SECOND
DIVISION
JOSE
BORDADOR and LYDIA BORDADOR,
Petitioners,
G. R. No. 130148
December 15, 1997
-versus-
BRIGIDA
D. LUZ, ERNESTO M. LUZ
and NARCISO DEGANOS,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
REGALADO, J.:
In this appeal
by certiorari, petitioners assail
the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 49175 affirming
the adjudication of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan which
found private respondent, Narciso Deganos, liable to petitioners for
actual
damages, but absolved respondent spouses Brigida D. Luz and Ernesto M.
Luz of liability. Petitioners likewise belabor the subsequent
resolution
of the Court of Appeals which denied their motion for reconsideration
of
its challenged decision.
Petitioners were
engaged in the business of purchase
and sale of jewelry and respondent Brigida D. Luz, also known as Aida
D.
Luz, was their regular customer. On several occasions during the period
from April 27, 1987 to September 4, 1987, respondent Narciso Deganos,
the
brother of Brigida D. Luz, received several pieces of gold and jewelry
from petitioner amounting to P382,816.00.[1]
These items and their prices were indicated in seventeen receipts
covering
the same. Eleven of the receipts stated that they were received for a
certain
Evelyn Aquino, a niece of Deganos, and the remaining six indicated that
they were received for Brigida D. Luz.[2]
Deganos was
supposed to sell the items at a profit
and thereafter remit the proceeds and return the unsold items to
petitioners.
Deganos remitted only the sum of P53,207.00. He neither paid the
balance
of the sales proceeds, nor did he return any unsold item to
petitioners.
By January 1990, the total of his unpaid account to petitioners,
including
interest, reached the sum of P725,463.98.[3]
Petitioners eventually filed a complaint in the barangay court against
Deganos to recover said amount.cralaw:red
In the barangay
proceedings, Brigida D. Luz, who
was not impleaded in the case, appeared as a witness for Deganos and
ultimately,
she and her husband, together with Deganos, signed a compromise
agreement
with petitioners. In that compromise agreement, Deganos obligated
himself
to pay petitioners, on installment basis, the balance of his account
plus
interest thereon. However, he failed to comply with his aforestated
undertakings.cralaw:red
On June 25, 1990,
petitioners instituted Civil
Case No. 412-M-90 in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan
against
Deganos and Brigida, D. Luz for recovery of a sum of money and damages,
with an application for preliminary attachment.[4]
Ernesto Luz was impleaded therein as the spouse of Brigida.cralaw:red
Four years later,
or on March 29, 1994, Deganos
and Brigida D. Luz were charged with estafa[5]
in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 785-M-94. That criminal case appears to be still
pending
in said trial court.cralaw:red
During the trial
of the civil case, petitioners
claimed that Deganos acted as the agent of Brigida D. Luz when he
received
the subject items of jewelry and, because he failed to pay for the
same,
Brigida, as principal, and her spouse are solidarily liable with him
therefor.cralaw:red
On the other
hand, while Deganos admitted that
he had an unpaid obligation to petitioners, he claimed that the same
was
only in the sum of P382,816.00 and not P725,463.98. He further asserted
that it was he alone who was involved in the transaction with the
petitioners;
that he neither acted as agent for nor was he authorized to act as an
agent
by Brigida D. Luz, notwithstanding the fact that six of the receipts
indicated
that the items were received by him for the latter. He further claimed
that he never delivered any of the items he received from petitioners
to
Brigida.cralaw:red
Brigida, on her
part, denied that she had anything
to do with the transactions between petitioners and Dangerous. She
claimed
that she never authorized Deganos to receive any item of jewelry in her
behalf and, for that matter, neither did she actually receive any of
the
articles in question. After trial, the court below found that only
Deganos
was liable to petitioners for the amount and damages claimed. It held
that
while Brigida D. Luz did have transactions with petitioners in the
past,
the items involved were already paid for and all that Brigida owed
petitioners
was the sum of P21,483.00 representing interest on the principal
account
which she had previously paid for.[6]
The trial court
also found that it was petitioner
Lydia Bordador who indicated in the receipts that the items were
received
by Deganos for Evelyn Aquino and Brigida D. Luz.[7]
Said court was "persuaded that Brigida D. Luz was behind Deganos," but
because there was no memorandum to this effect, the agreement between
the
parties was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.[8]
Absent the required memorandum or any written document connecting the
respondent
Luz spouses with the subject receipts, or authorizing Deganos to act on
their behalf, the alleged agreement between petitioners and Brigida D.
