and that it denies petitioners' right to due process and
that equal protection of the laws. The reason for this different
treatment
has been cogently stated by an eminent authority on constitutional law
thus: "when freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that
commands a momentum of respect; when property is imperiled it is the
lawmakers'
judgment that commands respect. This dual standard may not precisely
reverse
the presumption of constitutionality in civil liberties cases, but
obviously
it does set up a hierarchy of values within the due process clause."[41]
Indeed, the
absence of threat of immediate harm
makes the need for judicial intervention less evident and underscores
the
essential nature of petitioners' attack on the law on the grounds of
regressivity,
denial of due process and equal protection and impairment of contracts
as a mere academic discussion of the merits of the law. For the fact is
that there have even been no notices of assessments issued to
petitioners
and no determinations at the administrative levels of their claims so
as
to illuminate the actual operation of the law and enable us to reach
sound
judgment regarding so fundamental questions as those raised in these
suits.cralaw:red
Thus, the broad
argument against the VAT is that
it is regressive and that it violates the requirement that "The rule of
taxation shall be uniform and equitable [and] Congress shall evolve a
progressive
system of taxation."[42]
Petitioners in G. R. No. 115781 quote from a paper, entitled "VAT
Policy
Issues: Structure, Regressivity, Inflation and Exports" by Alan A. Tait
of the International Monetary Fund, that "VAT payment by low-income
households
will be a higher proportion of their incomes [and expenditures] than
payments
by higher-income households. That is, the VAT will be regressive."
Petitioners
contend that as a result of the uniform 10% VAT, the tax on consumption
goods of those who are in the higher-income bracket, which before were
taxed at a rate higher than 10%, has been reduced, while basic
commodities,
which before were taxed at rates ranging from 3% to 5%, are now taxed
at
a higher rate.cralaw:red
Just as
vigorously as it is asserted that the
law is regressive, the opposite claim is pressed by respondents that in
fact it distributes the tax burden to as many goods and services as
possible
particularly to those which are within the reach of higher-income
groups,
even as the law exempts basic goods and services. It is thus equitable.
The goods and properties subject to the VAT are those used or consumed
by higher-income groups. These include real properties held primarily
for
sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary course of business,
the right or privilege to use industrial, commercial or scientific
equipment,
hotels, restaurants and similar places, tourist buses, and the like. On
the other hand, small business establishments, with annual gross sales
of less than P500,000, are exempted. This, according to respondents,
removes
from the coverage of the law some 30,000 business establishments. On
the
other hand, an occasional paper[43]
of the Center for Research and Communication cites a NEDA study that
the
VAT has a minimal impact on inflation and income distribution and that,
while additional expenditure for the lowest income class is only P301
or
1.49% a year, that for a family earning P500,000 a year or more is
P8,340
or 2.2%.cralaw:red
Lacking empirical
data on which to base any conclusion
regarding these arguments, any discussion whether the VAT is regressive
in the sense that it will hit the "poor" and middle-income group in
society
harder than it will the "rich," as the Cooperative Union of the
Philippines
[CUP] claims in G. R. No. 115873, is largely an academic exercise. On
the
other hand, the CUP's contention that Congress' withdrawal of exemption
of producers cooperatives, marketing cooperatives, and service
cooperatives,
while maintaining that granted to electric cooperatives, not only goes
against the constitutional policy to promote cooperatives as
instruments
of social justice [Art. XII, Section 15] but also denies such
cooperatives
the equal protection of the law is actually a policy argument. The
legislature
is not required to adhere to a policy of "all or none" in choosing the
subject of taxation.[44]
Nor is the
contention of the Chamber of Real Estate
and Builders Association [CREBA], petitioner in G. R. 115754, that the
VAT will reduce the mark up of its members by as much as 85% to 90%,
any
more concrete. It is a mere allegation. On the other hand, the claim of
the Philippine Press Institute, petitioner in G. R. No. 115544, that
the
VAT will drive some of its members out of circulation because their
profits
from advertisements will not be enough to pay for their tax liability,
while purporting to be based on the financial statements of the
newspapers
in question, still falls short of the establishment of facts by
evidence
so necessary for adjudicating the question whether the tax is
oppressive
and confiscatory.cralaw:red
Indeed,
regressivity is not a negative standard
for courts to enforce. What Congress is required by the Constitution to
do is to "evolve a progressive system of taxation." This is a directive
to Congress, just like the directive to it to give priority to the
enactment
of laws for the enhancement of human dignity and the reduction of
social,
economic and political inequalities [Art. XIII, Section 1] or for the
promotion
of the right to "quality education" [Art. XIV, Section 1]. These
provisions
are put in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as
judicially enforceable rights.cralaw:red
At all events,
our 1988 decision in Kapatiran[45]
should have laid to rest the questions now raised against the VAT.
There
similar arguments made against the original VAT Law [Executive Order
No.
273] were held to be hypothetical, with no more basis than newspaper
articles
which this Court found to be "hearsay and [without] evidentiary value."
As Republic Act No. 7716 merely expands the base of the VAT system and
its coverage as provided in the original VAT Law, further debate on the
desirability and wisdom of the law should have shifted to Congress.cralaw:red
Only slightly
less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical
is the contention of CREBA that the imposition of the VAT on the sales
and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts entered into prior to
the effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision
that
"No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." It is
enough
to say that the parties to a contract cannot, through the exercise of
prophetic
discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing power of the State. For
not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix
obligations
as between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of
sovereign
power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal
order.
The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the
maintenance
of a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace
and
good order of society.[46]
In truth, the
Contract Clause has never been thought
as a limitation on the exercise of the State's power of taxation save
only
where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid consideration.[47]
Such is not the case of PAL in G. R. No. 115852, and we do not
understand
it to make this claim. Rather, its position, as discussed above, is
that
the removal of its tax exemption cannot be made by a general, but only
by a specific, law.cralaw:red
The substantive
issues raised in some of the cases
are presented in abstract, hypothetical form because of the lack of a
concrete
record. We accept that this Court does not only adjudicate private
cases;
that public actions by "non-Hohfeldian"[48]
or ideological plaintiffs are now cognizable provided they meet the
standing
requirement of the Constitution; that under Art. VIII, Section 1,
paragraph
2, the Court has a "special function" of vindicating constitutional
rights.
Nonetheless the feeling cannot be escaped that We do not have before Us
in these cases, a fully developed factual record that alone can impart
to our adjudication the impact of actuality[49]
to insure that decision-making is informed and well grounded. Needless
to say, we do not have power to render advisory opinions or even
jurisdiction
over petitions for declaratory judgment. In effect we are being asked
to
do what the Conference Committee is precisely accused of having done in
these cases to sit as a third legislative chamber to review
legislation.cralaw:red
We are told,
however, that the power of judicial
review is not so much power as it is duty imposed on this Court by the
Constitution and that we would be remiss in the performance of that
duty
if we decline to look behind the barriers set by the principle of
separation
of powers. Art. VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 is cited in support of
this
view:
Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.cralaw:red
To view the
judicial power of review as a duty
is nothing new. Chief Justice Marshall said so in 1803 to justify the
assertion
of this power in Marbury v. Madison:
It is emphatically the province and duty
of the
judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If
two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the
operation
of each.[50]
Justice Laurel
echoed this justification in 1936
in Angara v. Electoral Commission:
And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate
constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments;
it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution
and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which
that instrument secures and guarantees to them.[51]
This conception
of the judicial power has been affirmed
in several cases[52]
of this Court following Angara.
It does not add
anything, therefore, to invoke
this "duty" to justify this Court's intervention in what is essentially
a case that at best is not ripe for adjudication. That duty must still
be performed in the context of a concrete case or controversy, as Art.
VIII, Section 5[2] clearly defines our jurisdiction in terms of
"cases,"
and nothing but "cases." That the other departments of the government
may
have committed a grave abuse of discretion is not an independent ground
for exercising our power. Disregard of the essential limits imposed by
the case and controversy requirement can in the long run only result in
undermining our authority as a court of law. For, as judges, what We
are
called upon to render is judgment according to law, not according to
what
may appear to be the opinion of the day.cralaw:red
In the preceeding
pages, We have endeavored to
discuss, within limits, the validity of Republic Act No. 7716 in its
formal
and substantive aspects as this has been raised in the various cases
before
Us. To sum up, We hold:
[1] That the procedural requirements of
the
Constitution
have been complied with by Congress in the enactment of the statute;
[2] That judicial inquiry, whether the
formal
requirements for the enactment of statutes beyond those
prescribed
by the Constitution have been observed, is precluded by the principle
of
separation of powers;
[3] That the law does not abridge
freedom of
speech,
expression or the press, nor interfere with the free exercise of
religion,
nor deny to any of the parties the right to an education; and
[4] That, in view of the absence of a
factual
foundation of record, claims that the law is regressive, oppressive and
confiscatory and that it violates vested rights protected under the
Contract
Clause are prematurely raised and do not justify the grant of
prospective
relief by writ of prohibition.
WHEREFORE, the
petitions in these cases are dismissed.
Bidin, Quiason
and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, C.J.:
I fully concur with the conclusions set
forth
in the scholarly opinion of my learned colleague, Mr. Justice Vicente
V.
Mendoza. I write this separate opinion to express my own views relative
to the procedural issues raised by the various petitions and death with
by some other Members of the Court in their separate opinions.
By their very
nature, it would seem, discussions
of constitutional issues prove fertile ground for a not uncommon
phenomenon:
debate marked by passionate partisanship amounting sometimes to
impatience
with adverse views, an eagerness on the part of the proponents on each
side to assume the role of, or be perceived as, staunch defenders of
constitutional
principles, manifesting itself in flights of rhetoric, even hyperbole.
The peril in this, obviously, is a diminution of objectivity that
quality which, on the part of those charged with the duty and authority
of interpreting the fundamental law, is of the essence of their great
function.
For the Court, more perhaps than for any other person or group, it is
necessary
to maintain that desirable objectivity. It must make certain that on
this
as on any other occasion, the judicial function is meticulously
performed,
the facts ascertained as comprehensively and as accurately as possible,
all the issues particularly identified, all the arguments clearly
understood;
else, it may itself be accused, by its own members or by others, of a
lack
of adherence to, or a careless observance of, its own procedures, the
signatures
of its individual members on its enrolled verdicts notwithstanding.cralaw:red
In the matter now
before the Court, and whatever
reservations some people may entertain about their intellectual
limitations
or moral scruples, I cannot bring myself to accept the thesis which
necessarily
implies that the members of our august Congress, in enacting the
expanded
VAT law, exposed their ignorance, or indifference to the observance, of
the rules of procedure set down by the Constitution or by their
respective
chambers, or what is worse, deliberately ignored those rules for some
yet
undiscovered purpose nefarious in nature, or at least some purpose
other
than the public weal; or that a few of their fellows, acting as a
bicameral
conference committee, by devious schemes and cunning maneuvers, and in
conspiracy with officials of the Executive Department and others,
succeeded
in "pulling the wool over the eyes" of all their other colleagues and
foisting
on them a bill containing provisions that neither chamber of our
bicameral
legislature conceived or contemplated. This is the thesis that the
petitioners
would have this Court approve. It is a thesis I consider bereft of any
factual or logical foundation.cralaw:red
Other than the
bare declarations of some of the
petitioners, or arguments from the use and import of the language
employed
in the relevant documents and records, there is no evidence before the
Court adequate to support a finding that the legislators concerned,
whether
of the upper or lower chamber, acted otherwise than in good faith, in
the
honest discharge of their functions, in the sincere belief that the
established
procedures were being regularly observed or, at least, that there
occurred
no serious or fatal deviation therefrom. There is no evidence on which
reasonably to rest a conclusion that any executive or other official
took
part in or unduly influenced the proceedings before the bicameral
conference
committee, or that the members of the latter were motivated by a desire
to surreptitiously introduce improper revisions in the bills which they
were required to reconcile, or that after agreement had been reached on
the mode and manner of reconciliation of the "disagreeing provisions,"
had resorted to stratragems or employed under-handed ploys to ensure
their
approval and adoption by either House. Neither is there any proof that
in voting on the Bicameral Conference Committee [BCC] version of the
reconciled
bills, the members of the Senate and the House did so in ignorance of,
or without understanding, the contents thereof or the bills therein
reconciled.cralaw:red
Also unacceptable
is the theory that since the
Constitution requires appropriation and revenue bills to originate
exclusively
in the House of Representatives, it is improper if not unconstitutional
for the Senate to formulate, or even think about formulating, its own
draft
of this type of measure in anticipation of receipt of one transmitted
by
the lower Chamber. This is specially cogent as regards much-publicized
suggestions for legislation [like the expanded VAT Law] emanating from
one or more legislators, or from the Executive Department, or the
private
sector, etc. which understandably could be expected to forthwith
generate
much Congressional cogitation.cralaw:red
Exclusive
origination, I submit, should have no
reference to time of conception. As a practical matter, origination
should
refer to the affirmative act which effectively puts the bicameral
legislative
procedure in motion, i.e., the transmission by one chamber to
the
other of a bill for its adoption. This is the purposeful act which sets
the legislative machinery in operation to effectively lead to the
enactment
of a statute. Until this transmission takes place, the formulation and
discussions or the reading for three or more times of proposed measures
in either chamber, would be meaningless in the context of the activity
leading towards concrete legislation. Unless transmitted to the other
chamber,
a bill prepared by either house cannot possibly become law. In other
words,
the first affirmative, efficacious step, the operative act as it were,
leading to actual enactment of a statute, is the transmission of a bill
from one house to the other for action by the latter. This is the
origination
that is spoken of in the Constitution in its Article VI, Section 24, in
reference to appropriation, revenue, or tariff bills, etc.cralaw:red
It may be that in
the Senate, revenue or tax measures
are discussed, even drafted, and this before a similar activity takes
place
in the House. This is of no moment, so long as those measures or bill
remain
in the Senate and are not sent over the House. There is no origination
of revenue or tax measures by the Senate in this case. However, once
the
House completes the drawing up of a similar tax measure in accordance
with
the prescribed procedure, ven if this is done subsequent to the Senates
own measure indeed, even if this be inspired by information that
measure of the Senate and after third reading transmits its bill
to the Senate, there is origination by [or in] the House within the
contemplation
of the Constitution.cralaw:red
So it is entirely
possible, as intimated, that
in expectation of the receipt of a revenue or tax bill from the House
of
Representatives, the Senate commences deliberations on its own concept
of such a legislative measure. This, possibly to save time, so that
when
the House bill raches it, its thoughts and views on the matter are
already
formed and even reduced to writing in the form of a draft statute. This
should not be thought ilegal, as interdicted by the Constitution. What
the Constitution prohibits is for the Senate to begin the legislative
process
first, by sending its own revenue bill to the House of Representatives
for its consideration and action. This is the initiation that is
prohibited
to the Senate.cralaw:red
But petitioners
claims that this last was what
in fact happened, that the went through the legislative mill and was
finally
approved as R. A. No. 7716, was the Senate version, S.B. 1630. This is
disputed by the respondents. They claim it was House Bill 11197 that,
after
being transmitted to the Senate, was referred after first reading to
its
Committee on Ways and Means; was reported out by said Committee;
underwent
second and third readings, was sent to the bicameral conference
committee
and then, after appropriate proceedings therein culminating in
extensive
amendments thereof, was finally approved by both Houses and became the
Expanded VAT Law.cralaw:red
On whose side
does the truth lie? If it is not
possible to make that determination from the pleadings and records
before
this Court, shall it require evidence to be presented? No, on both law
and principle. The Court will reject a case where the legal issues
raised,
whatever they may be, depend for their resolution on still unsettled
questions
of fact. Petitioners may not, by raising what are Court to assume the
role
of a trier of facts. It is on the contrary their obligation, before
raising
those questions to this Court, to see to it that all issues of fact are
settled in accordance with the procedures laid down by law for proof of
facts. Failing this, petitioners would have only themselves to blame
for
a peremptory dismissal.cralaw:red
Now, what is
really proven about what happened
to H.B. 11197 after it was transmitted to the Senate? It seems to be
admitted
on all sides that after going through first reading, H.B. 11197 was
referred
to the Committee on Ways and Means chaired by Senator Ernesto Herrera.cralaw:red
It is, however,
surmised that after this initial
step, H.B. 11197 was never afterwards deliberated on in the Senate,
that
it was there given nothing more than a passing glance, and that it
never
went through a proper second and third reading. There is no competent
proof
to substantiate this claim. What is certain is that on February 7,
1994,
the Senate Committee on Ways and Means submitted its Report [No. 349]
stating
that H.B. 11197 was considered, and recommending that S.B. 1630 be
approved
"in substitution of S.B. No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res.
No. 734[1]
and H.B. No. 11197." This Report made known to the Senate, and clearly
indicates, that H.B. No. 11197 was indeed deliberated on by the
Committee;
in truth, as Senator Herrera pointed out, the BCC later "agreed to
adopt
[a broader coverage of the VAT] which is closely adhering to the Senate
version with some new provisions or amendments." The plain implication
is that the Senate Committee had indeed discussed H.B. 11197 in
comparison
with the inconsistent parts of SB 1129 and afterwards proposed
amendments
to the former in the form of a new bill [No. 1630] more closely akin to
the Senate bill [No. 1129].cralaw:red
And it is as
reasonable to suppose as not that
later, during the second and third readings on March 24, 1994, the
Senators,
assembled as a body, had before them copies of H.B. 11197 and S.B.
1129,
as well as of the Committee's new "S.B. 1630" that had been recommended
for their approval, or at the very least were otherwise perfectly aware
that they were considering the particular provisions of these bills.
That
there was such a deliberation in the Senate on H.B. 11197 in light of
inconsistent
portions of S.B. 1630, may further be necessarily inferred from the
request,
made by the Senate on the same day, March 24, 1994, for the convocation
of a bicameral conference committee to reconcile "the disagreeing
provisions
of said bill [S.B. 1630] and House Bill No. 11197," a request that
could
not have been made had not the Senators more or less closely examined
the
provisions of H.B. 11197 and compared them with those of the
counterpart
Senate measures.cralaw:red
Were the
proceedings before the bicameral conference
committee fatally flawed? The affirmative is suggested because the
committee
allegedly overlooked or ignored the fact that S.B. 1630 could not
validly
originate in the Senate, and that H.B. 11197 and S.B. 1630 never
properly
passed both chambers. The untenability of these contentions has already
been demonstrated. Now, demonstration of the indefensibility of other
arguments
purporting to establish the impropriety of the BCC proceedings will be
attempted.cralaw:red
There is the
argument, for instance, that the
conference committee never used H.B. 11197 even as "frame of reference"
because it does not appear that the suggestion therefor [made by House
Penal Chairman Exequiel Javier at the bicameral conference committee's
meeting on April 19, 1994, with the concurrence of Senator Maceda] was
ever resolved, the minutes being regrettably vague as to what occurred
after that suggestion was made. It is, however, as reasonable to assume
that it was, as it was not, given the vagueness of the minutes already
alluded to. In fact, a reading of the BCC Report persuasively
demonstrates
that H.B. 11197 was not only utilized as a "frame of reference" but
actually
discussed and deliberated on.cralaw:red
Said BCC Report
pertinently states:[2]
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT
The Conference Committee on the
disagreeing
provisions
of House Bill No. 11197 entitled:
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE ADDED
TAX
[VAT]
SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING
FOR
THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 1013, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 AND
110 OF TITLE IV, 112, 115 AND 116 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237, AND 238 OF
TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113SD AND 114 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE
NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED.
and Senate Bill No. 1630 entitled:
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE ADDED
TAX
[VAT]
SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING
FOR
THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 1 106, 107, 108 AND 110
OF TITLE IV, 112, 115, 117 AND 121 OF TITLE V, ACND 236, 237, AND 238
OF
TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 1113, 114, 116, 119 AND 120 OF TITLE
V,
ALL OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
having met, after full and free
conference, has
agreed to recommend and do hereby recommend to their respective Houses
that House Bill No. 11197, in consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630,
be approved in accordance with the attached copy of the bill as
reconciled
and approved by the conferees.
The Report, it
will be noted, explicitly adverts
to House Bill No. 11197, it being in fact mentioned ahead of Senate
Bill
No. 1630; graphically shows the very close identity of the subjects of
both bills [indicated in their respective titles]; and clearly says
that
the committee met in "full and free conference" on the "disagreeing
provisions"
of both bills [obviously in an effort to reconcile them]; and that
reconciliation
of said "disagreeing provisions" had been effected, the BCC having
agreed
that "House Bill No. 11197, in consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630,
be approved in accordance with the attached copy of the bill as
reconciled
and approved by the conferees."
It may be
concluded, in other words, that, conformably
to the procedure provided in the Constitution with which all the
Members
of the bicameral conference committee cannot but be presumed to be
familiar,
and no proof to the contrary having been adduced on the point, it was
the
original bill [H.B. 11197] which said body had considered and
deliberated
on in detail, reconciled or harmonized with S.B. 1630, and used as
basis
for drawing up the amended version eventually reported out and
submitted
to both houses of Congress.cralaw:red
It is further
contended that the BCC was created
and convoked prematurely, that S.B. 1630 should first have been sent to
the House of Representatives for concurrence It is maintained, in other
words, that the latter chamber should have refused the Senate request
for
a bicameral conference committee to reconcile the "disagreeing
provisions"
of both bills, and should have required that S.B. 1630 be first
transmitted
to it. This, seemingly, is nit-picking given the urgency of the
proposed
legislation as certified by the President [to both houses, in fact].
Time
was of the essence, according to the President's best judgment as
regards which absolutely no one in either chamber of Congress took
exception,
general acceptance being on the contrary otherwise manifested and
that judgment the Court will not now question. In light of that
urgency,
what was so vital or indispensable about such a transmittal that its
absence
would invalidate all else that had been done towards enactment of the
law,
completely escapes me, specially considering that the House had
immediately
acceded without demur to the request for convocation of the conference
committee.cralaw:red
What has just
been said should dispose of the
argument that the statement in the enrolled bill, that "This Act which
is a consolidation of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 11630
was
finally passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate on April
27, 1994 and May 2, 1994," necessarily signifies that there were two
[2]
bills separately introduced, retaining their independent existence
until
they reached the bicameral conference committee where they were
consolidated,
and therefore, the VAT law did not originate exclusively in the House
having
originated in part in the Senate as S.B. 1630, which bill was not
embodied
in but merely merged with H.B. 11197, retaining its separate identity
until
it was joined by the BCC with the house measure. The more logical, and
fairer, course is to construe the expression, "consolidation of House
Bill
No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 11630" in the context of accompanying and
contemporaneous statements, i.e.,: [a] the declaration in the
BCC
Report, supra, that the committee met to reconcile the
disagreeing
provisions of the two bills, "and after full and free conference" on
the
matter, agreed and so recommended that "House Bill No. 11197, in
consolidation
with Senate Bill No. 1630, be approved in accordance with the attached
copy of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees"; and[b]
the averment of Senator Herrera, in the Report of the Ways and Means
Committee,
supra, that the committee had actually "considered" [discussed] H.B.
No.
11197 and taken it "into consideration" in recommending that its own
version
of the measure [S.B. 1630] be the one approved.cralaw:red
That the Senate
might have drawn up its own version
of the expanded VAT bill, contemporaneously with or even before the
House
did, is of no moment. It bears repeating in this connection that no VAT
bill ever originated in the Senate; neither its S.B. 1129 or S.B. 1630
or any of its drafts was ever officially transmitted to the House as an
initiating bill which, as already pointed out, is what the Constitution
forbids; it was H.B. 11197 that was first sent to the Senate, underwent
first reading, was referred to Committee on Ways and Means and there
discussed
in relation to and in comparison with the counterpart Senate version or
versions the mere formulation of which was, as also already
discussed,
not prohibited to it and afterwards considered by the Senate
itself,
also in connection with S.B. 1630, on second and third readings. H.B.
11197
was in the truest sense, the originating bill.cralaw:red
An issue has also
arisen respecting the so-called
"enrolled bill doctrine" which, it is said, whatever sacrosanct status
it might originally have enjoyed, is now in bad odor with modern
scholars
on account of its imputed rigidity and unrealism; it being also
submitted
that the ruling in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito [78 Phil. 1] and the cases
reaffirming
it, is no longer good law, it being based on a provision of the Code of
Civil Procedure[3]
long since stricken from the statute books.cralaw:red
I would myself
consider the "enrolled bill" theory
as laying down a presumption of so strong a character as to be well
nigh
absolute or conclusive, fully in accord with the familiar and
fundamental
philosophy of separation of powers. The result, as far as I am
concerned,
is to make discussion of the enrolled bill principle purely academic;
for
as already pointed out, there is no proof worthy of the name of any
facts
to justify its re-examination and, possibly, disregard.cralaw:red
The other
question is, what is the nature of the
power given to a bicameral conference committee of reconciling
differences
between, or "disagreeing provisions" in, a bill originating from the
House
in relation to amendments proposed by the Senate whether as
regards
some or all of its provisions? Is the mode of reconciliation, subject
to
fixed procedure and guidelines? What exactly can the committee do, or
not
do? Can it only clarify or revise provisions found in either Senate or
House bill? Is it forbidden to propose additional or new provisions,
even
on matters necessarily or reasonably connected with or germane to items
in the bills being reconciled?
In answer, it is
postulated that the reconciliation
function is quite limited. In these cases, the conference committee
should
have confined itself to reconciliation of differences or
inconsistencies
only by [a] restoring provisions of H.B.11197 eliminated by S.B. 1630,
or [b] sustaining wholly or partly the Senate amendments; or [c] as a
compromise,
agreeing that neither provisions nor amendments be carried into the
final
form of H.B. 11197 for submission to both chambers of the legislature.cralaw:red
The trouble is,
it is theorized, the committee
incorporated activities or transactions which were not within the
contemplation
of both bills; it made additions and deletions which did not enjoy the
enlightenment of initial committee studies; it exercised what is known
as an "ex post veto power" granted to it by no law, rule or regulation,
a power that in truth is denied to it by the rules of both the Senate
and
the House. In substantiation, the Senate rule is cited, similar to that
of the House, providing that "differences shall be settled by a
conference
committee" whose report shall contain "detailed and sufficiently
explicit
statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure, [to
be]
signed by the conferees;" as well as the "Jefferson's Manual," adopted
by the Senate as supplement to its own rules, directing that the
managers
of the conference must confine themselves to differences submitted to
them;
they may not include subjects not within the disagreements even though
germane to a question in issue."
It is significant
that the limiting proviso in
the relevant rules has been construed and applied as directory, not
mandatory.
During the oral argument, counsel for petitioners admitted that the
practice
for decades has been for bicameral conference committees to include
such
provisions in the reconciled bill as they believed to be germane or
necessary
and acceptable to both chambers, even if not within any of the
"disagreeing
provisions," and the reconciled bills, containing such provisions had
invariably
been approved and adopted by both houses of Congress. It is a practice,
they say, that should be stopped. But it is a practice that establishes
in no uncertain manner the prevailing concept in both houses of
Congress
of the permissible and acceptable modes of reconciliation that their
conference
committees may adopt, one whose undesirability is not all that patent
if
not, indeed, incapable of unquestionable demonstration. The fact is
that
conference committees only take up bills which have already been freely
and fully discussed in both chambers of the legislature, but as to
which
there is need of reconciliation in view of "disagreeing provisions"
between
them; and both chambers entrust the function of reconciling the bills
to
their delegates at a conference committee with full awareness, and
tacit
consent, that conformably with established practice unquestioningly
observed
over many years, new provisions may be included even if not within the
"disagreeing provisions" but of which, together with other changes,
they
will be given detailed and sufficiently explicit information prior to
voting
on the conference committee version.cralaw:red
In any event, a
fairly recent decision written
for the Court by Senior Associate Justice Isagani A. Cruz, promulgated
on November 11, 1993 [G. R. No. 105371, The Philippine Judges
Association,
etc., et al. v. Hon. Pete Prado, etc., et al.], should leave no doubt
of
the continuing vitality of the enrolled bill doctrine and give an
insight
into the nature of the reconciling function of bicameral conference
committees.
In that case, a bilateral conference committee was constituted and met
to reconcile Senate Bill No. 720 and House Bill No. 4200. It adopted a
"reconciled" measure that was submitted to and approved by both
chambers
of Congress and ultimately signed into law by the President, as R. A.
No.
7354. A provision in this statute [removing the franking privilege from
the courts, among others] was assailed as being an invalid amendment
because
it was not included in the original version of either the senate or the
house bill and hence had generated no disagreement between them which
had
to be reconciled. The Court held:
While it is true that a conference
committee
is the mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate and
the
House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its
broader
function is described thus:
A conference committee may deal
generally
with
the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise
differences
between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by
rule
limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the
freedom
with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill.
But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results,
results
beyond its mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules impose
strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is
symptomatic
of the authoritarian power of conference committee [Davies, Legislative
Law and Process: In A Nutshell, 1987 Ed., p. 81].
It is a matter
of record that the Conference Committee
Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by
both
the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was
enrolled
with its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and
Speaker
Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been duly
passed
by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by
President
Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the
doctrine of separation of powers, the
Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a
bill
from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co.
v. Gimenez [7 SCRA 347] laid down the rule that the enrolled bill is
conclusive
upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the
journals
like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill) [Mabanag v.
Lopez
Vito, 78 Phil. 1]. The journals are themselves also binding on the
Supreme
Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. v. Pons [34
Phil. 729] where we explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the
journals
of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and
explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the organic
laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to
invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and
to
interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the
petitioners'
charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill
that
eventually R. A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form
were
not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill
and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted,
i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26 [2] of the
Constitution.
We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department
of
the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
Withal, an
analysis of the changes made by the conference
committee in H.B. 11197 and S.B. 1630 by way of reconciling their
"disagreeing
provisions," assailed by petitioners as unauthorized or
incongrouous
reveals that many of the changes related to actual "disagreeing
provisions,"
and that those that might perhaps be considered as entirely new are
nevertheless
necessarily or logically connected with or germane to particular
matters
in the bills being reconciled.
For instance, the
change made by the bicameral
conference committee [BCC] concerning amendments to Section 99 of the
National
Internal Revenue Code [NIRC] the addition of "lessors of goods or
properties and importers of goods" is really a reconciliation of
disagreeing provisions, for while H.B. 11197 mentions as among those
subject
to tax, "one who sells, barters, or exchanges goods or properties and
any
person who leases personal properties," S.B. 1630 does not. The change
also merely clarifies the provision by providing that the contemplated
taxpayers includes "importers." The revision as regards the amendment
to
Section 100, NIRC, is also simple reconciliation, being nothing more
than
the adoption by the BCC of the provision in H.B. 11197 governing the
sale
of gold to Bangko Sentral, in contrast to S.B. 1630 containing no such
provision. Similarly, only simple reconciliation was involved as
regards
approval by the BCC of a provision declaring as not exempt, the sale of
real properties primarily held for sale to customers or held for lease
in the ordinary course of trade or business, which provision is found
in
H.B. 11197 but not in S.B. 1630; as regards the adoption by the BCC of
a provision on life insurance business, contained in S.B. 1630 but not
found in H.B. 11197; as regards adoption by the BCC of the provision in
S.B. 1630 for deferment of tax on certain goods and services for no
longer
than 3 years, as to which there was no counterpart provision in S.B.
11197;
and as regards the fixing of a period for the adoption of implementing
rules, a period being prescribed in S.B. 1630 and none in H.B. 11197.cralaw:red
In respect of
other revisions, it would seem that
questions logically arose in the course of the discussion of specific
"disagreeing
provisions" to which answers were given which, because believed
acceptable
to both houses of Congress, were placed in the BCC draft. For example,
during consideration of radio and television time [Sec. 100, NIRC]
dealt
with in both House and Senate bills, the question apparently came up,
the
relevance of which is apparent on its face, relative to satellite
transmission
and cable television time. Hence, a provision in the BCC bill on the
matter.
