SECOND
DIVISION
PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G. R. Nos. 111206-08
October 6, 1995
-versus-
CLAUDIO
TEEHANKEE, JR.,
Accused-Appellant.
D
E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
Three [3]
separate Informations were filed against
accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. for the shooting of Roland John Chapman,
Jussi Olavi Leino and Maureen Hultman. Initially, he was charged with:
Murder for the killing of Roland Chapman and two [2] Frustrated Murder
for the shooting and wounding of Jussi Leino and Maureen Hultman. When
Hultman died on October 17, 1991, during the course of the trial, the
Information
for Frustrated Murder against accused was amended to Murder.[1]
The Information
for murder in Criminal Case No.
91-4605 thus reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July,
1991,
in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y
Javier, armed with a handgun, with intent to kill and evident
premeditation
and by means of treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with and shoot with the said
handgun
Roland John Chapman who war hit in the chest, thereby inflicting mortal
wounds which directly caused the death of said Roland John Chapman.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
The Amended
Information for Murder in Criminal Case
No. 91-4606 reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July,
1991,
in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y
Javier, armed with a handgun, with intent to kill and evident
premeditation
and by means of treachery, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said handgun Maureen
Navarro
Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby inflicting moral wounds which
directly caused the death of the said Maureen Hultman.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Finally, the
Information for Frustrated Murder in
Criminal Case No. 91-4607 reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July,
1991,
in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while
armed
with a handgun, with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault
and shoot one Jussi Olavi Leino on the head, thereby inflicting gunshot
wounds which ordinarily would have caused the death of said Jussi Olavi
Leino, thereby performing all the acts of execution which would have
produced
the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce
it by reason of cause or causes independent of his will, that is, due
to
the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Jussi Olavi
Leino
which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
In the two [2]
Informations for Frustrated Murder
initially filed against accused, bail was set at twenty thousand pesos
[P20,000.00] each. No bail was recommended for the murder of Roland
John
Chapman. A petition for bail was thus filed by accused. Hearing was set
on August 9, 1991, while his arraignment was scheduled on August 14,
1991.
At the hearing of
the petition for bail on August
9, 1991, the prosecution manifested that it would present the surviving
victim, Jussi Leino, to testify on the killing of Chapman and on the
circumstances
resulting to the wounding of the witness himself and Hultman. Defense
counsel
Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez objected on the ground that the incident pending
that day was hearing of the evidence on the petition for bail relative
to the murder charge for the killing of Chapman only. He opined that
Leino's
testimony on the frustrated murder charges with respect to the wounding
of Leino and Hultman would be irrelevant.[5]
Private
prosecutor, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, countered
that time would be wasted if the testimony of Leino would be limited to
the killing of Chapman considering that the crimes for which accused
were
charged involved only one continuing incident. He pleaded that Leino
should
be allowed to testify on all three [3] charges to obviate delay and the
inconvenience of recalling him later to prove the two [2] frustrated
murder
charges.[6]
By way of
accommodation, the defense suggested
that if the prosecution wanted to present Leino to testify on all three
[3)]charges, it should wait until after the arraignment of accused on
August
14, 1991. The defense pointed out that if accused did not file a
petition
for bail, the prosecution would still have to wait until after accused
had been arraigned before it could present Leino.[7]
The private
prosecutor agreed to defer the hearing
on the petition for bail until after arraignment of accused on the
condition
that there shall be trial on the merits and, at the same time, hearing
on the petition for bail. The defense counsel acceded.[8]
Upon arraignment,
accused pleaded not guilty to
the three [3] charges. The prosecution then started to adduce evidence
relative to all three [3] cases. No objection was made by the defense.[9]
A replay of the facts will show that on July
12, 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino invited Roland Chapman, Maureen Hultman and
other friends for a party at his house in Forbes Park, Makati. The
party
started at about 8:30 P.M. and ended at past midnight. They then
proceeded
to Roxy's, a pub where students of International School hang out[10]
After an hour, they transferred to Vintage, another pub in Makati,
where
they stayed until past 3:00 A.M. of July 13, 1991. Their group returned
to Roxy's to pick up a friend of Maureen, then went back to Leino's
house
to eat.[11]
After a while,
Maureen requested Leino to take
her home at Campanilla Street, Dasmariñas Village, Makati.
Chapman
tagged along[12]
When they entered the village, Maureen asked Leino to stop along
Mahogany
Street, about a block away from her house in Campanilla Street. She
wanted
to walk the rest of the way for she did not like to create too much
noise
in going back to her house. She did not want her parents to know that
she
was going home that late. Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman
stayed in the car and listened to the radio[13]
Leino and Maureen
started walking on the sidewalk
along Mahogany Street. When they reached the corner of Caballero and
Mahogany
Streets, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car, driven by
accused
Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind them and stopped on the
middle
of the road. Accused alighted from his car, approached them, and asked:
"Who are you? [Show me your] I.D." Leino thought accused only wanted to
check their identities. He reached into his pocket, took out his
plastic
wallet and handed to accused his Asian Development Bank [ADB] I.D[14]
Accused did not bother to look at his I.D. as he just grabbed Leino's
wallet
and pocketed it[15]
Chapman saw the
incident. All of a sudden, he
manifested from behind Leino and inquired what was going on. He stepped
down on the sidewalk and asked accused: "Why are you bothering us?"
Accused
pushed Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at him.
Chapman felt his upper body, staggered for a moment, and asked: "Why
did
you shoot me?" Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside
Chapman
to assist him but accused ordered him to get up and leave Chapman alone.[16]
Accused then
turned his ire on Leino. He pointed
gun at him and asked: "Do you want trouble?" Leino said "No" and took a
step backward. The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to
her senses, she became hysterical and started screaming for help. She
repeatedly
shouted: "Oh, my God, he's got a gun. He's gonna kill us. Will somebody
help us?" All the while, accused was pointing his gun to and from
Leino to Maureen, warning the latter to shut up. Accused ordered Leino
to sit down on the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt to move
away.
Accused stood 2-3 meters away from him. He knew he could not run far
without
being shot by accused.cralaw:red
Maureen continued
to be hysterical. She could
not stay still. She strayed to the side of accused's car. Accused tried
but failed to grab her. Maureen circled around accused's car, trying to
put some distance between them. The short chase lasted for a minute or
two. Eventually, accused caught Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to
shut up and sit down beside Leino.[17]
Maureen finally
sat beside Leino on the sidewalk.
Two [2] meters away and directly in front of them stood accused.[18]
For a moment, accused turned his back from the two. He faced them again
and shot Leino. Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on the
sidewalk,
but did not lose consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw
Maureen
fall beside him. He lifted his head to see what was happening and saw
accused
return to his car and drive away.[19]
Leino
struggled to his knees and shouted
for help. He noticed at least three [3] people looking on and standing
outside their houses along Caballero Street.[20]
The three were: Domingo Florece, a private security guard hired by
Stephen
Roxas to secure his residence at No. 1357 Caballero Street,
Dasmariñas
Village, Makati;[21]
Vicente Mangubat, a stay-in driver of Margarita Canto, residing at No.
1352 Caballero Street corner Mahogany Street, Dasmariñas Village;[22]
and Agripino Cadenas, a private security guard assigned at the house of
Rey Dempsey located at No. 1351 Caballero Street corner Mahogany
Street,
Dasmariñas Village.[23]
Security guards
Florece and Cadenas were then
on duty at the house of their employer, while driver Mangubat was in
his
quarters, preparing to return to his own house. These three [3]
eyewitnesses
heard the first gunshot while at their respective posts. Upon hearing
the
first shot, Florece went out to Caballero Street to see what was
happening,
while Mangubat and Cadenas peeped over the fence of their employer's
house
and looked out to Caballero Street. Each saw a man [Chapman] sprawled
on
the ground, another man [Leino] sitting on the sidewalk, a third man
standing
up and holding a gun and a woman [Hultman]. They saw the gunman shoot
Leino
and Hultman and flee aboard his Lancer car. However, because of
Florece's
distance from the scene of the crime,[24]
he was not able to discern the face of the gunman. He saw the plate
control
number of the gunman's car as 566. He described the getaway car as a
box-type
Lancer, its color somewhat white ["medyo maputi"].[25]
Cadenas noticed in full the plate number of the getaway car and gave it
as PDW 566. He described the car as silver metallic gray.[26]
Both Cadenas and Mangubat saw the gunman's face. They had a good look
at
him. Cadenas was then a mere four [4] meters away from the gunman's car;[27]
while Mangubat was about twenty [20] meters away from the scene of the
crime[28]
The three confirmed that the corner of Caballero and Mahogany Streets
where
the shooting took place was adequately illuminated by a Meralco
lamppost
at the time of the incident.[29]
After the gunman
sped away, Mangubat ran outside
his employer's house and went near the scene of the crime. He noticed
security
guard Florece along Caballero Street. A man on a bike passed by and
Mangubat
requested him to report the shooting incident to the security officers
of Dasmariñas Village.[30]
Meanwhile, Florece returned to his post and narrated to his employer,
Mrs.
Helen Roxas, what he saw. Mrs. Roxas repaired to the crime scene while
Florece noted the incident in his logbook [Exhibit "B"]. He also jotted
down the license plate control number of the gunman's car as "566".[31]
The security
guards of Dasmariñas Village
came after a few minutes. They rushed Leino and Maureen to the Makati
Medical
Center for treatment.[32] The Makati police and
agents of
the NBI also came. Patrolman James Baldado of the Makati police
together
with SPO3 Alberto Fernandez investigated the incident.[33]
Their initial investigation disclosed that the gunman's car was a
box-type
Mitsubishi Lancer with plate control number 566. They checked the list
of vehicles registered with the Village Homeowners' Association and
were
able to track down two [2] Lancer cars bearing plate control number
566.
One was registered in the name of Jose Montano of 1823 Santan Street,
Dasmariñas
Village with plate number PKX 566, and another was traced to accused
Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. of 1339 Caballero Street, Dasmariñas Village,
with
plate number PDW 566.cralaw:red
Salvador Ranin,
Chief of the Special Operations
Group [SOG] of the NBI was also tasked by then NBI Director Alfredo Lim.[34]
to head a team to investigate the shooting. Ranin's team immediately
proceeded
to the house of Jose Montaño.[35]
where they found ahead of them the Makati police and operatives of the
Constabulary Highway Patrol. Ranin tried to verify from Mrs.
Montaño
whether the white Lancer car registered in the name of Mr.
Montaño
and bearing plate number 566 was the gunman's car. Mrs. Montaño
denied and declared they had already sold the car to Saldaña
Enterprises.
She averred the car was being used by one Ben Conti, a comptroller in
said
company, who resides in Cubao, Quezon City. Mrs. Montaño called
up her husband and informed him about the investigation. She also
called
up Conti and asked him to bring the car to the house.[36]
Jose
Montaño came around noon. Conti followed
with white Lancer car. Ranin brought them to the NBI office for
investigation
together with the Lancer car. At the NBI, Ranin inquired from
Montaño
the whereabouts of his car on July 12 and 13, 1991. Montaño
informed
him that the car was at the residence of his employee, Ben Conti, at E.
Rodriguez Street, Cubao, Quezon City, the night of July 12, 1991. In
the
morning of July 13, 1991, Conti drove the car to their office at
Saldaña
Enterprises. Conti confirmed this information. Ranin received the same
confirmation from two [2] NBI agents who made a countercheck of the
allegation.
Upon Ranin's request, Montaño left his car at the NBI parking
lot
pending identification by possible witnesses.[37]
On July 14, 1991,
a team of NBI agents conducted
an on-the-spot investigation and neighborhood inquiry of the shooting
incident.
They interviewed Domingo Florece and asked him to report to their
office
the next day for further investigation.[38]
They also interviewed Agripino Cadenas who was reluctant to divulge any
information and even denied having witnessed the incident. Sensing his
reluctance, they returned to Cadenas' post at Dasmariñas Village
that night and served him a subpoena, inviting him to appear at the NBI
office for investigation the next day.[39]
The NBI agents also talked with Armenia Asliami, an Egyptian national
residing
at No. 1350 Caballero Street, Dasmariñas Village near the scene
of the crime. Asliami informed the agents that the gunman's car was not
white but light gray. A foreign national, Asliami was afraid and
refused
to give a statement about the incident. The agents exerted every effort
to convince Asliami to cooperate, assuring her of their protection.
Ranin
even asked a representative of the Egyptian embassy to coax Asliami to
cooperate. They failed.[40]
On July 15, 1991,
Florece and Cadenas appeared
at the NBI office as summoned. Florece readily executed a sworn
statement.[41]
Cadenas, however, continued to feign ignorance and bridled his
knowledge
of the incident. He was lengthily interviewed. At around 2:00 P.M., the
NBI agents informed SOG Chief Ranin that Cadenas was still withholding
information from them. Ranin talked to Cadenas in his office. Cadenas
confided
to Ranin his fear to get involved in the case. He was apprehensive that
the gunman would harass or harm him or his family. After Ranin assured
him of NBI protection, Cadenas relented.[42]
The next day,
July 16, 1991, Cadenas gave a full
disclosure to Ranin. He described the gunman's car as a box-type Lancer
with plate number PDW 566. He was brought to the NBI parking lot where
Montaño's white Lancer car was parked to identify the gunman's
car.
Ranin asked Cadenas if Montaño's was the gunman's car. Cadenas
replied
that its color was different. Ranin directed him to look around the
cars
in the parking lot and to point the color that most resembled the color
of the gunman's car. He pointed to a light gray car. Ranin told him
that
the color of the car he pointed to was not white but light gray.[43]
Ranin then asked
Cadenas if he could identify
the gunman. Cadenas replied in the affirmative. Ranin led Cadenas to
his
office and showed him ten [10] pictures of different men [Exhibits
"CC-1"
to "CC-10"] taken from the NBI files. One of the pictures belonged to
accused
Claudio Teehankee, Jr. Cadenas studied the pictures, picked accused's
picture
[Exhibit "CC-7"] and identified him as the gunman. Cadenas wrote his
name
and the date at the back of said picture. Atty. Alex Tenerife of the
NBI
then took down Cadenas' statement.[44]
Ranin sent his
agents and the witnesses to the
Makati Regional Trial Court to apply for a search warrant. After a
searching
examination of the witnesses, Judge Rebecca Salvador issued a search
warrant
[Exhibit "RR"] authorizing the NBI to search and seize the silver
metallic
gray, 1983 Mitsubishi Lancer car owned by accused, bearing plate number
PDW 566. Ranin and his agents drove to accused's house at #1339
Caballero
Street, Dasmariñas Village, to implement the warrant.[45]
At accused's
house, Ranin informed Mrs. Pilar
Teehankee, mother of accused, of their search warrant. Ranin also told
Mrs. Teehankee that they had orders from Director Lim to invite accused
to the NBI office for investigation. Mrs. Teehankee informed them that
accused was not in the house at that time. She excused herself, went to
the kitchen and called up someone on the phone.[46] In the meantime, Ranin
and his
men slipped to the Teehankee garage and secured accused's car. After a
while, Mrs. Teehankee joined them. Ranin asked her for the car keys but
she told him that the keys were with accused. Upon Ranin's request,
Mrs.
Teehankee got in touch with accused on the phone. Ranin conversed with
accused and invited him to the NBI for investigation. Accused assured
Ranin
that he would report to the NBI later that day. The agents then towed
the
car of accused to the NBI office.[47]
At around 9:00
P.M., accused's brother, Raul Teehankee,
arrived at the NBI office and waited for accused. Accused came,
escorted
by three [3] Makati policemen, after an hour. He informed them that he
just came from the Makati police station where he was also
investigated.