Luz was unenforceable.cralaw:red
Deganos was
ordered to pay petitioners the amount
of P725,463.98, plus legal interest thereon June 25, 1990, and
attorney's
fees. Brigida D. Luz was ordered to pay P21,483.00 representing the
interest
on her own personal loan. She and her co-defendant spouse were absolved
from any other or further liability.[9]
As stated at the
outset, petitioners appealed
the judgment of the court a quo to the Court Appeals which affirmed
said
judgment.[10]
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was subsequently
dismissed,[11]
hence, the present recourse to this Court.cralaw:red
The primary issue
in the instant petition is whether
or not herein respondent spouses are liable to petitioners for the
latter's
claim for money and damages in the sum of P725,463.98, plus interests
and
attorney's fees, despite the fact that the evidence does not show that
they signed any of the subject receipts or authorized Deganos to
received
the items of jewelry on their behalf. Petitioners argue that the Court
of Appeals erred in adopting the findings of the court a quo that
respondent
spouses are not liable to them, as said conclusion of the trial court
is
contradicted by the finding of fact of the appellate court that
"[Deganos]
acted as agent of his sister [Brigida Luz]."[12]
In support of this contention, petitioners quoted several letters sent
to them by Brigida D. Luz wherein the latter acknowledged her
obligation
to petitioners and requested for more time to fulfill the same. They
likewise
aver that Brigida testified in the trial court that Deganos took some
gold
articles from petitioners and delivered the same to her.cralaw:red
Both the Court of
Appeals and the trial court,
however, found as a fact that the aforementioned letters concerned the
previous obligations of Brigida to petitioners, and had nothing to do
with
the money sought to be recovered in the instant case. Such concurrent
factual
findings are entitled to great weight, hence, petitioners cannot
plausibly
claim in this appellate review that the letters were in the nature of
acknowledgments
by Brigida that she was the principal of Deganos in the subject
transactions.cralaw:red
On the other
hand, with regard to the testimony
of Brigida admitting delivery of the gold to her, there is no showing
whatsoever
that her statement referred to the items which are the subject matter
of
this case. It cannot, therefore, be validly said that she admitted her
liability regarding the same.
Petitioners insist that Deganos was the
agent
of Brigida D. Luz as the latter clothed him with apparent authority as
her agent and held him out to the public as such, hence Brigida can not
be permitted to deny said authority to innocent third parties who dealt
with Deganos under such belief.[13]
Petitioners further represent that the Court of Appeals recognized in
its
decision that Deganos was an agent of Brigida.[14]
The evidence does
not support the theory of petitioners
that Deganos was an agent of Brigida D. Luz and that the latter should
consequently be held solidarily liable with Deganos in his obligation
to
petitioners. While the quoted statement in the findings of fact of the
assailed appellate decision mentioned that Deganos ostensibly acted as
an agent of Brigida, the actual conclusion and ruling of the Court of
Appeals
categorically stated that "[Brigida Luz] never authorized her brother
[Deganos]
to act for and in her behalf in any transaction with Petitioners.[15]
It is clear, therefore, that even assuming arguendo that Deganos acted
as an agent of Brigida, the latter never authorized him to act on her
behalf
with regard to the transaction subject of this case.cralaw:red
The Civil Code
provides:
Art. 1868. By the contract of agency a
person
binds himself to render some service or to do something in
representation
or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter.
The basis for
agency is representation. Here, there
is no showing that Brigida consented to the acts of Deganos or
authorized
him to act on her behalf, much less with respect to the particular
transactions
involved. Petitioners' attempt to foist liability on respondent spouses
through the supposed agency relation with Deganos is groundless and
ill-advised.
Besides, it was
grossly and inexcusably negligent
of petitioners to entrust to Deganos, not once or twice but on at least
six occasions as evidenced by six receipts, several pieces of jewelry
of
substantial value without requiring a written authorization from his
alleged
principal. A person dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry and must
discover upon his peril the authority of the agent.[16] The records show that
neither
an express nor an implied agency was proven to have existed between
Deganos
and Brigida D. Luz. Evidently, petitioners, who were negligent in their
transactions with Deganos, cannot seek relief from the effects of their
negligence by conjuring a supposed agency relation between the two
respondents
where no evidence supports such claim.cralaw:red
Petitioners next
allege that the Court of Appeals
erred in ignoring the fact that the decision of the court below, which
it affirmed, is "null and void" as it contradicted its ruling in CA-G.
R. SP No. 39445 holding that there is "sufficient evidence/proof"
against
Brigida D. Luz and Deganos for estafa in the pending criminal case.
