SECOND
DIVISION
S/G
FRANCISCO G. LUNA, ORBITO MACATIAG,
JENNELTHO
LANOJAN, DOMINGO PEREZ,
RAYMUNDO ROMANO, LAMBERTO MONDEJAR,
JUANITO DEL AMEN, DENNIS MARIANO, ARIEL
SARGENTO and WENIFREDO LAGBO,
Petitioners,
G. R. No. 116404
March 20, 1997
-versus-
NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
LIONS SECURITY & SERVICES CORPORATION
and GRANDEUR SECURITY AGENCY,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a Petition for
Certiorari to annul the
order dated May 3, 1994 of the NLRC, dismissing petitioners' appeal for
having been filed beyond the reglementary period.
Petitioners were
security guards of private respondents
Lion's Security and Services Corporation and its successor, Grandeur
Security
Services Corporation. They filed a complaint for illegal dismissal,
underpayment
of wages and non-payment of labor standards benefits, before the
regional
arbitration branch of the NLRC. Judgment was rendered on March 18, 1993
against private respondents, holding them liable to pay petitioners
wage
differentials corresponding to the period of services rendered. But the
Labor Arbiter found petitioners' dismissal proper and their other
claims
to be without merit.cralaw:red
Petitioners
appealed to the NLRC. However, the
NLRC dismissed their appeal on March 3, 1994, on the basis of its
finding
that petitioners' counsel had been furnished a copy of the Labor
Arbiter's
decision on April 12, 1993 but their appeal was filed only on May 5,
1993.
The NLRC found that petitioners' counsel received a copy of the
decision
on April 12, 1993 based on the Notice of Judgment/Decision attached to
the record of the case, which bore the notation "4-12-93 rm" above the
typewritten name of petitioners' counsel, Atty. Ernesto R. Javalera. On
the other hand, the NLRC based its statement that petitioners filed
their
appeal only on May 5, 1993 on the stamp "Received" of the NLRC Docket
Section
showing payment of the appeal fee and research fee. Consequently, the
NLRC
held that the appeal was filed out of time.cralaw:red
Petitioners
brought this special civil action
for certiorari assailing the NLRC's order. They claim that their
counsel
received the decision of the Labor Arbiter on April 16, 1993 and filed
their appeal on April 26, 1993, the last day of the 10-day reglementary
period. As proof thereof, petitioners presented the registry return
card
addressed to the NLRC, which shows that the registered mail containing
the decision was received by their counsel on April 16, 1993 and the
envelope
addressed to the NLRC, which they claimed contained their appeal
memorandum
which was stamped April 26, 1993.cralaw:red
The Solicitor
General, in his Manifestation and
Motion in Lieu of Comment, agreed with petitioners, noting that the
NLRC
must have mistaken the date "4-12-93" appearing above the name of Atty.
Ernesto R. Javalera in the Notice of Judgment/Decision for the date of
receipt and the letters "rm" to be the "initials" of their counsel. But
this could just have been the date a copy of the Labor Arbiter's
decision
was sent and the letters "rm" meant that the decision was sent to
petitioners'
counsel by registered mail.cralaw:red
The NLRC, on the
other hand, argues that even
conceding that petitioners' counsel received the appealed decision on
April
16, 1993, the appeal of petitioners must nevertheless be considered as
having been filed out of time because it was personally filed on May 5,
1993, based on the fact that the official receipt shows that the appeal
and research fees were paid in cash on May 5, 1993 and that the appeal
was stamped received by the Docket Section on that day. The NLRC avers
that the envelope alone does not indicate that it contained
petitioners'
memorandum on appeal and their appeal fees, hence, it does not prove
petitioners'
allegation. The NLRC furthermore contends that this petition must be
dismissed
because petitioners did not file a motion for the reconsideration of
the
NLRC order before bringing this action.cralaw:red
Private
respondent Grandeur Security Services
Corporation also defends the order of the NLRC and contends that
petitioners'
appeal was not perfected because the required appeal fees were paid
beyond
the reglementary period.[1]
The issue in this
case is whether the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in
dismissing the petitioners' appeal. We hold that it did not. Under the
rules of the NLRC, an appeal from the Labor Arbiter's decision to the
NLRC
may be taken [1] by filing a verified memorandum of appeal; and [2] by
paying the appeal fees filed within ten [10] calendar days from receipt
of a decision, award or order of the Labor Arbiter.[2]
Both requisites must be satisfied, otherwise the running of the
prescriptive
period for perfecting an appeal will not be tolled.cralaw:red
To be sure, as
petitioners say, the date "4-12-93"
written by hand on the Notice of Judgment/Decision, appears to be the
date
the Labor Arbiter's decision was sent to petitioners' counsel and the