He told Lim that he has given a statement to the Makati police and was
brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for paraffin test.[48]
Accused's NBI investigation started. Lim
asked
accused of the whereabouts of his Lancer car at the time of the
shooting.
Accused claimed that his car was involved in an accident a few weeks
back
and was no longer functioning. The car had been parked in his mother's
house at Dasmariñas Village since then. Due to the lateness of
the
evening, the group decided to continue the investigation the following
day.[49]
The next day,
July 17, 1991, after breakfast at
the Manila Hotel, Lim pressed accused on what really happened at
Dasmariñas
Village. Accused said he did not see anything. Lim apprised accused
that
he would be confronted with some eyewitnesses. Accused sank into
silence.[50] Lim directed Ranin to
prepare a
line-up at his office. Accused was requested to join the line-up
composed
of seven [7] men and he acceded. Cadenas was called from an adjoining
room[51]
and Ranin asked him to identify the gunman from the line-up. Forthwith,
Cadenas pointed to accused.[52]
Accused merely stared at Cadenas.[53]
On the same day,
then Asst. Director Epimaco Velasco,
Ranin and two [2] other agents brought accused to Forbes Park for
further
identification by the surviving victim, Jussi Leino. Leino has just
been
discharged from the hospital the day before. Since Leino's parents were
worried about his safety, they requested the NBI to conduct the
identification
of the gunman in Forbes Park where the Leinos also reside. The NBI
agreed.[54]
House security
agents from the U.S. Embassy fetched
Leino at his house and escorted him and his father to a vacant house in
Forbes Park along Narra Avenue. After a couple of minutes, Leino was
brought
out of the house and placed in a car with slightly tinted windows. The
car was parked about five [5] meters away from the house. Inside the
car
with Leino was his father, NBI-SOG Chief Salvador Ranin and a driver.
Leino
was instructed to look at the men who would be coming out of the house
and identify the gunman from the line-up.[55]
A group of five
to six men [including accused]
then came out of the unoccupied house into the street, in a line-up.
Leino
noticed that one of them was wearing sunglasses. Since Leino could not
yet speak at that time due to the extensive injury on his tongue, he
wrote
down on a piece of paper a request for one of the men in the line-up to
remove his sunglasses. Leino handed this written request to his father.
The men in the line-up were herded back inside the house. After a
couple
of minutes, they again stepped out and none was wearing sunglasses.
From
the line-up, Leino identified accused as the gunman.[56]
The agents
brought back accused to the NBI. They
prepared and referred the cases of Murder and double Frustrated Murder
against accused to the Department of Justice for appropriate action. At
the inquest, Fiscal Dennis Villa-Ignacio did not recommend bail insofar
as the murder charge was concerned. Hence, accused was detained at the
NBI.[57]
The shooting
incident was also investigated by
the Makati Police. Pat. Baldado went to see security guard Vicente
Mangubat
at his post at the residence of his employer in Dasmariñas
Village.
Baldado interviewed Mangubat and invited him to the Makati police
station
where his statement [Exhibit "D"] was taken.[58]
The next day,
July 16, 1991, at about 8:30 a.m.,
Pat. Baldado fetched Mangubat from his house and brought him to the
Makati
police station. At the station, Baldado told him to wait for a man who
would be coming and see if the person was the gunman. Mangubat was
posted
at the top of the stairs at the second floor of the station.[59] After a couple of hours,
accused
came with Makati police Major Lovete. He ascended the stairs, passed by
Mangubat and proceeded to Major Lovete's office at the second floor.
While
accused was going up the stairs, Pat. Baldado inquired from Mangubat if
accused was the gunman. Mangubat initially declined to identify
accused,
saying that he wanted to see the man again to be sure. He also confided
to Pat. Baldado that he was nervous and afraid for accused was
accompanied
by a police Major. When accused came out from Major Lovete's office,
Pat.
Baldado again asked Mangubat if accused was the gunman. Mangubat nodded
his head in response.[60]
Accused, together with Major Lovete and Pat. Baldado, boarded a
Mercedes
Benz and left. Mangubat was brought back to his post at
Dasmariñas
Village by other Makatipolicemen.[61]
Two [2] days
later, Pat. Baldado visited Mangubat
at his employer's house and asked him again if accused was really the
gunman.
Once more, Mangubat answered in the affirmative. Pat. Baldado told
Mangubat
that he would no longer ask him to sign a statement which he [Baldado]
earlier prepared [Exhibit "HHH"].[62]
Baldado then left.[63]
In the afternoon
of July 23, 1991, Mangubat was
also questioned by the NBI agents. Director Lim asked Mangubat if he
could
recognize the gunman. Mangubat said he could. Mangubat was shown twelve
[12] pictures [Exhibits "E" to "E-11"] of different men and was asked
to
identify the gunman from them. He chose one picture [Exhibit "E-10"]
that
of accused, and identified him as the gunman. Mangubat's statement was
taken. He was asked to return to the NBI the next day to make a
personal
identification.[64]
When Mangubat
returned, a line-up was prepared
in Lim's office in the presence of the media. At that time, accused's
counsels,
Attys. Jimenez and Malvar, were at the office of then Asst. Director
Epimaco
Velasco protesting to the submission of accused to the identification.
They pointed out that since the cases against accused had already been
filed in court and they have secured a court order for the transfer of
accused to the Makati municipal jail, any identification of accused
should
be made in the courtroom. Asst. Director Velasco insisted on the
identification
as it was part of their on-going investigation. Eventually, accused's
counsels
acquiesced but requested that the identification be made without the
presence
of the media. Velasco turned them down and explained that if accused is
not identified in the line-up, the media coverage would favor accused.[65]
All that time,
accused was at the SOG office.
He refused to join the line-up at Lim's office and remained seated.
Ranin
was compelled to bring to the SOG office the men composing the line-up
and he asked them to go near accused. Ranin then told Mangubat to go in
the office. Mangubat pointed to accused as the gunman. With the
identification
of accused by Mangubat, the NBI wrote finis to its
investigation.[66]
JussiI Leino, the
surviving victim, suffered the
following injuries:
FINDINGS:
- Abrasion, 0.5 cm., temporal area,
left.
- Wound, gunshot, entrance, circular in shape,
1.0 cm. in diameter, located at the upper lip, mouth, along the medial
line, directed backwards and downwards, fracturing the maxillary bone
and
central and lateral incisors, both sides, to the buccal cavity then
lacerating
the tongue with fragments of the bullet lodged in the right palatine,
tongue
and tonsillar region.
SKULLCHEST FOR RIBS X-RAY #353322July
13,
1991
No demonstrable evidence of fracture.
Note
of
radioopaque foreign body (bullet fragments) along the superior alveolar
border on the right. No remarkable findings.
CT SCAN #43992 July 13, 1991
Small hyperdensities presumably bullet
and
bone
fragments in the right palatine, tongue and tonsillar regions with
associated
soft tissue swelling.
Anterior maxillary bone comminuted
fracture.
Temporal lobe contusions with small
hematomata
on the right side.
Minimal subarachnoid hemorrhage.
Intact bone calvarium.
xxx xxx xxx[67]
Dr. Pedro Solis
testified that the bullet entered
the left temple of Leino. After entering Leino's head, it fractured his
upper jaw and his front teeth. Some of the bullet fragments pierced his
palette and tongue. Brain scanning revealed contusions on the temporal
lobe and hemorrhage on the covering of the brain. Physical deformity
resulted
as a consequence of the gunshot wound because of the fractured upper
jaw
and the loss of the front teeth. Sutures were performed on the upper
portion
of his tongue. Nonetheless, Leino's injuries on the tongue caused him
difficulty
in speaking.[68]
Dr. Solis also
testified as to the relative position
of Leino and the gunman. He opined that the muzzle of the gun, like in
the case of Maureen, must have been at a higher level than the victim's
head. He concluded that the gun must have been pointed above Leino's
head
considering the acuteness and downward trajectory of the bullet.[69]
Dr. Leovigildo C.
Isabela, a neuro-surgeon at
the Makati Medical Center, operated on Maureen Hultman. He testified
that
when he first saw Maureen, she was unconscious and her face was
bloodied
all over. Maureen had a bullet hole on the left side of the forehead,
above
the eyebrow. Brain tissues were oozing out of her nostrils and on the
left
side of the forehead where the bullet entered.[70]
They brought
Maureen to the x-ray room for examination
of her skull. She was also given a CT scan. The examination revealed
that
she suffered injuries on the skull and brain. There were several
splintered
bullets in her brain and the major portion of the bullet, after it
fragmented,
was lodged beneath her right jaw.[71]
Maureen was
rushed to the operating room for surgery.
Dr. Isabela led a team who operated on her brain to arrest the bleeding
inside her head, remove devitalized brain tissues and retrieve the
splintered
bullets embedded in her brain. Due to the extensive swelling of
Maureen's
brain and her very unstable condition, he failed to patch the destroyed
undersurface covering of her brain.[72]
After the surgery, Maureen's vital signs continued to function but she
remained unconscious. She was wheeled to the ICU for further
observation.cralaw:red
Two [2] weeks
later, brain tissues and fluid continue
to flow out of Maureen's nostrils due to the unpatched undersurface
covering
of her brain, leaving the swollen portion of her brain exposed. A
second
surgery was made on July 30, 1991, to repair Maureen's brain covering.
He used the fascia lata of Maureen's right thigh to replace
the
destroyed covering of the brain. Nonetheless, Maureen remained
unconscious.
The trickle of brain tissues through her nose was lessened but Maureen
developed infection as a result of the destruction of her brain
covering.
Maureen developed brain abscess because of the infection. She underwent
a third operation to remove brain abscess and all possible focus of
infection.[73]
Testifying on the
extensive injuries suffered
by Maureen Hultman, Dr. Solis explained that Maureen was shot at the
left
side of the forehead. The bullet entry was at 1.5 cm. above the
eyebrow.
Upon entering the forehead, the bullet fragmented into pieces and went
from the left to the right side of the temple, fracturing the frontal
bone
of the skull. The bullet eventually settled behind the right jaw of
Maureen.[74] The wound inflicted on
Maureen
was mortal for it hit one of the most vital parts of the body, the
brain.
When Maureen was subjected to CT scan, they discovered hemorrhage in
her
brain. After the bullet hit her head, it caused hemorrhagic lesion on
the
ventricles of the brain and the second covering of the brain.[75]
The bullet also
injured Maureen's eye sockets.
There was swelling underneath the forehead brought about by edema in
the area. Scanning also showed that Maureen's right jaw was affected by
the fragmented bullet. The whole interior portion of her nose was also
swollen.[76]
A team of doctors
operated on Maureen's brain.
They tried to control the internal bleeding and remove the splintered
bullets,
small bone fragments and dead tissues. The main bullet was recovered
behind
Maureen's right jaw. There was also an acute downward trajectory of the
bullet. Hence, it was opined that Maureen was shot while she was seated.[77]
With each passing
day, Maureen's condition deteriorated.
Even if Maureen survived, she would have led a vegetating life and she
would have needed assistance in the execution of normal and ordinary
routines.[78]
She would have been completely blind on the left eye and there was
possibility
she would have also lost her vision on the right eye. All her senses
would
have been modified and the same would have affected her motor
functions.
There was practically no possibility for Maureen to return to normal.[79]
Maureen did not
survive her ordeal. After ninety-seven
[97] days of confinement in the hospital, she ceased to be a breathing
soul on October 17, 1991.cralaw:red
For his
exculpation, accused relied on the defense
of denial and alibi. Accused claimed that on said date and time, he was
not anywhere near the scene of the crime. He alleged that he was then
in
his house at No. 53 San Juan, Barrio Kapitolyo, Pasig. He slept at
around
1:00 a.m. on July 13, 1991 and woke up at around 8:00 or 9:00 a.m. that
same morning. Accused avowed his two [2] maids could attest to his
presence
in his house that fateful day.[80]
Accused averred
that he only came to know the
three [3] victims in the Dasmariñas shooting when he read the
newspaper
reports about it. He denied knowing prosecution eyewitnesses Agripino
Cadenas
and Vicente Mangubat before they identified him as the gunman.[81]
Accused admitted
ownership of a box-type, silver
metallic gray Mitsubishi Lancer with plate number PDW 566. He, however,
claimed that said car ceased to be in good running condition after its
involvement in an accident in February 1991. Since May 1991 until the
day
of the shooting, his Lancer car had been parked in the garage of his
mother's
house in Dasmariñas Village. He has not used this car since
then.
Accused, however, conceded that although the car was not in good
running
condition, it could still be used.[82]
Accused said that
on July 16, 1991, he went to
the Makati police station at around 5:00 p.m. upon invitation of Chief
of Police Remy Macaspac and Major Lovete who wanted to ask him about
the
ownership of the Lancer car parked in his mother's house. He readily
gave
a statement to the Makati police denying complicity in the crime. He
submitted
himself to a paraffin test. He was accompanied by the Makati police to
the Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame and was tested negative for
gunpowder
nitrate.[83]
After the test, he asked the Makati policemen to accompany him to the
NBI
for he had earlier committed to his mother that he would present
himself
to Director Lim.[84]
He arrived at
Director Lim's office at about 9:30
to 10:00 p.m. He furnished Lim with the statement he earlier gave to
the
Makati police. Thereafter, Lim detained him at the NBI against his will.[85] The following day, July
17,
1991,
Lim and his agents brought him to the Manila Hotel for breakfast. When
they returned to the NBI, he was asked to proceed to Lim's office. On
his
way, he saw a line-up formed inside Lim's office. The NBI agents forced
him to join the line-up and placed him in the number seven (7) slot. He
observed that the man who was to identify him was already in the room.
As soon as he walked up to the line-up, Cadenas identified him as the
gunman.[86]
A second
identification was made on the same day
at a house in Forbes Park. The NBI agents brought him to Forbes Park
but
he never saw Jussi Leino who allegedly identified him as the gunman in
a line-up.[87]
A third
identification was conducted on July 24,
1991. He was then seated at the office of Ranin for he refused to join
another line-up. Despite his protest, the NBI agents insisted on the
conduct
of the identification and ordered a group of men to line up alongside
him.
While thus seated, he was identified by Mangubat as the gunman. He
complained
that he was not assisted by counsel at any stage of said investigation.[88]
The defense also
presented Claudio Teehankee III,
son of accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. He testified that from May 1989
to
February 1991, he had been using his father's Lancer car bearing plate
number PDW 566 in going to school.[89]
In February 1991,
while driving his father's Lancer
car, he accidentally hit a bicycle driver and two [2] trucks parked at
the side of the road. The accident resulted in the death of the bicycle
driver and damage to his father's car,[90]
especially on its body. The timing of the engine became a little off
and
the car was hard to start. They had the car repaired at Reliable Shop
located
in Banawe Street, Quezon city. After a month, he brought the car to the
residence of his grandmother, Pilar Teehankee, at Dasmariñas
Village,
Makati. He personally started the car's engine and drove it to Makati
from
the shop in Quezon City. He did not bring the car to their house in
Pasig
for it was still scheduled for further repairs and they preferred to
have
the repair done in a shop in Makati. Teehankee III claimed that from
that
time on, he was prohibited by his father from using the car because of
his careless driving. He kept the keys to the car and since he was busy
in school, no further repair on said car had been made.[91]
Accused also
imputed the commission of the crimes
at bar to Anders Hultman, adoptive father of deceased victim Maureen
Hultman.