They
further aver that said appellate court erred in ruling against them in
this civil action since the same would result in an inevitable conflict
of decisions should be trial court convict the accused in the criminal
case.cralaw:red
By way of
backdrop for this argument of petitioners,
herein respondents Brigida D. Luz and Deganos had filed a demurrer to
evidence
and a motion for reconsideration in the aforestated criminal case, both
of which were denied by the trial court. They then filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals to set aside the denial of their
demurrer
and motion for reconsideration but, as just stated, their petition
therefor
was dismissed.[17]
Petitioners now
claim that the aforesaid dismissal
by the Court of Appeals of the petition in CA-G. R. SP No. 39445 with
respect
to the criminal case is equivalent to a finding that there is
sufficient
evidence in the estafa case against Brigida D. Luz and Deganos. Hence,
as already stated, petitioners theorize that the decision and
resolution
of the Court of Appeals now being impugned in the case at bar would
result
in a possible conflict with the prospective decision in the criminal
case.
Instead of promulgating the present decision and resolution under
review,
so they suggest, the Court of Appeals should have awaited the decision
in the criminal case, so as not to render academic or preempt the same
or, worse, create two conflicting rulings.[18]
Petitioners have
apparently lost sight of Article
33 of the Civil Code which provides that in cases involving alleged
fraudulent
acts, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from
the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall
require
only a preponderance of evidence.cralaw:red
It is worth
noting that this civil case was instituted
four years before the criminal case for estafa was filed, and that
although
there was a move to consolidate both cases, the same was denied by the
trial court. Consequently, it was the duty of the two branches of the
Regional
Trial Court concerned to independently proceed with the civil and
criminal
cases. It will also be observed that a final judgment rendered in a
civil
action absolving the defendant from civil liability is no bar to a
criminal
action.[19]
It is clear,
therefore, that this civil case may
proceed independently of the criminal case[20]
especially because while both cases are based on the same facts, the
quantum
of proof required for holding the parties liable therein differ. Thus,
it is improvident of petitioners to claim that the decision and
resolution
of the Court of Appeals in the present case would be preemptive of the
outcome of the criminal case. Their fancied fear of possible conflict
between
the disposition of this civil case and the outcome of the pending
criminal
case is illusory.cralaw:red
Petitioners
surprisingly postulate that the Court
of Appeals had lost its jurisdiction to issue the denial resolution
dated
August 18, 1997, as the same was tainted with irregularities and badges
of fraud perpetrated by its court officers.[21]
They charge that said appellate court, through conspiracy and fraud on
the part of its officers, gravely abused its discretion in issuing that
resolution denying their motion for reconsideration. They claim that
said
resolution was drafted by the ponente, then signed and issued by the
members
of the Eleventh Division of said court within one and a half days from
the elevation thereof by the division clerk of court to the office of
the
ponente.cralaw:red
It is the thesis
of petitioners that there was
undue haste in issuing the resolution as the same was made without
waiting
for the lapse of the ten-day period for respondents to file their
comment
and for petitioners to file their reply. It was allegedly impossible
for
the Court of Appeals to resolve the issue in just one and a half days,
especially because its ponente, the late Justice Maximiano C. Asuncion,
was then recuperating from surgery and that, additionally, "hundreds of
more important cases were pending."[22]
These lamentable
allegation of irregularities
in the Court of Appeals and in the conduct of its officers strikes us
as
a desperate attempt of petitioners to induce this Court to give
credence
to their arguments which, as already found by both the trial and
intermediate
appellate courts, are devoid of factual and legal substance. The
regrettably
irresponsible attempt to tarnish the image of the intermediate
appellate
tribunal and its judicial officers through ad hominem imputations
could well be contumacious, but we are inclined to let that pass with a
strict admonition that petitioners refrain from indulging in such
conduct
in litigations.cralaw:red
On July 9, 1997,
the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment in this case affirming the trial court's decision.[23]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration and the Court of Appeals ordered
respondents to file a comment. Respondents filed the same on August 5,
1997[24]
and petitioners filed their reply to said comment on August 15, 1997.[25]
The Eleventh Division of said court issued the questioned resolution
denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration on August 18, 1997.[26]
It is ironic that
while some litigants malign
the judiciary for being supposedly slothful in disposing of cases,
petitioners
are making a show of calling out for justice because the Court of
Appeals
issued a resolution disposing of a case sooner than expected of it.