Again, while deliberating on the definition of goods or properties in
relation
to the provision subjecting sales thereof to tax, a question apparently
arose, logically relevant, about real properties intended to be sold by
a person in economic difficulties, or because he wishes to buy a car,
i.e.,
not as part of a business, the BCC evidently resolved to clarify the
matter
by excluding from the tax, "real properties held primarily for sale to
customers or held for lease in the ordinary course of business." And in
the course of consideration of the term, sale or exchange of services
[Sec
102, NIRC], the inquiry most probably was posed as to whether the term
should be understood as including other services: e.g., services of
lessors
of property whether real or personal, of warehousemen, of keepers of
resthouses,
pension houses, inns, resorts, or of common carriers, etc., and
presumably
the BCC resolved to clarify the matter by including the services just
mentioned.
Surely, changes of this nature are obviously to be expected in
proceedings
before bicameral conference committees and may even be considered grist
for their mill, given the history of such BCCs and their general
practice
here and abroad
In any case, all
the changes and revisions, and
deletions, made by the conference committee were all subsequently
considered
by and approved by both the Senate and the House, meeting and voting
separately.
It is an unacceptable theorization, to repeat, that when the BCC report
and its proposed bill were submitted to the Senate and the House, the
members
thereof did not bother to read, or what is worse, having read did not
understand,
what was before them, or did not realize that there were new provisions
in the reconciled version unrelated to any "disagreeing provisions," or
that said new provisions or revisions were effectively concealed from
them
Moreover, it
certainly was entirely within the
power and prerogative of either legislative chamber to reject the BCC
bill
and require the organization of a new bicameral conference committee.
That
this option was not exercised by either house only proves that the BCC
measure was found to be acceptable as in fact it was approved and
adopted
by both chambers.cralaw:red
I vote to dismiss
the petitions for lack of merit.
PADILLA, J.:
I.chanrobles virtual law libraryThe Original VAT Law and the
Expanded
VAT Law
In Kapatiran v.
Tan,[1]
where the ponente was the writer of this Separate Opinion, a
unanimous
Supreme Court en banc upheld the validity of the original VAT law
[Executive
Order No. 273, approved on 25 July 1987]. It will, in my view, be
pointless
at this time to re-open arguments advanced in said case as to why said
VAT law was invalid, and it will be equally redundant to re-state the
principles
laid down by the Court in the same case affirming the validity of the
VAT
law as a tax measure. And yet, the same arguments are, in effect,
marshalled
against the merits and substance of the expanded VAT law [Rep. Act. No.
7716, approved on 5 May 1994]. The same Supreme Court decision should
therefore
dispose, in the main, of such arguments, for the expanded VAT law is
predicated
basically on the same principles as the original VAT law, except that
now
the tax base of the VAT imposition has been expanded or broadened.cralaw:red
It only needs to
be stated what actually
should be obvious that a tax measure, like the expanded VAT law
[Republic
Act. No. 7716], is enacted by Congress and approved by the President in
the exercise of the State's power to tax, which is an attribute of
sovereignty.
And while the power to tax, if exercised without limit, is a power to
destroy,
and should, therefore, not be allowed in such form, it has to be
equally
recognized that the power to tax is an essential right of government.
Without
taxes, basic services to the people can come to a halt; economic
progress
will be stunted, and, in the long run, the people will suffer the pains
of stagnation and retrogression.cralaw:red
Consequently,
upon careful deliberation, I have
no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the expanded VAT law
comes
within the legitimate power of the state to tax. And as I had occasion
to previously state:
Constitutional Law, to begin with, is
concerned
with power not political convenience, wisdom, exigency, or even
necessity.
Neither the Executive nor the legislative [Commission on Appointments]
can create power where the Constitution confers none.[2]
Likewise, in
the first VAT case, I said:
In any event, if petitioners seriously
believe
that the adoption and continued application of the VAT are prejudicial
to the general welfare or the interests of the majority of the people,
they should seek, recourse and relief from the political branches of
the
government. The Court, following the time-honored doctrine of
separation
of powers, cannot substitute its judgment for that of the President
[and
Congress] as to the wisdom, justice and advisability of the adoption of
the VAT.[3]
This Court
should not, as a rule, concern itself
with questions of policy, much less, economic policy. That is better
left
to the two [2] political branches of government. That the expanded VAT
law is unwise, unpopular and even anti-poor, among other things said
against
it, are arguments and considerations within the realm of policy-debate,
which only Congress and the Executive have the authority to decisively
confront, alleviate, remedy and resolve.
II.chanrobles virtual law libraryThe Procedure Followed in the
Approval
of Rep. Act No. 7716
Petitioners
however posit that the present case
raises a far-reaching constitutional question which the Court is
duty-bound
to decide under its expanded jurisdiction in the 1987 Constitution.[4]
Petitioners more specifically question and impugn the manner by which
the
expanded VAT law [Rep. Act. No. 7716] was approved by Congress. They
contend
that it was approved in violation of the Constitution from which fact
it
follows, as a consequence, that the law is null and void. Main reliance
of the petitioners in their assault in Section 24, Art. VI of the
Constitution
which provides:
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or
tariff
bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bill of local
application,
and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives,
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
While it should
be admitted at the outset that there
was no rigorous and strict adherence to the literal command of the
above
provision, it may however be said, after careful reflection, that there
was substantial compliance with the provision.
There is no
question that House Bill No. 11197
expanding the VAT law originated from the House of Representatives. It
is undeniably a House measure. On the other hand, Senate Bill No. 1129,
also expanding the VAT law, originated from the Senate. It is
undeniably
a Senate measure which, in point of time, actually antedated House Bill
No. 11197.cralaw:red
But it is of
record that when House Bill No. 11197
was, after approval by the House, sent to the Senate, it was referred
to,
and considered by the Senate Committee on Ways and Means [after first
reading]
together with Senate Bill No. 1129, and the Committee came out with
Senate
Bill No. 1630 in substitution of Senate Bill No. 1129 but after
expressly
taking into consideration House Bill No. 11197.
Since the Senate is, under the above-quoted
constitutional
provision, empowered to concur with a revenue measure exclusively
originating
from the House, or to propose amendments thereto, to the extent of
proposing
amendments by substitution to the House measure, the approval by the
Senate
of Senate Bill No. 1630, after it had considered House Bill No. 11197,
may be taken, in my view, as an amendment by substitution by the Senate
not only of Senate Bill No. 1129 but of House Bill No. 11197 as well
which,
it must be remembered, originated exclusively from the House.cralaw:red
But then, in
recognition of the fact that House
Bill No. 11197 which originated exclusively from the House and Senate
Bill
No. 1630 contained conflicting provisions, both bills [House Bill No.
11197
and Senate Bill No. 1630] were referred to the Bicameral Conference
Committee
for joint consideration with a view to reconciling their conflicting
provisions.cralaw:red
The Conference
Committee came out eventually with
a Conference Committee Bill which was submitted to both chambers of
Congress
[the Senate and the House]. The Conference Committee reported out a
bill
consolidating provisions in House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No.
1630.
What transpired in both chambers after the Conference Committee Report
was submitted to them, is not clear from the records in this case. What
is clear, however, is that both chambers voted separately on the bill
reported
out by the Conference Committee and both chambers approved the bill of
the Conference Committee.cralaw:red
To me then, what
should really be important is
that both chambers of Congress approved the bill reported out by the
Conference
Committee. In my considered view, the act of both chambers of Congress
in approving the Conference Committee bill, should put an end to any
inquiry
by this Court as to how the bill came about. What is more, such
separate
approvals cured whatever constitutional infirmities may have arisen in
the procedures leading to such approvals. For if such infirmities were
serious enough to impugn the very validity of the measure itself, there
would have been an objection or objections from members of both
chambers
to the approval. The Court has been shown no such objection on record
in
both chambers.cralaw:red
Petitioners
contend that there were violations
of Sec. 26 paragraph 2, Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 26.
[2] No bill passed by either House
shall
become
a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed
copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members
three
days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity
of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon
the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and
the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas
and
nays entered in the Journal.
in that when
Senate Bill No. 1630 [the Senate counterpart
of House Bill No. 11197] was approved by the Senate, after it had been
reported out by the Senate Committee on Ways and Means, the bill went
through
second and third readings on the same day [not separate days] and
printed
copies thereof in its final form were not distributed to the members of
the Senate at least three [3] days before its passage by the Senate.
But
We are told by the respondents that the reason for this "short cut" was
that the President had certified to the necessity of the bill's
immediate
enactment to meet an emergency a certification that, by leave of
the same constitutional provision, dispensed with the second and third
readings on separate days and the printed form at least three [3] days
before its passage.
We have here then
a situation where the President
did certify to the necessity of Senate Bill No. 1630's immediate
enactment
to meet an emergency and the Senate responded accordingly. While I
would
be the last to say that this Court cannot review the exercise of such
power
by the President in appropriate cases ripe for judicial review, I am
not
prepared however to say that the President gravely abused his
discretion
in the exercise of such power as to require that this Court overturn
his
action. We have been shown no fact or circumstance which would impugn
the
judgment of the President, concurred in by the Senate, that there was
an
emergency that required the immediate enactment of Senate Bill No.
1630.
On the other hand, a becoming respect for a co-equal and coordinate
department
of government points that weight and credibility be given to such
Presidential
judgment.cralaw:red
The authority or
power of the Conference Committee
to make insertions in and deletions from the bills referred to it,
namely,
House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630 is likewise assailed by
petitioners.
Again, what appears important here is that both chambers approved and
ratified
the bill as reported out by the Conference Committee [with the reported
insertions and deletions]. This is perhaps attributable to the known
legislative
practice of allowing a Conference Committee to make insertions in and
deletions
from bills referred to it for consideration, as long as they are
germane
to the subject matter of the bills under consideration. Besides, when
the
Conference Committee made the insertions and deletions complained of by
petitioners, was it not actually performing the task assigned to it of
reconciling conflicting provisions in House Bill No. 11197 and Senate
Bill
No. 1630?
This Court
impliedly if not expressly recognized
the fact of such legislative practice in Philippine Judges Association,
etc. vs. Hon. Peter Prado, etc.,[5]
In said case, We stated thus:
The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of
the
Rules
of the House of Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill
when
the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled
by a conference committee of both chambers. They stress that Sec. 35
was
never a subject of any disagreement between both Houses and so the
second
paragraph could not have been validly added as an amendment.
These arguments are unacceptable.
While it is true that a conference
committee
is the mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate and
the
House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its
broader
function is described thus:
A conference committee may deal
generally
with
the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise
differences
between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by
rule
limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the
freedom
with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill.
But occasionally, a conference committee produces unexpected results,
results
beyond its mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules impose
strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is
symptomatic
of the authoritarian power of conference committee [Davies, Legislative
Law and Process: In A Nutshell, 1986 ed., p. 81].
It is a matter
of record that the Conference Committee
Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by
both
the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was
enrolled
with its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and
Speaker
Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been duly
passed
by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by
President
Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
It would seem
that if corrective measures are
in order to clip the powers of the Conference Committee, the remedy
should
come from either or both chambers of Congress, not from this Court,
under
the time-honored doctrine of separation of powers.cralaw:red
Finally, as
certified by the Secretary of the
Senate and the Secretary General of the House of Representatives:
This Act [Rep. Act No. 7716] is a
consolidation
of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630 was finally passed by
the House of Representatives and the Senate on April 27, 1994 and May
2,
1994, respectively.
Under the
long-accepted doctrine of the "enrolled
bill," the Court in deference to a co-equal and coordinate branch of
government
is held to a recognition of Rep. Act No. 7716 as a law validly enacted
by Congress and, thereafter, approved by the President on 5 May 1994.
Again,
We quote from Our recent decision in Philippine Judges Association, supra:
Under the doctrine of separation of
powers, the
Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a
bill
from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co.
v. Gimenez[6]
laid down the rule that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the
Judiciary
[except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the
yeas
and nays on the finally reading of the bill]. The journals are
themselves
also binding on the Supreme Court,[7]
as We held in the old [but still valid] case of U.S. vs. Pons,[8]
where We explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the
journals
of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and
explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the organic
laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to
invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and
to
interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.
Applying these
principles, We shall decline to look
into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the last
reading of the bill that eventually became R. A. No. 7354 and that
copies
thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of
each
House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that
the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec.
26[2] of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances
from
a coordinate department of the government, to which We owe, at the very
least, a becoming courtesy.
III.chanrobles virtual law libraryPress Freedom and Religious
Freedom
and Rep. Act No. 7716
The validity of
the passage of Rep. Act No. 7716
notwithstanding, certain provisions of the law have to be examined
separately
and carefully.cralaw:red
Rep. Act. No.
7716 in imposing a value-added tax
on circulation income of newspapers and similar publications and on
income
derived from publishing advertisements in newspapers[9],
to my mind, violates Sec. 4, Art. III of the Constitution. Indeed, even
the Executive Department has tried to cure this defect by the issuance
of the BIR Regulation No. 11-94 precluding implementation of the tax in
this area. It should be clear, however, that the BIR regulation cannot
amend the law [Rep. Act No. 7716]. Only legislation [as distinguished
from
administration regulation] can amend an existing law.cralaw:red
Freedom of the
press was virtually unknown in
the Philippines before 1900. In fact, a prime cause of the revolution
against
Spain at the turn of the 19th century was the repression of the freedom
of speech and expression and of the press. No less than our national
hero,
Dr. Jose P. Rizal, in "Filipinas Despues de Cien Anos" [The
Philippines
a Century Hence] describing the reforms sine quibus non which
the
Filipinos were insisting upon, stated: "The minister who wants his
reforms
to be reforms, must begin by declaring the press in the Philippines
free."[10]
Press freedom in
the Philippines has met repressions,
most notable of which was the closure of almost all forms of existing
mass
media upon the imposition of martial law on 21 September 1972.
Section 4, Art. III of the Constitution
maybe
traced to the United States Federal Constitution. The guarantee of
freedom
of expression was planted in the Philippines by President McKinley in
the
Magna Carta of Philippine Liberty, Instructions to the Second
Philippine
Commission on 7 April 1900.cralaw:red
The present
constitutional provision which reads:
Sec. 4 No law shall be passed abridging
the
freedom
of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably
to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
is essentially
the same as that guaranteed in the
U.S. Federal Constitution, for which reason, American case law giving
judicial
expression as to its meaning is highly persuasive in the Philippines.
The plain words
of the provision reveal the clear
intention that no prior restraint can be imposed on the exercise of
free
speech and expression if they are to remain effective and meaningful.
The U.S. Supreme Court in the leading case
of
Grosjean
v. American Press Co. Inc.[11]
declared a statute imposing a gross receipts license tax of 2% on
circulation
and advertising income of newspaper publishers as constituting a prior
restraint which is contrary to the guarantee of freedom of the press.cralaw:red
In Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan,[12]
the U.S. Supreme Court stated: "Any system of prior restraint of
expression
comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutionality."
In this jurisdiction, prior restraint on the
exercise of free expression can be justified only on the ground that
there
is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the State has
the right to prevent.[13]
In the present
case, the tax imposed on circulation
and advertising income of newspaper publishers is in the nature of a
prior
restraint on circulation and free expression and, absent a clear
showing
that the requisite for prior restraint is present, the constitutional
flaw
in the law is at once apparent and should not be allowed to proliferate.cralaw:red
Similarly, the
imposition of the VAT on the sale
and distribution of religious articles must be struck down for being
contrary
to Sec. 5, Art. III of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting
an
establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination
or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required
for the exercise of civil or political rights.
That such a tax
on the sale and distribution of religious
articles is unconstitutional, has been long settled in American Bible
Society,
supra.
Insofar,
therefore, as Rep. Act No. 7716 imposes
a value-added tax on the exercise of the above- discussed two [2] basic
constitutional rights, Rep. Act No. 7716 should be declared
unconstitutional
and of no legal force and effect.
IV.chanrobles virtual law libraryPetitions of CREBA and PAL
and Rep.
Act No. 7716
The Chamber of
Real Estate and Builders' Association,
Inc. [CREBA] filed its own petition [G. R. No. 11574] arguing that the
provisions of Rep. Act No. 7716 imposing a 10% value-added tax on the
gross
selling price or gross value in money of every sale, barter or exchange
of goods or properties [Section 2] and a 10% value-added tax on gross
receipts
derived from the sale or exchange of services, including the use or
lease
of properties [Section 3], violate the equal protection, due process
and
non-impairment provisions of the Constitution as well as the rule that
taxation should be uniform, equitable and progressive.cralaw:red
The issue of
whether or not the value-added tax
is uniform, equitable and progressive has been settled in Kapatiran.cralaw:red
CREBA which
specifically assails the 10% value-added
tax on the gross selling price of real properties, fails to distinguish
between a sale of real properties primarily held for sale to customers
or held for lease in the ordinary course of trade or business and
isolated
sales by individual real property owners (Sec. 103[s]). That those
engaged
in the business of real estate development realize great profits is of
common knowledge and need not be discussed at length here. The
qualification
in the law that the 10% VAT covers only sales of real property
primarily
held for sale to customers, i.e. for trade or business thus takes into
consideration a taxpayer's capacity to pay. There is no showing that
the
consequent distinction in real estate sales is arbitrary and in
violation
of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The inherent power
to tax of the State, which is vested in the legislature, includes the
power
to determine whom or what to tax, as well as how much to tax. In the
absence
of a clear showing that the tax violates the due process and equal
protection
clauses of the Constitution, this Court, in keeping with the doctrine
of
separation of powers, has to defer to the discretion and judgment of
Congress
on this point.cralaw:red
Philippine
Airlines [PAL] in a separate petition
[G. R. No. 115852] claims that its franchise under P.D. No. 1590 which
makes it liable for a franchise tax of only 2% of gross revenues "in
lieu
of all the other fees and charges of any kind, nature or description,
imposed,
levied, established, assessed or collected by any municipal, city,
provincial,
or national authority or government agency, now or in the future,"
cannot
be amended by Rep. Act No. 7716 as to make it [PAL] liable for a 10%
value-added
tax on revenues, because Sec. 24 of P.D. No. 1590 provides that PAL's
franchise
can only be amended, modified or repealed by a special law specifically
for that purpose.cralaw:red
The validity of
PAL's above argument can be tested
by ascertaining the true intention of Congress in enacting Rep. Act No.
7716. Sec. 4 thereof dealing with Exempt Transactions states:
Sec. 103. Exempt Transactions.-
The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:
[q] Transactions which are exempt under
special
laws, except those granted under Presidential Decrees No. 66, 529, 972,
1491,1590," [Emphasis supplied].
The repealing
clause of Rep. Act No. 7716 further
reads:
Sec. 20. Repealing clauses.-
The
provisions of any special law relative to the rate of franchise taxes
are
hereby expressly repealed.
All other laws, orders, issuances, rules
and
regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby
repealed,
amended or modified accordingly. [Emphasis supplied].
There can be no
dispute in my mind, that the clear
intent of Congress was to modify PAL's franchise with respect to the
taxes
it has to pay. To this extent, Rep. Act No. 7716 can be considered as a
special law amending PAL's franchise and its tax liability thereunder.
That Rep. Act. No. 7716 imposes the value-added taxes on other subjects
does not make it a general law which cannot amend PD No. 1590.
To sum up: it is
my considered view that Rep.
Act No. 7716 [the expanded value-added tax] is a valid law, viewed from
both substantive and procedural standards, except only insofar as it
violates
Secs. 4 and 5, Art. III of the Constitution [the guarantees of freedom
of expression and the free exercise of religion]. To that extent, it
is,
in its present form, unconstitutional.cralaw:red
I, therefore,
vote to dismiss the petitions, subject
to the above qualification.
VITUG, J.:
Lest we be lost by a quagmire of trifles,
the
real threshold and prejudicial issue, to my mind, is whether or not
this
Court is ready to assume and to take upon itself with an overriding
authority
the awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. Far
from
it, ours is merely to construe and to apply the law regardless of its
wisdom
and salutariness, and to strike it down only when it clearly disregards
constitutional proscriptions. It is what the fundamental law mandates,
and it is what the Court must do.
I cannot yet
concede to the novel theory, so challengingly
provocative as it might be, that under the 1987 Constitution the Court
may now at good liberty intrude, in the guise of the people's
imprimatur,
into every affair of the government. What significance can still then
remain,
I ask, of the time-honored and widely-acclaimed principle of separation
of powers, if at every turn the Court allows itself to pass upon, at
will,
the disposition of a co-equal, independent and coordinate branch in our
system of government. I dread to think of the so varied uncertainties
that
such an undue interference can lead to. The respect for long standing
doctrines
in our jurisprudence, nourished through time, is one of maturity not
timidity,
of stability rather than quiescence.cralaw:red
It has never
occurred to me, and neither do I
believe it has been intended, that judicial tyranny is envisioned, let
alone institutionalized, by our people in the 1987 Constitution. The
test
of tyranny is not solely on how it is wielded but on how, in the first
place, it can be capable of being exercised. It is time that any such
perception
of judicial omnipotence is corrected.cralaw:red
Against all that
has been said, I see, in actuality
in these cases at bench, neither a constitutional infringement of
substance,
judging from precedents already laid down by this Court in previous
cases,
nor a justiciability even now of the issues raised, more than an
attempt
to sadly highlight the perceived shortcomings in the procedural
enactment
of laws, a matter which is internal to Congress and an area that is
best
left to its own basic concern. The fact of the matter is that the
legislative
enactment, in its final form, has received the ultimate approval of
both
houses of Congress. The finest rhetoric, indeed fashionable in the
early
part of this closing century, would still be a poor substitute for
tangibility.
I join, nonetheless, some of my colleagues in respectfully inviting the
kind attention of the honorable members of our Congress in the
suggested
circumspect observance of their own rules.cralaw:red
A final remark. I
should like to make it clear
that this opinion does not necessarily foreclose the right, peculiar to
any taxpayer adversely affected, to pursue at the proper time, in
appropriate
proceedings, and in proper fora, the specific remedies prescribed
therefor
by the National Internal Revenue Code, Republic Act 1125, and other
laws,
as well as rules of procedure, such as may be pertinent. Some petitions
filed with this Court are, in essence, although styled differently, in
the nature of declaratory relief over which this Court is bereft of
original
jurisdiction.cralaw:red
All considered,
I, therefore, join my colleagues
who are voting for the dismissal of the petitions.
CRUZ,
J.:
It is a curious
and almost incredible fact that
at the hearing of these cases on July 7, 1994, the lawyers who argued
for
the petitioners, two of them former presidents of the Senate and the
third
also a member of that body, all asked this Court to look into the
internal
operations of their Chamber and correct the irregularities they claimed
had been committed there as well as in the House of Representatives and
in the bicameral conference committee.cralaw:red
While a member of
the legislative would normally
resist such intervention and invoke the doctrine of separation of
powers
to protect Congress from what he would call judicial intrusion, these
counsel
practically implored the Court to examine the questioned proceedings
and
to this end go beyond the journals of each House, scrutinize the
minutes
of the committee, and investigate all other matters relating to the
passage
of the bill (or bills) that eventually became R. A. No. 7716.cralaw:red
In effect, the
petitioners would have us disregard
the time-honored inhibitions laid down by the Court upon itself in the
landmark case of U.S. v. Pons [34 Phil. 725] where it refused to
consider
extraneous evidence to disprove the recitals in the journals of the
Philippine
Legislature that it had adjourned sine die at midnight of February 28,
1914. Although it was generally known then that the special session had
actually exceeded the deadline fixed by the Governor-General in his
proclamation,
the Court chose to be guided solely by the legislative journals,
holding
significantly as follows:
From their very nature and object, the
records
of the legislature are as important as those of the judiciary, and to
inquire
into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when
they
are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the
letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government
was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent
department
of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions
of the Legislature. But counsel in his argument says that the public
knows
that the Assembly's clock was stopped on February 28, 1914, at midnight
and left so until the determination of the discussion of all pending
matters.
Or, in other words, the hands of the clock were stayed in order to
enable
the Assembly to effect an adjournment apparently within the fixed time
by the Governor's proclamation for the expiration of the special
session,
in direct violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. If the
clock
was, in fact, stopped, as here suggested, "the resultant evil might be
slight as compared with that of altering the probative force and
character
of legislative records, and making the proof of legislative action
depend
upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and
so
imperfect on account of the treachery of memory.
The journals say that the Legislature
adjourned
at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the
court did not err in declining to go beyond the journals.
As one who has
always respected the rationale of
the separation of powers, I realize only too well the serious
implications
of the relaxation of the doctrine except only for the weightiest of
reasons.
The lowering of the barriers now dividing the three major branches of
the
government could lead to individious incursions by one department into
the exclusive domains of the other departments to the detriment of the
proper discharge of the functions assigned to each of them by the
Constitution.
Still, while
acknowledging the value of tradition
and the reasons for judicial non-interference announced in Pons, I am
not
disinclined to take a second look at the ruling from a more pragmatic
viewpoint
and to tear down, if we must, the iron curtain it has hung, perhaps
improvidently,
around the proceedings of the legislature.cralaw:red
I am persuaded
even now that where a specific
procedure is fixed by the Constitution itself, it should not suffice
for
Congress to simply say that the rules have been observed and flatly
consider
the matter closed. It does not have to be as final as that. I would
imagine
that the judiciary, and particularly this Court, should be able to
verify
that statement and determine for itself, through the exercise of its
own
powers, if the Constitution has, indeed, been obeyed.cralaw:red
In fact, the
Court had already said that the question
of whether certain procedural rules have been followed is justiciable
rather
than political because what is involved is the legality and not the
wisdom
of the act in question. So we ruled in Sanidad v. Commission on
Elections
[73 SCRA 333] on the amendment of the Constitution; in Daza v. Singson
[180 SCRA 496] on the composition of the Commission on Appointments;
and
in the earlier case of Tañada v. Cuenco [100 SCRA 1101] on the
organization
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, among several other cases.cralaw:red
By the same
token, the ascertainment of whether
a bill underwent the obligatory three readings in both Houses of
Congress
should not be considered an invasion of the territory of the
legislature
as this would not involve an inquiry into its discretion in approving
the
measure but only the manner in which the measure was enacted.cralaw:red
These views may
upset the conservatives among
us who are most comfortable when they allow themselves to be petrified
by precedents instead of venturing into uncharted waters. To be sure,
there
is much to be said of the wisdom of the past expressed by vanished
judges
talking to the future. Via trita est tuttisima. Except when
there
is a need to revise them because of an altered situation or an emergent
idea, precedents should tell Us that, indeed, the trodden path is the
safest
path.cralaw:red
It could be that
the altered situation has arrived
to welcome the emergent idea. The jurisdiction of this Court has been
expanded
by the Constitution, to possibly include the review the petitioners
would
have us make of the congressional proceedings being questioned. Perhaps
it is also time to declare that the activities of Congress can no
longer
be smoke-screened in the inviolate recitals of its journals to prevent
examination of its sacrosanct records in the name of the separation of
powers.cralaw:red
But then again,
perhaps all this is not yet necessary
at this time and all these observations are but wishful musings for a
more
activist judiciary. For I find that this is not even necessary, at
least
for me, to leave the trodden path in the search for new adventures in
the
byways of the law. The answer we seek, as I see it, is not far afield.
It seems to me that it can be found through a study of the enrolled
bill
alone and that we do not have to go beyond that measure to ascertain if
R. A. No. 7716 has been validly enacted.cralaw:red
It is settled in
this jurisdiction that in case
of conflict between the enrolled bill and the legislative journals, it
is the former that should prevail except only as to matters that the
Constitution
requires to be entered in the journals. [Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78
Phil.
1]. These are the yeas and nays on the final reading of a bill or on
any
question at the request of at least one-fifth of the member of the
House
(Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 16[4]), the objections of the President to
a vetoed bill or item (Ibid., Sec. 27 [1]), and the names of the
members voting for or against the overriding of his veto (Id.,
Section
27 [1]), The original of a bill is not specifically required by the
Constitution
to be entered in the journals. Hence, on this particular manner, it is
the recitals in the enrolled bill and not in the journals that must
control.cralaw:red
Article VI,
Section 24, of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or
tariff
bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application,
and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives,
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
The enrolled
bill submitted to and later approved
by the President of the Philippines as R. A. No. 7716 was signed by the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
It carried the following certification over the signatures of the
Secretary
of the Senate and the Acting Secretary of the House of Representatives:
This Act which is a consolidation of
House Bill
No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 11630 was finally passed by the House of
Representative and the Senate on April 27, 1994, and May 2, 1994.
Let us turn to
Webster for the meaning of certain
words. To "originate" is "to bring
into
being; to create something (original); to invent; to begin; start." The
word "exclusively" means "excluding all others" and is derived from the
word "exclusive," meaning "not shared or divided; sole; single."
Applying
these meanings, I would read Section 24 as saying that the bills
mentioned
therein must be brought into being, or created, or invented, or begun
or
started, only or singly or by no other body than the house of
Representatives.
According to the
certification, R. A. No. 7716
"is a consolidation of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630."
Again giving the words used their natural and ordinary sense
conformably
to an accepted canon of construction, I would read the word
"consolidation"
as a "combination or merger" and derived from the word "consolidated,"
meaning "to combine into one; merge; unite."
The two bills
were separately introduced in their
respective Chambers. Both retained their independent existence until
they
reached the bicameral conference committee where they were
consolidated.
It was this consolidated measure that was finally passed by Congress
and
submitted to the President of the Philippines for his approval.cralaw:red
House Bill No.
11197 originated in the House of
Representatives but this was not the bill that eventually became R. A.
No. 7716. The measure that was signed into law by President Ramos was
the
consolidation of that bill and another bill, viz., Senate Bill No.
1630,
which was introduced in the Senate. The resultant enrolled bill thus
did
not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. The enrolled
bill itself says that part of it (and it does not matter to what
extent)
originated in the Senate.cralaw:red
It would have
been different if the only participation
of the Senate was in the amendment of the measure that was originally
proposed
in the House of Representatives. But this was not the case. The
participation
of the Senate was not in proposing or concurring with amendments that
would
have been incorporated in House Bill No. 11197. Its participation was
in
originating its own Senate Bill No. 1630, which was not embodied in but
merged with House Bill No. 11197.cralaw:red
Senate Bill No.
1630 was not even an amendment
by substitution, assuming this was permissible. To "substitute" means
"to
take the place of; to put or use in place of another." Senate Bill No.
1630 did not, upon its approval replace [and thus eliminate] House Bill
No. 11197. Both bills retained their separate identities until they
were
joined or united into what became the enrolled bill and ultimately R.
A.
No. 7716.cralaw:red
The certification
in the enrolled bill says it
all. It is clear that R. A. No. 7716 did not originate exclusively in
the
House of Representatives.cralaw:red
To go back to my
earlier observations, this conclusion
does not require the reversal of U.S. vs. Pons and an inquiry by this
Court
into the proceedings of the legislature beyond the recitals of its
journals.
All we need to do is consider the certification in the enrolled bill
and,
without entering the precincts of Congress, declare that by this own
admission
it has, indeed, not complied with the Constitution.
While this Court respects the prerogatives
of
the other departments, it will not hesitate to rise to its higher duty
to require from them, if they go astray, full and strict compliance
with
the fundamental law. Our fidelity to it must be total. There is no
loftier
principle in our democracy than the supremacy of the Constitution, to
which
all must submit.cralaw:red
I vote to
invalidate R. A. No. 7716 for violation
of Article VI, Sec. 24, of the Constitution.
REGALADO, J.:
It would seem like an inconceivable irony
that
Republic Act No. 7716 which, so respondents claim, was conceived by the
collective wisdom of a bicameral Congress and crafted with sedulous
care
by two branches of government should now be embroiled in challenges to
its validity for having been enacted in disregard of mandatory
prescriptions
of the Constitution itself. Indeed, such impugnment by petitioners goes
beyond merely the procedural flaws in the parturition of the law.
Creating
and regulating as it does definite rights to property, but with its own
passage having been violative of explicit provisions of the organic
law,
even without going into the intrinsic merits of the provisions of
Republic
Act No. 7716 its substantive invalidity is pro facto
necessarily
entailed.
How it was
legislated into its present statutory
existence is not in serious dispute and need not detain us except for a
recital of some salient and relevant facts. The House of
Representatives
passed House Bill No. 11197[1]
on third reading on November 17, 1993 and, the following day, It
transmitted
the same to the Senate for concurrence. On its part, the Senate
approved
Senate Bill No. 1630 on second and third readings on March 24, 1994. It
is important to note in this regard that on March 22, 1994, said S.B.
No.