He capitalized on a newspaper report that the gunman may have been an
over-protective
father. This theory was formed when an eyewitness allegedly overheard
Maureen
pleading to the gunman: "Huwag Daddy. Huwag, Daddy." The
defense
presented Anders Hultman as a hostile witness.cralaw:red
Anders Hultman
testified that he is a Swedish
national. He and Vivian Hultman were married in the Philippines in
1981.
Vivian had two [2] children by her previous marriage, one of whom was
Maureen.
He legally adopted Vivian's two [2] daughters in 1991. He and Vivian
had
three [3] children of their own.[92]
The defense
confronted Anders with one of the
angles of the crime in the initial stage of the investigation, i.e.,
that Maureen was overheard pleading to the gunman: "Huwag, Daddy.
Huwag,
Daddy." Anders explained that Maureen could not have uttered those
words for Maureen never spoke Tagalog. He also said that all
his
children call him "Papa", not "Daddy".[93]
On July 12, 1991,
he and Vivian permitted Maureen
to have a night out but instructed her to be home by 2:00 a.m. Maureen
just received her first salary in her first job and she wanted to
celebrate
with friends. At the time of the shooting, he and his wife were
sleeping
in their house. He woke up at around 5:15 a.m. of July 13, 1991 when a
security guard came to their house and informed them about the killings.[94]
Anders admitted
he had been vocal about the VIP
treatment accorded to accused at the Makati municipal jail. On several
occasions, he checked on accused in jail and discovered that accused
was
not in his cell. The jail guards even covered up accused's whereabouts.
His complaint was investigated by the Congressional Committee on Crime
Prevention, headed by Congressman Concepcion.[95]
The defense also
presented two (2) Makati policemen,
Pat. James Baldado and SPO3 Alberto Fernandez who investigated the
shooting.cralaw:red
Pat. Baldado
testified that in the course of his
investigation, he learned from Mr. Jose Montaño that he sold his
white Lancer car, with plate number PKX 566, to Saldaña Lending
Investors in February 1991. This car was assigned to Ben Conti,
Operations
Manager of said company, and was in the residence of Conti at the time
of the shooting. The other witnesses he interviewed confirmed that
Montaño's
white Lancer car was not in the vicinity of Montaño's residence
at the time of the incident.[96]
SPO3 Fernandez
testified that he interviewed security
guard Vicente Mangubat. Mangubat saw the gunman and the getaway car but
could not give the central letters of the car's license plate.
Fernandez
went to one of the houses at the corner of Mahogany and Caballero
Streets
and asked the maid therein if he could use the phone. After placing a
call,
the maid told him that he saw the gunman and heard one of the victims
say:
"Daddy, don't shoot. Don't, don't." Fernandez tried to get
the
maid's
name but the latter refused. The defense did not present this maid in
court
nor asked the court to subpoena her to testify. Neither was the alleged
statement of the maid included in the Progress Report [Exhibit "13"]
prepared
by the Makati police investigators.[97]
SPO3 Fernandez
saw Mangubat the next time on July
16, 1991 when he and Baldado fetched the latter at Dasmariñas
Village
for identification of the gunman at the Makati police station.
At the police station, Fernandez and
Baldado
posted
Mangubat at the lobby. After a few minutes, accused and company
arrived.
When accused passed by them, they instructed Mangubat to look around
and
see if he could identify the gunman. Mangubat failed to identify
accused.
Mangubat told Fernandez that the gunman was younger and shorter than
accused.[98]
SPO3 Fernandez
also took the statement of security
guard Domingo Florece [Exhibit "MM"]. It was signed by Florece in his
presence.
In said statement, Florece described the gunman's car as "medyo
puti"
[somewhat white].[99]
Elizabeth Ayonon,
forensic chemist of the PNP
Crime Laboratory, testified on the paraffin test she conducted on July
17, 1991 on both hands of accused.[100]
As per Chemistry Report No. C 274-91,[101]
the test yielded a negative result of gunpowder nitrates on accused's
hands.
In said Report, she noted that accused was subjected to paraffin test
more
than seventy-two [72] hours after the shooting incident. She explained
that 72 hours is the reasonable period within which nitrate residues
may
not be removed by ordinary washing and would remain on the hands of a
person
who has fired a gun.[102]
Atty. Manuel Q.
Malvar, one of accused's counsel
of record, also took the stand for the defense. He testified that in
the
course of handling the cases, he was able to confer with Ponferrada,
Cadenas'
supervisor at the security agency where Cadenas was employed.
Ponferrada
informed him that Cadenas confided to him that he was tortured at the
NBI
and was compelled to execute a statement. Ponferrada, allegedly,
refused
to testify. Atty. Malvar, however, admitted the defense did not compel
the attendance of Ponferrada by subpoena. On rebuttal, Cadenas denied
the
torture story.cralaw:red
Atty. Malvar also
admitted that he and Atty. Jimenez
were aware of the irregularities committed in the off-court
identification
of their client. When asked what he did to remedy this perceived
irregularity,
Malvar said he objected to the conduct of the line-up. When further
pressed
whether he filed a petition for review raising this issue with the
Department
of Justice upon the filing of the cases therewith, he said he did not.
He offered the excuse that he deferred to Atty. Jimenez, the principal
counsel of accused at that time. He also declared that although they
knew
that arraignment would mean waiver of the alleged irregularities in the
conduct of the investigation and preliminary investigation, he and
Atty.
Jimenez allowed accused to be arraigned.[103]
The defense
likewise relied on a number of news
accounts reporting the progress in the investigation of the case. It
presented
seven [7] newspaper reporters as witnesses, viz: Nestor
Barrameda
of the Manila Times, Martin Marfil and Dave Veridiano of the Philippine
Daily Inquirer, Nida Mendoza of Malaya, Itchie Kabayan and Alex Allan
of
the People's Journal, and Elena Aben of the Manila Bulletin. The bulk
of
defense evidence consists of newspaper clippings and the testimonies of
the news reporters, thus:
Nestor Barrameda,
a news reporter of the Manila
Times, identified two [2] news reports as having been partly written by
him. One was a news item, entitled: "JUSTICE DEP'T ORDERS PROBE OF
THREE
METRO KILLINGS" [Exhibit "1"] appearing on the July 16, 1991 issue of
the
Manila Times.[104]
He, however, clarified that a news report is usually the product of
collaborative
work among several reporters. They follow the practice of pooling news
reports where several reporters are tasked to cover one subject matter.
The news editor then compiles the different reports they file and
summarizes
them into one story.[105]
The defense
lifted only certain portions of Exhibit
"1" and marked them in evidence as follows:
Exhibit "1-A":
Bello directed NBI Deputy Director
Epimaco
Velasco
to take over the investigation of the murders of Roland Chapman, 21,
Eldon
Maguan, 25, and three members of a family Estrellita Vizconde and
her daughters, Carmela, 19, and Anne Marie Jennifer, 7.
Exhibit "1-B"
Police said that Chapman's assailant
could have
been angered when Hultman, a 10th grader at the International School in
Makati, was escorted home by Chapman after going to a disco.
Exhibit "1-C"
The lone gunman, witnesses told police,
first
pistol-whipped Hultman.
Exhibit "l-D"
The same witnesses said Chapman and Leino
were
shot when they tried to escape.
Exhibit "1-E"
Other angles. Velasco
said "we are pursuing two angles" in the Chapman murder.
One, he said, is the jealousy angle and
the
other
is a "highly sensitive" matter that might involve influential people.[106]
Barrameda
testified that he had no personal knowledge
of the content of the news items marked as Exhibits "1-C" to "1-D". He
just culled them from previous news reports of other newspapers. He
admitted
that the only portion he wrote based on an actual interview with NBI
Asst.
Director Velasco was Exhibit "I-E." Barrameda
identified another news item in the July 23, 1991 issue of the Manila
Times,
entitled: "NBI INSISTS IT HAS 'RIGHT' SUSPECT IN CHAPMAN SLAY" which
was
marked as Exhibit "2." Certain portions thereof which were not written
by Barrameda,[107]
were lifted by the defense and offered in evidence, viz:
Exhibit "2-a"
Superintendent Lucas Managuelod, CIS
Director
for the National Capital Region, claims, however, that another security
guard, Vic Mangubat, had testified before the police that another man,
not Teehankee, had fired at Chapman and his companions.
Exhibit "2-b"
The CIS official added that the absence
of
nitrite
or powder burns on Teehankee's hands as shown by paraffin tests at the
CIS laboratory indicated that he may not have fired the gun.[108]
Martin Marfil,
a reporter of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, identified two [2] newspaper clippings which were partly
written
by him.One news item which appeared on
the
July 17, 1991 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, was entitled:
"FBI
JOINS PROBE OF DASMA SLAY" [Exhibit "3"].[109]
Again, the defense marked in evidence
certain
portions
of Exhibit "3", thus:
Exhibit "3-a"
Witnesses said Hultman talked with the
gunman
whom she called "Daddy" shortly before Chapman's shooting.
Exhibit "3-b"
But Ranin said they were also looking
into
reports
that Hultman was a dancer before she was adopted by her foster parent.
Exhibit "3-c"
Investigations showed that the gunman
sped
along
Caballero Street inside the village after the shooting and was believed
to have proceeded toward Forbes Park using the Palm Street gate.
On
cross-examination, Marfil admitted that he did
not write Exhibits"3-a" and "3-c". He just reiterated previous reports
in other newspapers. They were based on speculations. Marfil
also wrote some portions of a news item, entitled: "TEEHANKEE SON HELD
FOR DASMA SLAY," which appeared on the July 18, 1991 issue of the
Philippine
Daily Inquirer [Exhibit "4"], viz:
Exhibit "4-B"
According to NBI Director Alfredo Lim,
the
break
in the case came when the witness showed up and said that the gunman
was
on board a silver-metallic Lancer.
Exhibit "4-C"
The witness said the gunman was standing
a few
feet away near the car and was talking to Hultman, who was shouting "Huwag!
Daddy!" several times.[110]
Marfil's source
of information was Director Lim.
On cross-examination, Marfil admitted that the news reports marked as
Exhibits
"3" and "4" were written based on information available at that time.[111]
Nida Mendoza, a
reporter of the Malaya, identified
a news report entitled: "TEEHANKEE SON HELD ON DASMA SLAYING," which
appeared
on the July 18, 1991 issue of Malaya. She testified that she wrote a
portion
thereof, marked as Exhibit "5-c" and the sources of her information
were
several Makati policemen.[112]
Exhibit "5-c" reads:
Makati policemen, meanwhile, disputed NBI
accounts
that Teehankee was arrested at his house.
They said Teehankee, the last remaining owner
of a car with plate control number 566 who had not been questioned,
voluntarily
went to police headquarters upon invitation of Makati Police Chief
Superintendent
Remy Macaspac.[113]
The defense
presented Exhibits "1-5" to prove: [a]
the alleged concerted effort of the investigators to implicate accused
as the lone gunman; [b] that there were other suspects aside from
accused
and that someone whom Maureen called as "Daddy" was the actual
gunman;
[c] that the initial police investigation showed that the gunman's car
was a white Lancer with Plate No. 566; and [d] that after the NBI took
over the investigation, the white Lancer car of the gunman became a
silver
gray Lancer of accused and thereafter, he became the gunman.
Itchie Cabayan, a
reporter of the People's Journal,
identified the portions she wrote in the news item, entitled: ''I WILL
HOUND YOU", which appeared on the October 24, 1991 issue of People's
Journal
[Exhibit "6"]. She identified the source of her information as Mr.
Anders
Hultman himself.[114]
The portions thereof were marked in evidence
by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "6-a"
"I will be visiting him often and at the
most
unexpected occasion," Hultman said the day after his 17-year old
daughter
was cremated.[115]
Exhibit "6-b"
The day Maureen died, a congressional
hearing
granted the Hultman family's request for permission to visit Teehankee
in his cell "at anytime of their choice."
Exhibit "6-c"
"If on my next visit he still refuses to
come
out and is still hiding behind the curtain," Hultman said, "Congress
told
me that I can take the curtain down and jail authorities will pull him
out."[116]
Alex Allan,
also a reporter of People's Journal,
co-wrote the news item marked as Exhibit "6". Specifically, he wrote
Exhibits
"6-d" and "6-e"[117]
which read:
Exhibit "6-d"
"Kaawaawa naman ang mga Hultmans,
tulungan
natin sila," Ong was quoted as telling Vergel de Dios.
Exhibit "6-e"
BIR insiders said Ong has shown a keen
interest
in the Chapman-Hultman, Vizconde and Eldon Maguan cases because he
belongs
to a secret but very influential multi-sectoral group monitoring graft
and corruption and other crimes in high levels of government and
society.[118]
Allan was not
able to check or verify the information
in Exhibit "6-e" given to him by BIR insiders for the latter refused to
be identified.[119] Exhibit "6" and its
sub-markings
were offered to prove: [a] the alleged blind and consuming personal
rage
and bias of Anders Hultman against accused; and [b] the unwarranted
pressure,
prejudice and prejudgment by some congressional leaders in favor of the
Hultmans in violation of due process.
Dave Veridiano, a
reporter of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, identified the news account which appeared on the July 16,
1991
issue of the Inquirer, entitled: "DASMA SLAY SUSPECT IDENTIFIED"
[Exhibit
"7"]. He wrote a portion of said article [Exhibit "7-c"] and the source
of his information was Camp Crame.[120]
It reads:
Exhibit "7-c"
Witnesses said the gunman fled aboard a
white
Mitsubishi Lancer with plate number "566." The witnesses cannot tell
the
plate's control letters.[121]
Veridiano
likewise identified a news item which appeared
in the July 1991 issue of the Inquirer, entitled: "N.B.I. FINDINGS
DISPUTED,
SECOND WITNESS TAGS TEEHANKEE" [Exhibit "8"]. The portions of said news
item which he wrote were marked in evidence by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "8-a"
At the Criminal Investigation Service,
however,
an investigator who asked not to be identified insisted that the NBI
got
the wrong man. The NBI has taken over the case from the CIS.
Exhibit "8-c"
He said the CIS will shortly identify the
suspect
killer whom he described as "resembling Teehankee but looks much
younger."
Exhibit "8-e"
The source said that the police's "prime
witness,"
identified only as Mangubat, saw everything that happened in the early
morning of July 13. The witness, however, failed to identify Teehankee
as the gunman.[122]
Veridiano was
shown another news report entitled:
"CIS GIVES UP CHAPMAN SLAY CASE", which appeared on the July 26, 1991
issue
of the Philippine Daily Inquirer [Exhibit "9"].[123]
He wrote the entire news account,[124]
portions of which were marked by the defense in evidence, thus:
Exhibit "9-a"
The CIS pulled out from the case a day
after
its so-called "surprise witness" picked Claudio Teehankee, Jr. from an
NBI lineup.
He gathered
this information from his source but
he was not able to interview Mangubat himself.[125]
Exhibit "9-b"
"Sira ulo pala siya [Mangubat]. Ilang
beses
kong pinarada sa kanya si Bobby [Teehankee Jr.] puro iling siya. Hindi
raw ito ang suspect. Ngayon bigla niyang ituturo," said a red-faced
Makati investigator who, as usual, did not want to be identified.
Elena Aben, a
reporter from the Manila Bulletin,
wrote the entire article entitled: "US DIPLOMAT'S SON SHOT DEAD", which
appeared on the July 14, 1991 issue of the Manila Bulletin [Exhibit
"10"].[126]
Two [2] portions thereof were marked as evidence by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "10-a-1"
The victims were on their way home in
Olanileino's
Mercedez Benz with a diplomat's plate number when a white Lancer with
plate
number PKX-566 blocked its path.
