

|
|
|
|
PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G. R. No. 117472
June 25, 1996
-versus-
LEO
ECHEGARAY y PILO,
PER CURIAM:
Amidst the
endless debates on whether or not
the re-imposition of the death penalty is indeed a deterrent as far as
the commission of heinous crimes is concerned, and while the attendant
details pertaining to the execution of a death sentence remain as yet
another
burning issue, We are tasked with providing a clear-cut resolution of
whether
or not the herein accused-appellant deserves to forfeit his place in
human
society for the infliction of the primitive and bestial act of
incestuous
lust on his own blood.
Before Us for automatic review is the judgment of conviction dated September 7, 1994 for the crime of rape rendered after marathon hearing by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the dispositive portion of which reads:
We note, however, that the charge had been formulated in this manner: The undersigned accuses LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:
Upon being arraigned on August 1, 1994, the accused-appellant, assisted by his counsel de oficio, entered the plea of "not guilty." These are the pertinent facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor-General in his brief: This is a case of rape by the father of his ten-year old daughter. Complainant Rodessa Echegaray is a ten-year old girl and a fifth-grader, born on September 11, 1983. Rodessa is the eldest of five siblings. She has three brothers aged 6, 5 and 2, respectively, and a 3-month old baby sister. Her parents are Rosalie and Leo Echegaray, the latter being the accused-appellant himself. The victim lives with her family in a small house located at No. 199 Fernandez St., Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City [pp. 5-9, Aug. 9, 1994, T.S.N.]. Sometime in the afternoon of April 1994, while Rodessa was looking after her three brothers in their house as her mother attended a gambling session in another place, she heard her father, the accused-appellant in this case, order her brothers to go out of the house [pp. 10-11, ibid.]. As soon as her brothers left, accused-appellant Leo Echegaray approached Rodessa and suddenly dragged her inside the room [p. 12, ibid.]. Before she could question the appellant, the latter immediately, removed her panty and made her lie on the floor [p. 13, ibid.]. Thereafter, appellant likewise removed his underwear and immediately placed himself on top of Rodessa. Subsequently, appellant forcefully inserted his penis into Rodessa's organ causing her to suffer intense pain [pp. 14-15, ibid.]. While appellant was pumping on her, he even uttered. "Masarap ba, masarap ba?" and to which Rodessa answered: "Tama na Papa, masakit." [p. 16, ibid.]. Rodessa's plea proved futile as appellant continued with his act. After satisfying his bestial instinct, appellant threatened to kill her mother if she would divulge what had happened. Scared that her mother would be killed by appellant, Rodessa kept to herself the ordeal she suffered. She was very afraid of appellant because the latter, most of the time, was high on drugs [pp. 17-18, ibid.]. The same sexual assault happened up to the fifth time and this usually took place when her mother was out of the house [p. 19, ibid.]. However, after the fifth time, Rodessa decided to inform her grandmother, Asuncion Rivera, who, in turn, told Rosalie, Rodessa's mother. Rodessa and her mother proceeded to the Barangay Captain where Rodessa confided the sexual assaults she suffered. Thereafter, Rodessa was brought to the precinct where she executed an affidavit [p. 21, ibid.]. From there, she was accompanied to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for medical examination [p. 22, ibid.]. Rodessa testified
that the said sexual assaults
happened only during the time when her mother was pregnant. Rodessa
added
that at first, her mother was on her side. However, when appellant was
detained, her mother kept on telling her. "Kawawa naman ang Tatay
mo,
nakakulong" [pp. 39-40, ibid.].
On the other hand, the accused-appellant's brief presents a different story:
In finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, the lower court dismissed the defense of alibi and lent credence to the straightforward testimony of the ten-year old victim to whom no ill-motive to testify falsely against accused-appellant can be attributed. The lower court likewise regarded as inconsequential the defense of the accused-appellant that the extraordinary size of his penis could not have insinuated itself into the victim's vagina and that the accused is not the real father of the said victim. The
accused-appellant now reiterates his position
in his attempt to seek a reversal of the lower court's verdict through
the following assignment of errors:
Considering that a rape charge, in the light of the re-imposition of the death penalty, requires a thorough and judicious examination of the circumstances relating thereto, this Court remains guided by the following principles in evaluating evidence in cases of this nature:
(b) In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) The evidence for the prosecution must stand and fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[7] Anent the first
assigned error, no amount of persuasion
can convince this Court to tilt the scales of justice in favor of the
accused-appellant
notwithstanding that he cries foul insisting that the rape charge was
merely
concocted and strongly motivated by greed over a certain lot situated
at
the NHA-Madrigal Estate Housing Project, Barangay San Antonio, San
Francisco
del Monte, Quezon City. The accused-appellant theorizes that
prosecution
witness Asuncion Rivera, the maternal grandmother of the victim
Rodessa,
concocted the charge of rape so that in the event that the
accused-appellant
shall be meted out a death sentence, title to the lot will be
consolidated
in her favor. Indeed, the lot in question is co-owned by the
accused-appellant
and Conrado Alfonso, the live-in partner of Asuncion Rivera, according
to the records of the National Housing Authority [Exh. "3"]. The
accused-appellant
would want Us to believe that the rape charge was fabricated by
Asuncion
Rivera in order to eliminate the accused-appellant from being a
co-owner.
