SECOND
DIVISION
SAMAR
II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE
INCORPORATED,
represented by PONCIANO R. ROSALES,
General
Manager,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 116692
March 21, 1997
-versus-
NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
and FROILAN RAQUIZA,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
ROMERO, J.:
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This Petition
for
Certiorariwith prayer
for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining
order seeks the annulment of the March 10, 1994, decision of the
National
Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case No. V-0307-92, as well as its
order
dated April 28, 1994, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration
for
lack of merit. The antecedent facts follow:
Private
respondent Froilan V. Raquiza was employed
by petitioner Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. [SAMELCO II] as
probationary
power plant operator on January 1, 1976, and became a regular employee
on July 1, 1976. On February 9, 1980, he was appointed as switchboard
operator
and sometimes alternated as acting plant superintendent.cralaw:red
Raquiza's
problems began when a major breakdown
of the pielstick engine causing electric failure to the whole franchise
area for a period of four months occurred during his shift on January
21,
1988. On January 22, 1988, he was immediately asked to explain the
incident,
which he did the following day. After investigation, however, SAMELCO
II
General Manager Ponciano Rosales found Raquiza and his two companions
in
the shift, Manuel Balasbas and Pascual Martinez, guilty of gross
negligence
in the performance of their duty. The three were placed under
preventive
suspension from January 27, 1988, until their termination on February
29,
1988. Nine months later, or on December 5, 1988, Raquiza filed a
complaint
against petitioner for illegal dismissal, praying for reinstatement and
payment of unpaid wages, unpaid overtime pay, attorney's fees, moral
and
exemplary damages, and the cost of suit.cralaw:red
Labor Arbiter
Gabino A. Velasquez, Jr. rendered
a decision on September 25, 1992, finding Raquiza's dismissal to be
based
on a just cause. On appeal, however, the NLRC reversed and set aside
his
ruling, and ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing,
the
decision appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside, and a new one
entered to wit:
(1) declaring the dismissal of the
complainant-appellant
(Raquiza) due to gross negligence as illegal;
(2) ordering respondents (herein
petitioners)
to reinstate the complainant-appellant to his former position with full
backwages not exceeding three (3) years, without loss of seniority
rights
and other privileges, or in the event reinstatement is no longer
feasible
due to the realities of the situation, to pay him his separation pay
equivalent
to one (1) month for every year of service from January 1, 1976 up to
and
including the three (3) years imputed service for which backwages was
awarded;
(3) ordering respondents further to
pay
attorney's
fees of 10% of the total monetary award.
All other claims are hereby dismissed
for
lack
of sufficient basis.
SO ORDERED.
Its motion for
reconsideration having likewise failed,
petitioner filed the instant petition.
Petitioner's
present action is premised solely
on the grave abuse of discretion allegedly exercised by the NLRC in
reversing
the labor arbiter's decision. Its arguments, however, fail to persuade
this Court, and a closer examination of the questioned judgment would
reveal
that the NLRC disposed of the case judiciously. Labor Arbiter
Velasquez
opined that since Raquiza was not able to specifically deny the charges
against him, he should be deemed to have admitted them. Technical rules
of evidence are not, however, strictly followed in labor cases. The
Labor
Code itself affirms this liberality, viz.:
Art. 221. Technical Rules not binding
and
prior resort to amicable settlement. - In any proceeding before the
Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence
prevailing
in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the
spirit
and intention of this Code that the Commission and its members and the
Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain
the
facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to
technicalities
of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.[1]
This rule is
reiterated in the Rules of Procedure
of the NLRC, to wit: Rule V.
Sec. 7. Nature of Proceedings. -
The
proceedings
before a Labor Arbiter shall be non-litigious in nature. Subject to the
requirements of due process, the technicalities of law and procedure
and
the rules obtaining in the courts of law shall not strictly apply
thereto.
The Labor Arbiter may avail himself of all reasonable means to
ascertain
the facts of the controversy speedily, including ocular inspection and
examination of well-informed persons.
Rule VII.
Sec. 10. Technical rules not binding.-
The rules of procedure and evidence prevailing in courts of law and
equity
shall not be controlling and the Commission shall use every and all
reasonable
means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively,
without
regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of
due
process.
Raquiza's
failure to specifically deny or explain
the charges against him should not, therefore, be deemed fatal to his
claim.
Our laws as well
as this Court have consistently
recognized and respected an employer's right to terminate the services
of an employee for just or authorized causes. This prerogative,
however,
must be exercised in good faith. As we held in Mercury Drug Corp. v.
