SECOND
DIVISION
LYDIA
VILLEGAS, MA. TERESITA VILLEGAS,ANTONIO
VILLEGAS, JR. and ANTONIETTE VILLEGAS,
Petitioners,
G. R. No. 82562
April 11, 1997
-versus-
COURT
OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and
ANTONIO V. RAQUIZA,
Respondents.
_______________________________________________
ANTONIO
V. RAQUIZA,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 82592
April 11, 1997
-versus-
COURT
OF APPEALS, LYDIA A. VILLEGAS,ANTONIO VILLEGAS, JR.,
MA. ANTONETTE VILLEGAS,MA. LYDIA VILLEGAS and ESTATE OF
ANTONIO J.
VILLEGAS,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
ROMERO, J.:
This case
originated from a libel suit filed
by then Assemblyman Antonio V. Raquiza against then Manila Mayor
Antonio
J. Villegas, who allegedly publicly imputed to him acts constituting
violations
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. He did this on several
occasions
in August 1968 through [a] a speech before the Lion's Club of
Malasiqui,
Pangasinan on August 10; [b] public statements in Manila on August 13
and
in Davao on August 17, which was coupled with a radio-TV interview; and
[c] a public statement shortly prior to his appearance before the
Senate
Committee on Public Works [the Committee] on August 20 to formally
submit
a letter-complaint implicating Raquiza, among other government
officials.
The Committee,
however, observed that all the
allegations in the complaint were based mainly on the uncorroborated
testimony
of a certain Pedro U. Fernandez, whose credibility turned out to be
highly
questionable. Villegas also failed to submit the original copies of his
documentary evidence. Thus, after thorough investigation, Raquiza was
cleared
of all charges by the Committee.[1]
All these acts of political grandstanding received extensive media
coverage.cralaw:red
On July 25, 1969,
an information for libel was
filed by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila with the then Court of
First Instance of Manila against Villegas who denied the charge. After
losing in the 1971 elections, Villegas left for the United States where
he stayed until his death on November 16, 1984. Nevertheless, trial
proceeded
in absentia. By the time of his death in 1984, the
prosecution
had already rested its case Two months after notice of his death, the
court
issued an order dismissing the criminal aspect of the case but
reserving
the right to resolve its civil aspect. No memorandum was ever filed in
his behalf.cralaw:red
Judge Marcelo R.
Obien[2]
rendered judgment on March 7, 1985, the dispositive portion of
which
was amended on March 26 to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing
considerations,
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. The dismissal of the criminal case
against
Antonio J. Vlllegas, on account of his death on November 16, 1984. is
hereby
reiterated.
2. Ordenng the estate of Antonio J.
Villegas,
represented herein by his legal heirs, namely: Lydia A Villegas, Ma.
Teresita
Villegas, Antonio Villegas, Jr., Ma. Antoniette Villegas, and Ma. Lydia
Villegas (sic), to pay plaintiff Antonio V. Raquiza Two Hundred
Million Pesos [P200,000,000.00], itemized as follows:
(a) One Hundred Fifty Million Pesos
[P150.000.000.00]
as moral damages:
(b) Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
[P200.000.00] as
actual damages:
(c) Forty-nine Million Eight
Hundred
Thousand
Pesos [P49,800,000.00] as exemplary damages; and
(d) The cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[3]
[Amendments underscored].
The heirs of
Villegas [the Heirs], through their
father's counsel, Atty. Norberto Quisumbing, appealed the decision on
these
three main grounds:
1. Whether the trial court, three months
after
notice of the death of the accused and before his counsel could file a
memorandum in his behalf, could validly render judgment in the case?
2. Whether in the absence of formal
substitution
of parties, the trial court could validly render judgment against the
heirs
and estate of a deceased accused?
3 Whether, under the facts of the
instant
case,
deceased Villegas was liable for libel, and assuming he was, whether
the
damages awarded by the trial court were just and reasonable?
On March 15,
1988, the Court of Appeals rendered
a decision affirming the trial court's judgment modified only with
respect
to the award of damages which was reduced to P2 million representing
P1.5
million, P300,000.00, and P200,000.00 in moral exemplary and actual
damages,
respectively. Both parties elevated said decision to this Court for
review
In their petition
[G. R. No. 82562], the heirs
once again raise the very same issues brought before the Court of
Appeals,
albeit reworded. On the other hand, petitioner Requiza [G. R. No.
82592]
questions the extensions of time to file appellant's brief granted by
the
appellate court to the heirs, as well as the drastic reduction in the
award
of damages.cralaw:red
It is immediately
apparent that the focal issue
in these petitions is the effect of the death of Villegas before the
case
was decided by the trial court. Stated otherwise, did the death of the
accused before final judgment extinguish his civil liability?
Fortunately, this
Court has already settled this
issue with the promulgation of the case of People v. Bayotas (G. R. No.
102007) on September 2, 1994,[4]
viz.:
It is, thus, evident that as
jurisprudence
evolved
from Castillo[5]
to Torrijos[6]
the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability
depends
on whether the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other
than
delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also
extinguished
together with the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e.,
civil liability ex delicto.
xxx xxx xxx
[I]n recovering damages for injury to
persons
thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code,
the same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the
estate
of deceased accused [under Sec. 1, Rule 87, infra] and not
against
the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits
the
claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of
the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract,
express
or implied.[7]
xxx xxx xxx
From this lengthy dlsquisition, We
summarize
our
ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal
of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability
based solely thereon As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard,
"the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability
and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on
the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in
senso
strictiore."
