THIRD
DIVISION
PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G. R. No. 109578
August 27, 1997
-versus-
RONALDO
FABRO y SERVAÑES,
JOVEL CASTRO y EUGENIO
alias
"JOEL CASTRO" and HERNANDOMORALES y DE CASTRO,
Accused-Appellants.
D
E C I S I O N
FRANCISCO, J.:
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In the
afternoon of September 22, 1991, a stabbing
incident took place in Galas Market, Quezon City. The victim was Victor
Ramirez y Olegenio, a vendor, who sustained twenty eight [28]
wounds,
"fourteen [14] of which are stab wounds while the rest are either
hacked
wounds, incised wounds, abrasions and contusions."[1]
He died instantenously of "cardio respiratory arrest due to shock and
hemorrhage
secondary to multiple stab wounds in the body."[2]
Tagged as responsible for this gruesome crime are Hernando Morales
[appellant
herein], Ronaldo Fabro, Jovel Castro and another unidentified accused,
all of whom were thereafter charged with murder under the following
accusatory
allegations:
That on or about the 22nd day of
September,
1991,
in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, with intent to
kill,
with abuse of superior strength and with evident premeditation and
treachery,
conspiring together, confederating with other persons and mutually
helping
with (sic) one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously
attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one
VICTOR
RAMIREZ Y OLEGENIO, by then and there stabbing him on the different
parts
of his body with bolos [bladed weapons], thereby inflicting upon him
serious
and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his
untimely
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
After being
arrested, they were arraigned[4]
and separately pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Ronaldo Fabro
and
Jovel Castro, however, had a change of heart during the ensuing trial
and
admitted their actual participation in the commission of the crime.[5]
Nonetheless, they asserted in their testimony that appellant was not
"involved"
in the incident, claiming that he was merely included in the indictment
by Victor's heirs because they had a grudge against him. Appellant,
according
to them, previously caused the arrest of Victor allegedly for selling
shabu.[6]
Believing the
prosecution's version that appellant
was among Victor's assailants, the trial court rendered a
judgment
of conviction sentencing him and his co-accused to suffer reclusion
perpetua
and to jointly and severally pay the heirs of Victor P50,000.00, as
death
indemnity, and P30,000.00, as moral damages.[7]
They were likewise ordered by the trial court to pay the costs of suit.[8]
They all filed their Notices of Appeal but Ronaldo Fabro and Jovel
Castro
subsequently moved to withdraw their appeal which we accordingly granted[9]
following the Public Attorney's Office's[10]
confirmation that such withdrawal was knowingly and voluntarily made.cralaw:red
This appeal,
therefore, concerns only appellant
Hernando Morales who maintains that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF MURDER DESPITE INSUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE
BY THE PROSECUTION.[11]
It is
appellant's principal contention that the prosecution
witnesses' testimony, on which the trial court anchored its verdict of
conviction, are "riddled with legal inconsistencies, incongruities and
incredulities.[12]
In support thereof, appellant points out that: [1] Remigio Nitura
testified
seeing Victor talking to his step-father Rosendo Pusilero seconds
before the incident, but Angelina Olegenio and Rosendo Pusilero did not
mention of such fact; and [2] Rosendo testified that appellant
approached
Victor from behind and stabbed the latter at his chest, while Remigio
Nitura
claimed that appellant called Victor and when the latter turned,
appellant
stabbed Victor.[13]
To our mind, the
alluded inconsistencies are inconsequential
for they do not affect the substance of the prosecution witnesses'
testimony
with respect to appellant's participation in the commission of the
crime.
If at all, these alleged inconsistencies refer only to collateral
matters
which are neither substantial nor of such nature as to cast serious
doubt
on the credibility of witnesses.[14]
And far from detracting from their credibility, these inconsistencies,
in fact, suggest that the assailed testimonies were unrehearsed.[15]
We certainly do not expect the testimony of witnesses to the crime to
be
consistent all throughout because different persons may have different
impressions and recollections of the same incident.[16]
We must stress
that appellant has been positively
identified by at least three [3] prosecution eyewitness, namely: [1]
Rosendo
Pusilero; [2] Angelina Olegenio; and [3] Remigio Nitura, as the first
assailant
to approach and stab Victor on his chest.[17]
They are also one in declaring that after his initial stabbing,
appellant
even lifted Victor's polo shirt from behind and used the same to cover
his [Victor's] face and thereafter stabbed him again. It was at this
juncture
that the other assailants arrived and successively stabbed and/or
hacked
Victor while Angelina was pleading for their mercy. The trial court,
which
has observed their demeanor while on the witness stand, finds no cogent
reason to doubt their credibility. We respect and uphold the same
considering
that the matter of assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is a
function best performed by the trial judge[18]
whose findings thereon are entitled to the hingest degree of respect on
appeal.[19]
Appellant's
defense of alibi that he was
in Lagro Subdivision, Quezon City at the time of the incident where he
was allegedly employed as construction worker[20]
albeit being corroborated by Rolando Villaflor,[21]
must fail. As against the testimony of the prosecution witnesses amply
demonstrating appellant's participation in the commission of the crime,
his alibi cannot prevail.[22]
Furthermore, proof that appellant was somewhere else when the crime was
committed is not enough. Appellant must likewise demonstrate that he
could
not have been present at the crime scene, or in its vicinity, at the
time
of its commission.[23]
In this case, as the trial court correctly noted,[24]
Lagro Subdivision and Galas Market are both situated in Quezon City and
that these two places are accessible to each other by any mode of
public
transportation. Indeed, considering the proximity of these two places
with
each other, it was not impossible for appellant to have easily gone to
Galas Market at about the time of the commission of the crime and to
have
returned to Lagro Subdivision immediately thereafter.cralaw:red
With respect to
the existence of treachery, We
fully subscribe to the findings of the trial court that this qualifying
circumstance was truly present in this case. Angelina narrates how her
son Victor met his untimely and bloody death in the hands of the
appellant
and his cohorts:
Q. On September 22, 1991 at about 12
o'clock
noontime, where were you?
