SECOND
DIVISION
PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G. R. No. 117218
March 20, 1997
-versus-
GERRY
NALANGAN, alias "GERRY BUKOL",
Accused-Appellant.
D
E C I S I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Adjudged guilty
by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 19 of Bacoor, Cavite of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No.
B-89-93, accused-appellant, Gerry Nalangan, alias Gerry Bukol,
predicates
his present appellate recourse on self defense. He seeks to bolster
that
apologia with the supposed unreliability of the prosecution witnesses,
especially their version of the events upon which the trial court
grounded
its affirmative nod on the prosecution's cause.
The initiatory
criminal information, dated March
9, 1989, imputed the murder subject of this case to appellant, the
pertinent
portion thereof alleging:
That on or about 11:30 p.m. of February
28,
1988,
at the vicinity of Block 14 and 15, Barangay Ramon Cruz, Municipality
of
General Mariano Alvarez, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
then
armed with a kitchen knife, with intent to kill and with treachery and
evident premeditation, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously
assault, attack and stab with the use of the aforesaid weapon Emmanuel
Rosal on the stomach, thereby inflicting upon the latter a mortal wound
which caused his death.[1]
Appellant, duly
assisted by counsel, registered a
negative plea at his arraignment on July 5, 1989.[2]
At the trial conducted thereafter, the prosecution presented as its
witnesses,
Rogelio Alvarez, Jose Samone, Jr., Constancia Rosal, Pat. Roland Alamo,
and Dr. Ruben Maranan. Appellant himself testified in his defense,
without
corroboration from any other witness to buttress his asseverations. On
November 29, 1993, the court a quo rendered its condemnatory verdict
sentencing
appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering him
to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P30,000.00 for
the
latter's death, P10,000.00 for hospitalization and funeral expenses,
and
to pay the costs. Appellant was credited with the period of his
preventive
imprisonment caused by his failure to post bail.[3]
Prosecution
witnesses Rogelio Alvarez and Jose
Samone, Jr., both of whom were townmates and common friends of the
victim
and appellant, narrated before the trial court that at around 11:30 in
the evening of February 28, 1989, they had just adjourned from a
drinking
spree with said victim and appellant. They were about to go their
separate
ways when they observed Nalangan, who was holding a knife, running away
from the wobbling victim. Emmanuel Rosal shouted that he had been
wounded.
When these two witnesses rushed to the succor of Rosal, the victim told
them that appellant had stabbed him, and asked them to bring him at
once
to a hospital for treatment. The stabbing incident occurred at a
well-lighted
place in the vicinity of Blocks 14 and 15 in Barangay Roman Cruz,
General
Mariano Alvarez, Cavite, and the witnesses were just a short distance
away
from the protagonists at the time. The victim was hospitalized for
about
two weeks before he expired, apparently on account of the wound
inflicted
by appellant.[4]
Appellant's own
story is that it had all begun
from a scuffle between him and the victim. He was then on his way home
after watching television at a friend's house when the victim accosted
him and tried to extort P20.00 from him. When he refused, Rosal
insisted
on selling to him a plastic bag containing marijuana. When appellant
again
declined, the victim assaulted him with blows from the handle of a
knife.
Appellant tried to fight back and, in the ensuing affray, the knife
fell
from the victim's hand. Appellant picked up the knife and attempted to
run away but the victim grasped his shirt and began to choke him. At
this
point, appellant thrust the knife into the victim's stomach and then
scampered
away. He insists that he stabbed the deceased to save his life.[5]
Appellant imputes
error on the part of the trial
court [a] when it gave full weight and credence to the testimonies of
the
prosecution witnesses and totally disregarded his own testimony; [b]
when
it held that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the
deceased
and that appellant's life was never placed in danger; and [c] when it
convicted
him in spite of the failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt
beyond
reasonable doubt.[6]
Evidently, all
the assigned errors revolve on
the question of credibility. In that regard, resort to appellate review
to reverse the findings thereon of the trial court would generally
elicit
a rebuff from the superior court where no perceivable gross error
bordering
on misapprehension of the facts could be readily gleaned from such
factual
conclusions.[7]
In appellant's case, while the trial court apparently misappreciated
treachery
and evident premeditation against him, his guilt for homicide in the
slaying
of Emmanuel Rosal, and not murder as found by the court below, is
indisputably
borne out by the evidence on record.cralaw:red
The justifying
circumstance of self defense, to
vindicate an accused relying thereon, must be proved clearly and
convincingly,
and it is not for an accused asserting its presence in his case to bank
on the weakness of the People's evidence. Once invoked by the accused,
the burden of proof is shifted to him to establish the elements of the
same, to wit: [1] unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; [2]
reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and [3] lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[8]
The incident
recounted by appellant, which is
uncorroborated and thus self-serving, is that an altercation occurred
between
him and the victim at the instance of the latter, immediately prior to
the stabbing. The two prosecution witnesses, Rogelio Alvarez and Jose
Samone,
Jr., to whom no ill motives had ever been attributed, were however
unequivocal
in their testimonies that no such squabble ever transpired between the
two. On the contrary, Alvarez stated that minutes before the stabbing,
as he and appellant were on their way to join the group of the
deceased,
appellant had intimated that he was going to inflict some harm on the
person
of the victim and that he was then armed with a knife.cralaw:red
That appellant
did just that appears to be beyond
question for, indeed, the victim later sustained a fatal wound on the
stomach,
inflicted no doubt by appellant who fled shortly thereafter from the
scene
of the incident. By his flight, appellant's claim of self defense was
exposed
as a mere subterfuge since he had no reason to flee considering that
the
persons present there were his friends. It could not even be suggested
to an acceptable degree that he had to escape from his antagonist since
the latter had by then been rendered hors de combat.cralaw:red
While it may be
conceded that the two witnesses
for the prosecution did not actually see the very act of stabbing, the
concatenation of the events immediately prior to and after the victim
shouted
that he had been hit confirms the criminal plan hatched by appellant.
