FIRST
DIVISION
MODESTO
G. ESPAÑO, SR.,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 123823
February 17, 1997
-versus-
COURT
OF APPEALS,
HON. NICOLAS SIAN MONTEBLANCO
and CARIDAD JINON,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
HERMOSISIMA, JR. J.:
On May 27,
1994, private respondent Caridad Jinon
instituted Civil Case No. 21-88 before the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo
City, Branch 31, for annulment of title, recovery of possession,
ownership,
reconveyance and damages against petitioner Modesto G. Españo,
Sr
Involved are Lots Nos. 2843 and 1941 allegedly both registered and
titled
in the name of Modesto G. Espano, Sr. under Transfer Certificates of
Title
Nos. T-55995 and T-74937, all of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara,
Leganes, Iloilo.
In her complaint,
Caridad Jinon claims ownership
over the two [2] parcels of land above-mentioned by way of succession
from
her grandparents, in representation of her father Mateo Jinon, who
predeceased
her and which ownership is evidenced by a Partition Agreement [Convenio
de Particion] dated April 6, 1927 executed by herself and her
uncles
and co-heirs, Eusebio, Manuel, Anastacio and Eladio, all surnamed Jinon.cralaw:red
In his answer
with counterclaim, Españo
submits, among others, the defenses of laches and prescription. He
alleges
that since TCT No. 55995 [Lot 2843] was registered in his name as early
as August 8, 1968, while TCT No. T-74937 [Lot 1941] was transferred to
him on March 22, 1973, twenty-five [25] and twenty [20] years
respectively
had already passed when Civil Case No. 21-88[1]was filed on May 27,
1994.
Therefore, the ten [10]-year prescriptive period for reconveyance based
on implied trust had already elapsed.cralaw:red
Preliminary
hearings on the affirmative defenses
were scheduled by the court on October 28 and December 16, 1994.
However,
petitioner Españo moved for the dismissal of the case and, thus,
submitted the issue on laches and prescription without presenting
evidence
inasmuch as, according to petitioner, the grounds relied upon are based
on facts alleged by private respondent in the complaint.
The trial court ruled that the defenses of
laches
and prescription are evidentiary in nature which could not be
established
by mere allegations in the pleadings and must be proved during the
trial
on the merits. The Order dated February 28, 1995 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let the
issue
of laches and prescription raised by defendant Modesto Españo be
resolved during the trial of the case on the merits.
The motion for
reconsideration subsequently filed
was denied on April 21, 1995 by the lower court.
On June 2, 1995, Españo brought a petition
for certiorari before the public respondent Court of Appeals seeking to
annul the Order dated February 28, 1995 and the subsequent Order dated
April 21, 1995 denying his motion for reconsideration by the trial
court,
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.
The appellate
court dismissed the petition in
a decision promulgated on August 17, 1995.A motion for
reconsideration
having been filed, the court a quo likewise denied the same in
a
resolution dated February 8, 1996.cralaw:red
Hence, this
petition.cralaw:red
Petitioner prays
for the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 21-88 with prejudice on grounds of laches and prescription.cralaw:red
We deny the
petition.cralaw:red
The essence of
laches or "stale demands" is the
failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time
to
do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done
earlier, thus giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to
assert
it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.[3]
It is not concerned with mere lapse of time, the fact of delay,
standing
alone, being insufficient to constitute laches.[4]
There is no
absolute rule as to what constitutes
laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according
to its particular circumstances. Ultimately, however, the question of
laches
is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and, since it is an
equitable
doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations.[5]
To substantiate
his argument that private respondent
in instituting Civil Case No. 21-88 is barred by laches, petitioner
narrates
factual averments, among which is the unreasonable length of time which
took private respondent to institute the present suit from the time her
cause of action accrued, which petitioner alleges to commence on April
6, 1927, the date when the Partition Agreement [Convenio de
Particion]
was executed between private respondent, her uncles and other co-heirs.cralaw:red
Clearly, these
are factual matters over which
the Supreme Court will not venture to make any determination for we are
not a trier of facts. The issue whether or not private respondent's
suit
is barred by laches will be best ventilated in a full-blown proceeding
before the trial court, for what is involved here is not a mere trifle
but sizable parcels of land covered by two certificates of title, which
private respondent claims to be part of her successional rights from
her
grandparents in representation of her father. True or not, private
respondent
must be given ample opportunity to prove her claim, and the petitioner
to debunk the same.cralaw:red
Petitioner
likewise avers that prescription has
set in to extinguish private respondent's claim. Prescription may
be effectively pleaded in a motion to dismiss if the complaint shows on
its face that the action had already prescribed at the time it was
filed.
In the case at bench, the only way by which we can determine whether or
not prescription has set in is the date of the issuance of Transfer
Certificate
of Title Nos. T-55995 and T-74937, allegedly in the name of petitioner
Españo. Unfortunately, however, both the trial court and the
public
respondent Court of Appeals found that petitioner failed to attach to
his
answer a copy of his alleged titles nor even to allege therein the
dates
when these titles were supposedly issued. Thus, the court was left with
nothing to effectively compute prescription. We find no substantial
evidence
in the records, apart from the self-serving averments of the
petitioner,
to disturb this factual finding of both courts. Apparently, petitioner
has no one to blame but himself.cralaw:red
We find occasion
here to state the rule, once
more, that an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory
and, therefore, not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition
for review on certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the
ordinary
course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. The ordinary
procedure to be followed in that event is to file an answer, go to
trial,
and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the
final judgment.[6]
This is exactly
what petitioner should have done
in this case after his prayer for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 21-88
was denied by the trial court. Although the special civil action for
certiorari
may be availed of in case there is grave abuse of discretion or lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, that vitiating error is
indubitably
not present in the instant case.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the
petition is hereby DENIED with
costs against petitioner.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Padilla,
Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ.,
concur.cralaw:red
_________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Decision, p. 2 ; Rollo, p. 28.
[2]
Chavez v. Bonto-Perez, 242 SCRA 73, 80 [1995] citing La Campana Food
Products,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 223 SCRA 151 [1993]; Radio Communications of
the Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 223 SCRA
656 [1993]; Marcelino v. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 444 [1992].
[3]
Ibid., citing Bergado v. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 497 [1989].
[4]
Ibid., citing Donato v. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 196 [1993].
[5]
Jimenez v. Fernandez, 184 SCRA 190, 197 [1990].
[6]
Reyes v. Camilon, 192 SCRA 445, 452 [1990], citing Buaya v. Judge Polo,
169 SCRA 471 [1989]. |