A. I was in my store.
Q. Why were you there at your place of
business
or store at Galas Market Quezon City, (sic) was there any
unusual
incident happened?
A. Yes ma'am.
Q. And what was that incident?
A. That person [referring to
appellant] I
heard
him call my son Victor, and then when my son face (sic) towards
that person he stabbed my son in his chest and he also removed the
polo-shirt
of my son and he stabbed him again.
Q. What happened Mrs. witness, after
your
son
was stabbed twice by that person?
A. Ronaldo Fabro arrived and the other
persons
arrived and each took turned (sic) stabbing my son.[25]
[Emphasis ours].
It can be
gleaned from the foregoing testimony that
Victor was not in a position to defend himself when appellant made the
initial assault. Neither was he sufficiently forewarned of the same
considering
the suddenness of the attack. What was clear was that appellant
suddenly
emerged from somewhere and lunged at the unsuspecting Victor. That
appellant
purposely adopted this mode of attack to consummate the crime without
any
risk to himself is beyond doubt, as in fact, he even waited for what
could
be a perfect opportunity for commencing the assault.[26]
This, unmistakably, was treachery.[27]
WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing, the assailed
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92,
convicting
appellant HERNANDO MORALES Y DE CASTRO of the crime of Murder is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto. It is so ordered.cralaw:red
Narvasa, C.J.,
Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban,
JJ., concur.cralaw:red
_______________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 92; Decision dated February
9,
1993, Rollo, p. 16; See Exhibit "B", Record, p. 58.
[2]
Exhibit "A-1," Record, p. 57.
[3]
Amended Information dated May 26, 1992; Record, p. 28.
[4]
Ronaldo Fabro and Jovel Castro were arraigned on February 10, 1992
[Record,
p. 21], while appellant Hernando Morales was arraigned on June 22, 1992
[Record, p. 39].
[5]
TSN, Ronald Fabro, August 24, 1992, p. 4; TSN, Jovel Castro, August 24,
1992, p. 12.
[6]
TSN, Ronald Fabro, August 24, 1992, p. 5; TSN, Jovel Castro, August 24,
1992, p. 13.
[7]
RTC Decision, supra at p. 23.
[8]
Id.
[9]
Resolution Dated November 22, 1993; Rollo, p. 68.
[10]
Now Public Defender's Office.
[11]
Brief for the Appellant, dated November 3, 1993; Rollo, p. 44.
[12]
Id. p. 50.
[13]
Id. pp. 50-51.
[14]
People v. Porras, 255 SCRA 514 [1996] citing People v. Irenea, 164 SCRA
121 [1988] and People v. Cariño, 165 SCRA 664 [1988].
[15]
People v. Acob, 246 SCRA 715 [1995]; People v. Cajambab, 240 SCRA 643
[1995].
[16]
See People v. Gazmen, 247 SCRA 414 [1995].
[17]
TSN, Rosendo Pusilero, July 23, 1992, p. 3; TSN, Angelina Olegenio,
August
6, 1992, p. 2; TSN, Remigio Nitura, October 22, 1992, p. 6.
[18]
People v. Bondoc, 232 SCRA 478 [1994]; People v. Nimo, 227 SCRA 69
[1993].
[19]
People v. de la Cruz, 217 SCRA 283 [1993]; People v. Dominguez, 217
SCRA
170 [1993]; People v. Caraig, 202 SCRA 357 [1991]; People v. Sarol, 139
SCRA 125 [1985]. This rule of course admits of certain exceptions,
which
we find absent herein, namely: (1) when patent inconsistencies in the
statements
of witnesses are ignored by the trial court, or (2) when the
conclusions
arrived at are clearly unsupported by the evidence. See People v.
Gumahin,
21 SCRA 729 [1967]; People v. Secapuri, et. al., 16 SCRA 199 [1966].
[20]
TSN, Hernando Morales, September 10, 1992, pp. 5-7.
[21]
TSN, Rolando Villaflor, October 1, 1992, pp. 4-6.
[22]
People v. Porras, 255 SCRA 514, 525 [1996] citing People v. Miranday,
242
SCRA 620 [1995]; See People v. Claudio, 216 SCRA 647 [1992]; People v.
Yadao, 216 SCRA 1 [1992]; People v. Cabuang, 217 SCRA 675 [1993].
[23]
People v. Manero, Jr., 218 SCRA 85 [1993], citing People v. Pugal, 215
SCRA 247 [1992].
[24]
RTC Decision, supra at p. 22.
[25]
TSN, Angelina Oligeno, July 23, 1992, p. 13.
[26]
TSN, Remigio Nitura, October 22, 1992, p. 5.
[27]
Serrano v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 203 [1995]; People v. Torres, 247
SCRA 212 [1995]; People v. Adonis, 240 SCRA 773 [1995]. |