So, the live-in partners would have the property for their own.[8]
We believe, as did the Solicitor-General, that no grandmother would be so callous as to instigate her 10-year old granddaughter to file a rape case against her own father simply on account of her alleged interest over the disputed lot.[9] It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that the testimony of a rape victim is credible where she has no motive to testify against the accused.[10] We find no flaws material enough to discredit the testimony of the ten-year old Rodessa which the trial court found convincing enough and unrebutted by the defense. The trial court not surprisingly noted that Rodessa's narration in detail of her father's monstrous acts had made her cry.[11] Once again, We rule that:
The accused-appellant points out certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in his attempt to bolster his claim that the rape accusation against him is malicious and baseless. Firstly, Rodessa's testimony that the accused-appellant was already naked when he dragged her inside the room is inconsistent with her subsequent testimony that the said accused-appellant was still wearing short pants when she was dragged inside the room. Secondly, Rodessa's sworn statement before the police investigator which indicated that, while the accused was executing pumping acts, he uttered the words "Masarap ba?", differ from her testimony in court wherein she related that, when the accused took out his penis from her vagina, the accused said "Masarap, tapos na." Thirdly, the victim's grandmother, Asuncion Rivera, recounted in her sworn statement that it was the accused who went to see her to apprise her of the rape committed on her granddaughter. However, in her testimony in court, Asuncion Rivera claimed that she was the one who invited the accused-appellant to see her in her house so as to tell her a secret.[13] These alleged discrepancies merely pertain to minor details which in no way pose serious doubt as to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Whether or not the accused was naked when he dragged Rodessa inside the room where he sexually assaulted her, bears no significant effect on Rodessa's testimony that she was actually raped by the accused-appellant. Moreover, a conflicting account of whatever words were uttered by the accused-appellant after he forcefully inserted his penis into Rodessa's private organ against her will cannot impair the prosecution's evidence as a whole. A determination of which version earmarks the truth as to how the victim's grandmother learned about the rape is inconsequential to the judgment of conviction. As we have pronounced in the case of People v. Jaymalin:[14]
After due deliberation, this Court finds that the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses deserves our utmost respect in the absence of arbitrariness. With respect to the second assigned error, the records of the instant case are bereft of clear and concrete proof of the accused-appellant's claim as to the size of his penis and that if that be the fact, it could not have merely caused shallow healed lacerations at 3:00 and 7:00 o'clock.[15] In his testimony, the accused-appellant stated that he could not have raped Rodessa because of the size of his penis which could have ruptured her vagina had he actually done so.[16] This Court gives no probative value on the accused-appellant's self-serving statement in the light of our ruling in the case of People v. Melivo, supra,[17] that:
In rape cases, a broken hymen is not an essential element thereof.[18] A mere knocking at the doors of the pudenda, so to speak, by the accused's penis, suffices to constitute the crime of rape as full entry into the victim's vagina is not required to sustain a conviction.[19] In the case, Dr. Freyra, the Medico-Legal Examiner, categorically testified that the healed lacerations of Rodessa on her vagina were consistent with the date of the commission of the rape as narrated by the victim to have taken place in April, 1994.[20] Lastly, the third assigned error deserves scant consideration. The accused-appellant erroneously argues that the Contract of Services [Exhibit 4] offered as evidence in support of the accused-appellant's defense of alibi need not be corroborated because there is no law expressly requiring so.[21] In view of Our finding that the prosecution witnesses have no motive to falsely testify against the accused-appellant, the defense of alibi, in this case, uncorroborated by other witnesses, should be completely disregarded.[22] More importantly, the defense of alibi which is inherently weak becomes even weaker in the face of positive identification of the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime of rape by his victim, Rodessa.[23] The Contract of
Services whereby the accused-appellant
obligated himself to do some painting job at the house of one Divina
Ang
in Parañaque, Metro Manila, within 25 days from April 4, 1994,
is
not proof of the whereabouts of the accused-appellant at the time of
the
commission of the offense.
