EN
BANC
ATTY.
ROMULO B.
MACALINTAL,
Complainant,
A.
M.
No. RTJ-97-1375
October
16, 1997
-versus-
JUDGE
ANGELITO C.
TEH, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 87, Rosario,
Batangas,
Respondent.
D
E C I S I
O N
PER
CURIAM:
In a letter, dated
01 April 1996, Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal related to the Court the
actuations
of Judge Angelito C. Teh, Executive Judge and the Presiding Judge of
the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 87, Rosario, Batangas, relative to
Election
Case No. R-95-001.
It would appear that
Judge Teh issued a resolution adverse to the client of Atty. Macalintal
in the aforenumbered election case. Atty. Macalintal questioned the
resolution,
via a petition for certiorari, before the Commission on Elections
["COMELEC"].
While the case was pending at the COMELEC, Judge Teh actively
participated
in the proceedings by filing his comment on the petition and, still
later,
an urgent manifestation. Complainant lawyer forthwith filed a motion to
prevent respondent Judge from further acting on Election Case No.
R-95-001.
Instead of acting on the motion for inhibition, Judge Teh hired his own
lawyer and filed his answer before his own court, with the prayer:
1. That Judgment be
rendered dismissing the Motion for Inhibition for lack of sufficient
factual
and legal basis;
2. Ordering the
movant
to pay the undersigned respondent in the amount of P100,000.00 as
attorney's
fees and expenses for litigation;
3. Cost of this
suit.
Respondent
respectfully
prays for such other reliefs and remedies as may be deemed just and
equitable
in the premises.[1]
In its resolution of 19
August 1996, the Court required respondent to comment on the
letter-complaint.
In his comment, dated
20 September 1996, respondent Judge admitted that he had filed his own
pleadings with the COMELEC out of respect and in deference to the order
of 16 November 1995 of the COMELEC En Banc requiring respondents to
comment
on the petition. The urgent manifestation he filed was meant to rectify
the assertion of complainant that he had erroneously cited Section 8,
Rule
35, of the Omnibus Election Code. Attached to his comment before this
Court
was his resolution, dated 31 July 1996, where respondent Judge, ruling
on the motion for inhibition, held:
WHEREFORE, in view
of all the foregoing considerations, this Court hereby rendered this
resolution
on the pending incidents to wit:
1. The protestee's
unverified
Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike Out Opposition are hereby DENIED
for lack of sufficient legal and factual basis;
2. The Motion for
Inhibition
is likewise DENIED for lack of sufficient legal and factual basis;
3. And for
compelling
the respondent Judge to engage the services of counsel who prepared the
Answer to the Motion for Inhibition, the Protestee's counsel, Atty.
Romulo
B. Macalintal is hereby ordered to pay P100,000.00 as Attorney's Fees
and
litigation expenses incident to his Motion for Inhibition.
SO ORDERED.[2]
In its resolution, dated
12 March 1997, the Court resolved to:
(a) DIRECT Judge
Angelito
Teh to ACT on the motion for inhibition in accordance with the
procedure
prescribed in Section 2, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court;
(b) TREAT the
letter
dated April 1, 1996 of complainant as an administrative complaint
against
Judge Angelito Teh and docket accordingly;
(c) CONSIDER the
comment
dated September 20, 1996 of Judge Teh filed in compliance with the
resolution
of August 19, 1996 as comment on the complaint; and
(d) require the
parties
to MANIFEST within fifteen (15) days from notice hereof whether they
are
willing to submit this case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings
already filed herein.[3]
In his manifestation, dated
29 April 1997, respondent Judge expressed his willingness to submit the
case for resolution on the basis of his comment which he repleaded and
reproduced. He also made his observation that the complaint of Atty.
Macalintal
had not been under oath.
In his compliance, dated
24 April 1997, complainant informed the Court that his letter of 01
April
1996 was not intended as an administrative complaint but that he was
leaving
the matter of treating it as such to the discretion of this Court in
the
exercise of its administrative control and supervision over the members
of the judiciary. He likewise manifested his willingness to submit the
case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings already filed. He, in
passing, informed the Court that the resolution of 31 July 1996 issued
by respondent judge was found by the COMELEC to be "irrational."
While Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court requires that complaints against Judges should be sworn
to, the Court deems it proper to dispense with the requirement since
the
letter of Atty. Macalintal, upon the recommendation of the Office of
the
Court Administrator, has heretofore been treated as an administrative
complaint
and considering, further, that respondent Judge, in his comment,
practically
admitted all pertinent allegations of complainant. Under the doctrine
of
res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its authority upon erring
judges
whose actuations, on their face, would show gross incompetence,
ignorance
of the law or misconduct.[4]
Section 5, Rule 65,
of the Rules of Court[5]
provides:
Sec. 5. Defendants
and costs in certain cases.- When the petition filed related
to the acts or omissions of a court or judge, the petitioner shall
join,
as parties defendant with such court or judge, the person or persons
interested
in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty of
such person or persons to appear and defend, both in his or their own
behalf
and in behalf of the court or judge affected by the proceedings, and
costs
awarded in such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against
the person or persons in interest only, and not against the court or
judge.
Evidently, the active participation
of respondent judge, being merely a nominal or formal party[6]
in the certiorari proceedings, is not called for. In Turqueza vs.
