THIRD
DIVISION
MAXIMINO
FUENTES,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 109849
February 26, 1997
-versus-
HON.
COURT OF APPEALS,THIRTEENTH DIVISION and
VIRGILIO UY, BRIGIDO SAGUINDANG, ET AL.,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In deciding
this appeal, the Court reiterates
the oft-stated doctrine that factual findings of the Court of Appeals
affirming
those of the trial court are binding on this Court unless there is a
clear
showing that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness,
capriciousness
or palpable error. This is a petition under Rule 45 seeking a reversal
of the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals[2]
promulgated on March 22, 1993, in CA-G. R. SP No. 29910.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts
of the case as gleaned from the
respondent Court of Appeals' Decision are as follows:
[Herein
petitioner] Maximino Fuentes and [herein
private respondents] Virgilio Uy, et al. are owners of adjoining
parcels
of land situated in Dela Paz, Clarin, Misamis Occidental. The [herein
petitioner's]
land declared in his name is identified as Lot No. 1358, Pls 707 while
that of the defendant Virgilio Uy, titled in the latter's name, is
identified
as Lot No. 1357. The boundary lines of the adjoining lands had been
relocated
twice by Engineer Armelito Amores in surveys conducted before the case
for forcible entry was filed. When the case was already filed, further
relocation surveys were conducted, this time, by Engineer Norberto lyog
thru a court order on the litigated portion consisting of 411 square
meters
which according to the plaintiff was forcibly taken and entered into by
[herein private respondents].cralaw:red
In hearing the
case, the MCTC of Clarin-Tudela
stated the issues to be as follows:
The trial court
making a review of the evidence on
record held that the [herein private respondents] have superior
evidence
to disprove the allegations of [herein petitioner] and on the basis of
which, it found that the [herein private respondents] have not
committed
the acts complained of by [herein petitioner], in the main pointing to
the statement of the witness Alfredo Dantes as reflected in the
stenographic
notes particularly indicated as t.s.n., p. 46, proceedings of February
8, 1991, wherein said witness appeared to have testified that he bought
the land from the heirs of the original owner, one Gadiane, which he
improved
gradually by putting up a dike which in effect was only an improvement
of an already existing dike and in 1976, he had entered into an
agreement
with [herein private respondents] to develop the property on a sharing
basis which finally culminated in his selling the said area in 1980 to
the [herein private respondents].
What appeared to
have impressed the trial court
most is expressed in its statement that the [herein petitioner] should
have questioned the action of the [herein private respondents] in
improving
the dike and having it fenced, and also, why it was only in 1987 when
he
tried to restrain the [herein private respondents] when the same dike
had
existed many years before. The part of the decision in connection with
said questions of the court is herein quoted:
"This court finds it strange for the
[herein
petitioner] for him to question the action of the defendant in fencing
the dikes. If it appeared to him that the dike fenced by the defendant
which is the same dike existing when Dantes bought the property from
Gadiane
really belonged to him, why did he not question the same many years
before?
Yet, all the time when Dantes, since 1970 and later the (herein private
respondent) in 1976, made improvements on the dike, the plaintiff did
not
make any adverse move to restrain them. It was only in 1987 when he
made
the initial move of trying to restrain [herein private respondent]
which
prompted the latter to cause a (sic) relocation surveys which
were
conducted by Engr. Amores twice.
Prescinding
from the foregoing findings, the trial
court said it found nothing wrong for the [herein private respondents]
to have fenced the dike after the relocation survey conducted by Engr.
Amores which the [herein petitioner] had attended and further stated
that
the act of fencing the dike and cutting the nipa palms did not violate
the property rights of the [herein petitioner] for the [herein private
respondents] only acted to assert what properly belongs to them and on
the basis of [the] Commissioner's Report more or less indicating the
foregoing
circumstances, it held that there was in fact no forcible dispossession
of property and that further, the area of 411 square meters under
dispute
factually belongs to [herein private respondent] Virgilio Uy.
The decision of
the MCTC of Clarin-Tudeia was
appealed by the [herein plaintiff] and the RTC Ozamis City resolved to
affirm the decision of the MCTC deleting only the monetary award
therein
granted in favor of the [herein private respondents]. The [herein]
petitioner
in the case before [the respondent Court of Appeals] has raised two [2]
purported errors of the court below, thus:
"That the honorable Regional Trial Court,
Branch
15-A, Ozamiz City, gravely erred in deciding that [herein petitioner]
had
no evidence to support the allegation that [herein private respondents]
entered the portion in question by force and intimidation.
