FIRST
DIVISION
JOEL
ALMERON and
EVANGELINE ALMERON,
Complainants,
A.
M.
No. MTJ-97-1142
[OCA-IPI
No. 96-221-MTJ]
November
6, 1997
-versus-
JUDGE
AGUSTIN T.
SARDIDO, Municipal Trial Court,
Koronadal, South
Cotabato,
Respondent.
D
E C I S I
O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Joel Almeron and his
wife Evangeline, in a letter complaint dated 18 October 1996, alleged
that
their twelve-year old daughter Jojielyn was raped sometime in April and
again in September 1996 by one Wilfredo Pino. As a result, two (2)
criminal
complaints for rape were filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Koronadal, South Cotabato, presided over by respondent Judge Agustin T.
Sardido.[1].
However, without conducting a hearing and without forwarding the
records
to the Office of the Public Prosecutor, respondent Judge granted bail
to
the accused in the amount of P200,000.00 for each count of rape. The
amount,
upon motion of the accused, was reduced to P120,000.00. In addition,
complainant
spouses alleged that the bail was posted using property of a person who
has already been dead for seven (7) years.
On 22 January 1997 the
Court directed Judge Sardido to answer the accusation which he did in
his
"Comment/Compliance" dated 20 February 1997. In his defense respondent
Judge alleged that he initially wrote the words "No Bail" on the face
of
the criminal complaints; however before he could issue a warrant of
arrest,
Atty. Bonifacio Pagunsan, counsel of the accused, engaged him in a
legal
argument inside his chambers about the feasibility of granting bail to
the accused; that according to the "1996 Bail Bond Guide" of the
Department
of Justice rape not committed with the use of a deadly weapon, by two
or
more men or not resulting in the insanity of the victim, or in the
commission
of a homicide by reason or on the occasion thereof, is penalized with
reclusion
temporal and bailable in the amount of P200,000.00; accordingly he
changed
"No Bail" to P200,000.00 and reduced it to P120,000.00 after finding
that
the amount was excessive for the provincial folk; that he approved the
property bond not knowing that the bondsman was already dead relying
instead
on the presumption of regularity in the performance by the notary
public
of his notarial function.cralaw:red
On 30 April 1997 this
case was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation,
report and recommendation. In a Memorandum dated 11 August 1997 the
Office
of the Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be fined
P10,000.00
for granting bail to the accused charged with rape on two (2) counts
without
a hearing thereby denying the prosecution the opportunity to prove that
the evidence of guilt of the accused was strong.cralaw:red
We adopt the foregoing
recommendation. Any self-respecting member of the bench or bar knows,
or
should know with little effort, that simple rape is punishable with
reclusion
perpetua as provided in Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code.[2]
Likewise, as lucidly provided in Sec. 7, Rule 114[3]
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, no person charged with such
an offense, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. Hence a litany of
cases emphasizes that bail is discretionary and not a matter of right
on
the part of the accused.[4]
In exercising such judicial discretion, however, a judge is required to
conduct a hearing wherein both the prosecution and the defense present
evidence that would point to the strength or weakness of the evidence
of
guilt.[5]
The discretion of the judge lies solely in the appreciation and
evaluation
of the weight of the evidence presented during the hearing but not in
the
determination of whether or not the hearing itself should be held[6]
for such a hearing is considered mandatory and absolutely indispensable
before a judge can aptly be said to be in a position to determine
whether
the evidence for the prosecution is weak or strong.[7]
Thus, when a judge grants
bail to a person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment without conducting the
required
hearing, he is considered guilty of ignorance or incompetence the
gravity
of which cannot be excused by a claim of good faith or excusable
negligence.[8]
This is because members of the judiciary are supposed to exhibit more
than
just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules,[9]
more so with legal principles and rules so elementary and basic that
not
to know them, or to act as if one does not know them, constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.[10]
In the instant case,
respondent Judge does not deny that he granted bail without a hearing
to
a person accused of two (2) counts of rape. He attempts to excuse
himself
by saying that he was misled by the "1996 Bail Bond Guide" of the
Department
of Justice which provides that simple rape is punishable by reclusion
temporal
and bailable at P200,000.00.[11]
However, as already stated, ignorance of this type cannot be excused by
a claim of good faith or excusable negligence.[12]
Besides, the fact that he was even misguided only manifests his
weakness
and reinforces his gross ignorance. As early as in their freshmen year,
aspiring members of the legal profession are already taught that
felonies
are defined and their corresponding penalties found in the Revised
Penal
Code, probably one of the most important codes in the legal profession.