Under Section
11 of Republic Act No. 7659 often referred
to as the Death Penalty Law, Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code was
amended,
to wit:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx [Emphasis supplied]. Apparently, as
a last glimpse of hope, the accused-appellant
questions the penalty imposed by the trial court by declaring that he
is
neither a father, stepfather or grandfather of Rodessa although he was
a confirmed lover of Rodessa's mother.[26]
On direct examination, he admitted that before the charge of rape was
filed
against him, he had treated Rodessa as his real daughter and had
provided
for her food, clothing, shelter and education.[27]
The Court notes that Rodessa uses the surname of the accused-appellant,
not Rivera [her mother's maiden name] nor Alfonso [her grandmother's
live-in
partner]. Moreover, Rodessa's mother stated during the
cross-examination
that she, the accused-appellant, and her five children, including
Rodessa,
had been residing in one house only.[28]
At any rate, even if he were not the father, stepfather or grandfather
of Rodessa, this disclaimer cannot save him from the abyss where
perpetrators
of heinous crimes ought to be, as mandated by law. Considering that the
accused-appellant is a confirmed lover of Rodessa's mother,[29]
he falls squarely within the aforequoted portion of the Death Penalty
Law
under the term "common-law spouse of the parent of the victim."
The fact that the ten-year old Rodessa referred to the accused-appellant as "Papa" is reason enough to conclude that accused-appellant is either the father or stepfather of Rodessa. Thus, the act of sexual assault perpetrated by the accused on his young victim has become all the more repulsive and perverse. The victim's tender age and the accused-appellant's moral ascendancy and influence over her, are factors which forced Rodessa to succumb to the accused's selfish and bestial craving. The law has made it inevitable under the circumstances of this case that the accused-appellant face the supreme penalty of death. WHEREFORE, We affirm the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur. __________________________
[1]
Records, p. 53.
[2] Records, p. 1. [3] The name of the Medico-Legal Officer as per Medico-Legal Report No. M-0980-94 [Exhibit "6"] reads Ma. Cristina B. Freyra. [4] Rollo, pp. 87-90. [5] Rollo, pp. 45-48. [6] Rollo, p. 49. [7] People v. Apolonio Melivo y Valete, G. R. No. 113029 promulgated on Feb. 8, 1996, citing People v. Matrimonio, 215 SCRA 613 [1992]; People v. Aldana 175 SCRA 635 [1989]; People v. Capilitan, 313 SCRA 313 [1990]. [8] T.S.N., August 30, 1994, p. 13. [9] Rollo, p. 93. [10] People v. Matamorosa, 231 SCRA 509, 515 [1994], citing People v. Palicte, 229 SCRA 543 [1994], and People v. Cabilao, 210 SCRA 326 [1992]. [11] R.T.C. Decision, p. 6; Records, p. 50. [12] People v. Espinoza, 247 SCRA 66, 72-73 [1995]. [13] Rollo, pp. 53-54. [14] 214 SCRA 685-690-691 [1992], citing People v. Ansing (196 SCRA 374 [1991]). [15] Rollo, p. 58. [16] T.S.N., August 30, 1994. p. 19. [17] See Note No. 7. [18] People v. Salinas, 232 SCRA 274, 278-279 [1994]; People v. Madrilano, 227 SCRA 363, [1993]. [19] People v. Abella, 228 SCRA 662, 666 [1993]; People v. Tesimo, 204 SCRA 535, 555-556 [1991]; People v. Castillo, 197 SCRA 657, 662 [1991]. [20] T.S.N., August 22, 1994, pp. 8-9. [21] Rollo, p. 65. [22] People v. Gapasan, 243 SCRA 53, 62 [1995]. [23] People v. Torres, 247 SCRA 212, 217 [1995]; People v. Tayco, 235 SCRA 610, 521 [1994]; People v. Molina, 213 SCRA 52, 65 [1992]. [24] People v. Samillano, 207 SCRA 50, 53-54 [1992] citing People v. Alegado, 201 SCRA 37 [1991]; People v. Puedan, 196 SCRA 388 [1991]; People v. Mangalinao, 182 SCRA 329 [1990]. [25] People v. Baylon, 57 SCRA 114, 120-121 [1974] see also People v. Cabadas, 208 SCRA 787, 794 [1992]; People v. Sulte, 232 SCRA 421, 425 [1994]. [26] Rollo, p. 38. [27] T.S.N., August 30, 1994, p. 13, 15-16. [28] T.S.N., August 29, 1994, pp. 28-29. [29] Rollo, p. 50. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|