2. Corollarily the claim for civil
liability survives
notwithstanding the death of [the] accused, if the same may also be
predicated
on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil
Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
(a) Law
(b) Contracts
(c) Quasi-contracts
(d) x x x
(e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives,
as
explained
in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but
only
by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule
111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.[8]
This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator
of the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon
which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended
party
need not
fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription,
in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior
to its extinction, the private offended party instituted together
therewith
the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case,
conformably with [the] provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code,
that
should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right
by prescription. [Emphasis supplied].
The source of
Villegas' civil liability in the present
case is the felonious act of libel he allegedly committed. Yet, this
act
could also be deemed a quasi-delict within the purview of Article 33[9]
in relation to Article 1157 of the Civil Code. If the Court ruled in
Bayotas
that the death of an accused during the pendency of his appeal
extinguishes
not only his criminal but also his civil liability unless the latter
can
be predicated on a source of obligation other than the act or omission
complained of, with more reason should it apply to the case at bar
where
the accused died shortly after the prosecution had rested its case and
before he was able to submit his memorandum and all this before any
decision
could even be reached by the trial court.
The Bayotas
ruling, however, makes the enforcement
of a deceased accused's civil liability dependent on two factors,
namely:
that it be pursued by filing a separate civil action and that it be
made
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
as amended. Obviously, in the case at bar, the civil action was deemed
instituted with the criminal. There was no waiver of the civil action
and
no reservation of the right to institute the same, nor was it
instituted
prior to the criminal action. What then is the recourse of the private
offended party in a criminal case such as this which must be dismissed
in accordance with the Bayotas doctrine, where the civil action was
impliedly
instituted with it?
The answer is
likewise provided in Bayotas, thus:
Assuming that for lack of express
reservation,
Belamala's civil civil for damages was to be considered instituted
together
with the criminal action still, since both proceedings were terminated
without finals adjudication the civil action of the offended party
under
Article 33 may yet be enforced separately.[10]
[Emphasis supplied].
Hence,
logically, the court a quo should have
dismissed both actions against Villegas which dismissal will not,
however,
bar Raquiza as the private offended party, from pursuing his claim for
damages against the executor or administrator of the former's estate,
notwithstanding
the fact that he did not reserve the right to institute a civil
separate
civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code.
It cannot be argued either that to follow Bayotas
would result in further delay in this protracted litigation. This is
because
the resolution of the civil aspect of the case after the dismissal of
the
main criminal action by the trial court was technically defective There
was no proper substitution of parties, as correctly pointed out by the
heirs and repeatedly put in issue by Atty. Quisumbing. What should have
been followed by the court a quo was the procedure laid down
in
the Rules of Court, specifically, Section 17, Rule 3, in connection
with
Section 1, Rule 87. The pertinent provisions state as follows:
Rule 3
Sec. 17. Death of party. -
After
a party dies and the claim is not there extinguished, the court shall
order
upon proper notice the legal representative of the deceased to appear
and
to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30)
days,
or within such time as may be granted. The heirs of the deceased
may be allowed to be for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment
of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad
litem
for the minor heirs.
Rule 87
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which
may
not
be brought against or executor or administrator.- No action
upon
a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be
commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover
real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or
to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury
to person or property, real or personal may be commenced against him.
Accordingly,
the Court sees no more necessity in
resolving the other issues used by both parties in these petitions.
WHEREFORE, the
petition in G. R. No. 82562 is
granted and the petition in G. R. No. 82592 is denied. The decisions of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CR No. 82186 dated March 15, 1988 and
of the Manila Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, dated March 7, 1985, as
amended, are hereby reversed and set aside, without prejudice to the
right
of the private offended party, Antonio V. Raquiza, to file the
appropriate
civil action for damages against the executor or administrator of the
estate
or the heirs of the late Antonio J. Villegas in accordance with the
foregoing
procedure.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Regalado, Puno,
Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.cralaw:red
______________________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Exhibit "WW" pp. 255-279 of original exhibits.
[2]
Presiding Judge, Manila Regional Trial Court, Branch 44.
[3]
Records. p. 621.
[4]
236 SCRA 239 [1994].
[5]
People v. Castillo and Ocfemia, 81 SCRA 120 [1978].
[6]
Torrijos v. Court of Appeals, 67 SCRA 394 [1975].
[7]
Citing Belamala v. Polinar, 21 SCRA 970 [1967].
[8]
It states inter alia
"Rule III.
Prosecution
of Civil Action.-
"Sec. 1 Institution of
criminal
and civil actions When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves his right to institute it the civil action prior to the
criminal
action.
xxx
xxx
xxx
"The reservation of the right
to institute the separate civil action shall be made before the
prosecution
starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
"xxx
xxx
xxx "
[9]
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil
action
for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,
may
be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently
of the criminal prosecution and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
[10]
Belamala, supra. |