Exhibit "10-a-2"
US embassy spokesman Stanley Schrager
said
Chapman's
father is a communications specialist. He said the shooting could be
the
result of an altercation on the street.[127]
Finally, Victor
Vega, a reporter of the Manila Bulletin,
identified the news account he wrote which appeared on the July 16,
1991
issue of the Bulletin entitled: "4 MURDER SUSPECTS FALL" [Exhibit
"22"].
Portions of said news item were marked by the defense as follows:
Exhibit "22-b"
He was shot to death by a group of armed
men
at the corner of Mahogany and Caballero Sts. in Dasmariñas
Village
at past 4 a.m. Friday.
Exhibit "22-c"
The NBI sources said that jealousy
sparked the
slaying of Chapman who was killed in front of his friends on his way
home
from a party. The armed men, on board a white Lancer car, blocked the
path
of the victim's Mercedes Benz car inside the village before the
shooting.
Exhibit "22-a-1"
The gunmen then alighted from their car
and at
gunpoint ordered Chapman to alight from the car. They shot Chapman
several
times in the body, while his companions identified as Maureen Hultman,
and Jussi Olanileino, were seriously wounded when the gunmen sprayed
the
car with bullets.
The gunmen escaped after the
shooting.
Lim said he will announce later the names of the detained suspects
after
their initial investigation.[128]
Finally, his
article, entitled: "MAKATI SLAY SUSPECT
IDENTIFIED" [Exhibit "23"] which appeared on the July 18, 1991 issue of
the Manila Bulletin, was introduced by the defense in evidence as
follows:
Exhibit "23-a-1"
The NBI said Teehankee was one of four
men who
blocked Chapman's car on Mahogany St. in the subdivision.
Exhibit "23-a-2"
Witnesses said they saw Teehankee order
Chapman
and his two companions, Maureen Hultman and Jussi Olanileino, a Finn,
to
get out of their car.
Exhibit "23-a-3"
They identified the car used by the
suspect,
a silver gray Lancer with Plate No. PDW 566. They added that they saw
the
same car in the garage of the Teehankee family.[129]
On
cross-examination, Vega declared that the source
of his two [2] stories was the NBI and they were based on information
available
to the NBI at that time.[130]
The prosecution
recalled to the stand, eyewitness
Vicente Mangubat as its rebuttal witness. Mangubat insisted that he was
able to identify accused when he saw the latter at the Makati police
station.
He reiterated that the next day, Pat. Baldado of the Makati police went
to his place of work in Dasmariñas Village and asked him if he
was
sure about the identity of the gunman. He told Baldado he was positive.
Baldado then said to him he would no longer require him to sign the
statement
he prepared for him earlier.[131]
Leonora C.
Vallado, Chief of the Forensic Chemistry
Division of the NBI, was also presented as a prosecution rebuttal
witness.
She testified that extensive washing of hands or excessive perspiration
can eliminate gunpowder nitrates lodged on skin pores of the hands.
Continued
washing with hot water can induce perspiration and remove nitrate
residue
embedded in the skin pores. Application of vinegar on the hand can
register
the same effect.[132] She testified that their
practice
at the NBI is to take the paraffin test on a suspect within 72 hours
from
the time of the alleged firing of a gun, during which time, any
possible
trace of nitrate may still be found.[133]
She divulged that
questions have been raised regarding
the reliability of the paraffin test. She related that she once
attended
a training in Baguio City where they tried to test the accuracy of a
paraffin
test. In said training, two [2] NBI agents fired a .38 revolver. One of
them washed his hands. They then subjected both agents to a paraffin
test
using diphylamine reagent. Both yielded a negative result. Thus, she
opined,
the result of a paraffin test should merely be taken as a corroborative
evidence and evaluated together with other physical evidence.[134]
The records show
that the case was set for hearing
on October 29, 1992, for the presentation by the defense of
sur-rebuttal
evidence. However, a day before the scheduled hearing, the defense
filed
a Constancia[135]
manifesting that it shall waive its right to present sur-rebuttal
evidence,
the same being unneccesary. The defense, however, declared that this is
without prejudice to the presentation of its evidence in the trial
proper
should the same be necessary.cralaw:red
At the hearing of
October 29, 1992, the defense
counsels did not appear. The prosecution moved in open court that the
main
cases and the petition for bail be submitted for decision in view of
the
absence of defense counsels who had manifested that they would no
longer
present their sur-rebuttal evidence. The motion was granted and the
parties
were given ten [10] days from receipt of the Order within which to
submit
their simultaneous Memorandum.[136]
It does not appear that the defense objected to this Order. The records
show that the defense even filed a motion asking for additional time to
file its Memorandum.[137]
In due time, both parties submitted their respective Memoranda.cralaw:red
On December 22,
1992, the trial court convicted
accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. of the crimes charged.[138] The dispositive portion
of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
hereby
renders judgment:
[1] In criminal Case No. 91-4605,
finding
accused
Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense
of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the fatal shooting of Roland
John
Chapman, and sentencing said accused to suffer imprisonment of
reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the sum of Fifty
Thousand
Pesos [P50, 000.00], Philippine Currency, plus moderate or temperate
and
exemplary damages in the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
[P500,000.00],
Philippine Currency;
[2] In Criminal Case No. 91-4606,
finding
accused
Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense
of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the fatal shooting of Maureen
Navarro
Hultman, and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua,
and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the sum of Fifty Thousand
Pesos
[P50,000.00], Philippine Currency, plus the sums of Two Million Three
Hundred
Fifty Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three Centavos
[P2,350,461.83],
Philippine Currency, as actual damages; Thirteen Million Pesos
[P13,000,000.00],
Philippine Currency, for loss of earning capacity of the said deceased;
and One Million Pesos [P1,000,000.00], Philippine Currency, as moral,
moderate
and exemplary damages;
[3] In Criminal Case No. 91-4607,
finding
accused
Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense
of Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Jussi
Olavi Leino, and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum, to ten (10) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum and to pay the said offended party
the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos [P30,000.00], Philippine Currency;
plus
the sum of One Hundred Eighteen Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Nine Pesos
and Eighty-Four Centavos [P118,369.84], Philippine Currency, and
another
sum equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U.S. $55,600.00, both as actual
damages;
an amount equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U.S. $40,000.00, as loss of
earning capacity of said offended party; and One Million Pesos
[P1,000,000.00],
Philippine Currency, as moral, moderate and exemplary damages.
[4] In all these three cases, ordering
said
accused
to pay all the offended parties the sum of Three Million Pesos
[P3,000,000.00],
Philippine Currency, as and for attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation;
and
[5] To pay the costs in these three
cases.
Consequently the petition for bail is
hereby
denied
for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Accused hired a
new counsel in the person of Atty.
Nicanor B. Gatmaytan, Jr. He filed a Motion for New Trial,[139]
alleging for the first time that the trial court erred in considering
as
submitted for decision not only the petition for bail but also the case
on the merits. He claimed that accused's right to adduce further
evidence
was violated. His motion for new trial was denied.
Accused
interposed the present appeal.[140]
He contends that:
I.chanrobles virtual law libraryTHE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT
THE ACCUSED HAD BEEN POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY JUSSI LEINO, CADENAS AND
MANGUBAT AS THE ONE WHO SHOT HIM, ROLAND CHAPMAN AND MAUREEN NAVARRO
HULTMAN.chanrobles virtual law libraryII.chanrobles virtual law libraryTHE PROSECUTION HAS FAILED TO
ESTABLISH
THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.chanrobles virtual law libraryIII.chanrobles virtual law libraryTHE PUBLICITY GIVEN THE CASE
AGAINST
THE
APPELLANT WAS MASSIVE, OVERWHELMING, AND PREJUDICIAL AS TO EFFECTIVELY
DEPRIVE THE ACCUSED OF RIGHT TO IMPARTIAL TRIAL.chanrobles virtual law libraryIV.chanrobles virtual law libraryTHE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT
THE KILLING OF CHAPMAN AND HULTMAN AND THE SHOOTING OF LEINO WAS
ATTENDED
BY TREACHERY.chanrobles virtual law libraryV.chanrobles virtual law libraryTHE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING
EXORBITANT
MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY.chanrobles virtual law libraryVI.chanrobles virtual law libraryTHE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
AWARDING
ATTORNEY'S
FEES OF THREE MILLION PESOS [P3,000,000.00].chanrobles virtual law libraryVII.chanrobles virtual law libraryTHE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
RENDERING
JUDGMENT
ON THE MERITS AND ON THE PETITION FOR BAIL AT THE SAME TIME WITHOUT
GIVING
THE ACCUSED THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE IN HIS
DEFENSE
ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE AND DENYING THE ACCUSED'S MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL.chanrobles virtual law library
We shall discuss
these alleged errors in seriatim.
I.
Appellant was
convicted on the strength of the
testimonies of three [3] eyewitnesses who positively identified him as
the gunman. He vigorously assails his out-of-court identification by
these
eyewitnesses.He starts by trying to
discredit
the eyeball account of Jussi Leino, the lone surviving victim of the
crimes
at bar. Appellant urges:
First, that Leino's identification
of
him outside an unoccupied house in Forbes Park was highly irregular.
Second, that Leino saw his
pictures
on
television and the newspapers before he identified him.
Third, that Leino's interview
at the
hospital
was never put in writing.
Fourth, that the sketch of
appellant
based
on the description given by Leino to the CIS agents was suppressed by
the
NBI. It is surmised that the sketch must have been among the evidence
turned
over to the NBI when the latter assumed jurisdiction over the
investigation.
Lastly, that Leino could not
have
remembered
the face of appellant. The shooting lasted for only five [5] minutes.
During
that period, his gaze could not have been fixed only on the gunman's
face.
His senses were also dulled by the five [5] bottles of beer he imbibed
that night.
It is
understandable for appellant to assail his
out-of-court identification by the prosecution witnesses in his first
assignment
of error. Eyewitness identification constitutes vital evidence and, in
most cases, decisive of the success or failure of the prosecution. Yet,
while eyewitness identification is significant, it is not as accurate
and
authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence such
as
the fingerprint or DNA testing. Some authors even describe eyewitness
evidence
as "inherently suspect."[141]
The causes of misidentification are known, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Identification testimony has at least
three
components.
First, witnessing a crime, whether as a victim or a bystander, involves
perception of an event actually occurring. Second, the witness must
memorize
details of the event. Third, the witness must be able to recall and
communicate
accurately. Dangers of unreliability in eyewitness testimony arise at
each
of these three stages, for whenever people attempt to acquire, retain,
and retrieve information accurately, they are limited by normal human
fallibilities
and suggestive influences. [Emphasis supplied].[142]
Out-of-court
identification is conducted by the police
in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is
brought
face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug
shots
where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It
is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from
a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of
out-of-court
identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification
during
the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its
fairness
and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process.
In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court
identification
of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test
where
they consider the following factors, viz: [1] the witness'
opportunity
to view the criminal at the time of the crime; [2] the witness' degree
of attention at that time; [3] the accuracy of any prior description
given
by the witness; [4] the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness
at the identification; [5] the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and [6] the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure.[143]
Using the
totality of circumstances test, We hold
that the alleged irregularities cited by appellant did not result in
his
misidentification nor was he denied due process. There is nothing wrong
in Leino's identification of appellant in an unoccupied house in Forbes
Park. The records reveal that this mode was resorted to by the
authorities
for security reasons.[144]
The need for security even compelled that Leino be fetched and escorted
from his house in Forbes Park by U.S. embassy security officials and
brought
to the house where he was to make the identification. The Leinos
refused
to have the identification at the NBI office as it was cramped with
people
and with high security risk.[145]
Leino's fear for his safety was not irrational. He and his companions
had
been shot in cold blood in one of the exclusive, supposedly safe
subdivisions
in the metropolis. Atty. Salvador Ranin, Chief of the Special
Operations
Group of the NBI, correctly testified that there is no hard and fast
rule
as to the place where suspects are identified by witnesses.
Identification
may be done in open field. It is often done in hospitals while the
crime
and the criminal are still fresh in the mind of the victim.[146]
Appellant cannot
also gripe that Leino saw his
pictures and heard radio and TV accounts of the shooting before he
personally
identified him. Indeed, the records show that on July 15, 1991, while
Leino
was still in the hospital, he was shown three [3] pictures of different
men by the investigators. He identified appellant as the gunman from
these
pictures. He, however, categorically stated that, before the mug shot
identification,
he has not seen any picture of appellant or read any report relative to
the shooting incident.[147]
The burden is on appellant to prove that his mug shot identification
was
unduly suggestive. Failing proof of impermissible suggestiveness, he
cannot
complain about the admission of his out-of-court identification by
Leino.cralaw:red
We have no reason
to doubt the correctness of
appellant's identification by Leino. The scene of the crime was
well-lighted
by a Meralco lamp post. Appellant was merely 2-3 meters away when he
shot
Leino. The incident happened for a full five [5] minutes. Leino had no
ill-motive to falsely testify against appellant. His testimony at the
trial
was straightforward. He was unshaken by the brutal cross-examination of
the defense counsels. He never wavered in his identification of
appellant.
When asked how sure he was that appellant was responsible for the
crime,
he confidently replied: "I'm very sure. It could not have been somebody
else."[148]
Appellant cannot
likewise capitalize on the failure
of the investigators to reduce to a sworn statement the information
revealed
by Leino during his hospital interviews. It was sufficiently
established
that Leino's extensive injuries, especially the injury to his tongue,
limited
his mobility. The day he identified appellant in the line-up, he was
still
physically unable to speak. He was being fed through a tube inserted in
his throat. There is also no rule of evidence which requires the
rejection
of the testimony of a witness whose statement has not been priorly
reduced
to writing. Reliance by appellant on the case of People v. Alindog[149]
to erode Leino's credibility is misplaced. In Alindog, accused was
acquitted
not solely on the basis of delay in taking his statement but mainly on
the finding that the prosecution evidence was, at best, circumstancial
and "suspiciosly short in important details," there being no
investigation
whatsoever conducted by the police.cralaw:red
We also reject
appellant's contention that the
NBI suppressed the sketch prepared by the CIS on the basis of the
description
given by Leino. There is nothing on the record[150]
to show that said sketch was turned over by the CIS to the NBI which
could
warrant a presumption that the sketch was suppressed. The suspicion
that
the sketch did not resemble appellant is not evidence. It is
unmitigated
guesswork.
We are not likewise impressed with the contention
that it was incredible for Leino to have remembered appellant's face
when
the incident happened within a span of five [5] minutes. Five [5]
minutes
is not a short time for Leino to etch in his mind the picture of
appellant.
Experience shows that precisely because of the unusual acts of
bestiality
committed before their eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a
crime, can remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of
criminals.[151]
We have ruled that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence
is to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and observe the
manner the crime was committed. Most often, the face end body movements
of the assailant create an impression which cannot be easily erased
from
their memory.[152]
In the case at bar, there is absolutely no improper motive for Leino to
impute a serious crime to appellant. The victims and appellant were
unknown
to each other before their chance encounter. If Leino identified
appellant,
it must be because appellant was the real culprit.cralaw:red
Appellant also
assails his identification by Cadenas.