Hernando,[7]
the Court has explained:
[U]nder Section 5 of
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a judge whose order is challenged in an
appellate court does not have to file any answer or take active part in
the proceeding unless expressly directed by order of this Court. It is
the duty of the private respondent to appear and defend, both in
his/her
behalf and in behalf of the Court or judge whose order or decision is
at
issue. The judge should maintain a detached attitude from the case and
should not waste his time by taking an active part in a proceeding
which
relates to official actuations in a case but should apply himself to
his
principal task of hearing and adjudicating the cases in his court. He
is
merely a nominal party to the case and has no personal interest nor
personality
therein.[8]
Respondent's folly
did not stop there. When complainant filed a motion for respondent's
inhibition
in Election Case No. R-95-001, the latter, instead of acting thereon in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 137, of the Rules of Court, hired his
own
lawyer, filed his answer to the motion and forthwith denied the same,
ordering,
at the same time, Atty. Macalintal to pay P100,000.00 by way of
attorney's
fees and litigation expenses "for compelling the respondent Judge to
engage
the services of counsel who prepared the Answer to the Motion for
Inhibition."
Respondent Judge, in fine, acted both as a party litigant and as a
judge
before his own court.
In the Court's resolution
of 12 March 1997, respondent was directed to act on the motion for
inhibition
in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 2, Rule 137,[9]
of the Rules of Court. Respondent Judge either misunderstood or chose
to
misunderstand the directive for, in his order, dated 17 April 1997, he
granted the motion for inhibition "in compliance with the resolution"
of
the Court. Clearly, the Court, in its resolution of 12 March 1997,
merely
required respondent Judge to act on the motion for inhibition in
accordance
with the Rules, i.e., "to either proceed with the trial, or
withdraw
therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question of his
disqualification." Certainly, he was not directed by the Court either
to
grant or deny the motion.cralaw:red
Respondent judge should
be reminded that decisions of courts need not only be just but must be
perceived to be just and completely free from suspicion or doubt both
in
its fairness and integrity.[10]
Judges, being the visible representation of the law and, most
importantly,
of justice,[11]
should be the embodiment of independence, competence, and integrity.[12]
Once again, the Court would also wish to say that a member of the bench
must continuously keep himself abreast of legal and jurisprudential
developments
and show acquaintance with statutes, procedural rules and authoritative
doctrines.[13]
Not for a moment, indeed, does the learning process in law cease.cralaw:red
In the case before Us,
respondent's gross deviation from the acceptable norm for judges is
clearly
manifest. In Castaños vs. Escaño, J.,[14]
the Court has had occasion to state:
When the inefficiency
springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law
or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too
incompetent
and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious
that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and
in
grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judge's
dismissal
is in order. After all, faith in the administration of justice exists
only
if every party-litigant is assured that occupants of the bench cannot
justly
be accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.[15]
WHEREFORE, finding respondent
Judge Angelito C. Teh guilty of gross ignorance of the law, the Court
hereby
dismisses him from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and with
prejudice to re-employment in any other branch, instrumentality or
agency
of the government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations.
Judge C. Teh is hereby
enjoined upon his receipt hereof to cease and desist from performing
any
and all acts pertaining to his office.cralaw:red
This decision is immediately
executory.cralaw:red
Let a copy of this decision
be attached to the records of Judge Angelito C. Teh with this Court.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Narvasa, C.J.,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco,
Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, J.,
is on leave.cralaw:red
__________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Rollo, p. 11.
[2]
Rollo, p. 62.
[3]
Rollo, p. 81.
[4]
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs. Capistrano, 159 SCRA 47.
[5]
The amended rule states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"Sec.
5. Respondents and costs in certain cases. When the petition
filed
relates to the acts or omissions of a judge, court, quasi-judicial
agency,
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, the petitioner shall
join,
as private respondent or respondents with such public respondent or
respondents,
the person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the
court;
and it shall be the duty of such private respondents to appear and
defend,
both in his or their own behalf and in behalf of the public respondent
or respondents affected by the proceedings, and the costs awarded in
such
proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against the private
respondents
only, and not against the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency,
tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person impleaded as public respondent or
respondents.
"Unless
otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition is
pending,
the public respondents shall not appear in or file an answer or comment
to the petition or any pleading therein. If the case is elevated to a
higher
court by either party, the public respondents shall be included therein
as nominal parties. However, unless otherwise specifically directed by
the court, they shall not appear or participate in the proceedings
therein."
[6]
Republic vs. CFI of Lanao del Norte, Branch II, 53 SCRA 317; Taroma vs.
Sayo, 67 SCRA 508.
[7]
97 SCRA 483.
[8]
At pp. 490-491.
[9]
"Sec. 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect.
If it be claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting as above
provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in writing, file
with
the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the
official
shall thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw, therefrom in
accordance
with his determination of the question of his disqualification. His
decision
shall be forthwith made in writing and filed with the other papers in
the
case, but no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his
decision in favor of his own competency, until after final judgment in
the case."
[10]
See Query of Executive Judge Estrella T. Estrada, 155 SCRA 72.
[11]
Gil vs. Son, 241 SCRA 467.
[12]
Wingarts vs. Mejia, 242 SCRA 436.
[13]
Chin vs. Gustilo, 247 SCRA 175.
[14]
251 SCRA 174.
[15]
At p. 199.
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