They
would even deny the exercise of discretion by the appellate court to
prioritize
its action on cases in line with the procedure it has adopted in
disposing
thereof and in declogging its dockets. It is definitely not for the
parties
to determine and dictate when and how a tribunal should act upon those
cases since they are not even aware of the status of the dockets and
the
internal rules and policies for acting thereon.cralaw:red
The fact that a
resolution was issued by said
court within a relatively short period of time after the records of the
case were elevated to the office of the ponente cannot, by itself, be
deemed
irregular. There is no showing whatsoever that the resolution was
issued
without considering the reply filed by petitioners. In fact, that brief
pleading filed by petitioners does not exhibit any esoteric or
ponderous
argument which could not be analyzed within an hour. It is a legal
presumption,
born of wisdom and experience, that official duty has been regularly
performed;[27]
that the proceedings of a judicial tribunal are regular and valid, and
that judicial acts and duties have been and will be duly and properly
performed.[28]
The burden of proving irregularity in official conduct is on the part
of
petitioners and they have utterly failed to do so. It is thus
reprehensible
for them to cast aspersions on a court of law on the bases of
conjectures
or surmises, especially since one of the petitioners appears to be a
member
of the Philippine Bar.cralaw:red
Lastly,
petitioners fault the trial court's holding
that whatever contract of agency was established between Brigida D. Luz
and Narciso Deganos is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds as
that
aspect of this case allegedly is not covered thereby.[29]
They proceed on the premise that the Statute of Frauds applies only to
executory contracts and not to executed or to partially executed ones.
From there, they move on to claim that the contract involved in this
case
was an executed contract as the items had already been delivered by
petitioners
to Brigida D. Luz, hence, such delivery resulted in the execution of
the
contract and removed the same from the coverage of the Statute of
Frauds.cralaw:red
Petitioners'
claim is speciously unmeritorious.
It should be emphasized that neither the trial court nor the appellate
court categorically stated that there was such a contractual relation
between
these two respondents. The trial court merely said that if there was
such
an agency existing between them, the same is unenforceable as the
contract
would fall under the Statute of Frauds which requires the presentation
of a note or memorandum thereof in order to be enforceable in court.
That
was merely a preparatory statement of a principle of law. What was
finally
proven as a matter of fact is that there was no such contract between
Brigida
D. Luz and Narciso Deganos, executed or partially executed, and no
delivery
of any of the items subject of this case was ever made to the former.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, no
error having been committed by the
Court of Appeals in affirming the judgment of the court a quo,
its
challenged decision and resolution are hereby AFFIRMED and the instant
petition is DENIED, with double costs against petitioners.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno, Mendoza and
Martinez, JJ., concur.cralaw:red
_________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Rollo, 86.
[2]
Ibid., 203.
[3]
Ibid., 85.
[4]
Ibid., 78-84.
[5]
Ibid., 111-112.
[6]
Ibid., 85-97.
[7]
Ibid., 94.
[8]
Article 1403 of the Civil Code pertinently provides that the following
contracts are unenforceable unless they are ratified:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Those entered into the name
of another person by one who had been given no authority or legal
representation,
or who has acted beyond his power.
2. Those that do not comply
with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the
following
cases, an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action,
unless
the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and
subscribed
by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the
agreement
cannot be received without the writing or a secondary evidence of its
contents:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxx
xxx
xxx
[b] A special promise to
answer
for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;
xxx
xxx
xxx
[9]
Rollo, 97.
[10]
Justice Maximiano C. Asuncion as ponente, with the concurrence of
Justice
Jesus M. Elbinias and Justice Ramon A. Barcelona of the Eleventh
Division
of the Court of Appeals, affirmed the decision of the trial court in a
decision dated July 9, 1997; Rollo, 9-13.
[11]
The resolution was dated August 18, 1997; Rollo, 70-A.
[12]
Rollo, 33-40.
[13]
Ibid., 40.
[14]
Ibid., 40-41.
[15]
Ibid., 12.
[16]
Toyota Shaw, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 116650, May
23,
1995, 244 SCRA 320.
[17]
Rollo, 128-131.
[18]
Ibid., 41.
[19]Section 4, Rule 111, Rules of Court.
[20]
Salta vs. De Veyra, etc., et al., L-37733 and Philippine National Bank
vs. Purisima, etc., et al., L-38035, jointly decided on September 30,
1992,
117 SCRA 212.
[21]
Rollo, 47.
[22]
Ibid., 48.
[23]
Ibid., 9-13.
[24]
Ibid., 160-167.
[25]
Ibid., 178-182.
[26]
Ibid., 70-A.
[27]Section 3[m], Rule 131, Rules of Court.
[28]Section 3[n], Rule 131, Rules of Court provides that it is presumed
that
a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or
elsewhere,
was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction.
[29]
Rollo, 52. |