He contends that Cadenas did not witness the crime. He stresses that
when
the Dasmariñas security force and the Makati police conducted an
on-the-spot investigation on the day of the incident, neither came
across
Cadenas. The next day, in the afternoon of July 14, 1991, an NBI agent
interviewed Cadenas and asked if he saw the incident. He merely
replied:
"Nakita ko pero patay na." He did not volunteer
information to
anyone
as to what he supposedly witnessed. That same night, the NBI subpoenaed
him for investigation. He went to the NBI the next morning. It was only
the next day, July 16, 1991, that he gave his statement to the NBI.
Cadenas
allegedly told Ponferrada, his supervisor, that the NBI tortured him.cralaw:red
We reject
appellant's submission. Cadenas' initial
reluctance to reveal to the authorities what he witnessed was
sufficiently
explained during the trial. He related that he feared for his and his
family's
safety. His fear was not imaginary. He saw with his own eyes the
senseless
violence perpetrated by appellant. He knew appellant belonged to an
influential
family. It was only after consistent prodding and assurance of
protection
from NBI officials that he agreed to cooperate with the authorities.[153]
The Court has taken judicial notice of the natural reticence of
witnesses
to get involved in the solution of crimes considering the risk to their
lives and limbs. In light of these all too real risks, the court has
not
considered the initial reluctance of fear-gripped witnesses to
cooperate
with authorities as an authorities as an indicium of credibility.[154]
It will not depart from this ruling.cralaw:red
Appellant's
assertion that Cadenas was tortured
by the NBI is not borne out by the records. Supposedly, Cadenas passed
on to his superior, a certain Ponferrada, information about his
torture.
The allegation is an out and out hearsay as Ponferrada was not
presented
in the witness stand. Cadenas himself stoutly denied this allegation of
torture. The claim of torture is also belied by the fact that Cadenas'
entire family was allowed to stay with him at the NBI headquarters and
likewise extended protection.[155]
Appellant then
discredits his identification by
Vicente Mangubat citing the testimony of defense witness Pat. James
Baldado
of the Makati Police. Pat. Baldado testified that Mangubat failed to
identify
appellant as the gunman the first time he was brought to the Makati
police
station. Mangubat, however, belied Baldado's story. He declared he
positively
identified appellant as the gunman at the Makati police station. He
averred
that the day after he identified appellant, Pat. Baldado returned to
his
place of work in Dasmariñas and asked him again whether
appellant
was the gunman. Again, he replied in the affirmative. Forthwith, Pat.
Baldado
said he would no longer ask him to sign a statement [Exhibit "HHH"][156]
earlier prepared by Baldado. In said statement previously prepared by
Baldado,
Mangubat was supposed to state that appellant, whom he saw at the
Makati
police station, was not the gunman. We give more weight to the
testimony
of Mangubat. We find nothing in the records to suspect that Mangubat
would
perjure himself. The Court cannot be as generous to Pat. Baldado of the
Makati police. Mr. Hultman has proved that the Makati police, including
some of its jail officials, gave appellant favored treatment while in
their
custody. The anomaly triggered nothing less than a congressional
investigation.
II.chanrobles virtual law library
We now rule on
appellant's second assignment of
error, i.e., that the trial court erred in not holding that the
prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
First, he claims the trial court erred in
citing
in its Decision his involvement in previous shooting incidents for this
contravenes the rule[157]
that evidence that one did or omitted to do a certain thing at one time
is not admissible to prove that he did or omitted to do the same or
similar
thing at another time.
Second, the NBI failed to conduct an
examination
to compare the bullets fired from the gun at the scene of the crime
with
the bullets recovered from the body of Chapman.
Third, the prosecution eyewitnesses
described
the gunman's car as white, but the trial court found it to be silver
mettalic
gray.
Fourth, appellant could not have been
the
gunman
for Mangubat, in his statement dated July 15, 1991, said that he
overheard
the victim Maureen Hultman plead to the gunman, thus: "Please, don't
shoot
me and don't kill me. I promise Mommy, Daddy." Appellant also contends
that a maid in a house near the scene of the crime told Makati police
Alberto
Fernandez that she heard Maureen say: "Daddy, don't shoot. Don't."
Fifth, the NBI towed accused's car
from
Dasmariñas
Village to the NBI office which proved that the same was not in good
running
condition.
Lastly, the result of the paraffin
test
conducted
on appellant showed he was negative of nitrates.
Appellant
points to other possible suspects, viz:.
Anders Hultman, since one of the eyewitnesses was quoted in the
newspapers
as having overheard Maureen plead to the gunman: "Huwag, Daddy.";
and, Jose Montano, another resident of Dasmariñas Village
who had a white Lancer car, also bearing License Plate Number 566.
We reject
appellant's thesis as bereft of merit.cralaw:red
Appellant cannot
hope to exculpate himself simply
because the trial judge violated the rule on res inter alios acta when
he considered his involvement in previous shooting incidents. This
stance
is a specie of a mid-1800 rule known as the English Exchequer Rule
pursuant
to which "a trial court's error as to the admission of evidence was
presumed
to have caused prejudice and, therefore, almost automatically required
a new trial."[158]
The Exchequer rule has long been laid to rest for even English
appellate
courts now disregard an error in the admission of evidence "unless in
its
opinion, some substantial wrong or miscarriage [of justice] has been
occasioned."[159]
American courts adopted this approach especially after the enactment of
a 1915 Federal Statute which required a federal appellate court to
"give
judgment after an examination of the entire record before the court,
without
regard to technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect
the substantial rights of the parties."[160]
We have likewise followed the harmless error rule in our jurisdiction.
In dealing with evidence improperly admitted in trial, We examine its
damaging
quality and its impact to the substantive rights of the litigant. If
the
impact is slight and insignificant, We disregard the error as it will
not
overcome the weight of the properly admitted evidence against the
prejudiced
party.[161]
In the case at
bar, the reference by the trial
judge to reports about the troublesome character of appellant is a
harmless
error. The reference is not the linchpin of the inculpatory evidence
appreciated
by the trial judge in convicting appellant. As aforestated, the
appellant
was convicted mainly because of his identification by three [3]
eyewitnesses
with high credibility. The NBI may
have
also failed to compare the bullets fired from the fatal gun with the
bullets
found at the scene of the crime. The omission, however, cannot
exculpate
appellant. The omitted comparison cannot nullify the evidentiary value
of the positive identification of appellant.cralaw:red
There is also
little to the contention of appellant
that his Lancer car was not in running condition. Allegedly, this was
vicariously
proved when the NBI towed his car from Dasmariñas Village where
it was parked to the NBI office. Again, the argument is negated by the
records which show that said car was towed because the NBI could not
get
its ignition key which was then in the possession of appellant.
Clearly,
the car was towed not because it was not in running condition. Even
appellant's
evidence show that said car could run. After its repairs, appellant's
son,
Claudio Teehankee III, drove it from the repair shop in Banawe, Quezon
City to Dasmariñas Village, in Makati, where it was parked.[162]
Nor are We
impressed by the alleged discrepancies
in the eyewitnesses' description of the color of the gunman's car.
Leino
described the car as light-colored; Florece said the car was somewhat
white
["medyo puti"];[163]
Mangubat declared the car was white;[164]
and Cadenas testified it was silver metallic gray.[165]
These alleged discrepancies amount to no more than shades of
differences
and are not meaningful, referring as they do to colors white, somewhat
white, and silver metallic gray. Considering the speed and shocking
nature
of the incident which happened before the break of dawn, these slight
discrepancies
in the description of the car do not make the prosecution eyewitnesses
unworthy of credence.cralaw:red
Appellant's
attempt to pin the crimes at bar on
Anders Hultman, the adoptive father of Maureen Hultman, deserves scant
consideration. Appellant cites a newspaper item[166]
where Maureen was allegedly overheard as saying to the gunman:
"Huwag,
Daddy. Huwag, Dadzdy." The evidence on record, however,
demonstrates
that Anders Hultman could not have been the gunman. It was clearly
established
that Maureen could not have uttered said statement for two (2) reasons:
Maureen did not speak Tagalog, and she addressed Anders Hultman as
"Papa,"
not "Daddy."[167]
Moreover, Leino outrightly dismissed this suspicion. While still in the
hospital and when informed that the Makati police were looking into
this
possibility, Leino flatly stated that Anders Hultman was not the gunman.[168] Leino is a reliable
witness.cralaw:red
Appellant cannot
also capitalize on the paraffin
test showing he was negative of nitrates. Scientific experts concur in
the view that the paraffin test has "proved extremely unreliable in
use.
The only thing that it can definitely establish is the presence or
absence
of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It cannot be established from this
test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the
discharge
of a firearm. The person may have handled one or more of a number of
substances
which give the same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as
explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous
plants
such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also
have
nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these substances are
present
in the products of combustion of tobacco."[169]
In numerous rulings, We have also recognized several factors which may
bring about the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman,
viz: when the assailant washes his hands after firing the
gun,
wears
gloves at the time of the shooting, or if the direction of a strong
wind
is against the gunman at the time of firing.[170]
In the case at bar, NBI Forensic Chemist, Leonora Vallado, testified
and
confirmed that excessive perspiration or washing of hands with the use
of warm water or vinegar may also remove gunpowder nitrates on the
skin.
She likewise opined that the conduct of the paraffin test after more
than
seventy-two [72] hours from the time of the shooting may not lead to a
reliable result for, by such time, the nitrates could have already been
removed by washing or perspiration.[171]
In the Report[172]
on the paraffin test conducted on appellant, Forensic Chemist Elizabeth
Ayonon noted that when appellant was tested for the presence of
nitrates,
more than 72 hours has already lapsed from the time of the alleged
shooting.
III.chanrobles virtual law library
In his third
assigned error, appellant blames
the press for his conviction as he contends that the publicity given to
his case impaired his right to an impartial trial. He postulates there
was pressure on the trial judge for high-ranking government officials
avidly
followed the developments in the case [as no less than Vice-President
Joseph
Estrada and then Department of Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon
attended
some of the hearings and President Corazon Aquino even visited victim
Maureen
Hultman while she was still confined at the hospital]. He submits that
the trial judge failed to protect him from prejudicial publicity and
disruptive
influences which attended the prosecution of the cases. He claims there
were placards displayed during the hearings of the cases, spectators
inside
the courtroom clapped their hands and converted the proceedings into a
carnival. In another instance, he was allegedly given the "finger sign"
by several young people while he was leaving the courtroom on his way
back
to his cell.cralaw:red
We cannot sustain
appellant's claim that he was
denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is
true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive
publicity, just like all high-profile and high-stake criminal trials.
Then
and now, We rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not
incompatible
to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an
accused's
right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, "a responsible press
has
always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial
administration,
especially in the criminal field. The press does not simply
publish
information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice
by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to
extensive
public scrutiny and criticism."[173]
Pervasive
publicity is not per se prejudicial
to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial
of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not,
by itself, prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial
judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal
the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court
publicity
of sensational criminal cases. The state-of-the-art of our
communication
system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and
right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the
facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and
impartial
judge is not that of a hermit who is out-of-touch with the world. We
have
not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from
publicity
lest they lose their impartiality. Criticisms against the jury system
are
mounting and Mark Twain's wit and wisdom put them all in better
perspective
when he observed: "When a gentleman of high social standing,
intelligence,
and probity swears that testimony given under the same oath will
outweigh
with him, street talk and newspaper reports based upon mere hearsay, he
is worth a hundred jurymen who will swear to their own ignorance and
stupidity.
Why could not the jury law be so altered as to give men of brains and
honesty
an equal chance with fools and miscreants?"[174]
Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court
evidence
and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere
exposure
to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally
infect
their impartiality.cralaw:red
At best,
appellant can only conjure possibility
of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of
publicity
that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In
Martelino,
et al. v. Alejandro, et a1.,[175]
We rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the
test
of actual prejudice as We ruled that to warrant a finding of
prejudicial
publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been
unduly influenced, not simply that they might be by the barrage of
publicity.
In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge
developed
actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media
coverage
of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances
of
the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion
as
a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by
evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove
this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.cralaw:red
We have minutely
examined the transcripts of the
proceedings and they do not disclose that the trial judge allowed the
proceedings
to turn into a carnival. Nor did he consent to or condone any
manifestation
of unruly or improper behavior or conduct inside the courtroom during
the
trial of the case at bar. The transcripts reveal the following:
1. At the August
14, 1991 hearing, the defense
counsel called the attention of the court to the visible display of a
placard
inside the courtroom. Acting on the manifestation, the trial judge
immediately
directed that the placard be hidden. Only then did he order the start
of
the arraignment of accused.[176]
On the same hearing, the defense counsel
asked
for the exclusion of the media after they had enough opportunity to
take
pictures. The court granted defense's request, noting that the
courtroom
was also too crowded.[177]
2. During the
testimony of Domingo Florece, an
argument ensued between the defense lawyer and the fiscal. When part of
the audience clapped their hands, the defense counsel invoked Rule 119,
Section 13 of the Rules of Court and moved for the exclusion of the
public.
Assistant Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio objected on the ground that the
public
was not unruly. The trial judge noted that there were yet no guidelines
drafted by the Supreme Court regarding media coverage of the trial
proceedings.[178] Collaborating defense
counsel,
Atty. Malvar, complained that the outpouring of sympathy by spectators
inside the courtroom has turned the proceedings into a carnival. He
also
manifested that he personally saw that when accused was being brought
back
to his cell from the courtroom, a group of young people were pointing
dirty
fingers at accused in full view of policemen. Forthwith, the trial
judge
declared that he could not be dissuaded by public sentiments. He noted
that the clapping of hands by the public was just a reaction at the
spur
of the moment. He then admonished the audience not to repeat it.[179]
3. At the hearing
of July 14, 1992, the parties
again argued on the coverage of the trial by the press. The defense
alleged
that the media coverage will constitute mistrial and deny accused's
constitutional
right to due process. It invoked the provision in the Rules of Court
which
allows the accused to exclude everybody in the courtroom, except the
organic
personnel. The prosecutor, however, argued that exclusion of the public
can be ordered only in prosecution of private offenses and does not
apply
to murder cases. He added that the public is entitled to observe and
witness
trial of public offenses. He quoted the U.S. case of Sheppard v. Maxwell[180]
where it was held: "A responsible press is always regarded as the
handmaiden
of effective judicial administration especially in the criminal field.
The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards
against
the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, the prosecutors
and
judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. What
transpires
in the courtrooms public property." The trial judge then ruled that the
media should be given a chance to cover the proceedings before the
trial
proper but, thereafter, he prohibited them from taking pictures during
the trial. They were allowed to remain inside the courtroom but were
ordered
to desist from taking live coverage of the proceedings.[181]
4. At the August
14, 1992 hearing, before the
hearing began, the trial judge gave the media two [2] minutes to take
video
coverage and no more. Trial then ensued.[182]
5. At the
September 8, 1992 hearing, the trial
judge again gave the media two [2] minutes to take pictures before the
trial proper. Afterwards, the reporters were duly admonished to remain
silent, to quietly observe the proceedings, and just take down notes.[183]
6. On September
10, 1992 before the start of the
afternoon session, the judge admonished the media people present in the
courtroom to stop taking pictures.[184]
Parenthetically,
appellant should be the last
person to complain against the press for prejudicial coverage of his
trial.