Hence, respondent Judge should not have been misled, purportedly at the
prodding of the counsel for the accused, that the "1996 Bail Bond
Guide"
of the Department of Justice prevails over the explicit provisions of
the
Revised Penal Code on rape, especially considering that the Guide is
addressed
and intended for the guidance of all regional state prosecutors,
city/provincial
prosecutors and their assistants, and provides in its "whereas" clauses
that bail shall not be recommended where the penalty is death,
reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment.[13]
In his ignorance respondent
Judge not only deprived the prosecution due process of law by denying
it
the opportunity to contest the application for bail[14]
but likewise acted in a manner contrary to Rule 2.01, Canon 2, of the
Code
of Judicial Conduct[15]
in allowing counsel for the accused to engage him in a legal discussion
inside his chambers, without the presence of any representative of the
prosecution, about the possibility of granting bail to the accused.cralaw:red
Thus, respondent Judge's
disregard of an established rule of law (not conducting a hearing in an
application for bail) thereby depriving the prosecution the opportunity
to prove the strength of the evidence of guilt of the accused which
amounts
to gross ignorance of the law subjects him to disciplinary action.[16]
In Cabilao v. Judge
Sardido,[17]
an administrative case for grave ignorance of the law, gross misconduct
and abuse of discretion, the same respondent Judge was fined the amount
of P5,000.00 and sternly warned against the commission of same or
similar
acts. Considering the foregoing and the seriousness of the present
offense
which cannot be excused by a claim of good faith, respondent should be
imposed a stiffer penalty so that he would better grasp the importance
of being proficient in both substantive and procedural laws,
particularly
in this case, on the subject matter of bail. This could be achieved
without
need for the Court to issue any "bail bond guide," as respondent judge
suggests, since the present Revised Rules an Criminal Procedure and
jurisprudence
on the matter are clear and enlightening enough.cralaw:red
ACCORDINGLY, respondent
Judge Agustin T. Sardido is fined P10,000.00 payable in two (2) equal
monthly
installments of P5,000.00 each, to be deducted from his monthly salary.
He is sternly WARNED that, considering that this is the second time
that
he is administratively sanctioned by this Court, the commission of the
same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely
including,
if warranted, his dismissal from the service.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., Vitug and
Kapunan, JJ., concur.
_______________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 13860 and 13861.
[2]
However, whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a
deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua
to death. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
become insane or a homicide is committed the penalty shall be death (as
amended by RA No. 7659 which took effect 31 December 1993).
[3]
"Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua
or life imprisonment not bailable. No person charged with a
capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment,
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless
of the stage of the criminal prosecution."
[4]
Santos v. Ofilada, A. M. No. RTJ-94-1217, 16 June 1995, 245 SCRA 56,
61;
Baylon v. Sison, A. M. No. 92-7-360-0, 6 April 1995, 243 SCRA 284, 293;
Cardines v. Rosete, A. M. No. MTJ-94-1000, 22 March 1995, 242 SCRA 557,
563; Concerned Citizens v. Elma, A. M. No. RTJ-94-1183, February 1995,
241 SCRA 84, 88; People v. Nitcha, G.R. No. 113517, 19 January 1995,
240
SCRA 283, 294-295; Guillermo v. Reyes, Jr., A.M. Mo. RTJ-93-1088, 18
January
1995, 240 SCRA 154, 158-159; Lardizabal v. Reyes, A. M. No. MTJ-94-897,
5 December 1994, 238 SCRA 640, 642; Borinaga v. Tamin, A. M. No.
RTJ-93-936,
10 September 1993, 226 SCRA 206, 213-214.
[5]
Paderanga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115407, 28 August 1995, 247
SCRA
741, 754.
[6]
Gimeno v. Arcueno, Sr., A. M. No. MTJ-94-981, 29 November 1995, 250
SCRA
376, 378; Baylon v. Sison, A. M. No. 92-7-360-0, 6 April 1995, 243 SCRA
284, 295.
[7]
Gimeno v. Arcueno, Sr., A. M. No. MTJ-94-981, 29 November 1995, 250
SCRA
376, 380; Santos v. Ofilada, A. M. No. RTJ-94-1217, 16 June 1995, 245
SCRA
56, 61; Concerned Citizens v. Elma, A. M. No. RTJ-94-1183, 6 February
1995,
241 SCRA 84, 88; Aurillo, Jr. v. Francisco, A. M. No. RTJ-93-1097, 12
August
1994, 235 SCRA 283, 288.
[8]
De los Santos-Reyes v. Montesa, Jr., A. M. No. RTJ-93-983, 7 August
1995,
247 SCRA 85, 95; Estoya v. Abraham-Singson, A. M. No. RTJ-91-758, 26
September
1994, 237 SCRA 1, 21; Re: Report of the Judicial Audit and Physical
Inventory
of the Record of Cases in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Roxas,
Mindoro
Oriental, A. M. No. 93-9-1249-RTC, 22 September 1994, 236 SCRA 631, 639.
[9]
Mamolo, Sr. v. Narisma, A. M. No. MTJ-96-1072, 31 January 1996, 252
SCRA
613, 618; Lim v. Domagas, A. M. No. RTJ-92-899, 15 October 1993, 227
SCRA
258, 263; Libarios v. Dabalos, A. M. No. RTJ-89-286, 11 July 1991, 199
SCRA 48, 55-56;
[10]
Uy v. Dizon-Capulong, A. M. No. RTJ-91-766, 7 April 1993, 221 SCRA 87,
95.
[11]
Department Circular No. 4 issued by Secretary of Justice Teofisto T.
Guingona,
Jr., which took effect 1 February 1996.
[12]
See Note 8.
[13]
See Note 11, p. 2.
[14]
Sule v. Biteng, A. M. No. MTJ-95-1018, 18 April 1995, 243 SCRA 524,
528-529;
Lardizabal v. Reyes, A. M. No. MTJ-94-897, 5 December 1994, 238 SCRA
640,
643; People v. Nano, G. R. No. 94639, 13 January 1992, 205 SCRA 155,
160;
People v. San Diego, No. L-29676, 24 December 1968, 26 SCRA 522, 524.
[15]
Rule 2.01. A judge should so behave at all times as to promote
public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
[16]
Libarios v. Dabalos, A. M. No. RTJ-89-286, 11 July 1991, 199 SCRA 49,
55-56.
[17]
A. M. No. MTJ-93-818, 14 July 1995, 246 SCRA 94. |