1630 had been certified by President Fidel V. Ramos for immediate
enactment
to meet a public emergency, that is, a growing budgetary deficit. There
was no such certification for H.B. No. 11197 although it was the
initiating
revenue bill.cralaw:red
It is, therefore,
not only a curious fact but,
more importantly, an invalid procedure since that Presidential
certification
was erroneously made for and confined to S.B. No. 1630 which was
indisputably
a tax bill and, under the Constitution, could not validly originate in
the Senate. Whatever is claimed in favor of S.B. No. 1630 under the
blessings
of that certification, such as its alleged exemption from the three
separate
readings requirement, is accordingly negated and rendered inutile by
the
inefficacious nature of said certification as it could lawfully have
been
issued only for a revenue measure originating exclusively from the
lower
House. To hold otherwise would be to validate a Presidential
certification
of a bill initiated in the Senate despite the Constitutional
prohibition
against its originating therefrom.cralaw:red
Equally of
serious significance is the fact that
S.B. No. 1630 was reported out in Committee Report No. 349 submitted to
the Senate on February 7, 1994 and approved by that body "in
substitution
of S.B. No. 1129," while merely "taking into consideration P.S. No. 734
and H.B. No. 11197."[2]
S.B. No. 1630, therefore, was never filed in substitution of either
P.S.
No. 734 or, more emphatically, of H.B. No. 11197 as these two
legislative
issuances were merely taken account of, at the most, as referential
bases
or materials.cralaw:red
This is not a
play on misdirection for, in the
first instance, the respondents assure us that H.B. No. 11197 was
actually
the sole source of and started the whole legislative process which
culminated
in Republic Act No. 7716. The participation of the Senate in enacting
S.B.
No. 1630 was, it is claimed, justified as it was merely in pursuance of
its power to concur in or propose amendments to H.B. No. 11197. Citing
the 83-year old case of Flint vs. Stone Tracy Co.,[3]
it is blithely announced that such power to amend includes an amendment
by substitution, that is, even the extent of substituting the entire
H.B.
No. 11197 by an altogether completely new measure of Senate provenance.
Ergo, so the justification goes, the Senate acted perfectly in
accordance
with its amending power under Section 24, Article VI of the
Constitution
since it merely proposed amendments through a bill allegedly prepared
in
advance.cralaw:red
This is a mode of
argumentation which, by reason
of factual inaccuracy and logical implausibility, both astounds and
confounds.
For, it is of official record that S.B. No. 1630 was filed, certified
and
enacted in substitution of S.B. No. 1129 which in itself was likewise
in
derogation of the Constitutional prohibition against such initiation of
a tax bill in the Senate. In any event, S.B. No. 1630 was neither
intended
as a bill to be adopted by the Senate nor to be referred to the
bicameral
conference committee as a substitute for H.B. No. 11197. These
indelible
facts appearing in official documents cannot be erased by any amount of
strained convolutions or incredible pretensions that S.B. No. 1630 was
supposedly enacted in anticipation of H.B. No. 11197.cralaw:red
On that score
alone, the invocation by the Solicitor
General of the hoary concept of amendment by substitution falls flat on
its face. Worse, his concomitant citation of Flint to recover from that
prone position only succeeded in turning the same postulation over,
this
time supinely flat on its back. As elsewhere noted by some colleagues,
which I will just refer to briefly to avoid duplication, respondents
initially
sought sanctuary in that doctrine supposedly laid down in Flint, thus:
"It has, in fact, been held that the substitution of an entirely new
measure
for the one originally proposed can be supported as a valid amendment."[4]
[Emphasis supplied]. During the interpellation by the
writer at
the oral argument held in these cases, the attention of the Solicitor
General
was called to the fact that the amendment in Flint consisted only of a
single item, that its, the substitution of a corporate tax for an
inheritance
tax proposed in a general revenue bill; and that the text of the
decision
therein nowhere contained the supposed doctrines he quoted and ascribed
to the court, as those were merely summations of arguments of counsel
therein.
It is indeed a source of disappointment for us, but an admission of
desperation
on his part, that, instead of making a clarification or a defense of
his
contention, the Solicitor General merely reproduced all over again[1]
the same quotations as they appeared in his original consolidated
comment,
without venturing any explanation or justification.cralaw:red
The aforestated
dissemblance, thus unmasked, has
further undesirable implications on the contentions advanced by
respondents
in their defense. For, even indulging respondents ex gratia argumenti
in
their pretension that S.B. No. 1630 substituted or replaced H.B. No.
11197,
aside from muddling the issue of the true origination of the disputed
law,
this would further enmesh respondents in a hopeless contradiction.cralaw:red
In a publication
authorized by the Senate and
from which the Solicitor General has liberally quoted, it is reported
as
an accepted rule therein that "an amendment by substitution when
approved
takes the place of the principal bill. C.R. March 19, 1963, p. 943."[6]
Stated elsewise, the principal bill is supplanted and goes out of
actuality.
Applied to the present situation, and following respondents' submission
that H.B. No. 11197 had been substituted or replaced in its entirety,
then
in law it had no further existence for purposes of the subsequent
stages
of legislation except, possibly, for referential data.cralaw:red
Now, the enrolled
bill thereafter submitted to
the President of the Philippines, signed by the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, carried this solemn
certification
over the signatures of the respective secretaries of both chambers:
"This
Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill
No.
1630 was finally passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate
on April 27, 1994, and May 2, 1994." [Emphasis mine). In
reliance
thereon, the Chief Executive signed the same into law as Republic Act
No.
7716.cralaw:red
The confusion to
which the writer has already
confessed is now compounded by that official text of the aforequoted
certification
which speaks, and this cannot be a mere lapsus calami, of two
independent
and existing bills [one of them being H.B. No. 11197] which were
consolidated
to produce the enrolled bill. In parliamentary usage, to consolidate
two
bills, is to unite them into one[7]
and which, in the case at bar, necessarily assumes that H.B. No. 11197
never became legally inexistent. But did not the Solicitor General,
under
the theory of amendment by substitution of the entire H.B. No. 11197 by
S.B. No. 1630, thereby premise the same upon the replacement, hence the
total elimination from the legislative process, of H.B. 11197?
It results,
therefore, that to prove compliance
with the requirement for the exclusive origination of H.B. No. 11197,
two
alternative but inconsistent theories had to be espoused and defended
by
respondents' counsel. To justify the introduction and passage of S.B.
No.
1630 in the Senate, it was supposedly enacted only as an amendment by
substitution,
hence on that theory H.B. No. 11197 had to be considered as displaced
and
terminated from its role or existence. Yet, likewise for the same
purpose
but this time on the theory of origination by consolidation, H.B. No.
11197
had to be resuscitated so it could be united or merged with S.B. No.
1630.
This latter alternative theory, unfortunately, also exacerbates the
constitutional
defect for then it is an admission of a dual origination of the two tax
bills, each respectively initiated in and coming from the lower and
upper
chambers of Congress.cralaw:red
Parenthetically,
it was also this writer who pointedly
brought this baffling situation to the attention of the Solicitor
General
during the aforesaid oral argument, to the extent of reading aloud the
certification in full. We had hoped thereby to be clarified on these
vital
issue in respondents' projected memorandum, but we have not been
favored
with an explanation unraveling this delimma. Verily, by passing sub
silentio
on these intriguing submissions, respondents have wreaked havoc on both
logic and law just to gloss over their non-compliance with the
Constitutional
mandate for exclusive origination of a revenue bill. The procedure
required
therefor, We emphatically add, can be satisfied only by complete and
strict
compliance since this is laid down by the Constitution itself and not
by
a mere statute.cralaw:red
This writer
consequently agrees with the clearly
tenable proposition of petitioners that when the Senate passed and
approved
S.B. No. 1630, had it certified by the Chief Executive, and thereafter
caused its consideration by the bicameral conference committee in total
substitution of H.B. No. 11197, it clearly and deliberately violated
the
requirements of the Constitution not only in the origination of the
bill
but in the very enactment of Republic Act No. 7716. Contrarily, the
shifting
sands of inconsistency in the arguments adduced for respondents betray
such lack of intellectual rectitude as to give the impression of being
mere rhetorics in defense of the indefensible.cralaw:red
We are told,
however, that by our discoursing
on the foregoing issues we are introducing into non-justiciable areas
long
declared verboten by such time-honored doctrines as those on political
questions, the enrolled bill theory and the respect due to two co-equal
and coordinate branches of Government, all derived from the separation
of powers inherent in republicanism. We appreciate the lectures, but we
are not exactly unaware of the teachings in U.S. vs. Pons,[8]
Mabanag, vs. Lopez Vito,[9]
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez, etc., et al.,[10]
Morales vs. Subido, etc.,[11]
and Philippine Judges Association, etc., et al. vs. Prado, etc., et al.,[12]
on the one hand, and Tañada, et al. vs. Cuenco, et al.,[13]
Sanidad, et al., vs. Commission on Elections, et al.,[14]
and Daza vs. Singson, et al.,[15]
on the other, to know which would be applicable to the present
controversy
and which should be rejected.cralaw:red
But, first, a
positional exordium. The
writer of this opinion would be among the first to acknowledge and
enjoin
not only courtesy to, but respect for, the official acts of the
Executive
and Legislative departments, but only so long as the same are in
accordance
with or are defensible under the fundamental charter and the statutory
law. He would readily be numbered in the ranks of those who would
preach
a reasoned sermon on the separation of powers, but with the
qualification
that the same are not contained in tripartite compartments separated by
empermeable membranes. He also ascribes to the general validity of
American
constitutional doctrines as a matter of historical and legal necessity,
but not to the extent of being oblivious to political changes or
unmindful
of the fallacy of undue generalization arising from myopic disregard of
the factual setting of each particular case.cralaw:red
These ruminations
have likewise been articulated
and dissected by my colleagues, hence it is felt that the only issue
which
must be set aright in this dissenting opinion is the so-called enrolled
bill doctrine to which we are urged to cling with reptilian tenacity.
It
will be preliminarily noted that the official certification appearing
right
on the face of Republic Act No. 7716 would even render unnecessary any
further judicial inquiry into the proceedings which transpired in the
two
legislative chambers and, on a parody of tricameralism, in the
bicameral
conference committee. Moreover, we have the excellent dissertations of
some of my colleagues on these matters, but respondents insist en
contra
that the congressional proceedings cannot properly be inquired into by
this Court. Such objection confirms a suppressive pattern aimed at
sacrificing
the rule of law to the fiat of expediency.cralaw:red
Respondents thus
emplaced on their battlements
the pronouncement of this Court in the aforecited case of Philippine
Judges
Association vs. Prado.[16]
Their reliance thereon falls into the same error committed by their
seeking
refuge in the Flint case, ante. which, as has earlier been demonstrated
[aside from the quotational misrepresentation] could not be on par with
the factual situation in the present case. Flint, to repeat, involved a
mere amendment on a single legislative item, that is, substituting the
proposal therein of an inheritance tax by one on corporate tax. Now, in
their submission based on Philippine Judges Association, respondents
studiously
avoid mention of the fact that the questioned insertion referred
likewise
to a single item, that is, the repeal of the franking privilege
thretofore
granted to the judiciary. That both cases cannot be equated with those
at bar, considering the multitude of items challenged and the plethora
of constitutional violations involved, is too obvious to belabor. Legal
advocacy and judicial adjudication must have a becoming sense of
qualitative
proportion, instead of lapsing into the discredited and maligned
practice
of yielding blind adherence to precedents.cralaw:red
The writer
unqualifiedly affirms his respect for
valid official acts of the two branches of government and eschews any
unnecessary
intrusion into their operational management and internal affairs.
These,
without doubt, are matters traditionally protected by the republican
principle
of separation of powers. Where, however, there is an overriding
necessity
for judicial intervention in light of the pervasive magnitude of the
problems
presented and the gravity of the constitutional violations alleged, but
this Court cannot perform its constitutional duty expressed in Section
1, Article VIII of the Constitution unless it makes the inescapable
inquiry,
then the confluence of such factors should compel an exception to the
rule
as an ultimate recourse. The cases now before us present both the
inevitable
challenge and the inescapable exigency for judicial review. For the
Court
to now shirk its bounden duty would not only project it as a citadel of
the timorous and the slothful, but could even undermine its raison
d'etre
as the highest and ultimate tribunal.cralaw:red
Hence, this
dissenting opinion has touched on
events behind and which transpired prior to the presentation of the
enrolled
bill for approval into law. The details of that law which resulted from
the legislative action followed by both houses of Congress, the
substantive
validity of whose provisions and the procedural validity of which
legislative
process are here challenged as unconstitutional, have been graphically
presented by petitioners and admirably explained in the respective
opinions
of my brethren. The writer concurs in the conclusions drawn therefrom
and
rejects the contention that we have unjustifiably breached the dike of
the enrolled bill doctrine.cralaw:red
Even in the land
of its source, the so-called
conclusive presumption of validity originally attributed to that
doctrine
has long been revisited and qualified, if not altogether rejected. On
the
competency of judicial inquiry, it has been held that "[u]nder the
'enrolled
bill rule' by which an enrolled bill is sole expository of its contents
and conclusive evidence of its existence and valid enactment, it is
nevertheless
competent for courts to inquire as to what prerequisites are fixed by
the
Constitution of which journals of respective houses of Legislature are
required to furnish the evidence."[17]
In fact, in Gwynn
vs. Hardee, etc., et al.,[18]
the Supreme Court of Florida declared:
[1] While the presumption is that the
enrolled
bill, as signed by the legislative officers and filed with the
secretary
of state, is the bill as it passed, yet this presumption is not
conclusive,
and when it is shown from the legislative journals that a bill though
engrossed
and enrolled, and signed by the legislative officers, contains
provisions
that have not passed both houses, such provisions will be held spurious
and not a part of the law. As was said by Mr. Justice Cockrell in the
case
of Wade vs. Atlantic Lumber Co., 51 Fla. 628, text 633, 41 So. 72, 73:
This Court is firmly committed to the
holding
that when the journals speak they control, and against such proof the
enrolled
bill is not conclusive.
More
enlightening and apropos to the present controversy
is the decision promulgated on May 13, 1980 by the Supreme Court of
Kentucky
in D & W Auto Supply, et al. vs. Department of Revenue, et al.,[19]
pertinent excerpts wherefrom are extensively reproduced hereunder:
In arriving at our decision we must,
perforce,
reconsider the validity of a long line of decisions of this court which
created and nurtured the so-called "enrolled bill" doctrine.
[1] Section 46 of the Kentucky
Constitution
sets
out certain procedures that the legislature must follow before a bill
can
be considered for final passage.
Under the enrolled bill doctrine as it
now
exists
in Kentucky, a court may not look behind such a bill, enrolled and
certified
by the appropriate officers, to determine if there are any defects.
In Lafferty, passage of the law in
question
violated
this provision, yet the bill was properly enrolled and approved by the
governor. In declining to look behind the law to determine the
propriety
of its enactment, the court enunciated three reasons for adopting the
enrolled
bill rule. First, the court was reluctant to scrutinize the processes
of
the legislature, an equal branch of government. Second, reasons of
convenience
prevailed, which discouraged requiring the legislature to preserve its
records and anticipated considerable complex litigation if the court
ruled
otherwise. Third, the court acknowledged the poor record-keeping
abilities
of the General Assembly and expressed a preference for accepting the
final
bill as enrolled, rather than opening up the records of the legislature.
Nowhere has the rule been adopted without
reason,
or as a result of judicial whim. There are four historical bases for
the
doctrine. [1] An enrolled bill was a "record" and, as such, was not
subject
to attack at common law. [2] Since the legislature is one of the three
branches of government, the courts, being coequal, must indulge in
every
presumption that legislative acts are valid. [3] When the rule was
originally
formulated, record-keeping of the legislatures was so inadequate that a
balancing of equities required that the final act, the enrolled bill,
be
given efficacy. [4] There were theories of convenience as expressed by
the Kentucky court in Lafferty.
The rule is not unanimous in the
several
states,
however, and it has not been without its critics. From an examination
of
cases and treaties, we can summarize the criticisms as follows: [1]
Artificial
presumptions, especially conclusive ones, are not favored. [2] Such a
rule
frequently (as in the present case) produces results which do not
accord
with facts or constitutional provisions. [3] The rule is conducive to
fraud,
forgery, corruption and other wrongdoings. [4] Modern automatic and
electronic
record-keeping devices now used by legislatures remove one of the
original
reasons for the rule. [5] The rule disregards the primary obligation of
the courts to seek the truth and to provide a remedy for a wrong
committed
by any branch of government. In light of these considerations, we are
convinced
that the time has come to re-examine the enrolled bill doctrine.
[2] This court is not unmindful of the
admonition
of the doctrine of stare decisis. The maxim is "Stare decisis et non
quieta
movere," which simply suggests that we stand by precedents and not
disturb
settled points of law. Yet, this rule is not inflexible, nor is it of
such
a nature as to require perpetuation of error or logic. As we stated in
Daniel's Adm'r v. Hoofnel, 287 Ky 834, 155 S.W. 2d 469, 471-72 (1941)
[citations
omitted]:
The force of the rule depends upon the
nature
of the question to be decided and the extent of the disturbance of
rights
and practices which a change in the interpretation of the law or the
course
of judicial opinions may create. Cogent considerations are whether
there
is clear error and urgent reasons "for neither justice nor wisdom
requires
a court to go from one doubtful rule to another," and whether or not
the
evils of the principle that has been followed will be more injurious
than
can possibly result from a change.
Certainly, when a theory supporting
a rule
of
law is not grounded on facts, or upon sound logic, or is unjust, or has
been discredited by actual experience, it should be discarded, and with
it the rule it supports.
[3] It is clear to us that the major
premise
of the Lafferty decision, the poor record-keeping of the legislature,
has
disappeared. Modern equipment and technology are the rule in
record-keeping
by our General Assembly. Tape recorders, electric typewriters,
duplicating
machines, recording equipment, printing presses, computers, electronic
voting machines, and the like remove all doubts and fears as to the
ability
of the General Assembly to keep accurate and readily accessible records.
It is also apparent that the
"convenience" rule
is not appropriate in today's modern and developing judicial
philosophy.
The fact that the number and complexity of lawsuits may increase is not
persuasive if one is mindful that the overriding purpose of our
judicial
system is to discover the truth and see that justice is done. The
existence
of difficulties and complexities should not deter this pursuit and we
reject
any doctrine or presumption that so provides.
Lastly, we address the premises that the
equality
of the various branches of government requires that we shut our eyes to
constitutional failings and other errors of our coparceners in
government.
We simply do not agree. Section 26 of the Kentucky Constitution
provides
that any law contrary to the constitution is "void." The proper
exercise
of judicial authority requires us to recognize any law which is
unconstitutional
and to declare it void. Without belaboring the point, we believe that
under
section 228 of the Kentucky Constitution it is our obligation to
"support
the Constitution of the commonwealth." We are sworn to see that
violations
of the constitution by any person, corporation, state agency or
branch
of government are brought to light and corrected. To countenance
an artificial rule of law that silences our voices when confronted with
violations of our constitution is not acceptable to this court.
We believe that a more reasonable rule is
the
one which Professor Sutherland describes as the "extrinsic evidence"
rule.
Under this approach there is a prima facie presumption that an enrolled
bill is valid, but such presumption may be overcome by clear,
satisfactory
and convincing evidence establishing that constitutional requirements
have
not been met.
We, therefore, overrule Lafferty v.
Huffman and
all other cases following the so-called enrolled bill doctrine, to the
extent that there is no longer a conclusive presumption that an
enrolled
bill is valid. [Emphasis mine].
Undeniably, the
value-added tax system may have its
own merits to commend its continued adoption, and the proposed widening
of its base could achieve laudable governmental objectives if properly
formulated and conscientiously implemented. We would like to believe,
however,
that ours is not only an enlightened democracy nurtured by a policy of
transparency but one where the edicts of the fundamental law are
sacrosanct
for all, barring none. While the realization of the lofty ends of this
administration should indeed be the devout wish of all, likewise
barring
none, it can never be justified by methods which, even if unintended,
are
suggestive of Machiavellism.
Accordingly, I
vote to grant the instant petitions
and to invalidate Republic Act No. 7716 for having been enacted in
violation
of Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The legislative history of R. A. No. 7716,
as
highlighted in the Consolidated Memorandum for the public respondents
submitted
by the Office of the Solicitor General, demonstrates beyond doubt that
it was passed in violation or deliberate disregard of mandatory
provisions
of the Constitution and of the rules of both chambers of Congress
relating
to the enactment of bills.
I, therefore,
vote to strike down R. A. No. 7716
as unconstitutional and as having been enacted with grave abuse of
discretion.cralaw:red
The Constitution
provides for a bicameral Congress.
Therefore, no bill can be enacted into law unless it is approved by
both
chambers the Senate and the House of Representatives (hereinafter
House). Otherwise stated, each chamber may propose and approve a bill,
but until it is submitted to the other chamber and passed by the
latter,
it cannot be submitted to the President for its approval into law.
Paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of the
Constitution
provides:
No bill passed by
either House shall become a
law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed
copies
thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three
days
before its passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity
of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon
the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and
the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas
and
nays entered in the journal.cralaw:red
The "three
readings" refers to the three readings
in both chambers.There are, however,
bills
which must originate exclusively in the House. Section 24, Article VI
of
the Constitution enumerates them:
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or
tariff
bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application,
and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives,
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
Webster's Third
New International Dictionary[1]
defines originate as follows:
v.t.1: to cause the beginning of: give
rise to:
INITIATE.2. to start (a person or thing) on a course or journey.vi: to take or have origin: be derived: ARISE, BEGIN, START.
Black's Law
Dictionary[2]
defines the word exclusively in this wise:
Apart from all others; only; solely;
substantially
all or for the greater part. To the exclusion of all others; without
admission
of others to participation; in a manner to exclude.
In City Mayor
vs. The Chief of Philippine Constabulary,[3]
this Court said:
The term "exclusive" in its usual and
generally
accepted sense, means possessed to the exclusion of others;
appertaining
to the subject alone, not including, admitting or pertaining to another
or others, undivided, sole. [15 Words and Phrases, p. 510, citing
Mitchel
v. Tulsa Water, Light, Heat and Power Co., 95 P. 961, 21 Okl. 243; and
p. 513, citing Commonwealth v. Superintendent of House of Correction,
64
Pa. Super. 613, 615].
Indisputably
then, only the House can cause the beginning
or initiate the passage of any appropriation, revenue, or tarriff bill,
any bill increasing the public debt, any bill of local application, or
any private bill. The Senate can only "propose or concur with
amendments."
Under the Rules
of the Senate, the first reading
is the reading of the title of the bill and its referral to the
corresponding
committee; the second reading consists of the reading of the bill in
the
form recommended by the corresponding committee; and the third reading
is the reading of the bill in the form it will be after approval on
second
reading.[4]
During the second reading, the following takes place:
[1] Second reading of the bill;
[2] Sponsorship by the Committee
Chairman or
any
member designated by the corresponding committee;
[3] If a debate ensues, turns for and
against
the bill shall be taken alternately;
[4] The sponsor of the bill closes the
debate;
[5] After the close of the debate, the
period
of amendments follows;
[6] Then, after the period of
amendments is
closed,
the voting on the bill on second reading.[5]
After approval
on second readings, printed copies
thereof in its final form shall be distributed to the Members of the
Senate
at least three days prior to the third reading, except in cases of
certified
bills. At the third reading, the final vote shall be taken and the yeas
and nays shall be entered in the Journal.[6]
Under the Rules of the House, the first reading
of a bill consists of a reading of the number, title, and author
followed
by the referral to the appropriate committees;[7]
the second reading consists of the reading in full of the bill with the
amendments proposed by the committee, it any;[8]
and the third reading is the reading of the bill in the form as
approved
on second reading and takes place only after printed copies thereof in
its final form have been distributed to the Members at least three days
before, unless the bill iscertified.[9]
At the second reading, the following takes place:
[1] Reading of the bill;
[2] Sponsorship;
[3] Debates;
[4] Period of Amendments; and
[5] Voting on Second Reading.[10]
At the third
reading, the votes shall be taken immediately
and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.[11]
Clearly, whether in the Senate or in the
House,
every
bill must pass the three readings on separate days, except when the
bill
is certified. Amendments to the bill on third reading are
constitutionally
prohibited.[12]
After its passage
by one chamber, the bill should
then be transmitted to the other chamber for its concurrence. Section
83,
Rule XIV of the Rules of the House expressly provides:
Sec. 83. Transmittal to Senate.-
The Secretary General, without need of express order, shall transmit to
the Senate for its concurrence all the bills and joint or concurrent
resolutions
approved by the House or the amendments of the House to the bills or
resolutions
of the Senate, as the case may be. If the measures approved without
amendments
are bills or resolutions of the Senate, or if amendments of the Senate
to bills of the House are accepted, he shall forthwith notify the
Senate
of the action taken.
Simplified,
this rule means that:
1. As to a bill originating in the
House:
[a] Upon its approval by the House, the
bill
shall be transmitted to the Senate;
[b] The Senate may approve it with
or
without
amendments;
[c] The Senate returns the bill to
the
House;
[d] The House may accept the Senate
amendments;
if it does not, the Secretary General shall notify the Senate of that
action.
As hereinafter be shown, a request for conference shall then be in
order.
2. As to bills originating in the
Senate:
[a] Upon its approval by the Senate,
the bill
shall be transmitted to the House;
[b] The House may approve it with or
without amendments;
[c] The House then returns it to the
Senate, informing
it of the action taken;
[d] The Senate may accept the House
amendements;
if it does not, it shall notify the House and make a request for
conference.
The transmitted
bill shall then pass three readings
in the other chamber on separate days. Section 84, Rule XIV of the
Rules
of the House states:
Sec. 84. Bills from the
Senate.- The
bills, resolutions and communications of the Senate shall be referred
to
the corresponding committee in the same manner as bills presented by
Members
of the House.
and Section 51,
Rule XXIII of the Rules of the Senate
provides:
Sec. 51. Prior to their final approval,
bills
and joint resolutions shall be read at least three times.
It is only when
the period of disagreement is reached,
i.e., amended proposed by one chamber to a bill
originating from
the other are not accepted by the latter, that a request for conference
is made or is in order. The request for conference is specifically
covered
by Section 26, Rule XII of the Rules of the Senate which reads:
Sec. 26. In the event that the Senate
does not
agree with the House of Representatives on the provision of any bill or
joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a conference
committee
of both Houses which shall meet within ten days after its composition.
and Section 85,
Rule XIV of the Rules of the House
which reads:
Sec. 85. Conference Committee
Reports.-
In the event that the House does not agree with the Senate on the
amendments
to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be settled by
conference
committees of both Chambers.
The foregoing
provisions of the Constitution and
the Rules of both chambers of Congress are mandatory. In
his Treatise On the Constitutional Limitations,[13]
more particularly on enactment of bill, Cooley states:
Where, for an instance, the legislative
power
is to be exercised by two houses, and by settled and well-understood
parliamentary
law these two houses are to hold separate sessions for their
deliberations,
and the determination of the one upon a proposes law is to be submitted
to the separate determination of the other, the constitution, in
providing
for two houses, has evidently spoken in reference to this settled
custom,
incorporating it as a rule of constitutional interpretation; so that it
would require no prohibitory clause to forbid the two houses from
combining
in one, and jointly enacting laws by the vote of a majority of all. All
those rules which are of the essentials of law-making must be observed
and followed; and it is only the customary rules of order and routine,
such as in every deliberative body are always understood to be under
its
control, and subject to constant change at its will, that the
constitution
can be understood to have left as matters of discretion, to be
established,
modified, or abolished by the bodies for whose government in
non-essential
matters they exist.
In respect of
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bills,
bills increasing the public debt, bills of local application, or
private
bills, the return thereof to the House after the Senate shall have
"proposed
or concurred with amendments" for the former either to accept or reject
the amendments would not only be in conformity with the foregoing rules
but is also implicit from Section 24 of Article VI.
With the
foregoing as our guiding light, I shall
now show the violations of the Constitution and of the Rules of the
Senate
and of the House in the passage of R.A. No. 7716.cralaw:red
VIOLATIONS OF
SECTION 24, ARTICLE VI OF THE
CONSTITUTION:
First
violation. Since R.
A. No. 7716 is a revenue measure, it must originate exclusively in the
House not in the Senate. As correctly asserted by petitioner
Tolentino,
on the face of the enrolled copy of R. A. No. 7716, it is a
"CONSOLIDATION
OF HOUSE BILL NO. 11197 AND SENATE BILL NO. 1630." In short, it is an
illicit
marriage of a bill which originated in the House and a bill which
originated
in the Senate. Therefore, R. A. No. 7716 did not originate exclusively
in the House.cralaw:red
The only bill
which could serve as a valid basis
for R. A. No. 7716 is House Bill [HB] No. 11197. This bill, which is
the
substitute bill recommended by the House Committee on Ways and Means in
substitution of House Bills Nos. 253, 771, 2450, 7033, 8086, 9030,
9210,
9397, 10012, and 10100, and covered by its Committee Report No. 367,[14]
was approved on third reading by the House on 17 November 1993.[15]
Interestingly, H.B. No. 9210,[16]
which was filed by Representative Exequiel B. Javier on 19 May 1993,
was
certified by the President in his letter to Speaker Jose de Venecia,
Jr.
of 1 June 1993.[17]
Yet, H.B. No. 11197, which substituted H.B. No. 9210 and the others
above-stated,
was not. Its certification seemed to have been entirely forgotten.cralaw:red
On 18 November
1993, the Secretary-General of
the House, pursuant to Section 83, Rule XIV of the Rules of the House,
transmitted to the President of the Senate H.B. No. 11197 and requested
the concurrence of the Senate therewith.[18]
However, H.B. No.
11197 had passed only its first
reading in that Senate by its referral to its Committee on Ways and
Means.
That Committee never deliberated on HB No. 11197 as it should have. It
acted only on Senate Bill [S.B.] No. 1129[19]
introduced by Senator Ernesto F. Herrera on 1 March 1993. It then
prepared
and proposed S.B. No. 1630, and in its Committee Report No.349[20]
which was submitted to the Senate on 7 February 1994,[21]
it recommended that S.B. No. 1630 be approved "in substitution of S.B.
No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No.
11197."[22]
It must be carefully noted that S.B. No. 1630 was proposed and
submitted
for approval by the Senate in substitution of S.B. No. 1129, and not
H.B.
No. 11197. Obviously, the principal measure which the Committee
deliberated
on and acted upon was S.B. No. 1129 and not H.B. No. 11197. The latter,
instead of being the only measure to be taken up, deliberated upon, and
reported back to the Senate for its consideration on second reading
and,
eventually, on third reading, was, at the most, merely given by the
Committee
a passing glance.cralaw:red
This specific
unequivocal action of the Senate
Committee on Ways and Means, i.e., proposing and recommending approval
of S.B. No. 1630 as a substitute for or in substitution of S.B. No.
1129
demolishes at once the thesis of the Solicitor General that:
Assuming that S.B. 1630 is distinct from
H.B.
11197, amendment by substitution is within the purview of Section 24,
Article
VI of the Constitution.
because,
according to him, [a] "Section 68, Rule
XXIX of the Rules of the Senate authorizes an amendment by substitution
and the only condition required is that "the text thereof is submitted
in writing"; and [b] "In Flint vs. Stone Tracy Co. [220 U.S. 107] the
United
Stated Supreme Court, interpreting the provision in the United States
Constitution
similar to Section 24, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution,
stated
that the power of the Senate to amend a revenue bill includes
substitution
of an entirely new measure for the one originally proposed by the House
of Representatives."[23]
This thesis is
utterly without merit. In the first
place, it reads into the Committee Report something which it had not
contemplated,
that is, to propose S.B. No. 1630 in substitution of H.B. No. 11197; or
speculates that the Committee may have committed an error in stating
that
it is S.B. No. 1129, and not H.B. No. 11197, which is to be substituted
by S.B. No. 1630. Either, of course, is unwarranted because the words
of
the Report, solemnly signed by the Chairman, Vice-Chairman [who
dissented]
seven members, and three ex-officio members,[24]
leave no room for doubt that although S.B. No. 1129, P.S. Res No. 734,
and H.B. No. 11197 were referred to and considered by the Committee, it
had prepared the attached S.B. No. 1630 which it recommends for
approval
"in substitution of S.B. No. 11197, taking into consideration P.S. No.