The records reveal he presented in court no less than seven [7]
newspaper
reporters and relied heavily on selected portions of their reports for
his defense. The defense's documentary evidence consists mostly of
newspaper
clippings relative to the investigation of the case at bar and which
appeared
to cast doubt on his guilt. The press cannot be fair and unfair to
appellant
at the same time.cralaw:red
Finally, it would
not be amiss to stress that
on May 29, 1992, the trial judge voluntarily inhibited himself from
further
hearing the case at bar to assuage appellant's suspicion of bias and
partiality.[185]
However, upon elevation of the trial judge's voluntary Order of
Inhibition
to this Court, We directed the trial judge to proceed with the trial to
speed up the administration of justice.[186]
We found nothing in the conduct of the proceedings to stir any
suspicion
of partiality against the trial judge.
IV.chanrobles virtual law library
In his fourth
assigned error, appellant claims
that treachery was not present in the killing of Hultman and Chapman
and
the wounding of Leino for it was not shown that the gunman consciously
and deliberately adopted particular means, methods and forms in the
execution
of the crime. Appellant asserts that mere suddenness of attack does not
prove treachery.cralaw:red
The three [3]
Informations charged appellant with
having committed the crimes at bar with treachery and evident
premeditation.
Evident premeditation was correctly ruled out by the trial court for,
admittedly,
the shooting incident was merely a casual encounter or a chance meeting
on the street since the victims were unknown to appellant and vice-versa.
It, however, appreciated the presence of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery.cralaw:red
We hold that the
prosecution failed to prove treachery
in the killing of Chapman. Prosecution witness Leino established the
sequence
of events leading to the shooting. He testified that for no apparent
reason,
appellant suddenly alighted from his car and accosted him and Maureen
Hultman
who were then walking along the sidewalk. Appellant questioned who they
were and demanded for an I.D. After Leino handed him his I.D., Chapman
appeared from behind Leino and asked what was going on. Chapman then
stepped
down on the sidewalk and inquired from appellant what was wrong. There
and then, appellant pushed Chapman, pulled a gun from inside his shirt,
and shot him. The gun attack was unexpected. "Why did you shoot me?"
was
all Chapman could utter.cralaw:red
Concededly, the
shooting of Chapman was carried
out swiftly and left him with no chance to defend himself. Even then,
there
is no evidence on record to prove that appellant consciously and
deliberately
adopted his mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of his criminal
design without risk to himself. It appears to Us that appellant acted
on
the spur of the moment. Their meeting was by chance. They were
strangers
to each other. The time between the initial encounter and the shooting
was short and unbroken. The shooting of Chapman was thus the result of
a rash and impetuous impulse on the part of appellant rather than a
deliberate
act of will. We have consistently ruled that mere suddenness of the
attack
on the victim would not, by itself, constitute treachery.[187]
Hence, absent any qualifying circumstance, appellant should only be
held
liable for homicide for the shooting and killing of Chapman.cralaw:red
As to the
wounding of Jussi Leino and the killing
of Maureen Hultman, We hold that treachery clearly attended the
commission
of the crimes. The evidence shows that after shooting Chapman in cold
blood,
appellant ordered Leino to sit on the pavement. Maureen became
hysterical
and wandered to the side of appellant's car. When appellant went after
her, Maureen moved around his car and tried to put some distance
between
them. After a minute or two, appellant got to Maureen and ordered her
to
sit beside Leino on the pavement. While seated, unarmed and begging for
mercy, the two were gunned down by appellant. Clearly, appellant
purposely
placed his two victims in a completely defenseless position before
shooting
them. There was an appreciable lapse of time between the killing of
Chapman
and the shooting of Leino and Hultman a period which appellant
used
to prepare for a mode of attack which ensured the execution of the
crime
without risk to himself. Treachery was thus correctly appreciated by
the
trial court against appellant insofar as the killing of Hultman and the
wounding of Leino are concerned.
V.chanrobles virtual law library
and
VI.chanrobles virtual law library
We come now to
the civil liability imposed against
appellant. Appellant posits that the award of moral and exemplary
damages
and for loss of earning capacity of Maureen Hultman, Roland Chapman and
Jussi Leino were exorbitant. He likewise claims that the trial court's
award of attorney's fees was excessive.cralaw:red
In its decision,
the trial court awarded to Jussi
Leino and the heirs of victims Hultman and Chapman the following
damages:
1. For the murder of Roland John Chapman,
appellant
was sentenced to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of Fifty
Thousand
Pesos [P50,000.00] as indemnity for death and the sum of Five Hundred
Thousand
Pesos [P500,000.00] as moderate or temperate and exemplary damages.
2. For the murder of Maureen Navarro
Hultman,
appellant was sentenced to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of
Fifty
Thousand Pesos [P50,000.00] as indemnity for death; Two Million Three
Hundred
Fifty Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three
Centavos[P2,350,461.83]
as actual damages; Thirteen Million Pesos [P13,000,000.00] for loss of
earning capacity of deceased; and, One Million Pesos as moral, moderate
and exemplary damages.
3. For the shooting of Jussi Olavi
Leino,
appellant
was sentenced to pay Thirty thousand pesos [P30,000.00] as indemnity
for
the injury; One Hundred Eighteen Thousand Three-Hundred Sixty Nine
Pesos
and Eighty-Four Centavos [P118,369.84] and the sum equivalent in
Philippine
Pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual damages; an amount equivalent
in
Philippine Pesos of U.S.$40,000.00, for loss of earning capacity of
Jussi
Leino; and One Million Pesos [P1,000,000.00] as moral, moderate and
exemplary
damages.
4. In all three cases, appellant was
also
ordered
to pay each of the offended parties the sum of One Million Pesos [or a
total of Three Million Pesos] for attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation.
5. Costs of litigation.[188]
The early case
of Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos[189]
discussed in detail the matter of damages recoverable in case of death
arising from a felony, thus:
When the commission of a crime results in
death,
the civil obligations arising therefrom are governed by penal laws,
"subject
to the provisions of Art. 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of
Chapter
2, Preliminary Title on Human Relations and of Title XVIII of this Book
[Book IV] regulating damages." [Art. 1161, Civil Code]. Thus,
"every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."
[Art.
100, Revised Penal Code]. This civil liability, in case the felony
involves
death, includes indemnification for consequential damages [Art. 104, id.]
and said consequential damages in turn include "those suffered by his
family
or by a third person by reason of the crime." [Art. 107, id.].
Since these provisions are subject, however, as above indicated, to
certain
provisions of the Civil Code, We will now turn to said provisions.
The general rule in the Civil Code is
that:
In crimes and quasi-delicts, the
defendant
shall
be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences
of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such
damages
have been foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen by the defendant.
[Art. 2202].
When, however, the crime committed
involves
death,
there is Art. 2206 which provides thus:
The amount of damages for death caused by
a
crime
or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos even though
there
may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
[1] The defendant shall be liable for
the
loss
of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be
paid
to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be
assessed
and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent
physical
disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the
time of his death;
[2] If the deceased was obliged to give
support
according to the provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not an
heir called to the descendant's inheritance by law of testate or
intestate
succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a
period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the
court;
[3] The spouse, legitimate or
illegitimate
descendants
and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental
anguish
by reason of the death of the deceased.
The amount of
P3,000 referred to in the above Article
has already been increased by this Court first, to P6,000.00 in People
v. Amansec, 80 Phil. 426, and lately, to P12,000.00 in the case of
People
v. Pantoja, G. R. No. L-18793, promulgated on October 11, 1968[190]
and it must be stressed that this amount as well as the amount of moral
damages, may be adjudicated even without proof of pecuniary loss, the
assessment
of the moral damages being "left to the discretion of the court,
according
to the circumstances of each case." [Art. 2216].
Exemplary damages
may also be imposed as a part
of this civil liability when the crime has been committed with one or
more
aggravating circumstances, such damages being "separate and distinct
from
fines and shall be paid to the offended party." [Art. 2230]. Exemplary
damages cannot, however, be recovered as a matter of right; the court
will
decide whether or not they should be given. [Art. 2233]
In any event, save as expressly provided in
connection
with the indemnity for the sole fact of death [1st par., Art. 2206] and
is cases wherein exemplary damages are awarded precisely because of the
attendance of aggravating circumstances, [Art. 2230]. "damages to be
adjudicated
may be respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating
or mitigating circumstances," [Art. 2204] "but the party suffering the
loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family
to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in
question."
[Art. 2203]. "Interest as a part of the damages, may, in a proper case,
be adjudicated in the discretion of the Court." [Art. 2211]. As
to
attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation, the same may be recovered
only
when exemplary damages have been granted [Art. 2208, Par. 1] or when
there
is a separate civil action.cralaw:red
Stated
differently, when death occurs as
a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to the
following
items of damages:
1. As indemnity for the death of the
victim of
the offense P12,000.00 [now P50,000.00], without the need of any
evidence or proof of damages, and even though there may have been
mitigating
circumstances attending the commission of the offense.
2. As indemnity for loss of earning
capacity
of
the deceased an amount to be fixed by the court according to the
circumstances of the deceased related to his actual income at the time
of death and his probable life expectancy, the said indemnity to be
assessed
and awarded by the court as a matter of duty, unless the deceased had
no
earning capacity at said time on account of permanent disability not
caused
by the accused. If the deceased was obliged to give support, under Art.
291, Civil Code, the recipient who is not an heir, may demand support
from
the accused for not more than five years, the exact duration to be
fixed
by the court.
3. As moral damages for mental
anguish,
an amount to be fixed by the court. This may be recovered even by the
illegitimate
descendants and ascendants of the deceased.
4. As exemplary damages, when the
crime is
attended
by one or more aggravating circumstances, an amount to be fixed
in
the discretion of the court, the same to be considered separate from
fines.
5. As attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation,
the actual amount thereof, [but only when a separate civil action to
recover
civil liability has been filed or when exemplary damages are awarded].
6. Interests in the proper cases.
7. It must be emphasized that the
indemnities
for loss of earning capacity of the deceased and for moral damages are
recoverable separately from and in addition to the fixed sum of
P12,000.00
[now P50,000.00] corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of
death,
and that these damages may, however, be respectively increased or
lessened
according to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances, except items
1 and 4 above, for obvious reasons.[191]
We shall first
review the damages awarded to the
heirs of Roland John Chapman in light of the law and the case law.
Appellant claims
that the award of Five Hundred
Thousand [P500,000.00] Pesos as moderate or temperate and exemplary
damages
to the heirs of Roland John Chapman was baseless. We
start with the observation that the trial court should not have lumped
together the awards for moderate or temperate and exemplary damages at
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos [P500,000.00] without specifying the
particular
amount which corresponds to each, as they are of a different kind. We
shall,
however, consider their propriety and reasonableness.cralaw:red
The amount of
Five Hundred Thousand [P500,000.00]
Pesos cannot be given as temperate or moderate damages for the records
do not show any basis for sustaining the award. Nor can it be given as
exemplary damages. The killing of Chapman was not attended by either
evident
premeditation or treachery. Be that as it may, the award can be
considered
as one for moral damages under Article 2206 [3] of the New Civil Code.[192]
It states:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for
death
caused
by a crime shall be at least [fifty thousand pesos, under current
jurisprudence].
In addition:
Moreover,
considering the shocking and senseless
aggression committed by appellant, We increase the amount of moral
damages
to One Million [P1,000,000.00] Pesos for the death of Chapman.
We next rule on
the legality of damages awarded
to the heirs of Maureen Navarro Hultman. Appellant argues that
the
damages for the death of Maureen should be awarded to her mother,
Vivian
Hultman, and her natural father. He contends that under Article 352 of
the New Civil Code, Anders Hultman as adoptive father of Maureen, is
not
entitled to said award. Only the parents by nature of Maureen should
inherit
from her.cralaw:red
We reject the
argument. Under the Family Code
which was already in effect at the time of Maureen's death, Anders
Hultman,
as adoptive father, is entitled to the award made by the trial court.
Article
190 of the Family Code provides:
xxx xxx xxx
[2] When the parents, legitimate or
illegitimate,
or the legitimate descendants of the adopted concur with the adopters,
they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the
parents
or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;
xxx xxx xxx
[5] When only the adopters survive,
they
shall
inherit the entire estate;
It does not
appear on the records whether Maureen
was survived by her natural father. During the trial of these cases,
only
Vivian and Anders Hultman testified on their claim of damages. Hence,
We
find that the award of damages in their favor has sufficient factual
and
legal basis.
Appellant also
urges that the award to the heirs
of Maureen Hultman of One Million Pesos [P1,000,000.00] as moral and
exemplary
damages is unjustified or, at the very least, exorbitant and should be
reduced.cralaw:red
We hold that the
award of One Million [P1,000,000.00]
Pesos is amply justified by the circumstances. The records reveal that
Maureen recovered between life and death for ninety-seven [97] days.
Her
family experienced the peaks and valleys of unspeakable suffering.
During
that time, she underwent brain surgery three [3] times. Her condition
was
never stable and remained critical. It was always touch and go with
death.
She could not be left alone at the hospital. Her parents had to be
perpetually
by her side at least six [6] to seven [7] hours daily. After the
shooting,
their siblings had to be sent back to Sweden for their safety. Left
unattended,
her family's business took a downspin. Soon, her family's assets were
depleted,
then wiped out. A total of twenty-three [23] doctors attended to her
and
their bills ballooned without abatement. They were forced to rely on
the
goodness of the gracious. Her family started receiving contributions
from
other people to defray the medical expenses and hospital bills.[193]
Maureen never regained consciousness until her demise on October 17,
1991,
at the tender age of seventeen. Under the foregoing circumstances, We
thus
find the award of One Million Pesos [P1,000,000.00] as moral damages to
be reasonable.cralaw:red
Moreover, We find
that the grant of exemplary
damages is called for by the circumstances of the case. Under Article
2229
of the Civil Code,[194]
in addition to the award of moral damages, exemplary or corrective
damages
may be adjudged in order to deter the commission of similar acts in the
future. The award for exemplary damages is designed to permit the
courts
to mould behavior that has socially deleterious consequences. Its
imposition
is required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of an offender.cralaw:red
In the case at
bar, appellant's unprovoked aggression
snuffed the life of Maureen Hultman, a girl in the prime of her youth.
Hultman and her companions were gunned down by appellant in cold-blood,
for no apparent reason. Appellant's vicious criminality led to the
suffering
of his victims and their families. Considering our soaring crime rate,
the imposition of exemplary damages against appellant to deter others
from
taking the lives of people without any sense of sin, is proper.
Moreover,
since the killing of Hultman was attended by treachery and pursuant to
Article 2229 of the New Civil Code,[195]
We impose an award of Two Million [P2,000,000.00] Pesos as exemplary
damages
against appellant for the death of Maureen Hultman.cralaw:red
We now review the
award of One Million Pesos [P1,000,000.00]
as moral, moderate and exemplary damages to victim Jussi Leino.
From the record, it is incontrovertible
that
Leino
likewise suffered extensive injuries as a result of the shooting. His
upper
jaw bone was shattered. He would need a bone transplant operation to
restore
it. His tongue was also injured. He partially lost his sense of taste
for
his taste buds were also affected. When he was discharged from the
hospital,
he had difficulty in speaking and had to be fed through a tube running
down his nose. He lost eight of his teeth. The roots of his teeth were
cut off and the raw nerves were exposed. But all these speak only of
his
physical injuries and suffering. More devastating was the emotional
strain
that distressed Leino. His parents were in Europe for a vacation at the
time of the shooting. Only a neighbor attended to him at the hospital.
It took two [2] days for his father to come and comfort by his bedside.