That the honorable Regional Trial Court
Branch
15-A, Ozamiz City, erred in sustaining that the [herein private
respondents]
did not commit any act constituting forcible entry."[3]
The Issue
Hence, petitioner
Maximino Fuentes filed the present
six-page petition alleging the same assignment of errors raised before
the Court of Appeals as follows:
1. That the Honorable Regional Trial
Court,
Branch
15-A, Ozamiz City, gravely erred in deciding that plaintiff had no
evidence
to support the allegation that defendants entered the portion in
question
by force and intimidation.
2. That the Honorable Regional Trial
Court,
Branch
15-A, Ozamiz City, erred in sustaining that the defendants did not
commit
any act constituting forcible entry.[4]
In his
Memorandum, the petitioner consolidated these
into a single issue: Who is in actual, physical and prior
possession
of the portion in question?
The Court's Ruling
The petition for
review is unmeritorious.cralaw:red
Jurisprudence
teaches us that "[a]s a rule, the
jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the Court of
Appeals
is limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly
committed
by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive.
As such this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over
again
the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. This rule,
however,
is not without exceptions."[5]
The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which are as a general
rule
deemed conclusive, may admit of review by this Court:[6]
[1] when the factual findings of the
Court of
Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;
[2] when the findings are grounded
entirely
on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
[3] when the inference made by the
Court of
Appeals
from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
[4] when there is grave abuse of
discretion
in
the appreciation of facts;
[5] when the appellate court, in
making its
findings,
goes beyond the issues of the case, and such findings are contrary to
the
admissions of both appellant and appellee;
[6] when the judgment of the Court of
Appeals
is premised on a misapprehension of facts;
[7] when the Court of Appeals fails to
notice
certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a
different
conclusion;
[8] when the findings of fact are
themselves
conflicting;
[9] when the findings of fact are
conclusions
without citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; and
[10] when the findings of fact of the
Court
of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but such findings are
contradicted
by the evidence on record.
After a
thorough review of the case at bench, the
Court finds that the petition raises no substantial question of law.
The
question raised as to who has prior actual possession over the
contested
portion of land is patently a question of fact beyond the pale of Rule
45 of the Rules of Court which mandates that only questions of law be
raised
in the petition.[7]
Moreover,
petitioner utterly failed to show the
presence of any of the previously mentioned exceptions to justify the
Court's
review of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. On the
contrary,
the factual findings and conclusion of the Metropolitan Circuit Trial
Court,
the Regional Trial Court, and Court of Appeals in the instant case
regarding
the issue raised in this petition are consistent and backed up by the
extant
evidence. "Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly holds that findings of
facts
of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
are binding upon this Court.[8]
All in all, the
petition, viewed in its entirety,
sorely fails to demonstrate any reversible error committed by the
respondent
Court of Appeals.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant petition
is hereby dismissed for utter lack of merit. Double costs against
petitioner.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Narvasa, C.J.,
Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco,
JJ., concur.cralaw:red
____________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Rollo, pp. 23-28.
[2]
Thirteenth Division composed of J. Cezar D. Francisco, Ponente, JJ.;
Pedro
A. Ramirez, Chairman and Angelina S. Gutierrez, concurring.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 24-26.
[4]
Ibid., p. 4.
[5]
Gaw, vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 220 SCRA 405, 413, March 24,
1993;
citing Morales vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 391, May 23, 1991, and
Navarra
vs. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 850, December 17, 1991.
[6]
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 110207, p. 8, July 11, 1996, Vda.
de Alcantara vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 457, 468, January 29, 1996,
Quebral vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 353, 368, January 25, 1996
[citing
Calde vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 376, June 27, 1994. See also
Cayabyab
vs. The Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court, 232 SCRA 1, April 28,
1994],
Engineering & Machinery Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA
156, 163, January 24, 1996, Chua Tiong Tay vs. Court of Appeals, 243
SCRA
183, 186, March 31, 1995, Dee vs. Court of Appeals, 238 SCRA 254, 263,
November 21, 1994, and Asia Brewery, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 224
SCRA
437, 443.
[7]
Paragraph 2, Section 2, Rule 45, Rules of Court.
[8]
Juan Castillo and Maria Masangya-Castillo, et al. vs. Court of Appeals,
et al., G. R. No. 106472, p. 9, August 7, 1996. |