734 and H.B. No. 11197 with Senators Herrera, Angara, Romulo, Sotto,
Ople
and Shahani as authors." To do as suggested would be to substitute the
judgment of the Committee with another that is completely inconsistent
with it, or, simply, to capriciously ignore the facts.cralaw:red
In the second
place, the Office of the Solicitor
General intentionally made it appear, to mislead rather than to
persuade
Us, that in Flint vs. Stone Tracy Co.[25]
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled, as quoted by it in the Consolidated
Memorandum
for Respondents, as follows:[26]
The Senate has the power to amend a
revenue
bill.
This power to amend is not confined to the elimination of provisions
contained
in the original act, but embraces as well the addition of such
provisions
thereto as may render the original act satisfactory to the body which
is
called upon to support it. It has, in fact, been held that the
substitution
of an entirely new measure for the one originally proposed can be
supported
as a valid amendment.
It is
contended, in the first place, that this section
of the act is unconstitutional, because it is a revenue measure, and
originated
in the Senate in violation of Section 7 of Article 1 of the
Constitution,
providing that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the
House
of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with the
amendments,
as on other bills."
The first part is
not a statement of the Court,
but a summary of the arguments of counsel in one of the companion cases
[No. 425, entitled: "Gay vs. Baltic Mining Co."]. The second part is
the
second paragraph of the opinion of the Court delivered by Mr. Justice
Day.
The misrepresentation that the first part is a statement of the Court
is
highly contemptuous. To show such deliberate misrepresentation, it is
well
to quote what actually are found in 55 L. Ed. 408, 410, to wit:
Messrs. Charles
A. Snow and Joseph H. Knight filed
a brief for appellees in No. 425:
The Senate has the power to amend a
revenue
bill.
This power to amend is not confined to the elimination of provisions
contained
in the original act, but embraces as well the addition of such
provisions
thereto as may render the original act satisfactory to the body which
is
called upon to support it. It has, in fact, been held that the
substitution
of an entirely new measure for the one originally proposed can be
supported
as a valid amendment.Brake v. Collison,
122
Fed. 722.
Mr. James L.
Quackenbush filed a statement for appellees
in No. 442.
Solicitor General Lehmann [by special
leave]
argued the cause for the United States on reargument.
Mr. Justice Day
delivered the opinion of the court:
These cases involve the constitutional
validity
of 38 of the act of Congress approved August 5, 1909, known as "the
corporation
tax" law. 36 Stat. at L. 11, 112-117, chap. 6, U.S. Comp. Stat. Supp.
1909,
pp. 659, 844-849.
It is contended, in the first place, that
this
section of the act is unconstitutional, because it is a revenue
measure,
and originated in the Senate in violation of 7 of article 1 of the
Constitution,
providing the "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the
House
of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with the
amendments,
as on other bills." The history of the act is contained in the
government's
brief, and is accepted as correct, no objection being made to its
accuracy.
This statement shows that the tariff bill
of
which the section under consideration is a part, originated in the
House
of Representatives, and was there a general bill for the collection of
revenue. As originally introduced, it contained a plan of inheritance
taxation.
In the Senate the proposed tax was removed from the bill, and the
corporation
tax, in a measure, substituted therefor. The bill having properly
originated
in the House, we perceive no reason in the constitutional provision
relied
upon why it may not be amended in the Senate in the manner which it was
in this case. The amendment was germane to the subject-matter of the
bill,
and not beyond the power of the Senate to propose. [Emphasis
supplied].
As shown above,
the underlined portions were deliberately
omitted in the quotation made by the Office of the Solicitor General.
In the third
place, a Senate amendment by substitution
with an entirely new bill of a bill, which under Section 24, Article VI
of the Constitution can only originate exclusively in the House, is not
authorized by said Section 24. Flint vs. Stone Tracy Co. cannot be
invoked
in favor of such a view. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Florenz D.
Regalado
during the oral arguments of these cases and during the initial
deliberations
thereon by the Court, Flint involves a Senate amendment to a revenue
bill
which, under the United States Constitution, should originate from the
House of Representatives. The amendment consisted of the substitution
of
a corporation tax in lieu of the plan of inheritance taxation contained
in a general bill for the collection of revenue as it came from the
House
of Representatives where the bill originated. The constitutional
provision
in question is Section 7, Article I of the United States Constitution
which
reads:
Sec. 7. Bills and Resolutions. -
All
Bills
for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives;
but
the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments, as on other Bills.
This provision,
contrary to the misleading claim
of the Solicitor General, is not similar to Section 24, Article VI of
our
Constitution, which for easy comparison is hereunder quoted again:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff
bills,
bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application,
and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives,
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
Note that in
the former, the word "exclusively" does
not appear. And, in the latter, the phrase "as on other Bill," which is
found in the former, does not appear. These are very significant in
determining
the authority of the upper chamber over the bills enumerated in Section
24. Since the origination is not exclusively vested in the House of
Representatives
of the United States, the Senate's authority to propose or concur with
amendments is necessarily broader. That broader authority is further
confirmed
by the phrase "as on other Bills," i.e., its power to propose
or
concur with amendments thereon is the same as in ordinary bills. The
absence
of this phrase in our Constitution was clearly intended to restrict or
limit the Philippine Senate's power to propose or concur with
amendments.
In the light of the exclusivity of origination and the absence of the
phrase
"as on other Bills," the Philippine Senate cannot amend by substitution
with an entirely new bill of its own any bill covered by Section 24 of
Article VI which the House of Representatives transmitted to it because
such substitution would indirectly violate Section 24.
These obvious
substantive differences between
Section 7, Article I of the U.S. Constitution and Section 24, Article
VI
of our Constitution are enough reasons why this Court should neither
allow
itself to be misled by Flint vs. Stone nor be awed by Rainey vs. United
States[27]
and the opinion of Messrs. Ogg and Ray[28]
which the majority cites to support the view that the power of the U.S.
Senate to amend a revenue measure is unlimited. Rainey concerns the
Tariff
Act of 1909 of the United States of America and specifically involved
was
its Section 37 which was an amendment introduced by the U.S. Senate. It
was claimed by the petitioners that the said section is a revenue
measure
which should originate in the House of Representatives. The U.S.
Supreme
Court, however, adopted and approved the finding of the court a quo
that:
The section in question is not void as a
bill
for raising revenue originating in the Senate, and not in the House of
Representatives. It appears that the section was proposed by the Senate
as an amendment to a bill for raising revenue which originated in the
House.
That is sufficient.
Messrs. Ogg and
Ray, who are professors emeritus
of political science, based their statement not even on a case decided
by the U.S. Supreme Court but on their perception of what Section 7,
Article
I of the U.S. Constitution permits. In the tenth edition [1951] of
their
work, they state:
Any bill may make its first appearance in
either
house, except only that bills for raising revenue are required by the
constitution
to "originate" in the House of Representatives. Indeed, through its
right
to amend revenue bills, even to the extent of substituting new ones,
the
Senate may, in effect, originate them also.[29]
Their "in
effect" conclusion is, of course, logically
correct because the word exclusively does not appear in said Section 7,
Article I of the U.S. Constitution.
Neither can I
find myself in agreement with the
view of the majority that the Constitution does not prohibit the filing
in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of
the
bill from the House so long as action by the Senate as a body is
withheld
pending receipt of the House bill, thereby stating, in effect, that
S.B.
No. 1129 was such an anticipatory substitute bill, which, nevertheless,
does not seem to have been considered by the Senate except only after
its
receipt of H.B. No. 11179 on 23 November 1993 when the process of
legislation
in respect of it began with a referral to the Senate Committee on Ways
and Means. Firstly, to say that the Constitution does not prohibit it
is
to render meaningless Section 24 of Article VI or to sanction its
blatant
disregard through the simple expedient of filing in the Senate of a
so-called
anticipatory substitute bill. Secondly, it suggests that S.B. No. 1129
was filed as an anticipatory measure to substitute for H.B. No. 11179.
This is a speculation which even the author of S.B. No. 1129 may not
have
indulged in. S.B. No. 1129 was filed in the Senate by Senator Herrera
on
1 March 1993. H.B. No. 11197 was approved by the House on third reading
only on 17 November 1993. Frankly, I cannot believe that Senator
Herrera
was able to prophesy that the House would pass any VAT bill, much less
to know its provisions. That "it does not seem that the Senate even
considered"
the latter not until after its receipt of H.B. No. 11179 is another
speculation.
As stated earlier, S.B. No. 1129 was filed in the Senate on 1 March
1993,
while H.B. No. 11197 was transmitted to the Senate only on 18 November
1993. There is no evidence on record to show that both were referred to
the Senate Committee on Ways and Means at the same time. Finally, in
respect
of H.B. No. 11197, its legislative process did not begin with its
referral
to the Senate's Ways and Means Committee. It began upon its filing, as
a Committee Bill of the House of Committee on Ways and Means, in the
House.cralaw:red
Second
violation. Since S.B.
No. 1129 is a revenue measure, it could not even be validly introduced
or initiated in the Senate. It follows too, that the Senate cannot
validly
act thereon.cralaw:red
Third
violation. Since S.B.
No. 1129 could not have been validly introduced in the Senate and could
not have been validly acted on by the Senate, then it cannot be
substituted
by another revenue measure, S.B. No. 1630, which the Senate Committee
on
Ways and Means introduced in substitution of S.B. No. 1129. The filing
or introduction in the Senate of S.B. No. 1630 also violated Section
24,
Article VI of the Constitution.cralaw:red
VIOLATIONS OF
SECTION 26(2), ARTICLE VI OF
THE CONSTITUTION:
First
violation. The Senate,
despite its lack of constitutional authority to consider S.B. No. 1630
or SB No. 1129 which the former substituted, opened deliberations on
second
reading of S.B. No. 1630 on 8 February 1994. On 24 March 1994, the
Senate
approved it on second reading and on third reading.[30]
That approval on the same day violated Section 26[2] Article VI of the
Constitution. The justification therefor was that on 24 February 1994
the
President certified to "the necessity of the enactment of SB No. 1630
to
meet a public emergency."[31]
I submit,
however, that the Presidential certification
is void ab initio not necessarily for the reason adduced by petitioner
Kilosbayan, Inc., but because it was addressed to the Senate for a bill
which is prohibited from originating therein. The only bill which could
be properly certified on permissible constitutional grounds even if it
had already been transmitted to the Senate is H.B. No. 11197. As
earlier
observed, this was not so certified, although H.B. No. 9210 [one of
those
consolidated into H.B. No. 11197] was certified on 1 June 1993.[32]
Also, the
certification of S.B. No. 1630 cannot,
by any stretch of the imagination, be extended to H.B. No. 11197
because
S.B. No. 1630 did not substitute H.B. No. 11197 but S.B. No. 1129.cralaw:red
Considering that
the certification of S.B. No.
1630 is void, its approval on second and third readings in one day
violated
Section 26[2], Article VI of the Constitution.cralaw:red
Second
violation. It further
appears that on 24 June 1994, after the approval of S.B. No. 1630, the
Secretary of the Senate, upon directive of the Senate President,
formally
notified the House Speaker of the Senate's approval thereof and its
request
for a bicameral conference "in view of the disagreeing provisions of
said
bill and House Bill No. 11197."[33]
It must be
stressed again that H.B. No. 11197
was never submitted for or acted on second and third readings in the
Senate,
and S.B. No. 1630 was never sent to the House for its concurrence.
Elsewise
stated, both were only half-way through the legislative mill. Their
submission
to a conference committee was not only anomalously premature, but
violative
of the constitutional rule on three readings.cralaw:red
The suggestion
that S.B. No. 1630 was not required
to be submitted to the House for otherwise the procedure would be
endless,
is unacceptable for, firstly, it violates Section 26, Rule XII of the
Rules
of the Senate and Section 85, Rule XIV of the Rules of the House, and,
secondly, it is never endless. If the chamber of origin refuses to
accept
the amendments of the other chamber, the request for conference shall
be
made.cralaw:red
VIOLATIONS OF
THE RULES OF BOTH CHAMBERS;GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION:
The erroneous
referral to the Conference Committee
needs further discussion. Since S.B. No. 1630 was not a substitute bill
for H.B. No. 11197 but for S.B. No. 1129, it [S.B. No. 1630] remained a
bill which originated in the Senate. Even assuming arguendo that it
could
be validly initiated in the Senate, it should have been first
transmitted
to the House where it would undergo three readings. On the other hand,
since H.B. No. 11197 was never acted upon by the Senate on second and
third
readings, no differences or inconsistencies could as yet arise so as to
warrant a request for a conference. It should be noted that under
Section
83, Rule XIV of the Rules of the House, it is only when the Senate
shall
have approved with amendments H.B. No. 11197 and the House declines to
accept the amendments after having been notified thereof that the
request
for a conference may be made by the House, not by the Senate.
Conversely,
the Senate's request for a conference would only be proper if,
following
the transmittal of S.B. No. 1630 to the House, it was approved by the
latter
with amendments but the Senate rejected the amendments.cralaw:red
Indisputably
then, when the request for a bicameral
conference was made by the Senate, S.B. No. 1630 was not yet
transmitted
to the House for consideration on three readings and H.B. No. 11197 was
still in the Senate awaiting consideration on second and third
readings.
Their referral to the bicameral conference committee was palpably
premature
and, in so doing, both the Senate and the House acted without authority
or with grave abuse of discretion. Nothing, and absolutely nothing,
could
have been validly acted upon by the bicameral conference committee.cralaw:red
GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION COMMITTED BYTHE BICAMERAL
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE:
Serious
irregularities amounting to lack of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion were committed by the bicameral conference
committee.cralaw:red
First,
it assumed, and took for
granted that S.B. No. 1630 could validly originate in the Senate. This
assumption is erroneous.cralaw:red
Second,
it assumed that H.B. No.
11197 and S.B. No. 1630 had properly passed both chambers of Congress
and
were properly and regularly submitted to it. As earlier discussed, the
assumption is unfounded in fact.cralaw:red
Third,
per the bicameral conference
committee's proceedings of 19 April 1994, Representative Exequiel
Javier,
Chairman of the panel from the House, initially suggested that H.B. No.
11197 should be the "frame of reference," because it is a revenue
measure,
to which Senator Ernesto Maceda concurred. However, after an
incompletely
recorded reaction of Senator Ernesto Herrera, Chairman of the Senate
panel,
Representative Javier seemed to agree that "all amendments will be
coming
from the Senate." The issue of what should be the "frame of reference"
does not appear to have been resolved. These facts are recorded in this
wise, as quoted in the Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents:[34]
CHAIRMAN JAVIER.
First of all, what would be the basis,
no,
or
framework para huwag naman mawala yung personality namin dito sa
bicameral,
no, because the bill originates from the House because this is a
revenue
bill, so we would just want to ask, we make the House Bill as the frame
of reference, and then everything will just be inserted?
HON. MACEDA.
Yes. That's true for every revenue
measure.
There's
no other way. The House Bill has got to be the base. Of course, for the
record, we know that this is an administration; this is certified by
the
President and I was about to put into the records as I am saying now
that
your problem about the impact on prices on the people was already
decided
when the President and the administration sent this to us and certified
it. They have already gotten over that political implication of this
bill
and the economic impact on prices.
CHAIRMAN HERRERA.
Yung concern mo about the bill as the
reference
in this discussion is something that we can just.
CHAIRMAN JAVIER.
We will just xxx all the amendments
will be
coming
from the Senate.
(BICAMERAL CONFERENCE ON MAJOR
DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN H.B. NO. 11197 AND S.B. NO. 1630 [Cte. on Ways & Means]
APRIL
19, 1994, II-6 and II-7; Emphasis supplied).
These exchanges
would suggest that Representative
Javier had wanted H.B. No. 11197 to be the principal measure on which
reconciliation
of the differences should be based. However, since the Senate did not
act
on this Bill on second and third readings because its Committee on Ways
and Means did not deliberate on it but instead proposed S.B. No. 1630
in
substitution of S.B. No. 1129, the suggestion has no factual basis.
Then,
when finally he agreed that "all amendments will be coming from the
Senate,"
he in fact withdrew the former suggestion and agreed that S.B. No.
1630,
which is the Senate version of the Value Added Tax [VAT] measure,
should
be the "frame of reference." But then S.B. No. 1630 was never
transmitted
to the House for the latter's concurrence. Hence, it cannot serve as
the
"frame of reference" or as the basis for deliberation. The posture
taken
by Representative Javier also indicates that S.B. No. 1630 should be
taken
as the amendment to H.B. No. 11197. This, too, is unfounded because
S.B.
No. 1630 was not proposed in substitution of H.B. No. 11197.
Since S.B. No.
1630 did not pass three readings
in the House and H.B. No. 11197 did not pass second and third readings
in the Senate, it logically follows that no disagreeing provisions had
as yet arisen. The bicameral conference committee erroneously assumed
the
contrary.cralaw:red
Even granting arguendo
that both H.B. No.
11197 and S.B. No. 1630 had been validly approved by both chambers of
Congress
and validly referred to the bicameral conference committee, the latter
had very limited authority thereon. It was created "in view of the
disagreeing
provisions of" the two bills.[35]
Its duty was limited to the reconciliation of disagreeing provisions or
the resolution of differences or inconsistencies. The committee
recognized
that limited authority in the opening paragraph of its Report[36]
when it said:
The Conference Committee on the
disagreeing
provisions
of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630.
Under such
limited authority, it could only either
[a] restore, wholly or partly, the specific provisions of H.B. No.
11197
amended by S.B. No. 1630; [b] sustain, wholly or partly, the Senate's
amendments;
or [c] by way of a compromise, to agree that neither provisions in H.B.
No. 11197 amended by the Senate nor the latter's amendments thereto be
carried into the final form of the former.
But as pointed out by petitioners Senator
Raul
Roco and Kilosbayan, Inc., the bicameral conference committee not only
struck out non-disagreeing provisions of H.B. No. 11197 and S.B. No.
1630,
i.e., provisions where both bills are in full agreement;
it
added
more activities or transactions to be covered by VAT, which were not
within
the contemplation of both bills.
Since both H.B.
No. 11197 and S.B. No. 1630 were
still half-cooked in the legislative vat, and were not ready for
referral
to a conference, the bicameral conference committee clearly acted
without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it consolidated
both
into one bill which became R. A. No. 7716.cralaw:red
APPROVAL BY
BOTH CHAMBERS OF CONFERENCE COMMITTEE
REPORT AND PROPOSED BILL DID NOT CURE CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES:
I cannot agree
with the suggestion that since
both the Senate and the House had approved the bicameral conference
committee
report and the bill proposed by it in substitution of H.B. No. 11197
and
S.B. No. 1630, whatever infirmities may have been committed by it were
cured by ratification. This doctrine of ratification may apply to minor
procedural flaws or tolerable breachs of the parameters of the
bicameral
conference committee's limited powers but never to violations of the
Constitution.
Congress is not above the Constitution. In the instant case, since S.B.
No. 1630 was introduced in violation of Section 24, Article VI of the
Constitution,
was passed in the Senate in violation of the "three readings" rule, and
was not transmitted to the House for the completion of the
constitutional
process of legislation, and H.B. No. 11197 was not likewise passed by
the
Senate on second and third readings, neither the Senate nor the House
could
validly approve the bicameral conference committee report and the
proposed
bill.cralaw:red
In view of the
foregoing, the conclusion is inevitable
that for non-compliance with mandatory provisions of the Constitution
and
of the Rules of the Senate and of the House on the enactment of laws,
R.
A. No. 7716 is unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. A
discussion
then of the instrinsic validity of some of its provisions would be
unnecessary.cralaw:red
The majority
opinion, however, invokes the enrolled
bill doctrine and wants this Court to desist from looking behind the
copy
of the assailed measure as certified by the Senate President and the
Speaker
of the House. I respectfully submit that the invocation is misplaced.cralaw:red
First,
as to the issue of origination,
the certification in this case explicitly states that R. A. No. 7716 is
a "consolidation of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630."
This
is conclusive evidence that the measure did not originate exclusively
in
the House.cralaw:red
Second,
the enrolled bill doctrine
is of American origin, and unquestioned fealty to it may no longer be
justified
in view of the expanded jurisdiction[37]
of this Court under Section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution which
now
expressly grants authority to this Court to:
Determine whether or not there has been a
grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Third,
even under the regime of the
1935 Constitution which did not contain the above provision, this
Court,
through Mr. Chief Justice Makalintal in Astorga vs. Villegas,[38]
declared that it cannot be truly said that Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito[39]
has laid to rest the question of whether the enrolled bill doctrine or
the journal entry rule should be adhered to in this jurisdiction, and
stated:
As far as Congress itself is concerned,
there
is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding
officers.
It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in
Congress
ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification
does
not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present
upon its passage. In other words, it is the approval of Congress and
not
the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the
[1935]
Constitution says that "(e)very bill passed by the Congress shall,
before
it becomes law, be presented to the President." In Brown vs. Morris, supra,
the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the
State Constitution, said that the same "makes it clear that the
indispensable
step in the passage" and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully
enacted
as a law, is not attested by the presiding officer, other proof that it
has "passed both houses will satisfy the constitutional requirement."
Fourth,
even in the United States,
the enrolled bill doctrine has been substantially undercut. This is
shown
in the disquisitions of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno in his dissenting
opinion,
citing Sutherland, Statutory Construction.
Last,
the pleadings of the parties
have established beyond doubt that H.B; No. 11197 was not acted on
second
and third readings in the Senate and S.B. No. 1630, which was approved
by the Senate on second and third readings in substitution of S.B. No.
1129, was never transmitted to the House for its passage. Otherwise
stated,
they were only passed in their respective chamber of origin but not in
the other. In no way can each become a law under paragraph 2, Section
26,
Article VI of the Constitution. For the Court to close its eyes to this
fact because of the enrolled bill doctrine is to shrink its duty to
hold
"inviolate what is decreed by the Constitution."[40]
I vote then to
grant these petitions and to declare
R. A. No. 7716 as unconstitutional.
ROMERO, J.:
Few issues brought before this Court for
resolution
have roiled the citizenry as much as the instant case brought by nine
petitioners
which challenges the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716 [to be
referred to herein as the "Expanded Value Added Tax" or EVAT law to
distinguish
it from Executive Order No. 273 which is the VAT law proper] that was
enacted
on May 5, 1994. A visceral issue, it has galvanized the populace into
mass
action and strident protest even as the EVAT proponents have taken to
podia
and media in a post facto information campaign.
The Court is
confronted here with an atypical
case. Not only is it a vatful of seething controversy but some unlikely
petitioners invoke unorthodox remedies. Three Senator-petitioners would
nullify a statute that bore the indispensable stamp of approval of
their
own Chamber with two of them publicly repudiating what they had earlier
endorsed. With two former colleagues, one of them an erstwhile Senate
President,
making common cause with them, they would stay the implementation by
the
Executive Department of a law which they themselves have initiated.
They
address a prayer to a co-equal Department to probe their official acts
for any procedural irregularities they have themselves committed lest
the
effects of these aberrations inflict such damage or irreparable loss as
would bring down the wrath of the people on their heads.cralaw:red
To the extent
that they perceive that a vital
cog in the internal machinery of the Legislature has malfunctioned from
having operated in blatant violation of the enabling Rules they have
themselves
laid down, they would now plead that this other Branch of Government
step
in, invoking the exercise of what is at once a delicate and awesome
power.
Undoubtedly, the case at bench is as much a test for the Legislature as
it is for the Judiciary.cralaw:red
A backward glance
on the Value Added Tax (VAT)
is in order at this point.cralaw:red
The first
codification of the country's internal
revenue laws was effected with the enactment of Commonwealth Act No.
466,
commonly known as the "National Internal Revenue Code" which was
approved
on June 15, 1939 and took effect on July 1, 1939, although the
provisions
on the income tax were made retroactive to January 1, 1939.cralaw:red
Since 1939 when
the turnover tax was replaced
by the manufacturer's sales tax, the Tax Code had provided for a
single-stage
value-added tax on original sales by manufacturers, producers and
importers
computed on the "cost deduction method" and later, on the basis of the
"tax credit method." The turnover tax was re-introduced in 1985 by
Presidential
Decree No. 1991 (as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2006).[1]
In 1986, a tax
reform package was approved by
the Aquino Cabinet. It contained twenty-nine measures, one of which
proposed
the adoption of the VAT, as well as the simplification of the sales tax
structure and the abolition of the turnover tax.cralaw:red
Up until 1987,
the system of taxing goods consisted
of [a] an excise tax on certain selected articles; [b] fixed and
percentage
taxes on original and subsequent sales, on importations and on milled
articles;
and [c] mining taxes on mineral products. Services were subjected to
percentage
taxes based mainly on gross receipts.[2]
On July 25, 1987,
President Corazon C. Aquino
signed into law Executive Order No. 273 which adopted the VAT. From the
former single-stage value-added tax, it introduced the multi-stage VAT
system where "the value-added tax is imposed on the sale of and
distribution
process culminating in sale, to the final consumer. Generally
described,
the taxpayer [the seller] determines his tax liability by computing the
tax on the gross selling price or gross receipt ["output tax"] and
subtracting
or crediting the earlier VAT on the purchase or importation of goods or
on the sale of service ["input tax"] against the tax due on his own
sale."[3]
On January 1,
1988, implementing rules and regulations
for the VAT were promulgated. President Aquino then issued Proclamation
No. 219 on February 12, 1988 urging the public and private sectors to
join
the nationwide consumers' education campaign for VAT.cralaw:red
Soon after the
implementation of Executive Order
No. 273, its constitutionality was assailed before this Court in the
case
of Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc., et
al.
v. Tan.[4]
The four petitioners sought to nullify the VAT law "for being
unconstitutional
in that its enactment is not allegedly within the powers of the
President;
that the VAT is oppressive, discriminatory, regressive, and violates
the
due process and equal protection clauses and other provisions of the
1987
Constitution."[5]
In dismissing the consolidated petitions, this Court stated:
The Court,
following the time-honored doctrine
of separation of powers cannot substitute its judgment for that of the
President as to the wisdom, justice and advisability of the VAT. The
Court
can only look into and determine whether or not Executive Order No. 273
was enacted and made effective as law, in the manner required by and
consistent
with, the Constitution, and to make sure that it was not issued in
grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and,
in
this regard, the Court finds no reason to impede its application or
continued
implementation.[6]
Although declared
constitutional, the VAT law
was sought to be amended from 1992 on by a series of bills filed in
both
Houses of Congress. In chronological sequence, these were:
HB/SB
No.
Date Filed in Congress
HB No. 253
- July 22,
1992
HB No. 771 - August
10,
1992
HB No. 2450 - September 9, 1992
Senate Res. No. 734[7]
- September 10, 1992
HB No. 7033 - February 3, 1993
SB No. 1129[8]
- March 1, 1993
HB No. 8086 - March 9, 1993
HB No. 9030 - May 11, 1993
HB No. 9210[9]
- May 19, 1993
HB No. 9297 - May 25, 1993
HB No. 10012 - July 28, 1993
HB No. 10100 - August 3, 1993
HB No. 11197 in substitution of
HB Nos. 253, 771, 2450, 7033, 8086, 9030,
9210,
9297, 10012 and10100[10]
- November 5, 1993
We now trace the
course taken by H.B. No. 11197
and S.B. No. 1129.cralaw:red
HB/SB No.cralaw:red
HB No. 11197 was
approved in the Lower House on
second reading - November 11, 1993
HB No. 11197 was
approved in the Lower House on
third reading and voted upon with 114 Yeas and 12 Nays - November 17,
1993
HB No. 11197 was
transmitted to the Senate - November
18, 1993
Senate Committee
on Ways and Means submitted Com.
Report No. 349 recommeding for approval SB No. 1630 in substitution of
SB No. 1129, taking into consideration PS Res. No.734 and HB No. 11197[11]
- February 7, 1994
Certification by
President Fidel V.Ramos of Senate
Bill No.1630 for immediate enactment to meet a public emergency - March
22, 1994
SB No. 1630 was
approved by the Senate on second
and third readings and subsequently voted upon with 13 yeas, none
against
and one abstention - March 24, 1994
Transmittal by
the Senate to the Lower House of
a reques tfor a conference in view of disagreeing provisions of SB No.
1630 and HB NO.11197 - March 24, 1994
The Bicameral
Conference Committee conducted various
meetings to reconcile the proposals on the VAT - April 13, 19, 20, 21,
25
The House agreed
on the Conference Committee Report
- April 27, 1994
The Senate agreed
on the ConferenceCommittee Report
- May 2, 1994
The President
signed Republic Act No. 7716 - The
Expanded VAT Law[12]
- May 5, 1994
Republic Act No.
7716 was published in two newspapers
of general circulation - May 12, 1994
Republic Act No.
7716 became effective - May 28,
1994
Republic Act No. 7716 merely expanded the
base
of the VAT law even as the tax retained its multi-stage character.cralaw:red
At the oral
hearing held on July 7, 1994, this
Court delimited petitioners' arguments to the following issues culled
from
their respective petitions.cralaw:red
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Does Republic Act
No. 7716 violate Article VI,
Section 24, of the Constitution?[13]
Does it violate
Article VI, Section 26, paragraph
2, of theConstitution?[14]
What is the
extent of the power of the Bicameral
Conference Committee?
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Does the law
violate the following provisions
in Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution:1.
Section 1[15]
2. Section 4 1[16]
3. Section 5[17]
4. Section 10[18]
Does the law
violate the following other provisions
of the Constitution?
1. Article VI,
Section 28, paragraph 1[19]
2. Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 3[20]
As a result of
the unedifying experience of the
past where the Court had the propensity to steer clear of questions it
perceived to be "political" in nature, the present Constitution, in
contrast,
has explicitly expanded judicial power to include the duty of the
courts,
especially the Supreme Court, "to determine whether or not there has
been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."[21]
I submit that under this explicit mandate, the Court is empowered to
rule
upon acts of other Government entities for the purpose of determining
whether
there may have been, in fact, irregularities committed tantamount to
violation
of the Constitution, which case would clearly constitute a grave abuse
of discretion on their part.cralaw:red
In the words of
the sponsor of the above-quoted
Article of the Constitution on the Judiciary, the former Chief Justice
Roberto R. Concepcion, "the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question
of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has
acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously
as
to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction
or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty
to
pass judgment on matters of this nature.cralaw:red
This is the back
ground of paragraph 2 of Section
1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter exhibit its wonted
reticence
by claiming that such matters constitute a political question."[22]
In the instant petitions, this Court is
called
upon,
not so much to exercise its traditional power of judicial review as to
determine whether or not there has indeed been a grave abuse of
discretion
on the part of the Legislature amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.cralaw:red
Where there are
grounds to resolve a case without
touching on its constitutionality, the Court will do so with utmost
alacrity
in due deference to the doctrine of separation of powers anchored on
the
respect that must be accorded to the other branches of government which
are coordinate, coequal and, as far as practicable, independent of one
another.Once it is palpable that the
constitutional
issue is unavoidable, then it is time to assume jurisdiction, provided
that the following requisites for a judicial inquiry are met: that
there
must be an actual and appropriate case; a personal and substantial
interest
of the party raising the constitutional question; the constitutional
question
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity and the decision of
the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of
the
case itself, the same being the lis mota of the case.[23]
Having assured
ourselves that the above-cited
requisites are present in the instant petitions, we proceed to take
them
up.cralaw:red
ARTICLE VI,
SECTION 24
Some petitioners
assail the constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 7716 as being in violation of Article VI, Section
24
of the Constitution which provides:
All
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application,
and
private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives,
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.cralaw:red
In G.R. Nos.
115455 and 115781, petitioners argue:
(a) The bill
which became Republic Act No. 7716
did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. The
Senate,
after receiving H.B. No. 11197, submitted its own bill, S.B. No. 1630,
and proceeded to vote and approve the same after second and third
readings.cralaw:red
(b) The Senate
exceeded its authority to "propose
or concur with amendments" when it submitted its own bill, S.B. No.
1630,
recommending its approval "in substitution of S.B. No. 1129, taking
into
consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197."
(c) H.B. No.