Leino had trouble sleeping in peace at night. The traumatic event woke
him up in the middle of the night. Black memories of the incident kept
coming back to mind.[196]
Understandably, the ill-effects of the incident spilled over his
family.
Seppo Leino, Jussi's father, was tortured by thoughts of insecurity. He
had to relocate his entire family to Europe where he felt they would be
safe.[197]
Under the foregoing circumstances, We find that an award of One Million
[P1,000,000.00] Pesos to Jussi Leino as indemnity for moral damages is
justified and reasonable.cralaw:red
As in the case of
Hultman, since the shooting
of Leino was committed with treachery and pursuant to Article 2229 of
the
New Civil Code,[198]
appellant is additionally adjudged liable for the payment to Leino of
Two
Million [P2,000,000.00] Pesos as exemplary damages.cralaw:red
We come now to
the trial court's monetary award
to compensate the loss of earning capacity of victims Jussi Leino and
Maureen
Hultman.cralaw:red
To be compensated
for loss of earning capacity,
it is not necessary that the victim, at the time of injury or death, is
gainfully employed. Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss
of earnings but for loss of capacity to earn money. In Cariaga v.
Laguna
Tayabas Bus Company,[199]
We awarded to the heirs of Cariaga a sum representing loss of his
earning
capacity although he was still a medical student at the time of injury.
However, the award was not without basis for Cariaga was then a fourth
year medical student at a reputable school; his scholastic record,
which
was presented at the trial, justified an assumption that he would have
been able to finish his course and pass the board in due time; and a
doctor,
presented as witness for the appellee, testified as to the amount of
income
Cariaga would have earned had he finished his medical studies.cralaw:red
In the case at
bar, the trial court awarded the
amount, equivalent in Philippine Pesos, of Forty Thousand US Dollars
for
loss of earning capacity of Jussi Leino. We agree with appellant that
this
amount is highly speculative and should be denied considering that
Leino
had only earned a high school degree at the International School,
Manila,
in 1989. He went back to Finland to serve the military and has just
arrived
in Manila in February 1991, to pursue his ambition to become a pilot.
At
the time of the shooting on July 13, 1991, he has just enrolled at the
Manila Aero Club to become a professional pilot. He was thus only on
his
first year, first semester in said school and was practically a mere
high
school graduate. Under the foregoing circumstances, We find the records
wanting with substantial evidence to justify a reasonable assumption
that
Leino would have been able to finish his studies at the Manila Aero
Club
and ultimately become a professional pilot.cralaw:red
We now pass upon
the propriety of the award of
Thirteen Million Pesos [P13,000,000.00] for loss of earning capacity of
deceased Maureen Hultman. We find that the award is not supported by
the
records.cralaw:red
In adjudging an
award for Maureen's loss of earning
capacity, the trial court incorrectly used the monthly salary of a
secretary
working in Sweden computed at Two Thousand Dollars [$2,000.00] a month,
as per the estimate given by Anders Hultman. Nowhere in the records
does
it appear that, at the time of her death, Maureen had acquired the
skills
needed for a secretarial job or that she intended to take a secretarial
course in preparation for such job in Sweden. Anders Hultman himself
testified
that there was uncertainty as to Maureen's future career path, thus:
ATTY. VINLUAN:
Q. Mr. Witness, if Maureen would not
been (sic)
shot and she continued her studies, what professional career would she (sic)
like to pursue considering her interests and
inclinations?
WITNESS:
A. That is very difficult to say. She
has
just
turned 17 and our projection is that, certainly she would have been an
artist in the creative side. She would have become an actress or a
movie
producer or probably she would have been a college graduate.
ATTY. VINLUAN:
Q. But if you would just say based on
the
salary
of a secretary in Sweden, how much would she have much earned?
A. Not less than Two Thousand Dollars
a
month.[200]
Clearly, there
is no factual basis for the award
of Thirteen Million [P13,000,000.00] Pesos to the heirs of Maureen far
loss of earning capacity as a probable secretary in Sweden.
In any event, what was proved on record is
that
after
graduating from high school, Maureen took up a short personality
development
course at the John Roberts Powers. Maureen was employed at the John
Roberts
Powers at the time of her death. It was her first job. In fact, she had
just received her first salary, for which reason she went out with her
friends to celebrate on that fateful day. However, neither the nature
of
her work nor her salary in said company was disclosed at the trial.
Thus,
to compute the award for Maureen's loss of earning capacity, We are
constrained
to use the minimum wage prevailing as of the date of her death [October
17, 1991], i.e., One Hundred Eighteen Pesos [P118.00].[201]
Allowing for reasonable and necessary expenses in the amount of
P19,800.00,
her net income per annum would amount to P26,859.17.[202]
Hence, using the formula repeatedly adopted by this Court:[203]
[2/3 x (80 age of victim at time of death)] x a reasonable
portion
of the net income which would have been received by the heirs as
support,[204]
We fix the award for loss of earning as capacity of deceased Maureen
Hultman
at Five Hundred Sixty-Four Thousand Forty-Two Pesos and Fifty-Seven
Centavos
[P564,042.57].
It also bears
emphasis that in the computation
of the award for loss of earning capacity of the deceased, the life
expectancy
of the deceased's heirs is not factored in. The rule is well-settled
that
the award of damages for death is computed on the basis of the life
expectancy
of the deceased, and not of the beneficiary.[205]
Lastly, appellant
seeks a reduction of the award
of attorney's fees in the amount of Three Million Pesos [P3,000,000.00]
claiming that the same is exorbitant.cralaw:red
We disagree. The
three [3] private complainants
were represented by the ACCRA law firm, with Atty. Rogelio Vinluan as
lead
counsel. They agreed to pay the amount of One Million [P1,000,000.00]
Pesos
each as attorney's fees and for litigation expenses. The three criminal
cases were consolidated. A continuous trial was conducted, with
some
hearings having both morning and afternoon sessions. The trial lasted
for
almost one and a half years. More than forty [40] witnesses testified
during
the hearings. Several pleadings were prepared and filed. A total of
sixty-eight
[68] documentary exhibits were presented by the prosecution. Incidents
related to the trial of the cases came up to this Court for review at
least
twice during the pendency of the trial.[206]
Given these circumstances and the evident effort exerted by the private
prosecutor throughout the trial, the trial court's award of a total of
Three Million [P3,000,000.00] Pesos as attorney's fees and litigation
expenses
appears just and reasonable.
VII.chanrobles virtual law library
In his last
assigned error, appellant urges that
the hearings conducted on the cases where no less than forty-one [41]
witnesses
were presented by the parties,[207]
were merely hearings on the petition for bail concerning the murder
charge
for the killing of Roland Chapman, and not a trial on the merits of all
three [3] cases. Appellant insists that after the termination of the
hearings,
he still had the right to adduce evidence at the trial proper. He
claims
he was denied due process when the trial court considered all the cases
submitted for decision after the defense waived its right to present
its
sur-rebuttal evidence.cralaw:red
Appellant's
position is untenable. This issue
was resolved at the very first hearing of the cases on August 9, 1991.
The incident then pending was appellant's petition for bail for the
murder
of Chapman. It will be remembered that, initially, there was only one
murder
charge against appellant since Maureen Hultman succumbed to death
during
the course of the proceedings on October 17, 1991.Thus,
at the initial hearing on August 9, 1991, the incident for resolution
was
appellant's petition for bail. The prosecution sought to present the
surviving
victim, Jussi Leino, to testify on all three [3] charges to obviate
delay
and inconvenience since all three [3] charges involved one continuing
incident.
Appellant, through counsel, objected to the testimony of Leino insofar
as the two [2] frustrated murder charges [with respect to the wounding
of Leino and Hultman] were concerned. He argued that since the pending
incident was the petition for bail with respect to the killing of
Chapman,
any testimony relative to the two [2] other charges in which bail were
recommended, was irrelevant.cralaw:red
After arguments,
the defense suggested that if
the prosecution would present Leino to testify on all three [3]
charges,
it should wait until after accused's arraingment on August 14, 1991.[208]
The prosecution agreed on the condition that there shall be trial on
the
merits and, at the same time, hearing on the petition for bail. Defense
counsel agreed.[209] As agreed upon, accused
was
arraigned
and the prosecution presented Jussi Leino as its first witness to
testify
on all three [3] cases. No objection was made by the defense.[210]
Subsequent
proceedings likewise disprove appellant's
insistence that the hearings conducted by the trial court were limited
to the petition for bail, viz:
1. The
prosecution presented all their witnesses
and documentary evidence relative to the shooting incident, including
evidence
in support of the claim for damages. These witnesses were extensively
cross-examined
by the defense counsels. The defense never objected that evidence on
damages
would be unnecessary if its intention was really to limit presentation
of evidence to appellant's petition for bail.cralaw:red
2. After the
prosecution and the defense rested
their cases, the trial court issued an Order[211]
directing the parties to submit their Memorandum, after which "the main
case as well as the petition for bail are respectively submitted for
Decision
and Resolution." After receipt of this Order, the defense counsel filed
two [2] motions for extension of time to file the defense Memorandum.
In
both Motions, the defense did not object to the trial court's Order
submitting
for decision the main case and the petition for bail. Neither did it
move
for a reconsideration of this Order and notify the court that it still
had witnesses to present.cralaw:red
3. In compliance
with said Order, appellant's
counsel, Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez, filed a Memorandum and Supplemental
Memorandum
praying for accused's acquittal. This is inconsistent with the
defense's
position that the hearing conducted was only on the petition for bail.
If the defense insists that what was submitted for decision was only
his
petition for bail, he would have only prayed that he be granted bail.
4. Upon receipt
of the notice of promulgation
of judgment from the trial court, the defense did not interpose any
objection
to the intended promulgation. In fact, the defense attended the
promulgation
of the Decision and manifested that they were ready therefor.
All these clearly
show that the merits of the
cases and the petition for bail were heard simultaneously and appellant
acquiesced thereto. Moreover, appellant's right to present additional
evidence
was not abridged by the trial court. On the contrary, the records
disclose
that the trial court afforded the defense fair opportunity to adduce
its
evidence. It took the defense almost one and a half years to submit its
evidence. The defense presented more than twenty [20] witnesses and
several
documentary evidence. It was only after the trial court rendered a
decision
against appellant that he filed a motion for new trial,[212]
through his new counsel, Atty. Gatmaytan, Jr. For the first time,
he alleged that the joint decision of the cases, both on the merits and
on the petition for bail, was irregular for he was not given a chance
to
present further evidence to corroborate his alibi. We note that
in his motion for new trial,[213]
appellant did not even identify his alleged additional witnesses and
the
substance of their testimonies. Nor was it shown that he could not have
produced these evidence at the trial with reasonable diligence.
Appellant's
motion was a patent ploy to delay the decision on his cases. His motion
was properly denied by the trial court.cralaw:red
IN VIEW WHEREOF,
We hereby affirm with modifications
the decision of the trial court dated December 22, 1992, thus:
[1] In Criminal Case No. 91-4605, finding
accused
Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Homicide for the shooting of Roland John Chapman, and sentencing
said
accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of eight [8]
years and one [1] day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen
[14]
years, eight [8] months and one [1] day of reclusion temporal
as
maximum, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the following
amounts:
Fifty Thousand [P50,000.00] Pesos as indemnity for the victim's death;
and, One Million [P1,000,000.00] Pesos as moral damages.
[2] In Criminal Case No. 91-4606,
finding
accused
Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Maureen Navarro
Hultman and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua
and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the following amounts: Fifty
Thousand [P50,000.00] Pesos as indemnity for her death; Two Million
Three
Hundred Fifty Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three
Centavos
[P2,350,461.83] as actual damages; Five Hundred Sixty-Four Thousand
Fourty-Two
Pesos and Fifty-Seven Centavos [P564,042.57] for loss of earning
capacity
of said deceased; One Million Pesos [P1,000,000.00] as moral damages;
and
Two Million [P2,000,000.00] Pesos as exemplary damages.
[3] In Criminal Case No. 91-4807,
finding
accused
Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Jussi
Olavi Leino, and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
eight [8] years of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen [14]
years
and eight [8] months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to
pay
the said offended party the following amounts: Thirty Thousand
[P30,000.00]
Pesos as indemnity for his injuries; One Hundred Eighteen Thousand
Three
Hundred Sixty-Nine Pesos and Eighty-Four Centavos [P118,369.84] and
equivalent
in Philippine Pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual damages; One
Million
[P1,000,000.00] Pesos as moral damages; and Two Million [P2,000,000.00]
Pesos as exemplary damages.
[4] In all three cases, ordering said
accused
to pay each of the three [3] offended parties the sum of One Million
Pesos
[P1,000,000.00; or a total of Three Million (P3,000,000.00) Pesos] for
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and
[5] To pay the costs in all three [3]
cases.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado,
Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.
______________________________________
Endnotes
[1]
The Court received the Appellant's Brief on March 21, 1994, the
Appellee's
Brief on November 10, 1994 and Appellant's Reply Brief on March 6,
1995.
With the filing of the Reply Brief, the case was deemed submitted for
decision.
[2]
Original Records, p. 1.
[3]
Ibid., p. 220.
[4]
Ibid, p. 41.
[5]
T.S.N., August 9, 1991, pp. 35-36.
[6]
Ibid., pp. 38 & 66.
[7]
Ibid., pp. 68, 71-72.
[8]
Ibid., 76-82.
[9]
T.S.N., August 14, 1991, pp. 5-8.
[10]
Jussi Leino and Maureen Hultman were former schoolmates at the
International
School.
[11]
T.S.N., August 14, 1991, pp. 15-20.
[12]
Ibid., pp. 21-22.
[13]
Ibid., pp., 22-24, 29-30, 80.
[14]
Seppo Leino, Jussi's father, was a Finnish national and a
communications
specialist at ADB; T.S.N., October 4, 1991, pp. 64-65.
[15]
T.S.N., August 14, 1991, pp. 31-32, 104.
[16]
Ibid., pp. 33-40, 105-109.
[17]
Ibid., pp. 33-39.
[18]
Ibid., pp. 97-98.
[19]
Ibid., pp. 40-42, 53.
[20]
Ibid., pp. 43 &111.
[21]
Roxas' residence was only about three [3] houses away from the scene of
the crime; T.S.N., August 27, 1991, pp. 10-11.
[22]
T.S.N., September 3, 1991, pp. 11 & 14.
[23]
T.S.N., September 23, 1991, pp. 43-45.
[24]
Florece was about 85 steps away from the scene of the crime; T.S.N.,
August
27, 1991, p. 22.
[25]
T.S.N., August 27, 1991, pp. 30, 34-35; See also Exhibit "C," Sworn
Statement
of Florece, Folder of Prosecution Exhibits, at p. 119.
[26]
See Sworn Statement of Cadenas dated July 16, 1991, Exhibit "BB,"
Folder
of Prosecution Exhibits, at p. 154.
[27]
T.S.N., September 23, 1991, p. 64.
[28]
T.S.N., September 3, 1991, pp. 31-32.
[29]
T.S.N., August 27, 1991, p. 21; T.S.N., September 3, 1991, p. 32;
T.S.N.,
September 23, 1991, p. 62.
[30]
T.S.N., September 11, 1991, pp. 30 & 32.
[31]
T.S.N., August 27, 1991, p. 35-37, 46-47.
[32]
Ibid., p. 44.
[33]
T.S.N., August 14, 1992, pp. 18-19.
[34]
Before 9 A.M. of July 13, 1991, NBI Director Lim received a call from
U.S.
embassy officials, informing him about a shooting incident at
Dasmariñas
Village which resulted in the death of an American citizen [Chapman]
and
the wounding of two [2] others; T.S.N., October 4, 1991, p. 10.