NLRC,
et al.:[2]
Management also
has its own rights, which, as
such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple
fair play. Out of its concern for those with less privileges in life,
the
Supreme Court has inclined more often than not toward the worker and
upheld
his cause in his conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism, however,
has not blinded the Court to rule that justice is in every case for the
deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and
applicable
law and doctrine.[3]
Petitioner as employer is duty-bound to
establish
the existence of a clear, valid and just ground for dismissing Raquiza.
It cannot merely allege that its employee was grossly negligent in the
performance of his duty thereby causing great damage to its property
and
resulting in great pecuniary loss.
Raquiza's dismissal was based on three factors,
namely, (a) leaving his work assignment while on duty; (b) not properly
checking the engine before starting it; and (c) authorizing the
continued
running of pielstick [engine] No. 2 in spite of the discovery that
there
was an oil leakage.cralaw:red
In the case of
Citibank, N.A. v. Gatchalian,[4]
we ruled that "(g)ross negligence implies a want or absence of or
failure
to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It
evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting
any effort to avoid them.cralaw:red
While it is true
that Raquiza left his place of
work to go to the administration building to get the proceeds of his
loan
during the testing period of the engine, such act cannot be perceived
to
be so serious as would amount to gross negligence. As to the claim that
he did not check the engine, the NLRC found that he actually made
several
inspections of the engine before actually starting it. We find no
reason
to disturb this finding in view of the respect and finality which this
Court has constantly accorded to factual findings of quasi-judicial
agencies
such as the NLRC.[5]
Finally, the fact that Raquiza failed to prevent the occurrence of the
incident does not sufficiently show nor can it be inferred that he was
grossly negligent. At most, it can be considered an error of judgment
on
his part when he continued to operate the engine. It must be remembered
that the purpose of the operation of said engine was to synchronize it
with the National Power Corporation's Geothermal Plant in Tangonan,
Leyte
to augment power during the peak hours in the early evenings.[6]
Stoppage of the operation would have defeated such purpose and violated
the very franchise of petitioner.cralaw:red
The investigation
conducted by petitioner revealed
that "the breakdown was due to the serious error committed by Froilan
V.
Raquiza, Manuel Balasbas, and Pascual Martinez, although complainant's
command responsibility, liability and negligence, was most serious and
the gravest."[7]
Yet, despite this collective error, only Raquiza was dismissed; the
other
two were merely suspended. Such discrimination cannot be sanctioned by
this Court.cralaw:red
Furthermore, the
NLRC correctly pointed out from
the evidence that there was no clarity or confirmation as to the cause
of the pielstick engine breakdown. Thus, it stated:
More significantly, the findings of the
consultant
who inspected pielstick Engine No. 2 at the instance of the respondents
cost (sic) a serious doubt on the alleged negligence of the
complainant-appellant
as the proximate cause for the damage of the said engine. It appears
from
the said inspection result that the said unit bogged down in September
1986, and in that incident all con/rod bearings were replaced with old
sets taken from Dorelco Units. The same con/rod bearings were likewise
noted to be due for replacement in (sic) December 17, 1987. Lastly, the
said engine unit at the time it broke down had a total running hours
[of]
21,332.1 far exceeding the tolerable maximum requirement of 18,000 hrs.
The above attendant circumstances shows (sic) that Pielstick
Engine
No. 2 broke down last January 21, 1988 not due to the negligence of the
complainant but due to worn out spare parts and its continued operation
beyond the schedule of replacement of con/rod bearing on December 17,
1987.[8]
Petitioner
claimed below that Raquiza's dismissal
was not solely attributable to the January 21, 1988, incident but was,
in fact, a result of a "long string of neglect and violations of
company
R & R [rules and regulations]." But this is beside the point. What
is significant is that the employer bears the burden of proving that
the
dismissal of an employee is for a just cause, failing which the
dismissal
cannot be deemed justified thus entitling the latter to reinstatement.[9]
The decision to dismiss must be in accord with the law and the evidence
and not merely the whim or caprice of the employer.[10]
IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED
for failing to show that respondent National Labor Relations Commission
committed grave abuse of discretion in arriving at its assailed
Decision
dated March 10, 1994, and Order dated April 28, 1994.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Regalado, Puno,
Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.cralaw:red
_________________________________
Endnotes
[1]
As amended by Sec 11, R. A. 6715.
[2]
177 SCRA 580 [1989].
[3]
Citing Sosito v. Aguinaldo Development Corp., 156 SCRA 392 [1987].
[4]
240 SCRA 212 [1994].
[5]
233 SCRA 439 [1994].
[6]
Rollo, p. 23.
[7]
Ibid., p. 24
[8]
Id., pp. 43-44.
[9]
Molave Tours Corporation vs NLRC, 250 SCRA 325 [1995].
[10]
Pampanga II Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs NLRC, 250 SCRA 31 [1995]. |