11197 was not deliberated upon by
the Senate. Neither was it voted upon by the Senate on second and third
readings, as what was voted upon was S.B. No. 1630.
Article VI, Section 24 is taken word for
word
from Article VI, Section 18 of the 1935 Constitution which was, in
turn,
patterned after Article I, Section 7 (1) of the Constitution of the
United
States, which states:
All bills for
raising revenue shall originate
in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur
with
amendments as on other bills.cralaw:red
The historical
precedent for requiring revenue
bills to originate in Congress is explained in the U.S. case of Morgan
v. Murray.[24]
The
constitutional requirement that all bills
for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives
stemmed
from a remedial outgrowth of the historic conflict between Parliament [i.e.,
Commons] and the Crown, whose ability to dominate the monarchially
appointive
and hereditary Lords was patent. [See 1 Story, Constitution, S 875 et
seq., 5th Ed.; 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, pp. 267, 268,
8th Ed., 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, S 806, 3d Ed.] There was
a measure of like justification for the insertion of the provision of
article
I, S 7, cl. 1, of the Federal Constitution. At that time [787] and
thereafter
until the adoption [in 1913] of the Seventeenth Amendment providing for
the direct election of senators, the members of the United States
Senate
were elected for each state by the joint vote of both houses of the
Legislature
of the respective states, and hence, were removed from the people.cralaw:red
The legislative
authority under the 1935 Constitution
being unicameral in the form of the National Assembly, it served no
purpose
to include the subject provision in the draft submitted by the 1934
Constitutional
Convention to the Filipino people for ratification.cralaw:red
In 1940, however,
the Constitution was amended
to establish a bicameral Congress of the Philippines composed of a
House
of Representatives and a Senate. In
the wake of the creation of a new legislative machinery, new provisions
were enacted regarding the law-making power of Congress. The National
Assembly
explained how the final formulation of the subject provision came about:
The concurrence
of both houses would be necessary
to the enactment of a law. However, all appropriation, revenue or
tariff
bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills, should originate exclusively in the
House
of Representatives, although the Senate could propose or concur with
amendments.cralaw:red
In one of the
first drafts of the amendments,
it was proposed to give both houses equal powers in lawmaking. There
was,
however, much opposition on the part of several members of the
Assembly.
In another draft; the following provision, more restrictive than the
present
provision in the amendment, was proposed and for sometime was seriously
considered:
All bills
appropriating public funds, revenue
or tariff bills, bills of local application, and private bills shall
originate
exclusively in the Assembly, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments. In case of disapproval by the Senate of any such bills, the
Assembly may repass the same by a two-thirds vote of all its members,
and
thereupon, the bill so repassed shall be deemed enacted and may be
submitted
to the President for corresponding action. In the event that the Senate
should fail to finally act on any such bills, the Assembly may, after
thirty
days from the opening of the next regular sessions of the same
legislative
term, reapprove the same with a vote of two-thirds of all the members
of
the Assembly. And upon such reapproval, the bill shall be deemed
enacted
and may be submitted to the president for corresponding action.cralaw:red
However, the
special committee voted finally to
report the present amending provision as it is now worded; and in that
form it was approved by the National Assembly with the approval of
Resolution
No. 38 and later of Resolution No. 73.[25]
[Emphasis supplied].
Thus, the present
Constitution is identically
worded as its 1935 precursor: "All appropriation, revenue or tariff
bills,
bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application,
and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives,
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." [Emphasis
supplied].
That all revenue
bills, such as Republic Act No.
7716, should "originate exclusively in the House of Representatives"
logically
flows from the more representative and broadly-based character of this
Chamber.cralaw:red
It is said that
the House of Representatives being
the more popular branch of the legislature, being closer to the people,
and having more frequent contacts with them than the Senate, should
have
the privilege of taking the initiative in the proposals of revenue and
tax project, the disposal of the people's money, and the contracting of
public indebtedness. These powers
of
initiative in the raising and spending of public funds enable the House
of Representatives not only to implement but even to determine the
fiscal
policies of the government. They place on its shoulders much of the
responsibility
of solving the financial problems of the government, which are so
closely
related to the economic life of the country, and of deciding on the
proper
distribution of revenues for such uses as may best advance public
interests.[26]
The popular
nature of the Lower House has been
more pronounced with the inclusion of Presidentially-appointed sectoral
representatives, as provided in Article VI, Section 5 [2], of the
Constitution,
thus: "The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum
of the total number of representatives including those under the party
list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." [Emphasis
supplied].
This novel
provision which was implemented in
the Batasang Pambansa during the martial law regime[27]
was eventually incorporated in the present Constitution in order to
give
those from the marginalized and often deprived sector, an opportunity
to
have their voices heard in the halls of the Legislature, thus giving
substance
and meaning to the concept of "people empowerment."
That the Congressmen indeed have access to, and
consult their constituencies has been demonstrated often enough by the
fact that even after a House bill has been transmitted to the Senate
for
concurrence, some Congressmen have been known to express their desire
to
change their earlier official position or reverse themselves after
having
heard their constituents' adverse reactions to their representations.cralaw:red
In trying to
determine whether the mandate of
the Constitution with regard to the initiation of revenue bills has
been
preserved inviolate, we have recourse to the tried and tested method of
definition of terms. The term "originate" is defined by Webster's New
International
Dictionary [3rd Edition, 1986] as follows: "v.i., to come into being;
begin;
to start."
On the other
hand, the word "exclusively" is defined
by the same Webster's Dictionary as "in an exclusive manner; to the
exclusion
of all others; only; as, it is his, exclusively." Black's Law
Dictionary
has this definition: "apart from all others; only; solely;
substantially
all or for the greater part. To the exclusion of all other; without
admission
of others to participation; in a manner to exclude. Standard Oil Co. of
Texas v. State, Tex. Civ. App., 142 S.W. 2d 519, 521, 522, 523."
This Court had
occasion to define the term "exclusive"
as follows:
In its usual and generally accepted
sense, the
term means possessed to the exclusion of others; appertaining to the
subject
alone; not including, admitting or pertaining to another or others;
undivided,
sole.[28]
When this
writer, during the oral argument of July
7, 1994, asked the petitioner in G. R. No. 115455 whether he considers
the word "exclusively" to be synonymous with "solely," he replied in
the
affirmative.[29]
A careful
examination of the legislative history
traced earlier in this decision shows that the original VAT law,
Executive
Order No. 273, was sought to be amended by ten House bills which
finally
culminated in House Bill No. 11197, as well as two Senate bills. It is
to be noted that the first House Bill No. 253 was filed on July 22,
1992,
and two other House bills followed in quick succession on August 10 and
September 9, 1992 before a Senate Resolution, namely, Senate Res. No.
734,
was filed on September 10, 1992 and much later, a Senate Bill proper,
viz.,
Senate Bill No. 1129 on March 1, 1993. Undoubtedly, therefore, these
bills
originated or had their start in the House and before any Senate bill
amending
the VAT law was filed. In point of time and venue, the conclusion is
ineluctable
that Republic Act No. 7716, which is indisputably a revenue measure,
originated
in the House of Representatives in the form of House Bill No. 253, the
first EVAT bill.cralaw:red
Additionally, the
content and substance of the
ten amendatory House Bills filed over the roughly one-year period from
July 1992 to August 1993 reenforce the position that these revenue
bills,
pertaining as they do, to Executive Order No. 273, the prevailing VAT
law,
originated in the Lower House.cralaw:red
House Bill Nos.
253, 771, 2450, 7033, 8086, 9030,
9210, 9297, 10012 and 10100 were intended to restructure the VAT system
by exempting or imposing the tax on certain items or otherwise
introducing
reforms in the mechanics of implementation.[30]
Of these, House Bill No. 9210 was favored with a Presidential
certification
on the need for its immediate enactment to meet a public emergency.
Easily
the most comprehensive, it noted that the revenue performance of the
VAT,
being far from satisfactory since the collections have always fallen
short
of projections, "the system is rendered inefficient, inequitable and
less
comprehensive." Hence, the Bill proposed several amendments designed to
widen the tax base of the VAT and enhance its administration.[31]
That House Bill
No. 11197 being a revenue bill,
originated from the Lower House was acknowledged, in fact was virtually
taken for granted, by the Chairmen of the Committee on Ways and Means
of
both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Consequently, at the
April 19, 1994 meeting of the Bicameral Conference Committee, the
Members
agreed to make the House Bill as the "frame of reference" or "base" of
the discussions of the Bicameral Conference Committee with the
"amendments"
or "insertions to emanate from the Senate."[32]
As to whether the
bills originated exclusively
in the Lower House is altogether a different matter. Obviously, bills
amendatory
of VAT did not originate solely in the House to the exclusion of all
others
for there were P.S. Res. No. 734 filed in the Senate on September 10,
1992
followed by Senate Bill No. 1129 which was filed on March 1, 1993.
About
a year later, this was substituted by Senate Bill No. 1630 that
eventually
became the EVAT law, namely, Republic Act No. 7716.cralaw:red
Adverting to the
passage of the amendatory VAT
bills in the Lower House, it is to be noted that House Bill No. 11197
which
substituted all the prior bills introduced in said House complied with
the required readings, that is, the first reading consisting of the
reading
of the title and referral to the appropriate Committee, approval on
second
reading on November 11, 1993 and on third reading on November 17, 1993
before being finally transmitted to the Senate. In the Senate, its
identity
was preserved and its provisions were taken into consideration when the
Senate Committee on Ways and Means submitted Com. Report No. 349 which
recommended for approval "S.B. No. 1630 in substitution of S.B. No.
1129,
taking into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197." At
this
stage, the subject bill may be considered to have passed first reading
in the Senate with the submission of said Committee Report No. 349 by
the
Senate Committee on Ways and Means to which it had been referred
earlier.
What remained, therefore, was no longer House Bill No. 11197 but Senate
Bill No. 1630. Thence, the Senate, instead of transmitting the bill to
the Lower House for its concurrence and amendments, if any, took a
"shortcut,"
bypassed the Lower House and instead, approved Senate Bill No. 1630 on
both second and third readings on the same day, March 24, 1994.cralaw:red
The first
irregularity, that is, the failure to
return Senate Bill No. 1630 to the Lower House for its approval is
fatal
inasmuch as the other chamber of legislature was not afforded the
opportunity
to deliberate and make known its views. It is no idle dictum that no
less
than the Constitution ordains: "The legislative power shall be vested
in
the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House
of Representatives."[33]
[Emphasis supplied].
It is to be
pointed out, too, that inasmuch as
Senate Bill No. 1630 which had "taken into consideration" House Bill
No.
11197 was not returned to the Lower House for deliberation, the latter
Chamber had no opportunity at all to express its views thereon or to
introduce
any amendment. The customary practice is, after the Senate has
considered
the Lower House Bill, it returns the same to the House of origin with
its
amendments. In the event that there may be any differences between the
two, the same shall then be referred to a Conference Committee composed
of members from both Chambers which shall then proceed to reconcile
said
differences.cralaw:red
In the instant
case, the Senate transmitted to
the Lower House on March 24, 1994, a letter informing the latter that
it
had "passed S. No. 1630entitled xxx [and] in view of the disagreeing
provisions
of said bill and House Bill No. 11197, entitled xxx the Senate requests
a conference xxx." This, in spite of the fact that Com. Report No. 349
of the Senate Committee on Ways and Means had already recommended for
approval
on February 7, 1994 "S.B. No. 1630 taking into consideration H.B. No.
11197."
Clearly, the Conference Committee could only have acted upon Senate
Bill
No. 1630, for House Bill No. 11197 had already been fused into the
former.cralaw:red
At the oral
hearing of July 7, 1994, petitioner
in G. R. No. 115455 admitted, in response to this writer's query, that
he had attempted to rectify some of the perceived irregularities by
presenting
a motion in the Senate to recall the bill from the Conference Committee
so that it could revert to the period of amendment, but he was
outvoted,
in fact "slaughtered."[34]
In accordance
with the Rules of the House of Representatives
and the Senate, Republic Act No. 7716 was duly authenticated after it
was
signed by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives
followed by the certifications of the Secretary of the Senate and the
Acting
Secretary General of the House of Representatives.[35]
With the signature of President Fidel V. Ramos under the words
"Approved:
5 May 1994," it was finally promulgated.cralaw:red
Its legislative
journey ended, Republic Act No.
7716 attained the status of an enrolled bill which is defined as one
"which
has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the
proper officers of each, approved by the governor [or president] and
filed
by the secretary of state."[36]
Stated differently:
It is a declaration by the two houses,
through
their presiding officers, to the president, that a bill, thus attested,
has received in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the
government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the
constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to
him.
And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited
in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed
Congress
should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no
authority
to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the
custody
of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the
Senate,
and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a
solemn
assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the
government,
charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the
laws,
that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and
independent
departments requires the judicial department to act upon that
assurance,
and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in
the
manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question
properly
arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the
Constitution.[37]
The enrolled
bill assumes importance when there is
some variance between what actually transpired in the halls of
Congress,
as reflected in its journals, and as shown in the text of the law as
finally
enacted. But suppose the journals of either or both Houses fail to
disclose
that the law was passed in accordance with what was certified to by
their
respective presiding officers and the President. Or that certain
constitutional
requirements regarding its passage were not observed, as in the instant
case. Which shall prevail: the journal or the enrolled bill?
A word on the
journal.cralaw:red
The journal is
the official record of the acts
of a legislative body. It should be a true record of the proceedings
arranged
in chronological order. It should be a record of what is done rather
than
what is said. The journal should be a clear, concise, unembellished
statement
of all proposals made and all actions taken complying with all
requirements
of constitutions, statutes, charters or rules concerning what is to be
recorded and how it is to be recorded.[38]
Article VI,
Section 16 [4] of the Constitution
ordains:
Each house shall keep a Journal of its
proceedings,
and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in
its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any
question
shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered
in
the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of
its
proceedings." [Emphasis supplied].
The rationale
behind the above provision and of the
"journal entry rule" is as follows:
It is apparent that the object of this
provision
is to make the legislature show what it has done, leaving nothing
whatever
to implication. And, when the legislature says what it has done, with
regard
to the passage of any bill, it negatives the idea that it has done
anything
else in regard thereto. Silence proves nothing where one is commanded
to
speak. Our constitution commands certain things to be done in regard to
the passage of a bill, and says that no bill shall become a law unless
these things are done. It seems a travesty upon our supreme law to say
that it guaranties to the people the right to have their laws made in
this
manner only, and that there is no way of enforcing this right, or for
the
court to say that this is law when the constitution says it is not law.
There is one safe course which is in harmony with the constitution, and
that is to adhere to the rule that the legislature must show, as
commanded
by the constitution, that it has done everything required by the
constitution
to be done in the serious and important matter of making laws. This is
the rule of evidence provided by the constitution. It is not
presumptuous
in the courts, nor disrespectful to the legislature, to judge the acts
of the legislature by its own evidence.[39]
Confronted with
a discrepancy between the journal
proceedings and the law as duly enacted, courts have indulged in
different
theories. The "enrolled bill" and "journal entry" rules, being rooted
deep
in the Parliamentary practices of England where there is no written
constitution,
and then transplanted to the United States, it may be instructive to
examine
which rule prevails in the latter country through which, by a process
of
legislative osmosis, we adopted them in turn.
There seems to be
three distinct and different
rules as applicable to the enrolled bill recognized by the various
courts
of this country. The first of these rules appears to be that the
enrolled
bill is the ultimate proof and exclusive and conclusive evidence that
the
bill passed the legislature in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.
Such has been the holding in California, Georgia, Kentucky, Texas,
Washington,
New Mexico, Mississippi, Indiana, South Dakota, and may be some others.cralaw:red
The second of the
rules seems to be that the enrolled
bill is a verity and resort cannot be had to the journals of the
Legislature
to show that the constitutional mandates were not complied with by the
Legislature, except as to those provisions of the Constitution,
compliance
with which is expressly required to be shown on the journal. This rule
has been adopted in South Carolina, Montana, Oklahoma, Utah, Ohio, New
Jersey, United States Supreme Court, and others.cralaw:red
The third of the
rules seems to be that the enrolled
bill raises only a prima facie presumption that the mandatory
provisions
of the Constitution have been complied with and that resort may be had
to the journals to refute that presumption, and if the constitutional
provision
is one, compliance with which is expressly required by the Constitution
to be shown on the journals, then the mere silence of the journals to
show
a compliance therewith will refute the presumption. This rule has been
adopted in Illinois, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Tennessee, Arkansas,
Idaho,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Arizona, Oregon, New Jersey, Colorado, and others.[40]
In the 1980 case
of D & W Auto Supply v. Department
of Revenue, the Supreme Court of Kentucky which had subscribed in the
past
to the first of the three theories, made the pronouncement that it had
shifted its stand and would henceforth adopt the third. It justified
its
changed stance, thus:
We believe that a more reasonable rule is
the
one which Professor Sutherland describes as the "extrinsic evidence"
rule.
Under this approach there is a prima facie presumption that an enrolled
bill is valid, but such presumption may be overcome by clear
satisfactory
and convincing evidence establishing that constitutional requirements
have
not been met.[41]
What rule, if
any, has been adopted in this jurisdiction?
Advocates of the
"journal entry rule" cite the
1916 decision in U.S. v. Pons[42]
where this Court placed reliance on the legislative journals to
determine
whether Act No. 2381 was passed on February 28, 1914 which is what
appears
in the Journal, or on March 1, 1914 which was closer to the truth. The
confusion was caused by the adjournment sine die at midnight of
February
28, 1914 of the Philippine Commission.cralaw:red
A close
examination of the decision reveals that
the Court did not apply the "journal entry rule" vis-a-vis the
"enrolled
bill rule" but the former as against what are "behind the legislative
journals."
Passing over the
question of whether the printed
Act [No. 2381] published by authority of law, is conclusive evidence as
to the date when it was passed, we will inquire whether the courts may
go behind the legislative journals for the purpose of determining the
date
of adjournment when such journals are clear and explicit.[43]
It is to be noted
from the above that the Court
"passed over" the probative value to be accorded to the enrolled bill.
Opting for the journals, the Court
proceeded to
explain:
From their very nature and object, the
records
of the Legislature are as important as those of the judiciary, and to
inquire
into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when
they
are, as we have said clear and explicit, would be to violate both the
letter
and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government
was
brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent
department
of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions
of the Legislature.[44]
Following the
courts in the United States since the
Constitution of the Philippine Government is modeled after that of the
Federal Government, the Court did not hesitate to follow the courts in
said country, i.e., to consider the journals decisive of the
point
at issue. Thus: "The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12
midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question and the court
did not err in declining to go behind these journals."[45]
The Court made a
categorical stand for the "enrolled
bill rule" for the first time in the 1947 case of Mabanag v. Lopez Vito[46]
where it held that an enrolled bill imports absolute verity and is
binding
on the courts. This Court held itself bound by an authenticated
resolution,
despite the fact that the vote of three-fourths of the Members of the
Congress
[as required by the Constitution to approve proposals for
constitutional
amendments] was not actually obtained on account of the suspension of
some
members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. In this
connection,
the Court invoked the "enrolled bill rule" in this wise: "If a
political
question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political
departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges
under
the 'enrolled bill rule' born of that respect."[47]
Mindful that the
U.S. Supreme Court is on the
side of those who favor the rule and for no other reason than that it
conforms
to the expressed policy of our law making body [i.e., Sec. 313
of
the old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210], the Court
said that "duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions
of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof." Without pulling the
legal
underpinnings from U.S. v. Pons, it justified its position by saying
that
if the Court at the time looked into the journals, "in all probability,
those were the documents offered in evidence" and that "even if both
the
journals and authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the
disposal
of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply
rejection
of the enrolled theory; for as already stated, the due enactment of a
law
may be proved in either of the two ways specified in Section 313 of Act
No. 190 as amended."[48]
Three Justices voiced their dissent from the majority decision.cralaw:red
Again, the Court
made its position plain in the
1963 case of Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez[49]
when a unanimous Court ruled that: "The enrolled bill is conclusive
upon
the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and
approved
by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of a
bill
before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the
Executive, the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation not by
judicial
decree." According to Webster's New 20th Century Dictionary, 2nd Ed.,
1983,
the word "tenor" means, among others, "the general drift of something
spoken
or written; intent, purport, substance."
Thus, the Court
upheld the respondent Auditor
General's interpretation that Republic Act No. 2609 really exempted
from
the margin fee on foreign exchange transactions "urea formaldehyde" as
found in the law and not "urea and formaldehyde" which petitioner
insisted
were the words contained in the bill and were so intended by Congress.cralaw:red
In 1969, the
Court similarly placed the weight
of its authority behind the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill. In
denying
the motion for reconsideration, the Court ruled in Morales v. Subido
that
"the enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the
President
of the Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the
statute
as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing.
Expressed
elsewise, this is a matter worthy of the attention not of an Oliver
Wendell
Holmes but of a Sherlock Holmes."[50]
The alleged omission of a phrase in the final Act was made, not at any
stage of the legislative proceedings, but only in the course of the
engrossment
of the bill, more specifically in the proofreading thereof.cralaw:red
But the Court did
include a caveat that qualified
the absoluteness of the "enrolled bill" rule stating:
By what we have essayed above we are not
of
course
to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield
to
the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the
Constitution
(Art. VI, secs. 10 [4], 20 [1], and 21 [1]) expressly requires must be
entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a
legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters
entered
on the journal, is a question which we do not now decide (Cf. e.g.,
Wilkes Country Comm'rs. v. Coler, 180 U.S. 506 [1900]). All we hold is
that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on
the
journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.[51]
More recently,
in the 1993 case of Philippine Judges
Association v. Prado,[52]
this Court, in ruling on the unconstitutionality of Section 35 of
Republic
Act No. 7354 withdrawing the franking privilege from the entire
hierarchy
of courts, did not so much adhere to the enrolled bill rule alone as to
both "enrolled bill and legislative journals." Through Mr. Justice
Isagani
A. Cruz, We stated: "Both the enrolled bill and the legislative
journals
certify that the measure was duly enacted, i.e., in accordance
with
Article VI, Sec. 26[2] of the Constitution. We are bound by such
official
assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we
owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy."
Aware of the
shifting sands on which the validity
and continuing relevance of the "enrolled bill" theory rests, I have
taken
pains to trace the history of its applicability in this jurisdiction,
as
influenced in varying degrees by different Federal rulings.cralaw:red
As applied to the
instant petition, the issue
posed is whether or not the procedural irregularities that attended the
passage of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630, outside of
the
reading and printing requirements which were exempted by the
Presidential
certification, may no longer be impugned, having been "saved" by the
conclusiveness
on us of the enrolled bill. I see no cogent reason why we cannot
continue
to place reliance on the enrolled bill, but only with respect to
matters
pertaining to the procedure followed in the enactment of bills in
Congress
and their subsequent engrossment, printing errors, omission of words
and
phrases and similar relatively minor matters relating more to form and
factual issues which do not materially alter the essence and substance
of the law itself.cralaw:red
Certainly,
"courts cannot claim greater ability
to judge procedural legitimacy, since constitutional rules on
legislative
procedure are easily mastered. Procedural disputes are over facts
whether or not the bill had enough votes, or three readings, or
whatever
not over the meaning of the constitution. Legislators, as eyewitnesses,
are in a better position than a court to rule on the facts. The
argument
is also made that legislatures would be offended if courts examined
legislative
procedure.[53]
Such a rationale,
however, cannot conceivably
apply to substantive changes in a bill introduced towards the end of
its
tortuous trip through Congress, catching both legislators and the
public
unawares and altering the same beyond recognition even by its sponsors.cralaw:red
This issue I wish
to address forthwith.cralaw:red
EXTENT OF THE
POWER OF THE BICAMERAL CONFERENCE
COMMITTEE
One of the issues
raised in these petitions, especially
in G. R. Nos. 115781, 115543 and 115754, respectively, is whether or
not:
Congress violated Section 26, Par. 2,
Article
VI [of the 1987 Constitution] when it approved the Bicameral Conference
Committee Report which embodied, in violation of Rule XII of the Rules
of the Senate, a radically altered tax measure containing provisions
not
reported out or discussed in either House as well as provisions on
which
there was no disagreement between the House and the Senate and, worse,
provisions contrary to what the House and the Senate had approved after
three separate readings.[54]
and
By adding or deleting provisions, when
there
was no conflicting provisions between the House and Senate versions,
the
BICAM acted in excess of its jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of
discretion
as to amount to loss of jurisdiction..In adding to the bill and
thus
subjecting to VAT, real properties, media and cooperatives despite the
contrary decision of both Houses, the BICAM exceeded its jurisdiction
or
acted with such abuse of discretion as to amount to loss of
jurisdiction.[55]
I wish to
consider this issue in the light of Article
VIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution which provides that "(j)udicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
We are also guided by the principle that a court may interfere with the
internal procedures of its coordinate branch only to uphold the
Constitution.[56]
A conference
committee has been defined:
Unlike the joint committee is two
committees,
one appointed by each house. It is normally appointed for a specific
bill
and its function is to gain accord between the two houses either by the
recession of one house from its bill or its amendments or by the
further
amendment of the existing legislation or by the substitution of an
entirely
new bill. Obviously the conference committee is always a special
committee
and normally includes the member who introduced the bill and the
chairman
of the committee which considered it together with such other
representatives
of the house as seem expedient. (Horack, Cases and Materials on
Legislation
[1940] 220. See also Zinn, Conference Procedure in Congress, 38 ABAJ
864
[1952]; Steiner, The Congressional Conference Committee [U of III.
Press,1951]).[57]
From the
foregoing definition, it is clear that a
bicameral conference committee is a creature, not of the Constitution,
but of the legislative body under its power to determine rules of its
proceedings
under Article VI, Sec. 16 (3) of the Constitution. Thus, it draws its
life
and vitality from the rules governing its creation. The why, when, how
and wherefore of its operations, in other words, the parameters within
which it is to function, are to be found in Section 26, Rule XII of the
Rules of the Senate and Section 85 of the Rules of the House of
Representatives,
respectively, which provide:
Rule XII, Rules of the Senate
Sec. 26. In the event that the Senate
does
not
agree with the House of Representatives on the provision of any bill or
joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a conference
committee
of both Houses which shall meet within ten days after their composition.
The President shall designate the
members
of the
conference committee in accordance with subparagraph (c), Section 8 of
Rule III.
Each Conference Committee Report
shall
contain
a detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or
amendments
to the subject measure, and shall be signed by the conferees.
The consideration of such report
shall not
be
in order unless the report has been filed with the Secretary of the
Senate
and copies thereof have been distributed to the Members.
Rules of the House of Representatives
Sec. 85. Conference Committee
Reports.-
In the event that the House does not agree with the Senate on the
amendments
to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be settled by
conference
committee of both Chambers.
The consideration of conference
committee
reports
shall always be in order, except when the journal is being read, while
the roll is being called or the House is dividing on any question. Each
of the pages of such reports shall contain a detailed, sufficiently
explicit
statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure.
The consideration of such report shall
not be
in order unless copies thereof are distributed to the Members: Provided,
That in the last fifteen days of each session period it shall be deemed
sufficient that three copies of the report, signed as above provided,
are
deposited in the office of the Secretary General.
Under these
Rules, a bicameral conference committee
comes into being only when there are disagreements and differences
between
the Senate and the House with regard to certain provisions of a
particular
legislative act which have to be reconciled.
Jefferson's
Manual, which, according to Section
112, Rule XLIX of the Senate Rules, supplements it, states that a
conference
committee is usually called "on the occasion of amendments between the
Houses" and "in all cases of difference of opinion between the two
House
on matters pending between them."[58]
It further states:
The managers of a conference must confine
themselves
to the differences committed to them, and may not include subjects not
within the disagreements, even though germane to a question in issue.
But
they may perfect amendments committed to them if they do not in so
doing
go beyond the differences. Managers may not change the text to which
both
Houses have agreed.[59]
[Emphasis
supplied].
Mason's Manual
of Legislative Procedures which
is also considered as controlling authority for any situation not
covered
by a specific legislative rule,[60]
states that either House may "request a conference with the other on
any
matter of difference or dispute between them" and that in such a
request,
"the subject of the conference should always be stated."[61]
In the
Philippines, as in the United States, the
Conference Committee exercises such a wide range of authority that they
virtually constitute a third House in the Legislature. As admitted by
the
Solicitor General, "It was the practice in past Congresses for
Conference
Committees to insert in bills approved by the two Houses new provisions
that were not originally contemplated by them."[62]In Legislative Procedure,
Robert
Luce gives a graphic description of the milieu and the circumstances
which
have conspired to transform an initially innocuous mechanism designed
to
facilitate action into an all-powerful Frankenstein that brooks no
challenge
to its authority even from its own members:
Their power lies chiefly in the fact that
reports
of conference committees must be accepted without amendment or else
rejected
in toto. The impulse is to get done with the matters and so the motion
to accept has undue advantage, for some members are sure to prefer
swallowing
unpalatable provisions rather than prolong controversy. This is the
more
likely if the report comes in the rush of business toward the end of a
session, when to seek further conference might result in the loss of
the
measure altogether. At any time in the session there is some risk of
such
a result following the rejection of a conference report, for it may not
be possible to secure a second conference, or delay may give opposition
to the main proposal chance to develop more strength.
xxx xxx xxx
Entangled in a network of rule and
custom,
the
Representative who resents and would resist this theft of his rights,
finds
himself helpless. Rarely can he vote, rarely can he voice his mind, in
the matter of any fraction of the bill. Usually he cannot even record
himself
as protesting against some one feature while accepting the measure as
whole.
Worst of all, he cannot by argument or suggested change, try to improve
what the other branch has done.
This means more than the subversion of
individual
rights. It means to a degree the abandonment of whatever advantage the
bicameral system may have. By so much it in effect transfers the
lawmaking
power to a small group of members who work out in private a decision
that
almost always prevails. What is worse, these men are not chosen in a
way
to ensure the wisest choice. It has become the practice to name as
conferees
the ranking members of the committee, so that the accident of seniority
determines. Exceptions are made, but in general it is not a question of
who are most competent to serve. Chance governs, sometimes giving way
to
favor, rarely to merit.
xxx xxx xxx
Speaking broadly, the system of
legislating
by
conference committee is unscientific and therefore defective. Usually
it
forfeits the benefit of scrutiny and judgment by all the wisdom
available.
Uncontrolled, it is inferior to that process by which every amendment
is
secured independent discussion and vote.[63]
[mphasis supplied].
Not
surprisingly has it been said: "Conference Committee
action is the most undemocratic procedure in the legislative process;
it
is an appropriate target for legislative critics."[64]
In the case at
bench, petitioners insist that
the Conference Committee to which Senate Bill No. 1630 and House Bill
No.
11197 were referred for the purpose of harmonizing their differences,
overreached
themselves in not confining their "reconciliation" function to those
areas
of disagreement in the two bills but actually making "surreptitious
insertions"
and deletions which amounted to a grave abuse of discretion.cralaw:red
At this point, it
becomes imperative to focus
on the errant provisions which found their way into Republic Act No.
7716.
Below is a breakdown to facilitate understanding the grounds for
petitioners'
objections:
INSERTIONS
MADE BY BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE
[BICAM] TO SENATE BILL [SB] NO. 1630 AND HOUSE BILL [HB] NO. 11197
1. Sec. 99 of the
National Internal Revenue Code
[NIRC]
[1] Under the H.B., this section includes
any
person who, in the course of trade or business, sells, barters or
exchanges
goods or properties and any person who leases personal properties.
[2] The S.B. completely changed the
said
section
and defined a number of words and phrases. Also, Section 99-A was added
which included one who sells, exchanges, barters properties and one who
imports properties.
[3] The BICAM version makes Lessors of
goods
or
properties and importers of goods liable to VAT [subject of petition in
G. R. No. 115754].
2. Section 100
[VAT on Sale of Goods]
The term "goods" or "properties" includes
the
following, which were not found in either the H.B. or the S.B.:
In addition to radio and television
time;
satellite
transmission and cable television time.
The term "Other similar properties"
was
deleted,
which was present in the HB and the SB.
Real properties held primarily
for
sale
to customers or held for lease in the ordinary course or business were
included, which was neither in the H.B. nor the S.B. [subject of
petition
in G. R. No. 115754].