[35]
T.S.N., October 2, 1991, pp. 184-187.
[36]
Ibid., pp. 188-189, 192.
[37]
Ibid., pp. 190-196.
[38]
T.S.N., August 27, 1991, pp. 192-193, 206, 213-218, 224; T.S.N.,
October
2, 1991, pp. 190-191.
[39]
T.S.N., September 23, 1991, pp. 92-102; T.S.N., October 2, 1991, pp.
201-204.
[40]
T.S.N., October 4, 1991, pp. 35-47.
[41]
T.S.N., August 27, 1991, pp. 221-224, 233-236.
[42]
T.S.N., October 2, 1991, pp. 205-208.
[43]
Ibid., pp- 208-211
[44]
Exhibit "BB," supra.
[45]
T.S.N., October 2, 1991, pp. 218-222.
[46]
Ibid., pp. 223-228.
[47]
lbid., pp. 229-231, 248-249.
[48]
Ibid., pp. 252-254.
[49]
Ibid., pp. 255-257.
[50]
Ibid., pp. 259-260.
[51]
At that time, Cadenas was staying at the NBI compound for security
purposes,
together with witnesses in other cases who were also placed under NBI
protection;
T.S.N., October 2, 1991, pp. 268-269.
[52]
Exhibit "DD," photo of the identification, Folder of Prosecution
Exhibits,
p. 161.
[53]
T.S.N., October 2, 1991, p. 260.
[54]
T.S.N., August 14, 1991, pp. 116 & 126.
[55]
Ibid., pp. 120-122, 128-137.
[56]
Ibid., pp. 132-148.
[57]
T.S.N., October 2, 1991, pp. 283-284.
[58]
T.S.N., September 3, 1991, p. 34; T.S.N., September 11, 1991, p. 60.
[59]
Ibid., pp. 37-38; ibid., pp. 72-73.
[60]
Ibid., pp. 37-42; ibid., pp. 68-75.
[61]
T.S.N., September 3, 1991, pp. 41-44.
[62]
Original Records, p. 709.
[63]
T.S.N., September 3, 1991, pp. 44-45; T.S.N., October 19, 1992, pp.
18-19.
[64]
T.S.N., September 3, 1991, pp. 45-50.
[65]
T.S.N., October 2, 1991, pp. 285-294.
[66]
Ibid., pp. 295-299.
[67]
As per Medico-Legal Report of Dr. Pedro P. Solis, Exhibit "K", Folder
of
Prosecution Exhibits, p. 138.
[68]
T.S.N., September 18, 1991, pp. 85-92.
[69]
Ibid., p.94.
[70]
T.S.N., October 2, 1991, pp. 26, 28.
[71]
Ibid., pp. 29-30.
[72]
Ibid., pp. 31-32.
[73]
Ibid., pp. 33-43.
[74]
T.S.N., September 18, 1991, pp. 27-39.
[75]
Ibid., pp. 41-46, 55.
[76]
Ibid., pp. 48-51.
[77]
Ibid., pp. 57, 68-69.
[78]
Ibid., pp. 66 & 73.
[79]
Ibid., pp. 76 & 82.
[80]
T.S.N., October 9, 1992, pp. 75-76, 132, 136, 186-187.
[81]
Ibid., pp. 77, 151-157.
[82]
Ibid., pp. 77-81, 183.
[83]
Ibid., pp. 81-87.
[84]
Ibid., pp. 87-89.
[85]
Ibid., pp. 92-93.
[86]
Ibid., pp. 94-107.
[87]
Ibid., pp. 114-117.
[88]
Ibid., pp. 112-114.
[89]
T.S.N., October 9, 1992, pp. 10-11, 24.
[90]
As a result of this accident, a criminal charge for reckless imprudence
was filed against him. However, in view of the desistance of the
victim's
parents, the case against him was dismissed; Id., pp. 11-14; See also
Resolution
dated May 16, 1991, Exhibit "30," Folder of Defense Exhibits, p. 60.
[91]
Ibid., pp. 20-41, 63-64.
[92]
T.S.N., July 14, 1992, pp. 49-60, 72.
[93]
Ibid., pp. 79-80, 90.
[94]
T.S.N., July 22, 1992, pp. 28, 35, 43 and 109.
[95]
Ibid., pp. 74-75.
[96]
T.S.N., August 10, 1992, pp. 77-78, 86-88.
[97]
T.S.N., August 14, 1992, pp. 16-30, 51-52.
[98]
Ibid., pp. 31-35.
[99]
T.S.N., August 18, 1992, pp. 22, 24, 33.
[100]
As per request of Captain Roberto Reyes, Chief of the Special
Investigation
Division, Makati Police Station; Exhibit "20", Folder of Defense
Exhibits,
p. 50.
[101]
Exhibit "21," Folder of Defense Exhibits, p. 51.
[102]
T.S.N., August 25, 1992, pp. 12, 14, 20-25, 83-87.
[103]
T.S.N., September 1, 1992, pp. 89-105.
[104]
Folder of Defense Exhibits, p. 16.
[105]
T.S.N., July 29, 1992, pp. 14-19.
[106]
Folder of Defense Exhibits, p. 16.
[107]
T.S.N., July 29, 1992, pp. 32, 39-40.
[108]
Folder of Defense Exhibits, p. 17.
[109]
Ibid., p. 18
[110]
Ibid., p. 19.
[111]
T.S.N., July 29, 1992, pp. 56-61.
[112]
Ibid., pp. 69-71, 76.
[113]
Folder of Defense Exhibits, at p. 21.
[114]
T.S.N., August 4, 1992, pp. 12-19.
[115]
Folder of Defense Exhibits, at p. 22.
[116]
Ibid., at p. 23.
[117]
T.S.N., August 7, 1992, pp. 30-34.
[118]
Folder of Defense Exhibits, at p. 23.
[119]
T.S.N., August 7, 1992, p. 36.
[120]
Ibid., pp. 40 & 49.
[121]
Folder of Defense Exhibits, at p. 24.
[122]
Ibid., p. 25.
[123]
Ibid., p. 26.
[124]
T.S.N., August 7, 1992, p. 59.
[125]
Ibid., p. 63.
[126]
Ibid., pp. 77-78.
[127]
Folder of Defense Exhibits, p. 28.
[128]
Ibid., pp. 63-64.
[129]
Ibid., p. 64.
[130]
T.S.N., August 12, 1992, pp. 68, 72 and 74.
[131]
T.S.N., October 19, 1992, pp. 18-19; There was a statement in the
unsigned
sworn statement prepared by Baldado [Exhibit "HHH"] to the effect that
Mangubat saw accused at the Makati police station but categorically
stated
that accused was not the gunman.
[132]
Ibid., pp. 110-116.
[133]
Ibid., pp. 116-117.
[134]
Ibid., pp. 118-121.
[135]
Original Records, p. 740.
[136]
Order dated October 29, 1992, Original Records, p. 743.
[137]
See Motion for Additional Time dated November 6, 1992, p. 744.
[138]
Decision penned by Judge Job B. Madayag, Presiding Judge, Makati
Regional
Trial Court, Branch 145; Rollo, pp. 50-78.
[139]
Original Records, pp. 989-1001.
[140]
Atty. Lino M. Patajo, Former Associate Justice of this Court,
represented
accused in the present appeal.
[141]
LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure, Hornbook Series, 1992 Ed., p.
353.
[142]
Ibid.
[143]
See Neil v. Biggers, 409 US 188 [1973]; Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 US 98
[1977]; Del Carmen, Criminal Procedure, Law and Practice, 3rd Edition,
p. 346.
[144]
T.S.N., August 14, 1991, p. 126.
[145]
Ibid, pp. 116, 120-122.
[146]
T.S.N., October 2, 1991, pp. 276-277.
[147]
T.S.N., August 17, 1991, p. 117.
[148]
Ibid.
[149]
T.S.N., August 14, 1991, p. 117.
[150]
Supra.
[151]
People v. Campa, G. R. No. 105391, February 28, 1994, 230 SCRA 431.
[152]
People v. Apawan, G. R. No. 85329, August 16, 1994, 235 SCRA 355.
[153]
T.S.N., September 23, 1991, pp. 96, 107-109.
[154]
People v. Bongadillo, G. R. No. 96687, July 20, 1994, 234 SCRA 233;
People
v. Israel, G. R. No. 97027, March 11, 1994, 231 SCRA 155; People v.
Fuertes,
G. R. No. 104067, January 17, 1994, 229 SCRA 289
[155]
T.S.N., September 23, 1991, pp. 90-97.
[156]
Original Records, p. 709.
[157]Section 48, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
[158]
LaFave and Israel, op cit, p. 1160.
[159]
Ibid. Rulings were based on the so-called Harmless Error legislation
included
in the English Judicature Act of 1873.
[160]
Ibid., p. 1161.
[161]
People v. Garcia, G. R. No. 105805, August 16, 1994, 235 SCRA 371;
People
v. Chatto, G. R. No. 102704, 219 SCRA 785; People v. Peran, G. R. No.
95259,
October 26, 1992, 215 SCRA 152; People v. Pizarro, G. R. No. 49282,
July
6, 1992, 211 SCRA 325, 336; People v. Martinez, G. R. No. 100813,
January
31, 1992, 205 SCRA 666.
[162]
T.S.N., October 9, 1992, pp. 37-39.
[163]
T.S.N., August 27, 1991, pp. 3, 34-35.
[164]
T.S.N., September 3, 1991, pp. 28-29.
[165]
T.S.N., September 23, 1991, p. 62.
[166]
Exhibit "4-c", Folder of Defense Exhibits, at p. 19.
[167]
T.S.N., October 4, 1991, p. 49; T.S.N., July 14, 1992, pp. 79-84.
[168]
T.S.N., October 4, 1991, p. 80.
[169]
Turner, Criminalities, Bancroft Whitney Co., 1915 ed., p. 141 See also
Richardson, Modern Scientific Evidence, Anderson Co., p. 495
[170]
People v. Ducay, G. R. No. 86939, August 2, 1993, 225 SCRA 1; People v.
Hubilo, G. R. No. 101741, 220 SCRA 389; People v. Pasiliao, G. R. No.
98152-53,
October 26, 1992, 215 SCRA 163; People v. Clamor, G. R. No. 82708, July
1, 1991, 198 SCRA 642; People v. Talingdan, G.R. No. 94339, November 9,
1990, 191 SCRA 333.
[171]
T.S.N., October 19, 1992, 110, 114-117.
[172]
Exhibit "21," Folder of Defense Exhibits, p. 51.
[173]
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 US 333, 350, 86 S Ct. 1507, 1515, 16 L ed. 600
[1966].
[174]
Mark Twain, Skecthes, New and Old, New York, Harper and Bros. 1899.
[175]
L-30894, March 25, 1970, 32 SCRA 108.
[176]
T.S.N., August 14, 1991, p. 5.
[177]
Ibid., pp. 51-52.
[178]
Indeed, it was only on October 22, 1991 that this Court issued a
Resolution
regarding live television and radio coverage of hearing of cases. This
en banc Resolution was brought about the live coverage of the hearing
of
the libel case filed by then President Aquino against newspaper
columnist
Luis Beltran. The testimony of Pres. Aquino as complainant was fully
carried
on air by the media. Then Congressman Art Borjal called the attention
of
this Court to the possible excessiveness and impropriety of such
coverage.
Forthwith, the Court issued the October 22, 1991 resolution proscribing
the live radio and television coverage of court proceedings. Video
footage
of hearings for news purposes was to be taken prior to the commencement
of the trial proper.
[179]
T.S.N., August 27, 1991, pp. 95-104.
[180]
Supra.
[181]
T.S.N., July 14, 1992, pp. 5-11, 16-17.
[182]
T.S.N., August 14, 1992, p. 13.
[183]
T.S.N., September 8, 1992, p. 11.
[184]
T.S.N., September 10, 1992, p. 8.
[185]
Order dated May 29, 1992, Original Records, pp. 560-563.
[186]
En Banc Resolution dated June 16, 1992, A. M. No. 91-6-508- RTC,
Original
Records, p. 564.
[187]
People v. Supremo, G. R. No. 100915, May 31, 1995, citing People v.
Ramirez,
G. R. Nos. 80747-48, October 17, 1991, 203 SCRA 25, 36; People v.
Tugbo,
Jr., G. R. No. 75894, April 22, 1991, 196 SCRA 133; People v. Tumaob,
No.
L-2300, May 27, 1949, 83 Phil. 738.
[188]
Decision, Rollo, at pp. 77-78.
[189]
G. R. No. L-25913, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 327.
[190]
As per the policy adopted by the Court En Banc on August 30, 1990, the
amount of civil indemnity for death caused by a crime has been
increased
to P50,000,00; People v. Sazon, G. R. No. 89684, September 18, 1990,
189
SCRA 700, 714.
[191]
Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos, supra, at pp. 332-335.
[192]
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime shall be
at
least [fifty thousand pesos, under current jurisprudence]. In
addition:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxx
xxx
xxx
[3] The spouse, legitimate or
illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand
moral
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
[193]
T.S.N., October 4, 1991, pp. 21-25; T.S.N., July 22, 1992, p. 69.
[194]
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of
example
or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages.
[195]
Supra.
[196]
T.S.N., October 4, 1991, pp. 68-70, 76 & 78; T.S.N., August 14,
1991,
p. 46.
[197]
T.S.N., October 4, 1991, p. 79.
[198]
Supra.
[199]
No. L-11037, December 29, 1960, 110 Phil 346.
[200]
T.S.N., October 4, 1991, pp. 36-38.
[201]
As per Wage Orders Nos. NCR-02 and 02-A effective January 8, 1991.
[202]
Using the equation: Equivalent Monthly Rate = Applicable Daily Rate x
365
divided by 12; See Annex ''A" of Rules Implementing Wage Orders Nos,
NCR-02
and NCR-02-A, January 8, 1991. Thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Equivalent Monthly Rate
= P118.00 x 365
12
= P3,589.17
With allowance for the
requirement
of at least one [1] month salary as 13th month pay, the gross income
per
annum would amount to P46,659.17.
[203]
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 54470, May 8,
1990, 185 SCRA 110; Monzon v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G. R. No.
72828,
January 31, 1989, 169 SCRA 760; Davila v. Philippine Airlines, No.
L-28512,
February 28, 1973, 49 SCRA 497; Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,
No. L-25499, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 511.
[204]
People v. Alvero, Jr., G. R. No. 72319, June 30, 1993.
[205]
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 54470, May 8,
1990, 185 SCRA 110, 121, citing Davila v. Philippine Airlines, No.
L-28512,
February 28, 1973, 49 SCRA 497.
[206]
Motion to Inhibit Presiding Judge and Order of Inhibition, Adm. Matter
No.91-6-508-RTC, Original Records, at p. 564; and, Petition for
Certiorari
relative to the conduct of another preliminary investigation for the
Amended
Information for Murder for the supervening death of Maureen Hultman, G.
R. No. 103102, March 6, 1992, 207 SCRA 134, Original Records, pp.
329-336.
[207]
Appellant himself presented more than twenty [20] witnesses.
[208]
T.S.N., August 9, 1991, pp. 35-36.
[209]
Ibid., pp. 76-82.
[210]
T.S.N., August 14, 1991, pp. 5-8.
[211]
Original Records, at p. 743.
[212]
Ibid., pp. 989-1000.
[213]
Original Records, pp. 989-1001.
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