letters
"rm" written above the typewritten name of Atty. Ernesto R. Javalera
are
not the initials of any person but are the abbreviations for
"registered
mail." Unlike other parties whose representatives signed the Notice of
Judgment/Decision and wrote the date of personal service on them of a
copy
of the decision, the proof of service on Atty. Javalera appears to have
been made by registered mail. This is evident upon an examination of
the
Notice of Judgment/Decision, a xerox copy of which is attached as Annex
1 of the Solicitor General's Manifestation in lieu of Comment. With
respect
to the date of filing of petitioners' memorandum, we are likewise
inclined
to sustain petitioners' claim that this was on April 26, 1993, the date
stamped on the envelope which, petitioners allege, contained the appeal
memorandum they sent to the NLRC. This is clear from the xerox copy of
the envelope which is stamped "REGISTERED.APR 26, 1993." This
envelope
is addressed to:
Hon. EDUARDO J. CARPIO
EXECUTIVE LABOR ARBITER
ARBITRATION BRANCH
Manila
National Capital Region
NLRC Associated Bank Bldg.,
T.M. KALAW St., Ermita, Manila
with indication
of the name of the sender:
Atty. E.R. Javalera
704 Del Monte Ave., QC
As no other
mail appears to have been sent by counsel
to the addressee on that day, it is probable that this envelope
contained
the appeal memorandum of petitioners. Consequently, We think the appeal
of petitioners to the NLRC was filed on time.
However, the
records do not support their claim
that they also paid the appeal fees on April 26, 1993, together with
the
filing of their appeal memorandum. What appears instead is that they
paid
the fees only on May 5, 1993, nine days after the expiration date of
the
reglementary period, as shown in the receipt given to petitioners. As
the
NLRC stated in its comment, the official receipt shows that the appeal
fees were paid in cash only on May 5, 1993:
May it be noted
on the Official Receipt of payment
[p. 370 records] on the left lower portion stating "received." The box
space for cash payment bears a check mark. This means to say that
payment
was made in cash and therefore goes to show that payment was made
personally
on May 5, 1993.[3]
This finding was
not refuted by petitioners in
their petition and reply. In the absence of clear and convincing
evidence,
this finding is entitled to great respect.[4]
As payment of the
requisite appeal fees is an
indispensable and jurisdictional requisite and not a mere technicality
of law or procedure, and as the failure to comply with this requirement
renders the decision of the court final, We hold that the NLRC
correctly
dismissed petitioners' appeal. Indeed, appeal is only a statutory
privilege
and, therefore, it may only be exercised in the manner provided by law.[5]
In addition, the
dismissal of this petition is
in order because petitioners failed to file a motion for a
reconsideration
of the NLRC's order before it was filed in this Court. The filing of a
motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the
filing
of a petition for certiorari.[6]
The plain and adequate remedy referred to in Rule 65, Section 1 is a
motion
for reconsideration of the assailed decision. The purpose for this
requirement
is to enable the court or agency to pass upon and rectify its mistakes
without the intervention of a higher court.[7]
While the liberal
construction of this requirement
is in keeping with the constitutional mandate of protecting labor,
nonetheless,
there must be concrete, cogent, and valid reason for a party's failure
to comply with this requirement.[8]
Here, petitioners' contention is that a motion for reconsideration is
not
necessary because what is involved is purely a legal issue. This claim
is untenable. A question of law is involved "when the doubt or
difference
arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts," whereas
"there
is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the
truth
or the falsehood of alleged facts."[9]
The questions when the order was received by petitioners, when the
appeal
was filed and when the appeal fees were paid are factual, not legal
questions.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DISMISSED.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Regalado, Romero,
Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.cralaw:red
_______________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Rollo, p. 38.
[2]
Rule VI, Section 3[a](2). See Star Angel Handicraft v. National Labor
Relations
Commission, 236 SCRA 580, 584 [1994].
[3]
Rollo, p. 84.
[4]
See Capulong v. Court of Appeals, 185 SCRA 215 [1990]; People v. De
Guzman,
229 SCRA 795 [1994].
[5]
Rodillas v. COMELEC, 245 SCRA 702 [1995].
[6]
PNCC v. NLRC, 245 SCRA 668 (1995); Labudahon v. NLRC, 251 SCRA 129,
[1995].
[7]
Villarama v. NLRC, 236 SCRA 280 [1994].
[8]
E.g., Philamlife Ins. Co. v. Bonto-Perez, 170 SCRA 508 [1989].
[9]
Cheesman v. IAC, 193 SCRA 93, 100-101 [1991] (per Narvasa, J.). |