3. Section 102
On what are
included in the term "sale or exchange
of services," as to make them subject to VAT, the BICAM
included/inserted
the following [not found in either House or Senate Bills]:
1. Services of lessors of property,
whether
personal
or real [subject of petition in G. R. No. 115754];
2. Warehousing services;
3. Keepers of resthouses, pension
houses,
inns,
resorts;
4. Common carriers by land, air and
sea;
5. Services of franchise grantees of
telephone
and telegraph;
6. Radio and television broadcasting;
7. All other franchise grantees except
those
under
Section 117 of this Code [subject of petition in G. R. No. 115852];
8. Services of surety, fidelity,
indemnity,
and
bonding companies;
9. Also inserted by the BICAM [on page
8
thereof]
is the lease or use of or the right to use of satellite transmission
and
cable television time.
4. Section 103
[Exempt Transactions]
The BICAM deleted
subsection [f] in its entirety,
despite its inclusion in both the House and Senate Bills. Therefore,
under
Republic Act No. 7716, the "printing, publication, importation or sale
of books and any newspaper, magazine, review, or bulletin which appears
at regular intervals with fixed prices for subscription and sale and
which
is not devoted principally to the publication of advertisements" is
subject
to VAT [subject of petition in G. R. No. 115931 and G. R. No. 115544].cralaw:red
The HB and SB did
not touch Subsection (g) but
it was amended by the BICAM by changing the word TEN to FIVE. Thus,
importation
of vessels with tonnage of more than five thousand tons is VAT exempt.cralaw:red
Subsection L,
which was identical in the HB and
the SB that stated that medical, dental, hospital and veterinary
services
were exempted from the VAT was amended by the BICAM by adding the
qualifying
phrase: EXCEPT THOSE RENDERED BY PROFESSIONALS, thus subjecting
doctors,
dentists and veterinarians to the VAT.cralaw:red
Subsection U
which exempts from VAT "transactions
which are exempt under special laws," was amended by the BICAM by
adding
the phrase: EXCEPT THOSE GRANTED UNDER P.D. Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491,
AND
1590, AND NON-ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES UNDER R.A. 6938 [subject of
petition
in G. R. No. 115873], not found in either the H.B. or the S.B.,
resulting
in the inclusion of all cooperatives to the VAT, except non-electric
cooperatives.cralaw:red
The sale of real
properties was included in the
exempt transactions under the House Bill, but the BICAM qualified this
with the provision:
(S) SALE OF REAL PROPERTIES NOT PRIMARILY
HELD
FOR SALE TO CUSTOMERS OR HELD FOR LEASE IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF TRADE
OR BUSINESS OR REAL PROPERTY UTILIZED FOR LOW-COST AND SOCIALIZED
HOUSING
AS DEFINED BY RA NO. 7279 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND
HOUSING ACT OF 1992 AND OTHER RELATED LAWS. [Subject of petition in G.
R. No. 115754].
The BICAM also
exempted the sale of properties, the
receipts of which are not less than P480,000.00 or more than
P720,000.00.
Under the S.B., no amount was given, but in the H.B. it was stated that
receipts from the sale of properties not less than P350,000.00 nor more
than P600,000.00 were exempt.
It did not
include, as VAT exempt, the sale or
transfer of securities, as defined in the Revised Securities Act [BP
178]
which was contained in both Senate and House Bills.cralaw:red
5. Section 104
Not included in
the H.B. or the S.B. is the phrase
"INCLUDING PACKAGING MATERIALS" which was inserted by the BICAM in
Section
104 (A) (1) (B), thus excluding from creditable input tax packaging
materials
and the phrase "ON WHICH A VALUE-ADDED TAX HAS BEEN ACTUALLY PAID" in
Section
104 [A] (2).cralaw:red
6. Section 107
Both House and
Senate Bills provide for the payment
of P500.00 VAT registration fee but this was increased by BICAM to
P1,000.00.cralaw:red
7. Section 112
Regarding a
person whose sales or receipts are
exempt under Section 103 [w], the BICAM inserted the phrase: "THREE
PERCENT
UPON THE EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT AND FOUR PERCENT [4%] TWO YEARS
THEREAFTER,"
although the S.B. and the H.B. provide only "three percent of his gross
quarterly sales."
8. Section 115
The BICAM adopted
the H.B. version which subjects
common carriers by land, air or water for the transport of passengers
to
3% of their gross quarterly sales, which is not found in the S.B.cralaw:red
9. Section 117
The BICAM amended
this section by subjecting franchises
on electric, gas and water utilities to a tax of two percent (2%) on
gross
receipts derived, although neither the H.B. nor the S.B. has a similar
provision.cralaw:red
10. Section 17 (d)
(a) The BICAM defers for only 2 years the
VAT
on services of actors and actresses, although the S.B. defers it for 3
years.
(b) The BICAM uses the word "EXCLUDE"
in the
section
on deferment of VAT collection on certain goods and services. The H.B.
does not contain any counterpart provision and S.B. only allows
deferment
for no longer than 3 years.
11. Section 18 on the Tax
Administration
Development
Fund is an entirely new provision not contained in the House/Senate
Bills.
This fund is supposed to ensure effective implementation of Republic
Act
No. 7716.
12. Section 19
No period within
which to promulgate the implementing
rules and regulations is found in the H.B. or the S.B. but BICAM
provided
"within 90 days" which found its way in Republic Act No. 7716.
Even a cursory perusal of the above outline will
convince one that, indeed, the Bicameral Conference Committee
[henceforth
to be referred to as BICAM] exceeded the power and authority granted in
the Rules of its creation. Both Senate and House Rules limit the task
of
the Conference Committee in almost identical language to the settlement
of differences in the provisions or amendments to any bill or joint
resolution.
If it means anything at all, it is that there are provisions in subject
bill, to start with, which differ and, therefore, need reconciliation.
Nowhere in the Rules is it authorized to initiate or propose completely
new matter. Although under certain rules on legislative procedure, like
those in Jefferson's Manual, a conference committee may introduce
germane
matters in a particular bill, such matters should be circumscribed by
the
committee's sole authority and function to reconcile differences.cralaw:red
Parenthetically,
in the Senate and in the House,
a matter is "germane" to a particular bill if there is a common tie
between
said matter and the provisions which tend to promote the object and
purpose
of the bill it seeks to amend. If it introduces a new subject matter
not
within the purview of the bill, then it is not "germane" to the bill.[65]
The test is whether or not the change represented an amendment or
extension
of the basic purpose of the original, or the introduction of an
entirely
new and different subject matter.[66]
In the BICAM,
however, the germane subject matter
must be within the ambit of the disagreement between the two Houses. If
the "germane" subject is not covered by the disagreement but it is
reflected
in the final version of the bill as reported by the Conference
Committee
or, if what appears to be a "germane" matter in the sense that it is
"relevant
or closely allied"[67]
with the purpose of the bill, was not the subject of a disagreement
between
the Senate and the House, it should be deemed an extraneous matter or
even
a "rider" which should never be considered legally passed for not
having
undergone the three-day reading requirement. Insertion of new matter on
the part of the BICAM is, therefore, an ultra vires act which makes the
same void.cralaw:red
The determination
of what is "germane" and what
is not may appear to be a difficult task but the Congress, having been
confronted with the problem before, resolved it in accordance with the
rules. In that case, the Congress approved a Conference Committee's
insertion
of new provisions that were not contemplated in any of the provisions
in
question between the Houses simply because of the provision in
Jefferson's
Manual that conferees may report matters "which are germane
modifications
of subjects in disagreement between the Houses and the committee.[68]
In other words, the matter was germane to the points of disagreement
between
the House and the Senate.cralaw:red
As regards
inserted amendments in the BICAM, therefore,
the task of determining what is germane to a bill is simplified, thus:
If the amendments are not circumscribed by the subjects of disagreement
between the two Houses, then they are not germane to the purpose of the
bill.In the instant case before Us, the
insertions
and deletions made do not merely spell an effort at settling
conflicting
provisions but have materially altered the bill, thus giving rise to
the
instant petitions on the part of those who were caught unawares by the
legislative legerdemain that took place. Going by the definition of the
word "amendment" in Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed., 1979, which means
"to change or modify for the better; to alter by modification,
deletion,
or addition," said insertions and deletions constitute amendments.
Consequently,
these violated Article VI, Section 26 [2] which provides inter alia:
"Upon
the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall beallowed." This
proscription is intended to subject all bills and their amendments to
intensive
deliberation by the legislators and the ample ventilation of issues to
afford the public an opportunity to express their opinions or
objections
issues to afford the public an opportunity to express their opinions or
objections thereon. The same rationale underlies the three-reading
requirement
to the end that no surprises may be sprung on an unsuspecting citizenry.cralaw:red
Provisions of the
"now you see it, now you don't"
variety, meaning those which were either in the House and/or Senate
versions
but simply disappeared or were "bracketed out" of existence in the
BICAM
Report, were eventually incorporated in Republic Act No. 7716. Worse,
some
goods, properties or services which were not covered by the two
versions
and, therefore, were never intended to be so covered, suddenly found
their
way into the same Report. No advance notice of such insertions prepared
the rest of the legislators, much less the public who could be
adversely
affected, so that they could be given the opportunity to express their
views thereon. Well has the final BICAM report been described,
therefore,
as an instance of "taxation without representation."
That the
conferees or delegates in the BICAM representing
the two Chambers could not possibly be charged with bad faith or
sinister
motives or, at the very least, unseemly behavior, is of no moment. The
stark fact is that items not previously subjected to the VAT now fell
under
its coverage without interested sectors or parties having been afforded
the opportunity to be heard thereon. This is not to say that the
Conference
Committee Report should have undergone the three readings required in
Article
VI, Section 26 [2], for this clearly refers only to bills which, after
having been initially filed in either House, negotiated the
labyrinthine
passage therein until its approval. The composition of the BICAM
including
as it usually does, the Chairman of the appropriate Committee, the
sponsor
of the bill and other interested members ensures an informed
discussion,
at least with respect to the disagreeing provisions. The same does not
obtain as regards completely new matter which suddenly spring on the
legislative
horizon.cralaw:red
It has been
pointed out that such extraneous matters
notwithstanding, all Congressman and Senators were given the
opportunity
to approve or turn down the Committee Report in toto, thus
"curing"
whatever defect or irregularity it bore.cralaw:red
Earlier in this
opinion, I explained that the
source of the acknowledged power of this ad hoc committee stems from
the
precise fact that, the meetings, being scheduled "take it or leave it"
basis. It has not been uncommon for legislators who, for one reason or
another have been frustrated in their attempt to pass a pet bill in
their
own chamber, to work for its passage in the BICAM where it may enjoy a
more hospitable reception and faster approval. In the instant case, had
there been full, open and unfettered discussion on the bills during the
Committee sessions, there would not have been as much vociferous
objections
on this score. Unfortunately, however, the Committee held two of the
five
sessions behind closed doors, sans stenographers, record-takers and
interested
observers. To that extent, the proceedings were shrouded in mystery and
the public's right to information on matters of public concern as
enshrined
in Article III, Section 7[69]
and the government's policy of transparency in transactions involving
public
interest in Article II, Section 28 of theConstitution[70]
are undermined.cralaw:red
Moreover, that
which is void ab initio such as
the objectionable provisions in the Conference Committee Report, cannot
be "cured" or ratified. For all intents and purposes, these never
existed.
Quae ab initio non valent, ex post facto convalescere non
possunt.
Things that are invalid from the beginning are not made valid by a
subsequent
act.cralaw:red
Should this
argument be unacceptable, the "enrolled
bill" doctrine, in turn, is invoked to support the proposition that the
certification by the presiding officers of Congress, together with the
signature of the President, bars further judicial inquiry into the
validity
of the law. I reiterate my submission that the "enrolled bill ruling"
may
be applicable but only with respect to questions pertaining to the
procedural
enactment, engrossment, printing, the insertion or deletion of a word
or
phrase here and there, but would draw a dividing line with respect to
substantial
substantive changes, such as those introduced by the BICAM herein.cralaw:red
We have before Us
then the spectacle of a body
created by the two Houses of Congress for the very limited purpose of
settling
disagreements in provisions between bills emanating therefrom,
exercising
the plenary legislative powers of the parent chambers but holding
itself
exempt from the mandatory constitutional requirements that are the
hallmarks
of legislation under the aegis of a democratic political system. From
the
initial filing, through the three readings which entail detailed
debates
and discussions in Committee and plenary sessions, and on to the
transmittal
to the other House in a repetition of the entire process to ensure
exhaustive
deliberations all these have been skipped over. In the proverbial
twinkling of an eye, provisions that probably may not have seen the
light
of day had they but run their full course through the legislative mill,
sprang into existence and emerged full-blown laws.cralaw:red
Yet our
Constitution vests the legislative power
in "the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and
a House ofRepresentatives."[71]
and not in any special, standing or super committee of its own
creation,
no matter that these have been described, accurately enough, as "the
eye,
the ear, the hand, and very often the brain of the house."
Firstly, that
usage or custom has sanctioned this
abbreviated, if questionable, procedure does not warrant its being
legitimized
and perpetuated any longer. Consuetudo, contra rationem introducta,
potius
usurpatio quam consuetudo appellari debet. A custom against reason is
rather
an usurpation. In the hierarchy of sources of legislative procedure,
constitutional
rules, statutory provisions and adopted rules [as for example, the
Senate
and House Rules], rank highest, certainly much ahead of customs and
usages.cralaw:red
Secondly, is this
Court to assume the role of
passive spectator or indulgent third party, timorous about exercising
its
power or more importantly, performing its duty, of making a judicial
determination
on the issue of whether there has been grave abuse of discretion by the
other branches or instrumentalities of government, where the same is
properly
invoked? The time is past when the Court was not loathe to raise the
bogeyman
of the political question to avert a head-on collision with either the
Executive or Legislative Departments. Even the separation of powers
doctrine
was burnished to a bright sheen as often as it was invoked to keep the
judiciary within bounds. No longer does this condition obtain. Article
VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution partly quoted in this paragraph has
broadened the scope of judicial inquiry. This Court can now safely
fulfill
its mandate of delimiting the powers of co-equal departments like the
Congress,
its officers or its committees which may have no compunctions about
exercising
legislative powers in full.cralaw:red
Thirdly, dare we
close our eyes to the presumptuous
assumption by a runaway committee of its progenitor's legislative
powers
in derogation of the rights of the people, in the process, subverting
the
democratic principles we all are sworn to uphold, when a proper case is
made out for our intervention? The answers to the above queries are
self-evident.cralaw:red
I call to mind
this exhortation: "We are sworn
to see that violations of the constitution by any person,
corporation,
state agency or branch of government are brought to light and
corrected.
To countenance an artificial rule of law that silences our voices when
confronted with violations of our Constitution is not acceptable to
this
Court."[72]
I am not unaware
that a rather recent decision
of ours brushed aside an argument that a provision in subject law
regarding
the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and this
Court itself, not having been included in the original version of
Senate
Bill No. 720 or of House Bill No. 4200 but only in the Conference
Committee
Report, was violative of Article VI, Section 26 [2] of the
Constitution.
Likewise, that said Section 35, never having been a subject of
disagreement
between both Houses, could not have been validly added as an amendment
before the Conference Committee.cralaw:red
The majority
opinion in said case explained:
While it is true that a conference
committee
is the mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate and
the
House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its
broader
function is described thus:
A conference committee may deal generally
with
the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise
differences
between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by
rule
limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the
freedom
with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill.
But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results,
results
beyond its mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules impose
strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is
symptomatic
of the authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative
Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81).[73]
[Emphasis supplied].
At the risk of
being repetitious, I wish to point
out that the general rule, as quoted above, is: "Even where the
conference
committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative
custom
severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be
inserted
into the conference bill." What follows, that is, "occasionally a
conference
committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its mandate." is
the exception. Then it concludes with a declaration that: "This is
symptomatic
of the authoritarian power of conference committee." Are we about to
reinstall
another institution that smacks of authoritarianism which, after our
past
experience, has become anathema to the Filipino people?
The ruling above
can hardly be cited in support
of the proposition that a provision in a BICAM report which was not the
subject of differences between the House and Senate versions of a bill
cannot be nullified. It submit that such is not authorized in our Basic
Law. Moreover, this decision concerns merely one provision whereas the
BICAM Report that culminated in the EVAT law has a wider scope as it,
in
fact, expanded the base of the original VAT law by imposing the tax on
several items which were not so covered prior to the EVAT.cralaw:red
One other flaw in
most BICAM Reports, not excluding
this one under scrutiny, is that, hastily drawn up, it often fails to
conform
to the Senate and House Rules requiring no less than a "detailed" and
"sufficiently
explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject
measure."
The Report of the committee, as may be gleaned from the preceding
pages,
was no more than the final version of the bill as "passed" by the
BICAM.
The amendments or subjects of dissension, as well as the reconciliation
made by the committee, are not even pointed out, much less explained
therein.cralaw:red
It may be argued
that legislative rules of procedure
may properly be suspended, modified, revoked or waived at will by the
legislators
themselves.[74]
This principle, however, does not come into play in interpreting what
the
record of the proceedings shows was, or was not, done. It is rather
designed
to test the validity of legislative action where the record shows a
final
action in violation or disregard of legislative rules.[75]
Utilizing the Senate and the House Rules as both guidelines and
yardstick,
the BICAM here obviously did not adhere to the rule on what the Report
should contain.cralaw:red
Given all these
irregularities that have apparently
been engrafted into the BICAM system, and which have been tolerated, if
not accorded outright acceptance by everyone involved in or conversant
with, the institution, it may be asked: Why not leave well enough alone?
That these
practices have remained unchallenged
in the past does not justify our closing our eyes and turning a deaf
ear
to them. Writ large is the spectacle of a mechanism ensconced in the
very
heart of the people's legislative halls, that now stands indicted with
the charge of arrogating legislative powers unto itself through the use
of dubious "shortcuts." Here, for the people to judge, is the "mother
of
all shortcuts."
In the petitions
at bench, we are confronted with
the enactment of a tax law which was designed to broaden the tax base.
It is rote learning for any law student that as an attribute of
sovereignty,
the power to tax is "the strongest of all the powers of government."[76]
Admittedly, "for all its plenitude, the power to tax is not unconfined.
There are restrictions."[77]
Were there none, then the oft-quoted 1803 dictum of Chief Justice
Marshall
that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy"[78]
would be a truism. Happily, we can concur with, and the people can find
comfort in, the reassuring words of Mr. Justice Holmes: "The power to
tax
is not the power to destroy while this Court sits."[79]
Manakanaka, mayroong dumudulog dito sa
Kataastaasang
Hukuman na may kamangha-manghang hinaing. Angkop na halimbawa ay ang
mga
petisyong iniharap ngayon sa amin.Ang
ilan
sa kanila ay mga Senador na nais mapawalang bisa ang isang batas ukol
sa
buwis na ipinasa mismo nila. Diumano ito ay hindi tumalima sa mga
itinatadhana
ng Saligang Batas. Bukod sa rito, tutol sila sa mga bagong talata na
isiningit
ng "Bicameral Conference Committee" na nagdagdag ng mga bagong bagay
bagay
at serbisyo na papatawan ng buwis. Ayon sa kanila, ginampanan ng
komiteng
iyan ang gawain na nauukol sa buong Kongreso. Kung kaya't ang nararapat
na mangyari ay ihatol ng Kataastaasang Hukuman na malabis na
pagsasamantala
sa sariling pagpapasiya ang ginawa ng Kongreso.
Bagama't bantulot kaming makialam sa
isang
kapantay na sangay ng Pamahalaan, hindi naman nararapat na kami ay
tumangging
gampanan ang tungkulin na iniatas sa amin ng Saligang Batas.
Lalu't-lalo
nang ang batas na kinauukulan ay maaaring makapinsala sa nakararami sa
sambayanan.
Sa ganang akin, itong batas na
inihaharap
sa amin ngayon, ay totoong labag sa Saligang Batas, samakatuwid ay
walang
bisa. Nguni't ito ay nauukol lamang sa mga katiwalian na may kinalaman
sa paraan ng pagpapasabatas nito. Hindi namin patakaran ang makialam o
humadlang sa itinakdang gawain ng Saligang Batas sa Pangulo at sa
Kongreso.
Ang dalawang sangay na iyan ng Pamahalaan ang higit na maalam ukol sa
kung
ang anumang panukalang batas ay nararapat, kanais-nais o magagampanan;
kung kaya't hindi kami nararapat na maghatol o magpapasiya sa mga bagay
na iyan. Ang makapapataw ng angkop na lunas sa larangan na iyan ay ang
mismong mga kinatawan ng sambayanan sa Kongreso.
Faced with this
challenge of protecting the rights
of the people by striking down a law that I submit is unconstitutional
and in the process, checking the wonted excesses of the Bicameral
Conference
Committee system, I see in this case a suitable vehicle to discharge
the
Court's Constitutional mandate and duty of declaring that there has
indeed
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction
on the part of the Legislature.
Republic Act No.
7716, being unconstitutional
and void, I find no necessity to rule on the substantive issues as
dealt
with in the majority opinion as they have been rendered moot and
academic.
These issues pertain to the intrinsic merits of the law. It is
axiomatic
that the wisdom, desirability and advisability of enacting certain laws
lie, not within the province of the Judiciary but that of the political
departments, the Executive and the Legislative. The relief sought by
petitioners
from what they perceive to be the harsh and onerous effect of the EVAT
on the people is within their reach. For Congress, of which
Senator-petitioners
are a part, can furnish the solution by either repealing or amending
the
subject law.cralaw:red
For the foregoing
reasons, I vote to grant the
petition.
PUNO, J.:
Petitioners plead that We affirm the
self-evident
proposition that they who make law should not break the law. There are
many evils whose elimination can be trusted to time. The evil of
lawlessness
in lawmaking cannot. It must be slain on sight for it subverts the
sovereignty
of the people.
First, a fast
snapshot of the facts. On November
17, 1993, the House of Representatives passed on third reading House
Bill
[H.B.] No. 11197 entitled "An Act Restructuring the Value Added Tax
[VAT]
System to Widen its Tax Base and Enhance its Administration, Amending
for
These Purposes Sections 99, 100, 102 to 108 and 110 Title V and 236,
237
and 238 of Title IX, and Repealing Sections 113 and 114 of Title V, all
of the National Internal Revenue Code as Amended." The vote was 114
Yeas
and 12 Nays. The next day, November 18, 1993, H.B. No. 11197 was
transmitted
to the Senate for its concurrence by the Hon. Camilo L. Sabio,
Secretary
General of the House of Representatives.cralaw:red
On February 7,
1994, the Senate Committee on Ways
and Means submitted Senate Bill [S.B.] No. 1630, recommending its
approval
"in substitution of Senate Bill No. 1129 taking into consideration P.S.
Res. No. 734 and House Bill No. 11197." On March 24, 1994, S.B. No.
1630
was approved on second and third readings. On the same day, the Senate,
thru Secretary Edgardo E. Tumangan, requested the House for a
conference
"in view of the disagreeing provisions of S.B. No. 1630 and H.B. No.
11197."
It designated the following as members of its Committee: Senators
Ernesto
F. Herrera, Leticia R. Shahani, Alberto S. Romulo, John H.
Osmeña,
Ernesto M. Maceda, Blas F. Ople, Francisco S. Tatad, Rodolfo G. Biazon,
and Wigberto S. Tañada. On the part of the House, the members of
the Committee were: Congressmen Exequiel B. Javier, James L.
Chiongbian,
Renato V. Diaz, Arnulfo P. Fuentebella, Mariano M. Tajon, Gregorio
Andolong,
Thelma Almario, and Catalino Figueroa. After five (5) meetings,[1]
the Bicameral Conference Committee submitted its Report to the Senate
and
the House stating:
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT
The Conference Committee on the
disagreeing
provisions
of House Bill No. 11197, entitled:
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE
ADDED TAX
[VAT]
SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING
FOR
THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 AND
110 OF TITLE IV, 112, 115 AND 116 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237, AND 238 OF
TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113 AND 114 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE
NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED
and Senate Bill No. 1630 entitled:
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE
ADDED TAX
[VAT]
SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING
FOR
THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108 AND 110
OF
TITLE IV, 112, 115, 117 AND 121 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237, AND 238 OF
TITLE
IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113, 114, 116, 119 AND 120 OF TITLE V, ALL
OF
THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
having met, after full and free
conference,
has
agreed to recommend and do hereby recommend to their respective Houses
that House Bill No. 11197, in consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630,
be approved in accordance with the attached copy of the bill as
reconciled
and approved by the conferees.
Approved.
The Report was
approved by the House on April 27,
1994. The Senate approved it on May 2, 1994. On May 5, 1994, the
President
signed the bill into law as R. A. No. 7716.
There is no
question that the Bicameral Conference
Committee did more than reconcile differences between House Bill No.
11197
and Senate Bill No. 1630. In several instances, it either added new
provisions
or deleted provisions already approved in House Bill No. 11197 and
Senate
Bill No. 1630. These insertions/deletions numbering twenty four (24)
are
specified in detail by petitioner Tolentino as follows:[2]
SOME SALIENT
POINTS ON THE(AMENDMENTS TO THE
VATE LAW [E.O. 273] SHOWING ADDITIONS/INSERTIONS MADE BY
BICAMERALCONFERENCE
COMMITTEE TO S.B. 1630 & H.B. 11197.chanrobles virtual law library
I. On Sec. 99
of the NIRC
H.B. 11197 amends
this section by including, as
liable to VAT, any person who in the course of trade of business,
sells,
barters, or exchanges goods or PROPERTIES and any person who LEASES
PERSONAL
PROPERTIES.cralaw:red
Senate Bill 1630
deleted Sec. 99 to give way for
a new Section 99 DEFINITION OF TERMS where eleven [11]
terms
were defined. A new Section, Section 99-A was incorporated which
included
as subject to VAT, one who sells, exchanges, barters PROPERTIES and one
who imports PROPERTIES.cralaw:red
The BCC version
[R. A. 7716] makes LESSORS of
goods OR PROPERTIES and importers of goods LIABLE to VAT.cralaw:red
II. On Section
100 [VAT on sale of goods]
A. The H.B.,
S.B., and the BCC [R. A. 7716] all
included sale of PROPERTIES as subject to VAT.
The term GOODS or PROPERTIES includes the
following:
HB pls. refer SB (pls. refer BCC [RA 7716
to Sec. 2] To Sec. 1[4] (Sec. 2)
1. Right or
the 1. The
same 1. The same
privilege to use
patent, copyright,
design, or model,
plan, secret
formula or process,
goodwill trademark,
tradebrand or other
like property or
right.
2. Right or the 2.
The
same 2. The same
privilege to use
in the Philippines
of any industrial,
commercial, or
scientific equip-
ment.
3. Right or the 3.
The
same 3. The same
privilege to use
motion picture films,
films, tapes and
discs.
4. Radio
and
4. The same 4. In addition
Television time to radio and
television time the
following were
included:
SATELLITE TRANSMISSION
and CABLE
TELEVISION TIME
5. Other Similar 5.
The
Same 5. 'Other
properties similar properties'
was deleted
6. -
6.
- 6. Real
properties held
primarily for sale to
customers or held
for lease in the
ordinary course or
business
B. The HB and the
BCC Bills has each a provision
which includes THE SALE OF GOLD TO BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS as
falling
under the term Export Sales, hence subject to 0% VAT. The Senate Bill
does
not contain such provision [See Section 102-A thereof].cralaw:red
III. On
Section 102
This section was
amended to include as subject
to a 10% VAT the gross receipts derived from THE SALE OR EXCHANGE OF
SERVICES,
INCLUDING THE USE OR LEASE OF PROPERTIES.
The SB, HB, and BCC have the same
provisions
on this.cralaw:red
However, on what
are included in the term SALE
OR EXCHANGE OF SERVICES, the BCC included/inserted the following [not
found
in either the House or Senate Bills]:
1. Services of lessors of property
WHETHER
PERSONAL
OR REAL; [See BCC Report/Bill p. 7]
2. WAREHOUSING SERVICES (Ibid.)
3. Keepers of RESTHOUSES, PENSION
HOUSES,
INNS,
RESORTS (Ibid.)
4. Common carriers by LAND, AIR AND
SEA (Ibid.)
5. SERVICES OF FRANCHISE GRANTEES OF
TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH;
6. RADIO AND TELEVISION BROADCASTING
7. ALL OTHER FRANCHISE GRANTEES EXCEPT
THOSE
UNDER
SECTION 117 OF THIS CODE
8. SERVICES OF SURETY, FIDELITY,
INDEMNITY,
AND
BONDING COMPANIES.
9. Also inserted by the BCC (on page B
thereof)
is the LEASE OR USE OF OR THE RIGHT TO USE OF SATTELITE TRANSMISSION
AND
CABLE TELEVISION TIME
IV. On
Section 103 ]Exempt Transactions]
The BCC deleted
subsection (f) in its entirety,
despite its retention in both the House and Senate Bills, thus under RA
7716, the "printing, publication, importation or sale of books and any
newspaper, magazine, review, or bulletin which appears at regular
intervals
with fixed prices for subscription and sale and which is not devoted
principally
to the publication of advertisements" is subject to VAT.
Subsection (g) was amended by the BCC (both
Senate
and House Bills did not) by changing the word TEN to FIVE, thus:
"Importation
of passenger and/or cargo vessel of more than five thousand ton to
ocean
going, including engine and spare parts of said vessel to be used by
the
importer himself as operator thereof." In short, importation of vessels
with tonnage of more than 5 thousand is VAT exempt.cralaw:red
Subsection L, was
amended by the BCC by adding
the qualifying phrase: EXCEPT THOSE RENDERED BY PROFESSIONALS.cralaw:red
Subsection U
which exempts from VAT "Transactions
which are exempt under special laws", was amended by BCC by adding the
phrase: EXCEPT THOSE GRANTED UNDER PD NOS. 66, 529, 972, 1491, and
1590,
and NON-ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES under RA 6938. This is the reason why
cooperatives are now subject to VAT.cralaw:red
While the SALE OF
REAL PROPERTIES was included
in the exempt transactions under the House Bill, the BCC made a
qualification
by stating:
(S) SALE OF REAL
PROPERTIES NOT PRIMARILY HELD
FOR SALE TO CUSTOMERS OR HELD FOR LEASE IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF TRADE
OR BUSINESS OR REAL PROPERTY UTILIZED FOR LOW-COST AND SOCIALIZED
HOUSING
AS DEFINED BY R.A. NO. 7279 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT
AND
HOUSING ACT OF 1992 AND OTHER RELATED LAWS.cralaw:red
Under the Senate
Bill, the sale of real property
utilized for low-cost and socialized housing as defined by R. A. 7279,
is one of the exempt transactions.
Under the House Bill, also exempt from
VAT, is
the SALE OF PROPERTIES OTHER THAN THE TRANSACTIONS MENTIONED IN THE
FOREGOING
PARAGRAPHS WITH A GROSS ANNUAL SALES AND/OR RECEIPTS OF WHICH DOES NOT
EXCEED THE AMOUNT PRESCRIBED IN THE REGULATIONS TO BE PROMULGATED BY
THE
SECRETARY OF FINANCE WHICH SHALL NOT BE LESS THAN P350,000.00 OR HIGHER
THAN P600,000.00 Under the Senate Bill, the amount is P240,000.00. The
BCC agreed at the amount of not less than P480,000.00 or more than
P720,000.00
SUBJECT TO TAX UNDER SEC. 112 OF THIS CODE.
The BCC did not
include, as VAT exempt, the sale
or transfer of securities as defined in the Revised Securities Act
[B.P.
178] which was contained in both Senate and House Bills.
V On Section
104
The phrase
INCLUDING PACKAGING MATERIALS was included
by the BCC on Section 104 (A) (1) (B), and the phrase ON WHICH A
VALUE-ADDED
TAX HAS BEEN ACTUALLY on Section 104 (A) (2).cralaw:red
These phrases are
not contained in either House
and Senate Bills.cralaw:red
VI On Section
107
Both House and
Senate Bills provide for the payment
of P500.00 VAT registration fee. The BCC provides for P1,000.00 VAT fee.cralaw:red
VII On Section
112
While both the
Senate and House Bills provide
that a person whose sales or receipts and are exempt under Section
103[w]
of the Code, and who are not VAT registered shall pay a tax equivalent
to THREE (3) PERCENT of his gross quarterly sales or receipts, the BCC
inserted the phrase: THREE PERCENT UPON THE EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT AND
FOUR PERCENT (4%) TWO YEARS THEREAFTER.cralaw:red
VIII On
Section 115
Sec. 17 of S.B.
