SECOND
DIVISION
BAYVIEW
HOTEL, INC.,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 119337
June 17, 1997
-versus-
COURT
OF APPEALS AND
CLUB FILIPINO, INC. DE CEBU,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
This is a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court filed by Bayview Hotel, Inc. to set aside the decision
of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP. No. 34800 entitled "Bayview Hotel,
Inc. v. Hon. Teodoro Lim and Club Filipino, Inc. de Cebu."[1]
The facts are
well established. On May 27, 1959,
petitioner Bayview Hotel, Inc. entered into a contract of lease over a
parcel of land located in Cebu City with its registered owner, private
respondent Club Filipino, Inc. De Cebu. The lease agreement gave
petitioner
the right to construct and operate a hotel complex known as the
Magellan
International Hotel for a period of thirty [30] years. It also
stipulated
that ownership of the building and other permanent improvements on the
land built by petitioner will transfer to private respondent upon the
expiration
of the lease. Under the agreement, petitioner was given the option to
renew
the lease for ten [10] more years, the amount of rent to be computed at
five percent [5%] of the approved value of the land and improvements.
Before
the expiration of the lease contract on December 31, 1992, petitioner
notified
private respondent of its intention to extend the lease contract for a
longer period and at a rate of rent different from the terms as
originally
agreed upon. There was no meeting of the minds between the parties as
private
respondent's Board of Directors insisted on adhering to the provisions
of the original lease contract. Private respondent then sent to
petitioner
a notice to vacate the premises and to pay accrued rentals. Private
respondent
claimed ownership of the building and the improvements pursuant to the
provisions of the original contract.[2]
When petitioner
failed to vacate the premises,
private respondents, on May 18, 1993, filed with the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Cebu a complaint for ejectment and recovery of accrued rentals
amounting to P2,850,000.00 as of April 30, 1993 and P712,500.00 for
every
month thereafter.[3]
Before petitioner could be served with a copy of the complaint and
summons,
the building was destroyed by a fire of undetermined origin.cralaw:red
On June 1, 1993,
petitioner filed its answer to
the complaint for ejectment interposing the following affirmative
defenses:
[a] Summons having been improperly and
defectively
served, the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant.
[b] Plaintiff has no cause of action
against
the
defendant.
[c] Plaintiff's claim has been
extinguished
by
the loss of the premises, from which defendant has been sought to be
ejected,
in a fire on 21 May, 1993.
[d] The fire has effectively ejected
the
defendant
from the premises rendering the action for ejectment moot and academic.
[e] Since the defendant has been
effectively
ejected
from the premises by the fire, defendant cannot be said to have
deprived
plaintiff of its possession of the same, therefore, the complaint for
ejectment
should be dismissed and the case be considered as an ordinary claim for
a sum of money.
[f] Consequently, since the amount
being
claimed
is beyond the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the suit should be
dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction.
[g] Plaintiff's claim for a sum of
money has
been
extinguished by compensation since under the lease contract with the
defendant,
plaintiff was bound to pay the latter the value of all its furnishings
and equipment in the leased premises upon the termination of the lease.
Petitioner then
moved for a preliminary hearing on
its affirmative defenses which was denied by the trial judge on the
ground
that the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure prohibits the motion.
Aggrieved
by this Order, petitioner, on June 24, 1993, filed with the Regional
Trial
Court of Cebu, a petitioner for certiorari with a prayer for
preliminary
injunction against private respondent and Metropolitan Trial Court
Judge
Teodoro Lim.[4]
Allegedly, Judge Lim abused his discretion when he refused to dismiss
the
complaint for ejectment. In its answer to the petition for certiorari,
private respondent admitted the destruction of the building but alleged
that petitioner has not completely vacated the premises since its
guards
continue to remain in the premises and its cars are still parked
thereat.
As to the jurisdiction of the court, private respondent argued that
jurisdiction
once acquired by the court remains with it until the termination of the
case. Private respondent also sought the dismissal of the petition on
the
ground that it is a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rules on
Summary
Procedure. On November 26, 1993, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
granted
the petition for certiorari and ordered the Metropolitan Trial Court to
dismiss the ejectment case.
Private
respondent appealed to the public respondent
Court of Appeals. On February 16, 1995, the appellate court reversed
the
decision of the RTC of Cebu. It ruled: [1] that petitioner submitted to
the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Court when it sought affirmative
relief
from the same court; [2] that despite the burning of the building, the
trial court retained its jurisdiction to try the case for the nature of
the action remained to be an ejectment case; [3] whether petitioner has
vacated the premises and transferred its possession to Club Filipino is
a question of fact that should be threshed out in the trial court; and
[4] that the petition for certiorari should not have been given due
course
by the Regional Trial Court for its filing is proscribed by the Rules
on
Summary Procedure.cralaw:red
Hence, this
appeal by petitioner where it contends:[5]
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND
ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT DID NOT
LOSE
ITS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE FOR EJECTMENT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
BUILDING FROM WHICH PETITIONER WAS SOUGHT TO BE EJECTED HAD BEEN
TOTALLY
DESTROYED BEFORE AN ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED.chanrobles virtual law library
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS
DISCRETION
IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONER'S ANSWER WHICH EMBODIED AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSES
IS TANTAMOUNT TO A MOTION TO DISMISS AND THEREFORE PROSCRIBED BY THE
RULES
ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE.chanrobles virtual law library
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION
IN HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CANNOT ENTERTAIN A PETITION
FOR
CERTIORARI AS IT IS PROHIBITED UNDER THE REVISED RULES ON SUMMARY
PROCEDURE.chanrobles virtual law library
We reject
petitioner's submissions.