As
further observed by the Solicitor General, appellant emerged unscathed
from the supposed struggle despite his claim that the deceased had
boxed
and also struck him with the handle of the knife and, on top of that,
even
choked him. In any case, it has been held that in the absence of
evidence
showing that the victim was the unlawful aggressor at the start, the
law
will consider the aggression as reciprocal between the combatants.[9]
Upon the other
hand, the evidence on record fails
to bear out the presence of treachery and evident premeditation, both
of
which cannot be simply presumed or speculated upon. For alevosia
to be considered, it must be established as clearly as the elements of
the crime or crimes it is alleged to qualify.[10]
And, as with treachery, evident premeditation must likewise be proved
with
as much certainty and clarity as the criminal act itself.[11]
Absent any particulars as to the manner in which the aggression
commenced
or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim unfolded,
treachery
cannot be appreciated.[12]
In the case of appellant, as already noted, the prosecution witnesses
had
not actually seen the stabbing of the victim. Hence, it could not just
be assumed that appellant had coolly and deliberately adopted
treacherous
means to take the victim's life.cralaw:red
Evident
premeditation could not also qualify the
slaying of Emmanuel Rosal, since there was no evidence of [1] the time
when the offender determined to commit the crime; [2] an act manifestly
indicating that the offender had clung to his determination; and [3] a
sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution, to
allow
the accused time to reflect on the consequences of his act.[13]
Here, although there is evidence showing that appellant had harbored an
evil design against the victim, the time within which he made known
that
plan to Alvarez until the stabbing of the victim, which involved an
interval
of only a few minutes, could not have afforded appellant a sufficient
opportunity
for reflection on the consequences of his criminal plan. Thus, the
crime
committed by appellant, given these factual considerations, is homicide
and not murder.cralaw:red
ACCORDINGLY, the
judgment appealed from is hereby
MODIFIED. Accused-Appellant Gerry Nalangan, alias Gerry Bukol,
is
declared guilty of simple homicide and is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of ten [10] years, of prison mayor in its
medium
period, as the minimum, to seventeen [17] years and four [4] months of
reclusion temporal in its medium period, as the maximum.cralaw:red
Further, the
death indemnity for the victim is
hereby increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with present case law. In
all other respects, the judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Romero, Puno,
Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.cralaw:red
____________________________________
Endnotes
[1]Original
Record, 42.
[2]Ibid.,
45.
[3]Ibid.,
126-127.
[4]TSN,
July 24, 1989, 3-12; November 14, 1989, 2-8; December 20, 1989, 2-11
[5]Ibid.,
July 11, 1990, 2-5; September 11, 1990, 2-7.
[6]Appellant's
Brief, 1; Rollo, 33.
[7]People
vs. Sanchez, G. R. Nos. 98402-04, November 16, 1995, 290 SCRA 14;
People
vs. Salodaga, et al., G. R. No. 106784, August 7, 1995, 297 SCRA 98.
[8]
People vs. Ronquillo, G. R. No. 96125, August 31, 1995, 247 SCRA 793;
People
vs. Aliviado, G.R. Nos. 113783-84, August 14, 1995, 247 SCRA 300;
People
vs. Morin, et al., G. R. No. 101794, February 24, 1995, 241 SCRA 709.
[9]
Bitalac vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G. R. No. 45835, February 15,
1995,
241 SCRA 351.
[10]People
vs. Rosario, et al., G. R. No. 108789, July 18, 1995, 246 SCRA 659.
[11]
People vs. Barros, G. R. Nos. 101107-08, June 27, 1985, 245 SCRA 312.
[12]People
vs. Patamama, G. R. No. 107938, December 4, 1995, 250 SCRA 603.
[13]People
vs. Gauzagan, Jr., G. R. No. 113793, August 11, 1995, 247 SCRA 220;
People
vs. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 111968, March 2, 1995, 242 SCRA 129. |