1630 Sec. 12 of House Bill 11197
amends this Section by clarifying that common carriers by land, air or
water FOR THE TRANSPORT OF PASSENGERS are subject to Percentage Tax
equivalent
to 3% of their quarterly gross sales.cralaw:red
The BCC adopted
this and the House Bill's provision
that the GROSS RECEIPTS OF COMMON CARRIERS DERIVED FROM THEIR INCOMING
AND OUTGOING FREIGHT SHALL NOT BE SUBJECTED TO THE LOCAL TAXES IMPOSED
UNDER RA 7160. The Senate Bill has no similar provision.cralaw:red
IX On Section
117
This Section has
not been touched by either Senate
and House Bills. But the BCC amended it by subjecting franchises on
ELECTRIC,
GAS and WATER UTILITIES A TAX OF TWO PERCENT (2%) ON GROSS RECEIPTS
DERIVED
X On Section
121
The BCC adopted
the Senate Bills' amendment to
this section by subjecting to 5% premium tax on life insurance business.
The House Bill does not contain this
provision.cralaw:red
XI Others
(A) The House
Bill does not contain any provision
on the deferment of VAT collection on Certain Goods and Services as
does
the Senate Bill [Section 19, S.B. 1630]. But although the Senate Bill
authorizes
the deferment on certain goods and services for no longer than 3 years,
there is no specific provision that authorizes the President to EXCLUDE
from VAT any of these. The BCC uses the word EXCLUDE.cralaw:red
(B) Moreover, the
Senate Bill defers the VAT on
services of actors and actresses etc. for 3 years but the BCC defers it
for only 2 years.cralaw:red
(C) Section 18 of
the BCC Bill [R.A. 7716] is
an entirely new provision not contained in the House/Senate Bills.cralaw:red
(D) The period
within which to promulgate the
implementing rules and regulations is within 60 days under S.B. 1630;
No
specific period under the House Bill, within 90 days under R. A. 7716
[BCC].cralaw:red
(E) The House
Bill provides for a general repealing
clause i.e., all inconsistent laws etc. are repealed. Section 16
of the Senate Bill expressly repeals Sections 113, 114, 116, 119 and
120
of the Code. The same Senate Bill, however, contains a general
repealing
clause in Sec. 21 thereof.cralaw:red
R. A. 7716 [BCC's
Bill] expressly repeals Sections
113, 114 and 116 of the NIRC; Article 39 [c] [d] and [e] of E. O. 226
and
provides the repeal of Sec. 119 and 120 of the NIRC upon the expiration
of two [2] years unless otherwise excluded by the President.cralaw:red
The charge that
the Bicameral Conference Committee
added new provisions in the bills of the two chambers is hardly
disputed
by respondents. Instead, respondents justify them. According to
respondents:
[1] the Bicameral Conference Committee has an ex post veto power or a
veto
after the fact of approval of the bill by both Houses; [2] the bill
prepared
by the Bicameral Conference Committee, with its additions and
deletions,
was anyway approved by both Houses; [3] it was the practice in past
Congresses
for conference committees to insert in bills approved by the two Houses
new provisions that were not originally contemplated by them; and [4]
the
enrolled bill doctrine precludes inquiry into the regularity of the
proceedings
that led to the enactment of R. A. 7716.cralaw:red
With due respect,
I reject these contentions which
will cave in on closer examination.cralaw:red
First.
There is absolutely no legal warrant
for the bold submission that a Bicameral Conference Committee possesses
the power to add/delete provisions in bills already approved on third
reading
by both Houses or an ex post veto power. To support this
postulate
that can enfeeble Congress itself, respondents cite no constitutional
provision,
no law, not even any rule or regulation.[3]
Worse, their stance is categorically repudiated by the rules of both
the
Senate and the House of Representatives which define with precision,
the
parameters of power of a Bicameral Conference Committee. Thus, Section
209, Rule XII of the Rules of the Senate provides:
In the event that the Senate does not
agree
with
the House of Representatives on the provision of any bill or joint
resolution,
the differences shall be settled by a conference committee of both
Houses
which shall meet within ten days after their composition.
Each Conference Committee Report shall
contain
a detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or
amendments
to the subject measure, and shall be signed by the conferees.
[Emphasis
supplied].
The counterpart
rule of the House of Representatives
is cast in near identical language. Section 85 of the Rules of the
House
of Representatives pertinently provides:
In the event that the House does not
agree with
the Senate on the amendments to any bill or joint resolution, the
differences
may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers.
Each report shall contain a detailed,
sufficiently
explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject
measure. [Emphasis supplied].
The Jefferson's
Manual has been adopted[4]
as a supplement to our parliamentary rules and practice. Section 456 of
Jefferson's Manual similarly confines the powers of a conference
committee,
viz:[5]
The managers of a conference must confine
themselves
to the differences committed to them and may not include subjects not
within
the disagreements, even though germane to a question in issue.
This rule of
antiquity has been honed and honored
in practice by the Congress of the United States. Thus, it is
chronicled
by Floyd Biddick, Parliamentarian Emeritus of the United States Senate,
viz:[6]
Committees of conference are appointed
for the
sole purpose of compromising and adjusting the differing and
conflicting
opinions of the two Houses and the committees of conference alone can
grant
compromises and modify propositions of either Houses within the limits
of the disagreement. Conferees are limited to the consideration of
differences
between the two Houses.
Conferees shall not insert in their
report
matters
not committed to them by either House, nor shall they strike from the
bill
matters agreed to by both Houses. No matter on which there is nothing
in
either the Senate or House passed versions of a bill may be included in
the conference report and actions to the contrary would subject the
report
to a point of order. [Emphasis ours].
In fine, there
is neither a sound nor a syllable
in the Rules of the Senate and the House of Representative to support
the
thesis of the respondents that a bicameral conference committee is
clothed
with an ex post veto power.
But the thesis
that a Bicameral Conference Committee
can wield ex post veto power does not only contravene the rules
of both the Senate and the House. It wages war against our settled
ideals
of representative democracy. For the inevitable, catastrophic effect of
the thesis is to install a Bicameral Conference Committee as the Third
Chamber of our Congress, similarly vested with the power to make laws
but
with the dissimilarity that its laws are not the subject of a free and
full discussion of both Houses of Congress. With such a vagrant power,
a Bicameral Conference Committee acting as a Third Chamber will be a
constitutional
monstrosity.cralaw:red
It needs no
omniscience to perceive that our Constitution
did not provide for a Congress composed of three chambers. On the
contrary,
section 1, Article VI of the Constitution provides in clear and certain
language: "The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives."
Note that in vesting legislative power exclusively to the Senate and
the
House, the Constitution used the word "shall." Its command for a
Congress
of two houses is mandatory. It is not mandatory sometimes.cralaw:red
In vesting
legislative power to the Senate, the
Constitution means the Senate "composed of twenty-four Senators elected
at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines."[7]
Similarly, when the Constitution vested the legislative power to the
House,
it means the House "composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members
who shall be elected from legislative districts and those who.shall
be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations."[8]
The Constitution thus, did not vest on a Bicameral Conference Committee
with an ad hoc membership the power to legislate for it exclusively
vested
legislative power to the Senate and the House as co-equal bodies. To be
sure, the Constitution does not mention the Bicameral Conference
Committees
of Congress. No constitutional status is accorded to them. They are not
even statutory creations. They owe their existence from the internal
rules
of the two Houses of Congress. Yet, respondents peddle the
disconcerting
idea that they should be recognized as a Third Chamber of Congress and
with ex post veto power at that.cralaw:red
The thesis that a
Bicameral Conference Committee
can exercise law-making power with ex post veto power is
freighted
with mischief. Law-making is a power that can be used for good or for
ill,
hence, our Constitution carefully laid out a plan and a procedure for
its
exercise. Firstly, it vouchsafed that the power to make laws should be
exercised by no other body except the Senate and the House. It ought to
be indubitable that what is contemplated is the Senate acting as a full
Senate and the House acting as a full House. It is only when the Senate
and the House act as whole bodies that they truly represent the people.
And it is only when they represent the people that they can
legitimately
pass laws. Laws that are not enacted by the people's rightful
representatives
subvert the people's sovereignty. Bicameral Conference Committees, with
their ad hoc character and limited membership, cannot pass laws for
they
do not represent the people. The Constitution does not allow the
tyranny
of the majority. Yet, the respondents will impose the worst kind of
tyranny
the tyranny of the minority over the majority. Secondly, the
Constitution
delineated in deft strokes the steps to be followed in making laws. The
overriding purpose of these procedural rules is to assure that only
bills
that successfully survive the searching scrutiny of the proper
committees
of Congress and the full and unfettered deliberations of both Houses
can
become laws. For this reason, a bill has to undergo three (3) mandatory
separate readings in each House. In the case at bench, the additions
and
deletions made by the Bicameral Conference Committee did not enjoy the
enlightened studies of appropriate committees. It is meet to note that
the complexities of modern day legislations have made our committee
system
a significant part of the legislative process. Thomas Reed called the
committee
system as "the eye, the ear, the hand, and very often the brain of the
house." President Woodrow Wilson of the United States once referred to
the government of the United States as "a government by the Chairman of
the Standing Committees of Congress."[9]
Neither did these additions and deletions of the Bicameral Conference
Committee
pass through the coils of collective deliberation of the members of the
two Houses acting separately. Due to this shortcircuiting of the
constitutional
procedure of making laws, confusion shrouds the enactment of R. A. No.
7716. Who inserted the additions and deletions remains a mystery. Why
they
were inserted is a riddle. To use a Churchillian phrase, lawmaking
should
not be a riddle wrapped in an enigma. It cannot be, for Article II,
Section
28 of the Constitution mandates the State to adopt and implement a
"policy
of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest."
The Constitution could not have contemplated a Congress of invisible
and
unaccountable John and Mary Does. A law whose rationale is a riddle and
whose authorship is obscure cannot bind the people.cralaw:red
All these
notwithstanding, respondents resort
to the legal cosmetology that these additions and deletions should
govern
the people as laws because the Bicameral Conference Committee Report
was
anyway submitted to and approved by the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
The submission may have some merit with respect to provisions agreed
upon
by the Committee in the process of reconciling conflicts between S.B.
No.
1630 and H.B. No. 11197. In these instances, the conflicting provisions
had been previously screened by the proper committees, deliberated upon
by both Houses and approved by them. It is, however, a different matter
with respect to additions and deletions which were entirely new and
which
were made not to reconcile inconsistencies between S.B. No. 1630 and
H.B.
No. 11197. The members of the Bicameral Conference Committee did not
have
any authority to add new provisions or delete provisions already
approved
by both Houses as it was not necessary to discharge their limited task
of reconciling differences in bills. At that late stage of law-making,
the Conference Committee cannot add/delete provisions which can become
laws without undergoing the study and deliberation of both chambers
given
to bills on 1st, 2nd, and 3rd readings. Even the Senate and the House
cannot
enact a law which will not undergo these mandatory three [3] readings
required
by the Constitution. If the Senate and the House cannot enact such a
law,
neither can the lesser Bicameral Conference Committee.cralaw:red
Moreover, the
so-called choice given to the members
of both Houses to either approve or disapprove the said additions and
deletions
is more of an optical illusion. These additions and deletions are not
submitted
separately for approval. They are tucked to the entire bill. The vote
is
on the bill as a package, i.e., together with the insertions
and
deletions. And the vote is either "aye" or "nay," without any further
debate
and deliberation. Quite often, legislators vote "yes" because they
approve
of the bill as a whole although they may object to its amendments by
the
Conference Committee. This lack of real choice is well observed by
Robert
Luce:[10]
Their power lies chiefly in the fact that
reports
of conference committees must be accepted without amendment or else
rejected
in toto. The impulse is to get done with the matter and so the motion
to
accept has undue advantage, for some members are sure to prefer
swallowing
unpalatable provisions rather than prolong controversy. This is the
more
likely if the report comes in the rush of business toward the end of a
session, when to seek further conference might result in the loss of
the
measure altogether. At any time in the session there is some risk of
such
a result following the rejection of a conference report, for it may not
be possible to secure a second conference, or delay may give opposition
to the main proposal chance to develop more strength.
In a similar
vein, Prof. Jack Davies commented that
"conference reports are returned to assembly and Senate on a take-it or
leave-it-basis, and the bodies are generally placed in the position
that
to leave-it is a practical impossibility."[11]
Thus, he concludes that "conference committee action is the most
undemocratic
procedure in the legislative process."[12]
The respondents
also contend that the additions
and deletions made by the Bicameral Conference Committee were in accord
with legislative customs and usages. The argument does not persuade for
it misappreciates the value of customs and usages in the hierarchy of
sources
of legislative rules of procedure. To be sure, every legislative
assembly
has the inherent right to promulgate its own internal rules. In our
jurisdiction,
Article VI, Section 16[3] of the Constitution provides that "Each House
may determine the rules of its proceedings." But it is hornbook
law
that the sources of Rules of Procedure are many and hierarchical in
character.
Mason laid them down as follows:[13]
3. Whenever there is conflict between
rules
from
these sources the rule from the source listed earlier prevails over the
rule from the source listed, later. Thus, where the Constitution
requires
three readings of bills, this provision controls over any provision of
statute, adopted rules, adopted manual, or of parliamentary law, and a
rule of parliamentary law controls over a local usage but must give way
to any rule from a higher source of authority. [Emphasis ours].
As discussed
above, the unauthorized additions and
deletions made by the Bicameral Conference Committee violated the
procedure
fixed by the Constitution in the making of laws. It is reasonless for
respondents
therefore to justify these insertions as sanctioned by customs and
usages.
Finally,
respondents seek sanctuary in the conclusiveness
of an enrolled bill to bar any judicial inquiry on whether Congress
observed
our constitutional procedure in the passage of R. A. No. 7716. The
enrolled
bill theory is a historical relic that should not continuously rule us
from the fossilized past. It should be immediately emphasized that the
enrolled bill theory originated in England where there is no written
constitution
and where Parliament issupreme.[14]
In this jurisdiction, We have a written constitution and the
legislature
is a body of limited powers. Likewise, it must be pointed out that
starting
from the decade of the 40's, even American courts have veered away from
the rigidity and unrealism of the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill.
Prof.
Sutherland observed:[15]
xxx xxx xxx.
Where the failure of constitutional
compliance
in the enactment of statutes is not discoverable from the face of the
act
itself but may be demonstrated by recourse to the legislative journals,
debates, committee reports or papers of the governor, courts have used
several conflicting theories with which to dispose of the issue. They
have
held: [1] that the enrolled bill is conclusive and like the sheriff's
return
cannot be attacked; [2] that the enrolled bill is prima facie correct
and
only in case the legislative journal shows affirmative contradiction of
the constitutional requirement will the bill be held invalid, [3] that
although the enrolled bill is prima facie correct, evidence from the
journals,
or other extrinsic sources is admissible to strike the bill down; [4]
that
the legislative journal is conclusive and the enrolled bill is valid
only
if it accords with the recital in the journal and the constitutional
procedure.
Various
jurisdictions have adopted these alternative
approaches in view of strong dissent and dissatisfaction against the
philosophical
underpinnings of the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill. Prof.
Sutherland
further observed:
Numerous reasons have been given for this
rule.
Traditionally, an enrolled bill was "a record" and as such was not
subject
to attack at common law. Likewise, the rule of conclusiveness was
similar
to the common law rule of the inviolability of the sheriff's return.
Indeed,
they had the same origin, that is, the sheriff was an officer of the
king
and likewise the parliamentary act was a regal act and no official
might
dispute the king's word. Transposed to our democratic system of
government,
courts held that as the legislature was an official branch of
government
the court must indulge every presumption that the legislative act was
valid.
The doctrine of separation of powers was advanced as a strong reason
why
the court should treat the acts of a co-ordinate branch of government
with
the same respect as it treats the action of its own officers; indeed,
it
was thought that it was entitled to even greater respect, else the
court
might be in the position of reviewing the work of a supposedly equal
branch
of government. When these arguments failed, as they frequently did, the
doctrine of convenience was advanced, that is, that it was not only an
undue burden upon the legislature to preserve its records to meet the
attack
of persons not affected by the procedure of enactment, but also that it
unnecessarily complicated litigation and confused the trial of
substantive
issues.
Although many of these arguments are
persuasive
and are indeed the basis for the rule in many states today, they are
not
invulnerable to attack. The rule most relied on the sheriff's
return
or sworn official rule did not in civil litigation deprive the
injured
party of an action, for always he could sue the sheriff upon his
official
bond. Likewise, although collateral attack was not permitted, direct
attack
permitted raising the issue of fraud, and at a later date attack in
equity
was also available; and that the evidence of the sheriff was not of
unusual
weight was demonstrated by the fact that in an action against the
sheriff
no presumption of its authenticity prevailed.
The argument that the enrolled bill is
a
"record"
and therefore unimpeachable is likewise misleading, for the correction
of records is a matter of established judicial procedure. Apparently,
the
justification is either the historical one that the king's word could
not
be questioned or the separation of powers principle that one branch of
the government must treat as valid the acts of another. Persuasive
as these arguments are, the tendency today is to avoid reaching results
by artificial presumptions and thus it would seem desirable to insist
that
the enrolled bill stand or fall on the basis of the relevant evidence
which
may be submitted for or against it. [Emphasis ours].
Thus, as far
back as the 1940's, Prof. Sutherland
confirmed that "the tendency seems to be toward the abandonment of the
conclusive presumption rule and the adoption of the third rule leaving
only a prima facie presumption of validity which may be attacked by any
authoritative source of information."[16]
I am not unaware that this Court has
subscribed
to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill as enunciated in the 1947
lead
case of Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, and reiterated in subsequent cases.[17]
With due respect,
I submit that these rulings
are no longer good law. Part of the ratiocination in Mabanag states:
xxx xxx xxx
If for no other reason than that it
conforms
to
the expressed policy of our law making body, we choose to follow the
rule.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No.
2210,
provides: "Official documents" may be proved as follows: xxx (2) the
proceedings
of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be
provided
for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those
bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or
resolutions,
or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary, or printed by their
order;
Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the
Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by
the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be
conclusive
proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
Suffice to
state that Section 313 of the Old Code
of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2210 is no longer in our
statute
books. It has long been repealed by the Rules of Court. Mabanag also
relied
on jurisprudence and authorities in the United States which are under
severe
criticisms by modern scholars. Hence, even in the United States the
conclusiveness
of an enrolled bill has been junked by most of the States. It is also
true
that as late as last year, in the case of Philippine Judges Association
v. Prado, op. cit., this Court still relied on the
conclusiveness
of an enrolled bill as it refused to invalidate a provision of law on
the
ground that it was merely inserted by the bicameral conference
committee
of both Houses. Prado, however, is distinguishable. In Prado, the
alleged
insertion of the second paragraph of section 35 of R. A. No. 7354
repealing
the franking privilege of the judiciary does not appear to be an
uncontested
fact. In the case at bench, the numerous additions/deletions made by
the
Bicameral Conference Committee as detailed by petitioners Tolentino and
Salonga are not disputed by the respondents. In Prado, the Court was
not
also confronted with the argument that it can no longer rely on the
conclusiveness
of an enrolled bill in light of the new provision in the Constitution
defining
judicial power. More specifically, Section 1 of Article VIII now
provides:
Sec. 1. The judicial power shall be
vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of
the
courts
of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphasis
supplied].
Former Chief
Justice Roberto R. Concepcion, the sponsor
of this provision in the Constitutional Commission explained the sense
and the reach of judicial power as follows:[18]
xxx xxx xxx
In other words, the judiciary is the
final
arbiter
on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,
or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to
pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of
Section
1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to
settle
matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute
political
question. [Emphasis ours].
The
Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted
to this Court is not a mere power which it can decline to exercise.
Precisely
to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of
this Court to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality of
government
or any of its officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution
has
elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other branches
of government despite their more democratic character, the President
and
the legislators being elected by the people.
It is, however,
theorized that this provision
is nothing new.[19]
I beg to disagree for the view misses the significant changes made in
our
constitutional canvass to cure the legal deficiencies we discovered
during
martial law. One of the areas radically changed by the framers of the
1987
Constitution is the imbalance of power between and among the three
great
branches of our government the Executive, the Legislative and the
Judiciary. To upgrade the powers of the Judiciary, the Constitutional
Commission
strengthened some more the independence of courts. Thus, it further
protected
the security of tenure of the members of the Judiciary by providing "No
law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the
security
of tenure of its Members."[20]
It also guaranteed fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.[21]
More, it
depoliticalized appointments in the judiciary
by creating the Judicial and Bar Council which was tasked with
screening
the list of prospective appointees to the judiciary.[22]
The power of confirming appointments to the judiciary was also taken
away
from Congress.[23]
The President was likewise given a specific time to fill up vacancies
in
the judiciary ninety [90] days from the occurrence of the vacancy
in case of the Supreme Court[24]
and ninety [90] days from the submission of the list of recommendees by
the Judicial and Bar Council in case of vacancies in the lower courts.[25]
To further insulate appointments in the judiciary from the virus of
politics,
the Supreme Court was given the power to "appoint all officials and
employees
of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law."[26]
And to make the separation of the judiciary from the other branches of
government more watertight, it prohibited members of the judiciary to
be
"designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions."[27]
While the Constitution strengthened the sinews of the Supreme Court, it
reduced the powers of the two other branches of government, especially
the Executive. Notable of the powers of the President clipped by the
Constitution
is his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and to proclaim
martial
law. The exercise of this power is now subject to revocation by
Congress.
Likewise, the sufficiency of the factual basis for the exercise of said
power may be reviewed by this Court in an appropriate proceeding filed
by any citizen.[28]
The provision
defining judicial power as including
the "duty of the courts of justice to determine whether or not there
has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government"
constitutes
the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade
the powers of this Court vis-a-vis the other branches of
government.
This provision was dictated by our experience under martial law which
taught
us that a stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort
abuses
in government. As sharply stressed by petitioner Salonga, this
provision
is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated
by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. It is thus
crystal
clear that unlike other Supreme Courts, this Court has been mandated by
our new Constitution to be a more active agent in annulling acts of
grave
abuse of discretion committed by a branch of government or any of its
officials.
This new role, however, will not compel the Court, appropriately
defined
by Prof. A. Bickel as the least dangerous branch of government, to
assume
imperial powers and run roughshod over the principle of separation of
power
for that is judicial tyranny by any language. But while respecting the
essential of the principle of separation of power, the Court is not to
be restricted by its non-essentials. Applied to the case at bench, by
voiding
R. A. No. 7716 on the ground that its enactment violated the procedure
imposed by the Constitution in lawmaking, the Court is not by any means
wrecking the wall separating the powers between the legislature and the
judiciary. For in so doing, the Court is not engaging in lawmaking
which
is the essence of legislative power. But the Court's interposition of
power
should not be defeated by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill. A
resort
to this fiction will result in the enactment of laws not properly
deliberated
upon and passed by Congress. Certainly, the enrolled bill theory was
not
conceived to cover up violations of the constitutional procedure in law
making, a procedure intended to assure the passage of good laws. The
conclusiveness
of the enrolled bill can, therefore, be disregarded for it is not
necessary
to preserve the principle of separation of powers.cralaw:red
In sum, I submit
that in imposing to this Court
the duty to annul acts of government committed with grave abuse of
discretion,
the new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism.
This transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as a nation,
is
not merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions,
this Court approached constitutional violations by initially
determining
what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in
stress
this Court is mandated to approach constitutional violations not by
finding
out what it should not do but what it must do. The Court must discharge
this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.cralaw:red
I vote to declare
R. A. No. 7716 unconstitutional.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
With a consensus already reached after due
deliberations,
silence perhaps should be the better part of discretion, except to
vote.
The different views and opinions expressed are so persuasive and
convincing;
they are more than enough to sway the pendulum for or against the
subject
petitions. The penetrating and scholarly dissertations of my brethren
should
dispense with further arguments which may only confound and confuse
even
the most learned of men.
But there is a
crucial point, a constitutional
issue which, I submit, has been belittled, treated lightly, if not
almost
considered insignificant and purposeless. It is elementary, as much as
it is fundamental. I am referring to the word "exclusively" appearing
in
Sec. 24, Art. VI of our 1987 Constitution. This is regrettable, to say
the least, as it involves a constitutional mandate which, wittingly or
unwittingly, has been cast aside as trivial and meaningless.cralaw:red
A comparison of
the particular provision on the
enactment of revenue bills in the U.S. Constitution with its
counterpart
in the Philippine Constitution will help explain my position.cralaw:red
Under the U.S.
Constitution, "all bills for raising
revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills" [Sec. 7, par.
(1), Art. I]. In contrast, our 1987 Constitution reads: "All
appropriation,
revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt,
bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively
in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur
with
amendments" [Sec. 24, Art. VI; Emphasis supplied].cralaw:red
As may be gleaned
from the pertinent provision
of our Constitution, all revenue bills are required to originate
"exclusively"
in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, the U.S.
Constitution
does not use the word "exclusively;" it merely says, "[a]ll bills for
raising
revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives."
Since the term
"exclusively" has already been
adequately defined in the various opinions, as to which there seems to
be no dispute, I shall no longer offer my own definition.cralaw:red
Verily, the
provision in our Constitution requiring
that all revenue bills shall originate exclusively from the Lower House
is mandatory. The word "exclusively" is an "exclusive word," which is
indicative
of an intent that the provision is mandatory.[1]
Hence, all American authorities expounding on the meaning and
application
of Sec. 7, par. (1), Art. I, of the U.S. Constitution cannot be used in
the interpretation of Sec. 24, Art. VI, of our 1987 Constitution which
has a distinct feature of "exclusiveness" all its own. Thus, when our
Constitution
absolutely requires as it is mandatory that a particular
bill
should exclusively emanate from the Lower House, there is no
alternative
to the requirement that the bill to become valid law must originate
exclusively
from that House.cralaw:red
In the
interpretation of constitutions, questions
frequently arise as to whether particular sections are mandatory or
directory.
The courts usually hesitate to declare that a constitutional provision
is directory merely in view of the tendency of the legislature to
disregard
provisions which are not said to be mandatory. Accordingly, it is the
general
rule to regard constitutional provisions as mandatory, and not to leave
any discretion to the will of the legislature to obey or disregard
them.
This presumption as to mandatory quality is usually followed unless it
is unmistakably manifest that the provisions are intended to be merely
directory. So strong is the inclination in favor of giving obligatory
force
to the terms of the organic law that it has even been said that neither
by the courts nor by any other department of the government may any
provision
of the Constitution be regarded as merely directory, but that each and
everyone of its provisions should be treated as imperative and
mandatory,
without reference to the rules and distinguishing between the directory
and the mandatory statutes.[1]
The framers of
our 1987 Constitution could not
have used the term "exclusively" if they only meant to replicate and
adopt
in toto the U.S. version. By inserting "exclusively" in Sec. 24, Art.
VI,
of our Constitution, their message is clear: they wanted it different,
strong, stringent. There must be a compelling reason for the inclusion
of the word "exclusively," which cannot be an act of retrogression but
progression, an improvement on its precursor. Thus, "exclusively" must
be given its true meaning, its purpose observed and virtue recognized,
for it could not have been conceived to be of minor consequence. That
construction
is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute
its
every word. Ut magis valeat quam pereat.cralaw:red
Consequently, any
reference to American authorities,
decisions and opinions, however wisely and delicately put, can only
mislead
in the interpretation of our own Constitution. To refer to them in
defending
the constitutionality of R.A. 7716, subject of the present petitions,
is
to argue on a false premise, i.e., that Sec. 24, Art. VI, of
our
1987 Constitution is, or means exactly, the same as Sec. 7, par. [1],
Art.
I, of the U.S. Constitution, which is not correct. Hence, only a wrong
conclusion can be drawn from a wrong premise.cralaw:red
For example, it
is argued that in the United States,
from where our own legislature is patterned, the Senate can practically
substitute its own tax measure for that of the Lower House. Thus,
according
to the Majority, citing an American case, "the validity of Sec. 37
which
the Senate had inserted in the Tariff Act of 1909 by imposing an ad
valorem
tax based on the weight of vessels, was upheld against the claim that
the
revenue bill originated in the Senate in contravention of Art. I, Sec.
7, of the U.S. Constitution."[3]
In an effort to be more convincing, the Majority even quotes the
footnote
in Introduction to American Government by F.A. Ogg and P.O. Ray which
reads:
Thus in 1883 the upper house struck out
everything
after the enacting clause of a tariff bill and wrote its own measure,
which
the House eventually felt obliged to accept. It likewise added 847
amendments
to the Payne-Aldrich tariff act of 1909, dictated the schedules of the
emergency tariff act of 1921, rewrote an extensive tax revision bill in
the same year, and recast most of the permanent tariff bill of 1922.[4]
which in fact
suggests, very clearly, that the subject
revenue bill actually originated from the Lower House and was only
amended,
perhaps considerably, by the Senate after it was passed by the former
and
transmitted to the latter.
In the cases
cited, where the statutes passed
by the U.S. Congress were upheld, the revenue bills did not actually
originate
from the Senate but, in fact, from the Lower House. Thus, the Supreme
Court
of the United States, speaking through Chief Justice White in Rainey v.
United States[5]
upheld the revenue bill passed by Congress and adopted the ruling of
the
lower court that:
The section in question is not void as a
bill
for raising revenue originating in the Senate and not in the House of
Representatives.
It appears that the section was proposed by the Senate as an amendment
to a bill for raising revenue which originated in the House. That is
sufficient.
Flint v. Stone
Tracy Co.,[6]
on which the Solicitor General heavily leans in his Consolidated
Comment
as well as in his Memorandum, does not support the thesis of the
Majority
since the subject bill therein actually originated from the Lower House
and not from the Senate, and the amendment merely covered a certain
provision
in the House bill.
In fine, in the
cases cited which were lifted
from American authorities, it appears that the revenue bills in
question
actually originated from the House of Representatives and were amended
by the Senate only after they were transmitted to it. Perhaps, if the
factual
circumstances in those cases were exactly the same as the ones at
bench,
then the subject revenue or tariff bill may be upheld in this
jurisdiction
on the principle of substantial compliance, as they were in the United
States, except possibly in instances where the House bill undergoes
what
is now referred to as "amendment by substitution," for that would be in
derogation of our Constitution which vests solely in the House of
Representatives
the power to initiate revenue bills. A Senate amendment by substitution
simply means that the bill in question did not in effect originate from
the lower chamber but from the upper chamber and not disguises itself
as
a mere amendment of the House version.cralaw:red
It is also
theorized that in the U.S., amendment
by substitution is recognized. That may be true. But the process may be
validly effective only under the U.S. Constitution. The cases before us
present a totally different factual backdrop. Several months before the
Lower House could even pass H.B. No. 11197, P.S. Res. No. 734 and S.B.
No. 1129 had already been filed in the Senate. Worse, the Senate
subsequently
approved S.B. No. 1630 "in substitution of S.B. No. 1129, taking into
consideration
P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197," and not H.B. No. 11197 itself
"as
amended." Here, the Senate could not have proposed or concurred with
amendments
because there was nothing to concur with or amend except its own bill.