Petitioner's
contention of lack of jurisdiction
of the Metropolitan Trial Court is premised on its allegation that the
building it leased from the private respondent was completely burned
down
before it could be served with summons in Civil Case No. R-32189. It
maintains
that it does not have anymore a lessor-lessee relationship with private
respondent citing Article 1655 of the Civil Code which provides that "if
the thing is totally destroyed by a fortuitous event, the lease is
extinguished."
Petitioner has
overlooked that the case at bar
involves land lease. Private respondent insists that petitioner is
still
occupying the subject land although the building on its has been burned
down. If the allegation is true, then the jurisdiction of the MTC
cannot
be assailed. We have held in Commander Realty Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[6]
that "an unlawful detainer is the act of unlawfully withholding the
possession
of the land or building against or from the landlord, vendor or vendee
or other person after the expiration or the termination of the
detainer's
right to hold possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied."
We also ruled in the same case that "the right of a lessee to occupy
the
land leased as against the demand of the lessor to regain possession
should
be decided in a case of Ejectment or Detainer under Rule 70 of the
Rules
of Court."[7]
To be sure, petitioner makes the contrary claim that private respondent
is already in full and complete possession of the premises. This is,
however,
a factual question that should be decided by the Metropolitan Trial
Court.cralaw:red
We likewise find
no reason to fault respondent
court when it rejected petitioner's contention that the Metropolitan
Trial
Court should have granted its motion for a preliminary hearing on its
affirmative
defenses which raised the issue of jurisdiction. Under the law, parties
are not prohibited from filing an answer with affirmative defenses in
cases
falling under summary procedure. However, the trial courts are enjoined
from conducting a preliminary hearing on such affirmative defenses to
prevent
unnecessary delay in disposing the case on its merits. Thus, time and
again,
we have ruled that under summary procedure ", adjudication of cases can
be done on the basis of affidavits or other evidence. The proceeding
must
be as summary as possible in order not to defeat the need to dispose
ejectment
cases in as fast a time as possible. The reason is because cases
involving
possession of properties usually pose a threat to the peace of society."[8]
Finally, we agree
with the respondent court that
the claim of the petitioner that the petition for certiorari it filed
with
the Regional Trial Court is permissible is not in accord with Section
19
of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure which provides:
Sec. 19.
Prohibited pleading and motions.
The following pleading, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in
the
cases covered by this Rules:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to
quash
the complaint or information except on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction
over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding
section;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion for new trial, or for
reconsideration
of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;
(d) Petitioner for relief from
judgment;
(e) Motion for extension of time to
file
pleadings,
affidavits or any other paper;
(f) Memoranda;
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus,
or
prohibition
against any interlocutory order issued by the court;
(h) Motion to declare the defendant in
default;
(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;
(j) Reply;
(k) Third party complaints;
(l) Interventions. [Emphasis
supplied].
The prohibition
is plain enough. Its further exposition
is unnecessary verbiage.
IN VIEW WHEREOF,
the petition is dismissed. Costs
against petitioner.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Regalado, Romero
and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J.,
took no part.
____________________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Decision penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-dela Cruz, and
concurred
in by Associate Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr. [Chairman] and Associate
Justice
Bernardo P. Pardo, Fifteenth Division.
[2]
On April 6, 1993, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 93-65439 for
consignation
and damages with a prayer for temporary restraining order at the
Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1, to compel private respondent to extend
the lease.
[3]
Civil Case No. R-32189, Branch IV, Metropolitan Trial Court in City,
Cebu
City, presided by Judge Teodoro Lim.
[4]
Civil Case No. CEB-14189.
[5]
Petition for Review, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 9-10.
[6]
161 SCRA 269 [1988] citing Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
Pharma
Industries, Inc. v. Pajarillaga, L-53788, October 17, 1980, 100 SCRA
339.
[7]
Ibid, citing Ching Pue v. Gonzales, 87 Phil. 81 [1950]; Lim Si v. Lim,
98 Phil. 868; Teodoro v. Mirasol, 99 Phil. 150 [1956]; Pardo de Tavera
v. Encarnacion, et al., 22 SCRA 632 [1968].
[8]
Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 519, 526 [1995]. |