It must be stressed that the process of concurring or amending
presupposes
that there exists a bill upon which concurrence may be based or
amendments
introduced. The Senate should have reported out H.B. No. 11197, as
amended,
even if in the amendment it took into consideration S.B. No. 1630. It
should
not have submitted to the Bicameral Conference Committee S.B. No. 1630
which, admittedly, did not originate exclusively from the Lower House.cralaw:red
But even assuming
that in our jurisdiction a revenue
bill of the Lower House may be amended by substitution by the
Senate
although I am not prepared to accept it in view of Sec. 24, Art. VI, of
our Constitution still R. A. 7716 could not have been the result
of amendment by substitution since the Senate had no House bill to
speak
of that it could amend when the Senate started deliberating on its own
version.cralaw:red
Be that as it
may, I cannot rest easy on the proposition
that a constitutional mandate calling for the exclusive power and
prerogative
of the House of Representatives may just be discarded and ignored by
the
Senate. Since the Constitution is for the observance of all the
judiciary
as well as the other departments of government and the judges are
sworn to support its provisions, the courts are not at liberty to
overlook
or disregard its commands. And it is not fair and just to impute to
them
undue interference if they look into the validity of legislative
enactments
to determine whether the fundamental law has been faithfully observed
in
the process. It is their duty to give effect to the existing
Constitution
and to obey all constitutional provisions irrespective of their opinion
as to the wisdom of such provisions.cralaw:red
The rule is fixed
that the duty in a proper case
to declare a law unconstitutional cannot be declined and must be
performed
in accordance with the deliberate judgment of the tribunal before which
the validity of the enactment is directly drawn into question. When it
is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the
legislature
by the Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act
unconstitutional
because they cannot shirk from it without violating their oaths of
office.
This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental
law of the state is imperative and unceasing; and, as Chief Justice
Marshal
said, whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law, the
courts
must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Any other
course would lead to the destruction of the Constitution. Since the
question
as to the constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter, the
courts
will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that
action might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the
judgment
of the judicial tribunals.[7]
It is my
submission that the power and authority
to originate revenue bills under our Constitution is vested exclusively
in the House of Representatives. Its members being more numerous than
those
of the Senate, elected more frequently, and more directly represent the
people, are therefore considered better aware of the economic life of
their
individual constituencies. It is just proper that revenue bills
originate
exclusively from them.cralaw:red
In this regard,
we do not have to devote much
time delving into American decisions and opinions and invoke them in
the
interpretation of our own Constitution which is different from the
American
version, particularly on the enactment of revenue bills. We have our
own
Constitution couched in a language our own legislators thought best.
Insofar
as revenue bills are concerned, our Constitution is not American; it is
distinctively Filipino. And no amplitude of legerdemain can detract
from
our constitutional requirement that all appropriation, revenue or
tariff
bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application,
and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives,
although the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.cralaw:red
In this milieu, I
am left no option but to vote
to grant the petitions and strike down R. A. 7716 as unconstitutional.
___________________________________
Endnotes
[1]
H. Nos. 253, 771, 2450, 7033, 8086, 9030, 9210, 9297, 10012 and 10100.
[Respondents' Consolidated Memorandum, Annexes 3-12]
[2]
U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Section 7; Cl. 1: "All bills for raising
revenue
shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may
propose
or concur with amendments, as on other bills."
[3]
Art. VII, Section 21.
[4]
Art. VI, Section 1.
[5]
U.S. Constitution, Art. II, Section 2, cl. 2.
[6]
Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 309, 58 L. Ed. 117 [1914].
[7]
F.A. Ogg and P.O. Ray, Introduction to American Government 309, N. 2
[1945].
[8]
Although the 1935 Constitution did not expressly require that bills
must
pass three readings in each House, this was clearly implied from its
Art.
VI, Section 21(2) so that the two Houses by their rules prescribed
three
readings for the passage of bills. Later the requirement was expressly
provided in the 1973 Constitution from which Art. VI, Section 26(2) was
taken. Art. VIII, Section 19(2) of the 1973 document provided:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
No bill shall become a
law
unless
it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies
thereof
in its final form have been distributed to the Members three days
before
its passage, except when the Prime Minister certifies to the necessity
of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon
the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and
the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas
and
nays entered in the Journal.
[9]
Respondents' Consolidated Reply, Annex 14.
[10]
Memorandum of Petitioner Arturo M. Tolentino, Supplement C.
[11]
Art. VII, Section 10 provides: "The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in
the
morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the
President
and Vice- President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules
without
need of a call and within seven days enact a law calling for a special
election to elect a President and a Vice- President to be held not
earlier
than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such
call.
The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under
paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of this Constitution and shall
become
law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress. Appropriations
for the special election shall be charged against any current
appropriations
and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25,
Article
VI of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be
suspended
nor the special election postponed. No special election shall be called
if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the
next
presidential election."
[12]
Journal of the House of Representatives, Sixth Congress, Fourth Session
398-399 [1968].
[13]
Zinn, Conference Procedure in Congress, 38 ABAJ 864-865 [1952].
[14]
Congress Quarterly 65 [1983]; M. Jewell, The Legislative Process in the
United States 169 [1986]; Lees and Shaw, Committees in Legislatures 163
[1979].
[15]
W. Keefe and M. Ogul, The American Legislative Process 149 [1985].
[16]
W. Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and Policy Process 214 [1984].
[17]
Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, Nov. 11, 1993.
[18]
The charge is an old one. In the United States, the same charge,
including
claims that important provisions were being "surreptitiously added" in
the committee, was made in the 1940s. But no satisfactory alternative
to
the conference committee has been devised. And today, given the
bicameral
nature of the U.S. Congress, the charge is no longer heard. Compare the
following from a 1945 comment: "As a devise for oiling the machinery of
legislation, committees of conference are, under American conditions,
useful,
if not indispensable. Nevertheless, they have shortcomings. Without
exception,
they work behind closed doors, hold no hearings, and give their
proceedings
no publicity. Doubtless it would be difficult for them to make headway
if they did otherwise. Nevertheless, in view of the power which they
wield,
strong objection can be, and is, raised. For, while the committees are
supposed to deal only with actual differences between the houses and to
stay well within the bounds set by the extreme positions which the
houses
have taken, they often work into measures, as reported, provisions of
their
own devising, even going so far as to rewrite whole sections with the
sole
purpose of incorporating the views which the majority members happen to
holdIn practice, this often results in the adoption of important
provisions,
more or less surreptitiously added, without consideration by either
house
in other words, legislation nominally by Congress but actually by
conference
committee. Any remedy found will probably take the form of reducing the
need for using conference committees at all; and the principal
suggestion
to that end is that bills and resolutions be referred, not, as now, to
separate committees of the two houses, but to joint committees, which
not
only would hold single sets of hearings, but might deliberate and
report
back bills to the two houses in such agreed form that further
significant
differences would not be likely to develop. Arrangements of this nature
yield excellent results in the legislature of Massachusetts. But there
are obstacles to adoption of the plan for Congress, not the least of
them
being a natural aversion of House members to joint committees in which
senators seem likely to dominate; and, as indicated below, the outlook
for the reform is problematical." F.A. OGG AND P.O. RAY, supra Note 7
at
310-311.
[19]
Osmeña v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863, 871 [1960].
[20]
E.g., Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1 [1947)] Casco (Phil.) Inc. v.
Gimenez,
7 SCRA 347 [1963]; Morales v. Subido, 27 SCRA 131 [1969].
[21]
Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, supra Note 20.
[22]
Morales v. Subido, supra Note 20.
[23]
Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 [1974].
[24]
See, e.g., Alalayan v. National Power Corp., 24 SCRA 172 [1968];
Cordero
v. Cabatuando, 6 SCRA 418 [1962]; Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288
[1941].
[25]
40 Phil. 224 [1919].
[26]
Art. VI, Section 28[4] provides: "No law granting any tax exemption
shall
be passed without the incurrence of a majority of all the Members of
the
Congress."
[27]
Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132, 81 L.Ed. 953, 961 [1937].
[28]
297 U.S. 233, 80 L.Ed. 660 [1936].
[29]
297 U.S. at 250, 80 L.Ed. at 669.
[30]
Minneapolis Star v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 75
L.Ed.2d 295 [1983].
[31]
460 U.S. at 591, 75 L.Ed. 2d at 308-9 [1983].
[32]
481 U.S. 221, 95 L.Ed. 2d 209 [1987].
[33]Section 103[t] of the NIRC exempts from the VAT "Sale or lease of goods
or properties or the performance of services other than the
transactions
mentioned in the preceeding paragraphs, the gross annual sales and/or
receipts
[of which] do not exceed the amount prescribed in regulations to be
promulgated
by the President upon the recommendation by the Secretary of Finance
which
shall not be less than four hundred eighty thousand pesos [P480,000.00]
or more than seven hundred twenty thousand pesos [P720,000.00] subject
to tax under Section 112 of this Code."
[34]
297 U.S. at 250, 80 L.Ed. at 668.
[35]
460 U.S. at 581, 75 L.Ed. 2d at 302.
[36]
493 U.S. 378, 107 L.Ed. 2d 796 [1990].
[37]Section 107 of the NIRC provides: "Any person subject to a value-added
tax under Sections 100 and 102 of this Code shall register with the
appropriate
Revenue District Officer and pay an annual registration fee in the
amount
of one thousand pesos [P1,000.00] for every separate or distinct
establishment
or place of business and every year thereafter on or before the last
day
of January. Any person just commencing a business subject to the
value-added
tax must pay the fee before engaging therein"
[38]
101 Phil. 386 [1957].
[39]
319 U.S. 105, 113, 87 L.Ed. 1292 [1943].
[40]
319 U.S. at 114, 87 L.Ed. 1292 at 1298. For the same reason, in People
v. Korins, 385 N.Y.S. 2d 474 [1976] a decision of the city court of
Utica,
Oneida County held that to apply an ordinance requiring a business
license
to be obtained before a person could sell newspapers in the streets
would
be to impose a prior restraint on press freedom because "a newspaper is
not in the same category as pineapple or a soap powder or a pair of
shoes"
whose sale may be conditioned on the possession of a business license.
[41]
P.A. Freund, Understunding the Supreme Court 11 [1950] quoted in
Ermita, Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Ass'n v. City Mayor, 21 SCRA
449,
459 [1967].
[42]
Art. VI, Sectiopn 28[1]. Related to this argument is the claim that
Republic
Act No. 7716 likewise infringes the due process and equal protection
clauses
of the Bill of Rights, Art. III, Section 1[1].
[43]
Neri, "In Support of the Expanded Value-Added Tax," [CRC Economic
Policy
Papers No. 5, 1994] pp. 3-4.
[44]
Cf. Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148, 153 [1955].
[45]
Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan,
163
SCRA 371.
[46]
Cf. Philippine American Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor General, 22 SCRA 135
[1968].
[47]
See E.M. Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines 560-561 [2d Ed.,
1977].
[48]
The term is Professor Jaffe's [Judicial Control of Administrative
Action
(1965)] adopted by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 119-120, 20 L.Ed.2d 947, 973 [1968] to distinguish between the
personal and proprietary interest of traditional plaintiffs and the
public
interest of a citizen suing in a public action. The term was mentioned
by some members of this Court in the Lotto case [Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Guingona,
G. R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994].
[49]
Compare Justice Laurel: "Even then, this power of judicial review is
limited
to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity
of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question
raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could
only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions
unrelated to actualities." Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil.
139,
158 [1936].
[50]
1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) [Emphasis added].
[51]
Supra note 49 (emphasis added).
[52]
People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 94 [1937]; Tañada v. Cuenco, 103
Phil.
1051, 1061-2 [1957]; Macias v. Comelec, 3 SCRA 1, 7-8 [1961].
NARVASA, C.J.,
concurring:
[1]
Resolution "Urging the Senate Committee on Ways and Means to Study the
Proposal to Exempt Local Movie Producers from the Payment of the
Value-Added
Tax as an Incentive to the Production of Quality and Wholesome Filipino
Movies Whenever they Feature an All-Filipino Cast of Actors and
Actresses."
[2]
Italics supplied
[3]
Giving "conclusive" character to copies of Acts of the Philippine
Commission
which have been signed by its presiding officers and secretaries.
PADILLA, J.:
Separate Opinion:
[1]
G. R. No. 81311, 30 June 1988, 163 SCRA 371.
[2]
Bautista v. Salonga, G. R. No. 86439, 13 April 1989, 172 SCRA 160.
[3]
Kapatiran; Supra at 385
[4]Sec. 1, Art. VIII.
[5]
G. R. No. 103371, 11 November 1993.
[6]
7 SCRA 347.
[7]
Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1.
[8]
34 Phil. 729.
[9]
Executive Order No. 273, in Sec. 103[f], had exempted this kind of
income
from the VAT. Rep. Act. No. 7716 removed the exemption.
[10]
United States v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731.
[11]
297 U.S. 233.
[12]
372 U.S. 58.
[13]
American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386.
REGALADO, J.:
Dissenting:
[1]
In substitution of H.B. Nos. 253, 771, 2450, 7033, 8086, 9030, 9210,
9297,
10012 and 10100 which were filed over the period from July 22, 1992 to
August 3, 1993.
[2]
P.S. Res. No. 734 had earlier been filed at the Senate on September 10,
1992, while S.B. No. 1129 was filed on March 1, 1993.
[3]
220 U.S. 107, 55 L.Ed. 389 [1911].
[4]
Consolidated Comment 36-37.
[5]
Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents, 56-57.
[6]
Orquiola, H.M., Annotated Rules of the Senate and Procedure, Precedents
and Practices of the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines since
1946,
1991 Ed., 108.
[7]
Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. [1951], 381, citing Fairview vs.
Durham,
45 Iowa 56.
[8]
34 Phil. 729 [1916].
[9]
78 Phil. 1 [1947].
[10]
L-17931, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 347.
[11]
L-29658, February 27, 1969, 27 SCRA 131.
[12]
G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 703.
[13]
103 Phil. 1051 [1957].
[14]
L-46640, October 12, 1976, 73 SCRA 333.
[15]
G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989, 180 SCRA 496.
[16]
Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents, 79-82.
[17]
Brailsford vs. Walker, 31 S.E. 2d 385, 387, 388, 205 S.C. 228.
[18]
110 So. 343, 346.
[19]
602 South Western Reporter, 2d Series, 402-425, jointly deciding
Carrolton
Wholesale Tobaccos, Inc. et al. vs. Department of Revenue, et al., and
Bluegrass Provisions Co., Inc., et al. vs. Department of Revenue, et al.
DAVIDE JR., J.:
Dissenting:
[1]
1971 Ed., 1592.
[2]
Sixth Edition [1990], 565, citing Standard Oil Co. of Texas vs. State,
Tex. Civ. App., 142 S.W. 2d 519, 521, 522, 523.
[3]
21 SCRA 665, 673 [1967].
[4]Section 52 and 53, Rule XXIII
[5]Section 57, Rule XXV.
[6]Section 26(2), Article VI, Constitution; paragraph (7), Section 57,
Rule
XXV.
[7]Section 69, Rule XIV.
[8]Section 77, Id.
[9]Section 82, Rule XIV.
[10]
Sections 77-81, Id.
[11]Section 82, Id., in relation to Section 26(2), Article VI, Constitution.
[12]Section 26(2), Article VI, Constitution.
[13]
Volume I, Eight Edition, Chapter VI, 267. See Miller vs. Mardo, 2 SCRA
539 [1961]; Everlasting Pictures, Inc. vs. Fuentes, 3 SCRA 539 [1961].
[14]
Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents, Annexes "2" to "12," inclusive.
[15]
Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents, 18.
[16]
Id., Annex "9."
[17]
Id., Annex "1."
[18]
Id., 18.
[19]
Id., Annex "15." Entitled "An Act Restructuring the Value-Added Tax
[VAT]
System By Expanding Its Tax Base, Amending Sections 103, 113, 114, of
the
National Internal Revenue Code, as Amended."
[20]
Id., Annex "17."
[21]
Id., 20.
[22]
Emphasis supplied.
[23]
Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents, 55-56.
[24]
Consolidated Memorandum for Respondent, Annex "17." Two signed with
reservations
and four signed subject to amendments.
[25]
And companion cases, 220 U.S. 107, 55 L.Ed. 389 [1911].
[26]
Page 56.
[27]
232 U.S. 309, 58 L ed. 117 [1914].
[28]
Introduction to American Government, 309, n. 2 [1945].
[29]
At 317.
[30]
Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents, 20-21.
[31]
Id., Annex "14."
[32]
Id., Annex "1."
[33]
Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents, Annex "18."
[34]
Page 22.
[35]
Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents, Annex "18."
[36]
Id., Annex "19."
[37]
ISAGANI A. CRUZ, Philippine Political Law, 1991 ed., 226; Daza vs.
Singson,
180 SCRA 496 [1989]; Coseteng vs. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377 [1990]; Gonzales
vs. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 [1990]; Llamas vs. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844
[1991];
Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767 [1991]; Oposa
vs.
Factoran, 224 SCRA 792 [1993].
[38]
56 SCRA 714, 719, 723 [1974].
[39]
78 Phil. 1 [1947].
[40]
Mutoc vs. COMELEC, 36 SCRA 228 [1970].
ROMERO, J.:
Dissenting:
[1]
Vitug, Jose C., Compendium of Tax Law and Jurisprudence, Third Revised
Edition, 1993 at 201.
[2]
Ibid.
[3]
Ibid.
[4]
L-81311, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 371 with Justice Teodoro R. Padilla as
ponente.
[5]
Ibid., at 378.
[6]
Ibid., at 385.
[7]
Senate Resolution No. 734 filed on September 10, 1992 was entitled
"Resolution
Urging the House Committee on Ways and Means to Study the Proposal to
Exempt
Local Movie Producers from the Payment of the Value-Added Tax as an
Incentive
to the Production of Quality and Wholesome Filipino Movies, Whenever
They
Feature an All-Filipino Cast of Actors and Actresses."
[8]
SB No. 1129 sought to include under the VAT Law such items as lease of
real properties, excluding agricultural lands and residential
properties
with monthly rentals of less than P10,000.00; hotels; restaurants,
eating
places, caterers; services by persons in the exercise of their
professions;
actors, actresses, talents, singers and professional athletes; and
lawyers,
accountants, doctors and other professionals registered with the
Philippine
Regulatory Commission.
[9]
On June 1, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos certified for immediate
enactment
House Bill No. 9210 entitled "An Act Amending Title IV and Sections 237
and 238 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, to meet a
public
emergency."
[10]
House Bill No. 11197 is entitled "An Act Restructuring the Value-Added
Tax (VAT) System to Widen its Tax Base and Enhance Its Administration,
Amending for these Purposes Sections 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106,
107, 108 and 110 of Title IV, 112, 115 and 116 of Title V, and 236,
237,
and 238 of Title IX and Repealing Sections 113 and 114 of Title V, all
of the National Internal Revenue Code, as Amended."
[11]
Senate Bill No. 1630 is entitled "An Act Restructuring The Value-Added
Tax (VAT) System to Widen its Tax Base and Enhance its Administration,
Amending for these Purposes Sections 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107,
108 and 110 of Title IV, 112 of Title V, and 236, 237 and 238 of Title
IX, and Repealing Sections 113, 114 and 116 of Title V, all of the
National
Internal Revenue Code, as Amended, and for other Purposes."
[12]
Republic Act No. 7716 is entitled "An Act Restructuring The Value-Added
Tax (VAT) System, Widening Its Tax Base and Enhancing Its
Administration,
And For These Purposes Amending And Repealing The Relevant Provisions
Of
The National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and for other purposes."
[13]
Article VI, Section 24: "All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills,
bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application,
and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives,
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments."
[14]
Article VI, Section 26, paragraph 2: "No bill passed by either House
shall
become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and
printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members
three days before its passage, except when the president certifies to
the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency.
Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed,
and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the
yeas
and nays entered in the Journal."
[15]
Article III, Section 1: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws."
[16]
Article III, Section 4: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom
of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably
to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances."
[17]
Article III, Section 5: "No law shall be made respecting an
establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever
be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of
civil
or political rights."
[18]
Article III, Section 10: "No law impairing the obligation of contracts
shall be passed."
[19]
Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 1: "The rules of taxation shall be
uniform
and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation."
[20]
Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 3: "Charitable institutions, churches
and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit
cemeteries,
and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and
exclusively
used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt
from taxation."
[21]
Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1.
[22]
Volume One, Concom Record, p. 436.
[23]
Luz Farms v. The Hon. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform,
G.
R. No. 86889, December 4, 1990, 192 SCRA 51; Dumlao, et al. v.
Commission
on Elections, G. R. No. 72245, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 392; People v.
Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937].
[24]
328 P. 2d 644 [1958].
[25]
Aruego, Jose M., Philippine Political Law, Know Your Constitution,
University
Publishing Co., 1950, pp. 65-66.
[26]
Sinco, Vicente G., Philippine Political Law, Eleventh Edition, p. 196.
[27]
Remarks of Commissioner Eulogio Lerum: "At a time when we did not have
a lawmaking body after martial law was declared, there were tripartite
conferences called by the President for the purpose of acting as a
recommendatory
body regarding settlement of labor and management disputes. During the
said conferences, labor had shown that it can act with maturity. As a
result,
in 1976, an amendment was introduced in the Constitution providing for
sectoral representation. In the Constitution that was approved, the
number
of sectors was not indicated. However, in the Election Code of 1978, it
provided for three sectors; namely, industrial labor, agricultural
labor
and the youth. The agricultural labor was given four seats; two for
Luzon,
one for the Visayas and one for Mindanao. The same is true with the
industrial
labor sector. As far as the youth are concerned, they were also given
four
seats: two for Luzon, one for Mindanao and one for the Visayas, with
the
condition that there will be an additional two at large. And so, the
youth
had six representatives plus four from the agricultural labor sector
and
four from the industrial labor sector we had 14 seats.
In 1981, the Constitution
was again amended. In the course of the amendment, the labor
representatives
in the Batasang Pambansa proposed that sectoral representation be
included
as a permanent addition to the lawmaking body.
Again, in that
Constitution
which was approved in 1981, the number and the name of the sectors were
not indicated. However, in the Election Code that was approved before
the
1984 election, there was really a definition of who will constitute the
sectors and how they will be appointed. Let me quote from that law that
was passed in 1984. Under Section 27 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, the
scope
of the sectors has been defined as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The
agricultural labor
sector covers all persons who personally and physically till the land
as
their principal occupation. It includes agricultural tenants and
lessees,
rural workers and farm employees, owner-cultivators, settlers and small
fishermen.
The industrial
labor
sector
includes all nonagricultural workers and employees.
The youth sector
embraces
persons not more than twenty-five years of age." (Volume Two, ConCom
Record,
p. 564).
[28]
City Mayor, et al. v. The Chief, Philippine Constabulary and Col.
Nicanor
Garcia, L-20346, October 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 673.
[29]
Transcript of the Stenographic Notes [T.S.N.] on the Hearing Had on
Thursday,
July 7, 1994, pp. 13-19:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
JUSTICE FLERIDA RUTH P.
ROMERO:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Q Mr. Counsel, may
I
interrupt
at this stage?
When you say that
according
to the Constitution such Revenue Bills should originate exclusively
from
the House. In this instance, did it not originally originate
exclusively
from the House.?
The word used was
not
"solely"; if there were Bills later also introduced, let us say in the
Senate, but the House Bill came ahead.
So, are you using
the
two (2) words originate "exclusively" and "solely" synonymously?
SENATOR TOLENTINO:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A The verb
"originate"
remains the same, Your Honor, but the word "exclusively", as I said,
means
"solely."
[30]
H.B. 771 exempting the sale of copra from VAT coverage; H.B.
2450
exempting the lessors or distributors of cinematographic films from
paying
the VAT; H.B. 7033 amending Sec. 103 of the National Internal
Revenue
Code, as amended by EO 273; H.B. 8086 exempting packaging
materials
of export products from the VAT; H.B. 9030 amending Sec. 120 of
the
NIRC, as renumbered by EO 273; H.B. 9210 amending Title IV and
Section
237 and 238 of the NIRC; H.B. 9297 restructuring the VAT system
by
expanding its tax base, and amending Sections 99, 100 (A), 102 (A),
103,
113, 114, 115 and 116 of the NIRC; H.B. 10012 reducing the rate
of
VAT imposed on sale and importation of goods, and sale of services;
H.B.
10100 amending certain provisions of the NIRC on VAT.
[31]
Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 9210.
[32]
Excerpts from the April 19, 1994 meeting of the Bicameral Conference
Committee:
"CHAIRMAN Javier. First of all, what would be the basis, no, or
framework
para huwag naman mawala yung personality namin dito sa bicameral, no,
because
the bill originates from the House because this is a revenue bill, so
we
would just want to ask, we make the House Bill as the frame of
reference,
and then everything will just be inserted?
"HON. MACEDA. Yes,
That's
true for every revenue measure. There's no other way. The House Bill
has
got to be the base. Of course, for the record, we know that this is an
administration bill; this is certified by the president and I was about
to put into the records as I am saying now that your problem about the
impact on prices on the people was already decided when the President
and
the administration sent this to us and certified it. They have already
gotten over that political implication of this bill and the economic
impact
on prices.
"CHAIRMAN HERRERA.
Yung
concern mo about the bill as the reference in this discussion is
something
that we can just
"CHAIRMAN JAVIER.
We
will
just xxx all the amendments will be coming from the Senate."
[33]
Article VI, Section 1.
[34]
Transcript of the Stenographic Notes (TSN) on the Hearing Had on
Thursday,
July 7, 1994, pp. 45-46.
"Justice Romero:
Q: Mr.
Counsel, is it not a fact that in the Bicameral Conference Committee,
you
presented a Motion to return the Bill as it was to the Lower House with
also your proposal that this be referred to a Referendum for the entire
nation to vote upon, then Senator Wigberto Tañada amended your
Motion
and convinced you to drop that portion about referral to a Referendum
and
you agreed.
So, that Motion
of
yours
to return to the House was the one voted upon by the Bicameral
Conference
Committee and it lost.
What can you say
to
that?
Senator
Tolentino: A:
No, no, if Your Honor please. My Motion was voted upon by the Senate
itself
because I presented that said Motion in order to recall the Bill from
the
Bicameral Conference Committee so that the Senate could go back to the
period of amendment and see if we could amend the House Bill itself,
but
that was defeated. So, it became academic. Thus, what we did we
proceeded
with the procedure already being followed by the Senate.
I thought, as a
matter
of fact, that was the one way of correcting this procedural error, but
I was only one (1), or two (2), or three (3) of us only, then we were
defeated
in the voting, if Your Honor please.
Justice Romero: Q:
You
mean you were outvoted?
Senator Tolentino:
A:
Yes, Your Honor; we were actually slaughtered in the voting, so to
speak,
if Your Honor please."
[35]
The certification states: "This Act which is a consolidation of House
Bill
No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630 was finally passed by the House of
Representatives
and the Senate on April 7, 1994 and May 2, 1994, respectively."
[36]
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. [1979].
[37]
Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 36 L ed. 294.
[38]
Mason, Paul, Mason's Manual of Legislative Procedure, 1953.
[39]
Cohn v. Kingsley, 49 P. 985 [1897].
[40]
Smith v. Thompson, 258 N.W. 190.
[41]
602 S.W. 2d 420 [1980].
[42]
34 Phil. 729 [1916].
[43]
Ibid., at 733.
[44]
Ibid., at 733-734.
[45]
Ibid., at 735.
[46]
78 Phil. 1 [1947].
[47]
Ibid., at 3.
[48]
Ibid., at 18.
[49]
117 Phil. 363 [1963].
[50]
136 Phil. 405, 409 [1969].
[51]
Ibid., at 412.
[52]
G. R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 703.
[53]
Davies, Jack, Legislative Law and Process, 2nd ed., 1986.
[54]
Petition in G. R. No. 115781, p. 18.
[55]
Petition in G. R. No. 115543, pp. 2-3.
[56]
Davies, Jack, supra at 90.
[57]
Sutherland, J.G., Statutes and Statutory Construction, Vol. I, 4th ed.,
pp. 293-294.
[58]
Page 261.
[59]
Page 268.
[60]
Davies, supra, at 65.
[61]Sec. 764, p. 541.
[62]
Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents, p. 71.
[63]
Pages 404-405 and 407.
[64]
Davies, supra, at 81.
[65]
See: 18 Words and Phrases 482 citing Kennedy v. Truss, Del. Super., 13
A. 2nd 431, 435, 1 Terry 424 [1940].
[66]
United States Gypsum Co. v. State, Dept. of Revenue, 110 N.W. 2d 698,
71,
363 Mich. 548 [1961].
[67]
Black's Dictionary, 6th ed., p. 687 citing State ex. rel. Riley v.
District
Court of Second Judicial Dist. in and for Silver Bow County, 103 Mont.
576, 64 P. 2d 115, 119 [1937].
[68]
Congressional Record, May 3, 1951, p. 885 cited in Orquiola, Annotated
Rules of the Senate, 1991 ed., pp. 40-41.
[69]
Article III, Section 7. "The right of the people to information on
matters
of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law."
[70]
Article II, Section 28. "Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure
of all its transactions involving public interest."
[71]
Article VI, Section 1.
[72]
D & W Auto Supply v. Department of Revenue, supra.
[73]
The Philippine Judges Association v. Hon. Pete Prado, G.R. No. 105371,
November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 703, 709.
[74]
In Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun [109 Phil. 863 (1960)], the Court
held
that parliamentary rules are merely procedural and they may be waived
or
disregarded by the legislative body. Hence, mere failure to conform to
parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action taken by a
deliberative
body when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure.
[75]
State v. Essling, 128 N.W. 2d 307, 316 [1964].
[76]
Sarasola v. Trinidad, 40 Phil. 252, 262 [1919].
[77]
Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, L-59431, July 25, 1984, 130 SCRA 654, 660.
[78]
McCullock v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316.
[79]
Quoted in Graves. v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 490.
PUNO, J.:
Dissenting:
[1]
April 13, 19, 20, 21, and 25, 1994.
[2]
See also Annex "A", Memorandum of Petitioner Kilosbayan in G.R. No.
115781;
also the Petition in G.R. No. 115543, pp. 2-3.
[3]
See p. 66 of the Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents where they
refer
to certain statements from Canlan, Weightson and Beam but without
citing
their specific book or article.
[4]
See Rule 49 of the Rules of the Senate.
[5]
See p. 22 Memorandum of Petitioners in G.R. No. 115781 citing
Jefferson's
Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives, by Lewis Deschler,
Parliamentarian,
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967, p. 264.
[6]
Ibid., citing Riddick, Senate Procedure: Precedents and Practices, US
Senate,
1981, US Government Printing Office, pp. 383-384.
[7]Section 2, Article VI.
[8]Section 5[1], Article VI.
[9]
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., Vol. I, p. 151.
[10]
Legislative Procedure, 1922 ed., Riverside Press, p. 404.
[11]
Legislative Law and Process in a Nut Shell, West Publishing Co., 1986
ed.,
p. 81.
[12]
Ibid.
[13]
Manual of Legislative Procedure for Legislative and other Governmental
Bodies, McGraw Hill Co., Inc., 1953 ed., pp. 32-33.
[14]
82 CJS 136.
[15]
Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., Vol. I., p. 223.
[16]
Op. cit., pp. 224-225 citing Barndall Refining v. Welsh, 64 S.D. 647,
269
N.W. 853, 859 [1936]. Jones, Constitutional Provisions Regulating the
Mechanics
of Enactment in Iowa [1935], 21 Iowa Law Rev. 79, Charlton,
Constitutional
Regulation of Legislative Procedure [1936], 21 Iowa Law Rev. 538; Note
[1936] 21 Iowa Law Rev. 573.
[17]
See Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. Rep. 1 [1947]; Casco Phil. Chemical
Co. v. Gimenez, L-17931, February 28, 1963; Morales v. Subido, No.
L-29658,
February 27, 1969 27 SCRA 131; Phil. Judges Association v. Prado, G. R.
No. 105371, November 11, 1993.
[18]
Record, Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 436; see also, Bernas,
The
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines; 1 Cranch 137 L. ed
[1803].
[20]
Article VIII, Section 2.
[21]
Article VIII, Section 3.
[22]
Article VIII, Section 8.
[23]
Article VIII, Section 9.
[24]
Article VIII, Section 4[1].
[25]
Article VIII, Section 9.
[26]
Article VIII, Section 6.
[27]
Article VIII, Section 12.
[28]
Article VII, Section 18.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Dissenting:
[1]
See McGee v. Republic, 94 Phil. 821 [1954].
[2]
See Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 [1957].
[3]
See Majority Opinion, p. 15, citing Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S.,
309, 58 Law Ed. 617.
[4]
Id., citing F.A. Ogg and P.O. Ray, Introduction to American Government,
302, n. 2 [1945].
[5]
See Note 3.
[6]
22 U.S. 107.
[7]
11 Am. Jur., pp. 712-13, 713-715.
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